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Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology xxx (2015) 1e9
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Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/pbiomolbio
The quantum epoch!
e
€nen a, b, *
Paavo Pylkka
a
Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies & The Academy of Finland Center of Excellence in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (TINT),
P.O. Box 24, FI-00014 University of Helsinki, Finland
b
€vde, P.O. Box 408, SE-541 28 Sko
€vde, Sweden
Department of Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy, School of Biosciences, University of Sko
a r t i c l e i n f o
a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Available online xxx
The theme of phenomenology and quantum physics is here tackled by examining some basic interpretational issues in quantum physics. One key issue in quantum theory from the very beginning has been
whether it is possible to provide a quantum ontology of particles in motion in the same way as in
classical physics, or whether we are restricted to stay within a more limited view of quantum systems, in
terms of complementary but mutually exclusive phenomena. In phenomenological terms we could
describe the situation by saying that according to the usual interpretation of quantum theory (especially
Niels Bohr's), quantum phenomena require a kind of epoch!
e (i.e. a suspension of assumptions about
reality at the quantum level). However, there are other interpretations (especially David Bohm's) that
seem to re-establish the possibility of a mind-independent ontology at the quantum level. We will show
that even such ontological interpretations contain novel, non-classical features, which require them to
give a special role to “phenomena” or “appearances”, a role not encountered in classical physics. We will
conclude that while ontological interpretations of quantum theory are possible, quantum theory implies
the need of a certain kind of epoch!
e even for this type of interpretations. While different from the epoch!
e
connected to phenomenological description, the “quantum epoch!
e” nevertheless points to a potentially
interesting parallel between phenomenology and quantum philosophy.
© 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This article is dedicated to Prof. Basil J. Hiley
on the occasion of his 80th birthday.
Contents
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Niels Bohr's quantum epoch!e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Einstein, Bohm and the search for quantum ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bohm and Hiley on appearance and essence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ontology vs. appearance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appearance and essence in the quantum domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Does Bohm and Hiley's ontological interpretation constitute a form of scientific realism? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Concluding reflections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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1. Introduction
* Theoretical Philosophy, P.O. Box 24, FI-00014 University of Helsinki, Finland.
E-mail address: paavo.pylkkanen@helsinki.fi.
There has been relatively little discussion in the phenomenological literature about the radical philosophical implications of
quantum theory and relativity. One underlying reason for this may
have been Husserl's view of phenomenology as first philosophy,
emphasizing that philosophy comes before the special sciences
(including physics), in the sense that it studies the preconditions of
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2015.08.014
0079-6107/© 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
€nen, P., The quantum epoch!e, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology (2015), http://dx.doi.org/
Please cite this article in press as: Pylkka
10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2015.08.014
2
€nen / Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology xxx (2015) 1e9
P. Pylkka
the possibility of our experience of empirical phenomena. While
not without insight and value, such a view of first philosophy may
make one less prone to see the new philosophical vistas opened up
by the empirical sciences, especially physics. Now, this special issue
of JPBM as well as the previous research of some of its contributors
contain significant attempts to overcome any such oversights. Also,
some leading phenomenologists have in fact made connections
between phenomenology and the new physics e the most well
known example being perhaps Merleau-Ponty's (2003) discussion
in his Nature lecture notes (delivered in 1956e1960). One also
thinks here about Heidegger's well-known discussions with Heisenberg (see Carson, 2011).
More generally, there were developments in already early 20th
century phenomenology that implied the possibility (and indeed
the need) to allow the natural sciences to give feedback to the
allegedly “first” phenomenological enterprise. For example, Heidegger famously emphasized the role of a “pre-structure” of understanding e the idea being that our experience of
meaningfulness is always based on background assumptions and
pre-established ways of structuring (Backman 2001: 71). However,
Heidegger also emphasized that we are not prisoners of this prestructure. As Backman (2001: 71) describes it:
“The pre-structure is never static … but lives along with the
“hermeneutical circle” of interpretation: in a successful … process of interpretation the target of interpretation forces us to
reconsider the concepts and view from which our interpretation
starts from, and grasp them in some way, which in turn influences the experience and interpretation of the target.”
[translated by PP]
Now, let us assume that our target of interpretation is the new
radical empirical results we encounter with quantum and relativistic phenomena, and which physicists first tried to understand in
terms of classical physics. In a Heideggerian-hermeneutical way we
could suggest that these new phenomena force us to reconsider the
classical pre-structure of understanding, to grasp and modify it, and
then experience and interpret the quantum-relativistic phenomena
in a new, more adequate way. But such modified pre-structure
could then be used not only when dealing with novel physical
phenomena, but also when trying to describe every-day phenomenal experience in general. A “quantum phenomenology” would
then start from first letting the pre-structure of understanding
transform and then proceeding to make novel phenomenological
descriptions in the light of this new pre-structure. An example of
this is David Bohm's (1980) discussion of time consciousness in the
light of the notion of implicate order (analysed and connected to
€nen, 2007).
Husserl's ideas by Pylkka
It is typical of later phenomenology, especially Heidegger that
there is much emphasis on the historical situation one finds oneself
in, as well as on the situation and context in which meaningful
phenomena unfold (see e.g. Westerlund, 2014). This is another area
where connections to quantum and relativistic phenomena seem
relevant. Regarding historicity, Heidegger emphasized that “philosophy” is a limited historical phase of Western thinking. As
Backman (2001: 76) describes it, “philosophy” in this Heideggerian
sense is metaphysical thinking aiming toward absolute generality
that begins with Plato and Aristotle, but which has come to an end
especially as a result of the thought of Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche.
However, quantum and relativistic phenomena may give a new
challenge and a possibility for renewal (rather than end) even for
“philosophy” in this traditional sense. And when it comes to situationality and contextuality, there are some interesting analogues
to phenomenological themes especially in some interpretations of
quantum theory, as we will see below.
There are thus a number of reasons why bringing together
phenomenology and quantum-relativistic physics is potentially
fruitful. For one thing this might enable new, more insightful
phenomenological descriptions, as Bohm's above-mentioned discussion of time consciousness illustrates. Also, the methodological
insights of phenomenology might prove useful when trying to
make sense of the interpretational puzzles of quantum theory in
particular (for example, we will below consider how a kind of
epoch!
e or suspension of assumptions about reality at the quantum
level seems to be required to make coherent sense of the results of
some quantum mechanical experiments).
Further, such bringing together of phenomenology and the new
physics also seems to be in line with the very criteria phenomenologists typically set to themselves. The empirical phenomena
encountered in quantum and relativity physics have given rise to a
new philosophical situation that poses a challenge to not only
“philosophy” in a Heideggerian sense, but also to phenomenology
broadly understood. Given the emphasis that (later) phenomenology puts upon historicity and situationality, it is somewhat ironical
that there have been so few phenomenological discussions of the
new epistemic and ontological situation opened up by quantum
theory and relativity. However, this also implies the possibility for
much fruitful research in the future. For example, there has been an
extensive philosophical discussion of the meaning of quantum
theory since the 1920s. Connecting this rich discussion with relevant aspects of phenomenological thought suggests a vast research
programme, with possibilities of mutual criticism and enrichment
between the two approaches. For examples of such attempts see
Honner (1987), and (especially in relation to “post-phenomenol€ (1998). And of
ogy”) Plotnitsky (1994), Globus (2003) and Pylkko
course, as already mentioned, this special issue of JPBM, as well as
the previous research of some of its contributors, marks significant
progress to a new synthesis of phenomenology, physics and biology
(see also Globus et al., 2004).
In this article the theme of phenomenology and quantum
physics is tackled by examining some basic interpretational issues
in quantum physics. One key issue in quantum theory from the very
beginning has been whether it is possible to provide a quantum
ontology of particles in motion in the same way as in classical
physics, or whether we are restricted to stay within a more limited
view of quantum systems, in terms of complementary but mutually
exclusive phenomena. In phenomenological terms we could
describe the situation by saying that according to the usual interpretation of quantum theory (especially that due to Niels Bohr),
quantum phenomena require a kind of epoch!
e (i.e. a suspension of
assumptions about reality at the quantum level; cf. Hut, 2001).
However, there are other interpretations (especially that due to
David Bohm) that seem to re-establish the possibility of a mindindependent ontology at the quantum level. But as we will see,
even such ontological interpretations contain novel, non-classical
features, which require them to give a special role to “phenomena” or “appearances”, a role not encountered in classical physics.
We will conclude that while ontological interpretations of quantum
theory are indeed possible, quantum theory implies the need of a
certain kind of epoch!
e even for this type of interpretations. While
different from the epoch!
e connected to phenomenological
description, the “quantum epoch!
e” nevertheless points to a
potentially interesting parallel between phenomenology and
quantum philosophy.
Our discussion also connects to some of the central issues discussed by Kauffman and Gare (2015) in their Prologue to this special issue of JPBM. For one thing, there is the question of
measurement in quantum mechanics. Kauffman and Gare explore
the possible role of “mind” in quantum measurements. They present the “Triad”, a new view of quantum mechanics which has
Please cite this article in press as: Pylkk€anen, P., The quantum epoch!e, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology (2015), http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2015.08.014
€nen / Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology xxx (2015) 1e9
P. Pylkka
“Actuals that are ontologically real and defined as obeying
Aristotle's law of the excluded middle, Possibles which are
ontologically real and are defined as not obeying the law of the
excluded middle, and Mind, consciousness with qualia, and free
will doings at measurement. In short: res potentia, res extensa
linked by “mind” at measurement.” (Kauffman and Gare, 2015).
Now, Bohm showed in 1952 that measurement-like processes at
the quantum level can take place objectively, without any active
role of human consciousness (for a good introduction to how the
Bohm theory solves the measurement problem, see Ney, 2013:
26e32; for a more extensive presentation, see Bohm and Hiley,
€nen, 2005). In Bohm's quan1993; ch 6; see also Hiley and Pylkka
tum ontology an electron is assumed to be a particle guided by a
new type of quantum field (which latter is mathematically
€dinger wave function). In Kauffman and
described by the Schro
Gare's terms, Bohm showed that res potentia (understood as a
quantum potential which arises from the quantum field) acts on res
extensa (the localized particle aspect of an electron) in such a way
€dinger's
that we get definite results of measurement, without Schro
cats or many worlds. And all of this can happen objectively, without
the need for human observers or minds. According to the Bohm
theory measurement processes are a special case of quantum
processes (such as transitions between stationary states) which
latter take place in nature completely independently of human
intervention (Bohm and Hiley, 1993: 97).
However, a deeper study of the Bohm theory suggests an affinity
with Kauffman and Gare's approach. Note especially that Bohm and
Hiley (1987, 1993) suggested that the quantum field is not pushing
and pulling the particle mechanically, but is rather in-forming the
energy of the particle. Bohm (1990) characterized the quantum
field as containing “active information” and saw this as a primitive
mind-like property of elementary particles such as electrons. This is
in some ways similar to Kauffman and Gare's ideas about some kind
of “proto-consciousness” being present in quantum processes.
There is also a connection to the issue of exophysics (which
presupposes a detached observer) and endophysics (which sees the
observer and measurement as part of the domain that needs to be
accounted for; for details see Kauffman and Gare's Prologue). First
of all, there is a sense in which the Bohm theory allows us to retain
an exophysical perspective to the universe. For if we assume that
human observers have no significant influence upon the quantum
state of the universe, then we can for all practical purposes ignore
measurements and the active role of human observers in our
general description of nature (remembering, however that Kantian
considerations suggest that we probably have no perceptual and
conceptual access to nature from a non-human perspective; see
€nen, 2015a). However, there is also a sense in which the
Pylkka
Bohm theory fits very well together with endophysics. For one
thing, the Bohm theory provides perhaps the clearest available
account of how the process of measurement can be accounted in
terms of quantum theory itself, thus enabling a coherent endophysical discussion of quantum measurements.
Bohm also sketched how the consciousness of the observer
could be included into the picture. The basic idea is that the
quantum ontology needs to be extended. At the quantum level we
have the particles guided by the quantum field of information.
Bohm speculated that in the context of complex biological systems
such as brains there is likely to be a whole hierarchy of such fields of
information, ranging from “manifest” to more “subtle”, and actively
enfolding and unfolding information about each other, involving
guidance relations. Mental processes and conscious experience
could then come in at the more subtle levels of organization.
Through the hierarchy of fields of information, mental processes
3
and perhaps a kind of “free will” could make a difference to more
manifest physical processes via the quantum field, suggesting
another affinity to the ideas of Kauffman and Gare (as well as to
€nen,
those of Penrose of Hameroff; see Bohm (1990: 283); Pylkka
2015b). Further, in his more general implicate order scheme
Bohm sketched how both biological and mental processes could be
understood in relation to the physical world, as described by
€nen, 2007).
quantum and relativity physics (see Bohm, 1980; Pylkka
The above considerations are meant to indicate that there are
rich connections between Bohm and Hiley's natural philosophy to
the general approach discussed in this special issue, especially as it
is excellently brought out by Kauffman and Gare. In the rest of this
article we will, however, focus on the question about the role of
phenomena or appearance in Bohr's and Bohm's interpretations of
quantum theory.
2. Niels Bohr's quantum epoch!
e
Can we have an ontological description of quantum systems e
say, of particles such as electrons? In the domain of classical physics
it is possible to measure simultaneously the position and momentum of a particle with arbitrarily good accuracy within a single
phenomenon, and thus one is allowed to postulate a particle
ontology, in other words to make the transition from phenomena to
ontology. Usually in classical physics one just talks about the particle and its properties, ignoring the phenomenon in which these
were measured (Bohm and Hiley, 1993). In phenomenological
terms, this reminds us of the “natural attitude” e we take for
granted that the objects that appear to us in experience also exist
when not being observed, we slip from appearance to reality
without noticing it.
However, according to Niels Bohr (1949) we cannot make a
separation between the particle and the experimental arrangement
in quantum situations, because the quantum of action that connects them during a measurement is indivisible, unpredictable and
uncontrollable. For Bohr this meant that we cannot analyse the
quantum phenomenon and assume that we are getting information
about a separately existing particle with well-defined properties.
Note in particular that there is no single phenomenon in which, say,
both the position and the momentum of a quantum system can be
accurately measured at the same time. Thus, implied Bohr, it is not
legitimate or meaningful to postulate an ontology in which a particle has simultaneously a well-defined position and momentum, as
these supposedly exists irrespective of any act of observation. In
phenomenological terms we could say that Bohr was calling for a
kind of epoch!
e in the context of quantum phenomena, in the sense
that we need to suspend our classical habit of conceiving of a welldefined, observation-independent ontology of particles in motion.
So the issue for Bohr seems to be when it is legitimate to
postulate an ontology. Or, to put it differently, what does the incompatibility of phenomena associated with a single system imply
for the ontology of that system? The following quote captures many
essential features of Bohr's (1949) subtle ideas:
“This crucial point … implies the impossibility of any sharp
separation between the behaviour of atomic objects and the
interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to
define the conditions under which the phenomena appear. In
fact, the individuality of the typical quantum effects finds its
proper expression in the circumstance that any attempt of
subdividing the phenomena will demand a change in the
experimental arrangement introducing new possibilities of
interaction between objects and measuring instruments which
in principle cannot be controlled. Consequently, evidence obtained under different experimental conditions cannot be
€nen, P., The quantum epoch!e, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology (2015), http://dx.doi.org/
Please cite this article in press as: Pylkka
10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2015.08.014
4
€nen / Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology xxx (2015) 1e9
P. Pylkka
comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded as
complementary in the sense that only the totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible information about the
objects.” (Bohr in Schilpp, 1949).
The phenomenological reader notices how the measuring instruments play a “transcendental” role for Bohr, as they define the
very conditions under which the phenomena appear (cf. Honner,
1987; Husserl, 1913/1976). A new kind of wholeness in physics is
implied by the fact that no sharp separation between the behaviour
of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments can be made. This means that we typically cannot assume, when looking at the result of measurement in an
experiment, that the result refers to the behaviour of the atomic
object as it unfolds independently of its being measured. This is in
stark contrast to the situation in classical physics, where the theory
allows us to calculate the influence of the measuring instruments to
a good approximation and in this way get as accurate information
about the behaviour of the object as we want.
Note also how Bohr says that it is because of such indivisibility
or “individuality” that different experimental arrangements are
mutually exclusive. If I want to measure the momentum of a particle in a situation where I am measuring its position, I need to
make changes in the experimental arrangement. However, such
changes introduce new possibilities of interaction between objects
and measuring instruments which, Bohr says, in principle cannot be
controlled. This connects with the uncertainty principle and Bohr's
assumption that the quantum of action needed in each measurement is uncontrollable. After the changes in the experimental
arrangement required to measure the momentum of the particle I
can no longer measure its position. Thus the experimental arrangements are mutually exclusive. Bohr further emphasizes that
we cannot comprehend the evidence from such mutually exclusive
arrangements within a single picture. And yet, we have different
kinds of evidence about the same object. How should we consider
such evidence concerning the same object, evidence that is obtained from mutually exclusive, incompatible experimental phenomena? Bohr says that we must consider such evidence as
complementary. Notice that “complementary” here cannot be understood in the sense of two parts of a single picture. Rather, we
have here two incompatible pictures which, however, both give information about the object. Bohr says that “… only the totality of
the phenomena exhausts the possible information about the objects”. But this totality includes mutually exclusive phenomena.
Bohr's notion of complementarity is thus very subtle, involving the
necessity to combine incompatible viewpoints. Arkady Plotnitsky
(2010: xvi) provides a succinct summary of this difficult concept:
“… complementarity is defined by (a) a mutual exclusivity of
certain phenomena, entities, or conceptions; and yet (b) the
possibility of applying each one of them separately at any given
point; and (c) the necessity of using all of them at different
moments for a comprehensive account of the totality of phenomena that we must consider.”
As we have noted above, complementarity also implies that we
cannot analyse the quantum phenomenon and assume that we are
getting information about a separately existing particle with welldefined properties. Note however that in recent years there has
been an increasing interest in so-called “weak measurements” in
quantum mechanics. While even these can be understood in terms
of Bohr's complementarity, they nevertheless open up the possibility for new ways of thinking about quantum measurement (see
Flack and Hiley, 2015, and the references therein).
Bohm and Hiley (1993: 16) describe the unanalyzable and holistic aspects of Bohr's view succinctly:
“… the quantum link connecting the experimental result with
its meaning is indivisible, unpredictable and uncontrollable. The
meaning of such a result can, therefore, no longer be coherently
described as referring unambiguously to the properties of a
particle that exists independently of the rest of the phenomenon. Instead this meaning has to be regarded as an inseparable
feature of the entire phenomenon itself. Or, to put it more
succinctly, the form of the experimental conditions and the
content (meaning) of the experimental results are a whole, not
further analysable. It is this whole that, according to Bohr,
constitutes the quantum phenomenon.”
Notice that, according to Bohm and Hiley, there is a relationship
between form and content in a new, special sense in Bohr's view. The
form of the experimental conditions and the content or meaning of
the experimental results are assumed to be an unanalyzable whole.
This means that it is not possible to isolate a particle from this
phenomenon, and think about it in the traditional realist fashion.
Bohr's holistic view implies limits to the visualisation of atomic
phenomena e for example, he thought that it is not possible to
provide trajectories for quantum particles. He underlined that the
“renunciation of the visualisation of atomic phenomena is imposed
upon us by the impossibility of their subdivision” and referred to
“the impossibility of subdividing quantum phenomena and … the
ambiguity in ascribing customary physical attributes to atomic
objects”. There is an
“… essential ambiguity involved in a reference to physical attributes of objects when dealing with phenomena where no
sharp distinction can be made between the behaviour of the
objects themselves and their interaction with the measuring
instruments” (1949).
Finally, Bohr did not think that the situation encountered with
quantum phenomena was just a temporary state of affairs, to be
overcome in future developments:
“… in quantum mechanics, we are not dealing with an arbitrary
renunciation of a more detailed analysis of atomic phenomena,
but with a recognition that such an analysis is in principle
excluded.” (1949).
Bohr's claim about the need for a renunciation of the visualisation of atomic phenomena is interesting from a phenomenological point of view. Note in particular that the late Heidegger's
post-metaphysical thought emphasized that the appearance of a
certain content is made possible only in relation to a background
context which itself does not appear (Backman, 2010: 77). Somewhat analogously, Bohr's complementarity implies that a given
aspect (e.g. position) can fully appear only if we give up the attempt
to make a complementary aspect (e.g. momentum) appear. In terms
of David Bohm's later implicate order approach (which is in some
ways similar to Bohr's view, but differs in that it is more ontological
and general) we could say that not every relevant property of a
particle can be made explicate or manifest at the same time e every
quantum particle, and thus the entire universe lives in an “intrinsically implicate order” which can unfold creatively to constitute
€nen, 2007). For example,
the present moment (Bohm, 1980; Pylkka
if a given variable (e.g. position) is explicated in an experiment, its
complementary variable (momentum) is left “implicate” and vice
versa. Thus Bohm's implicate order scheme, like the late Heidegger,
Please cite this article in press as: Pylkk€anen, P., The quantum epoch!e, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology (2015), http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2015.08.014
€nen / Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology xxx (2015) 1e9
P. Pylkka
emphasizes that for something to appear there must be an entire
implicate background which cannot be made to appear at the same
time. And Bohr assumed that it is not possible to go consistently
beyond this phenomenologically limited situation, by visualizing
quantum systems with all their properties present simultaneously,
as one does in classical physics. As we will see, it was Bohm who
made such “impossible” visualization possible in his 1952 theory.
Ironically, there is a sense in which Bohm's 1952 scheme with its
more explicate ontology is in opposition to the more general
implicate order scheme he developed since the 1960s (for Bohm's
own attempt to bring the 1952 approach and the implicate order
approach together, see Bohm, 1987).
3. Einstein, Bohm and the search for quantum ontology
For Albert Einstein the programmatic aim of physics was a
complete description of any individual real situation as it supposedly exists irrespective of any act of observation (1949). In other
words he felt that physics ought to strive for a kind of “exophysical”
description that Bohr thought was in principle impossible. There
was thus, as is well known, a fundamental disagreement between
Bohr and Einstein about the interpretation of quantum theory.
As we have already mentioned many times above, a very
important contribution to this debate was made by David Bohm.
After several “interesting and stimulating” discussions with Einstein in Princeton, Bohm published in 1952 an interpretation of
quantum theory in terms of “hidden variables”. He realized that
€dinger's equation implies a well-defined, visualizable, unSchro
ambiguous ontology where an electron is a particle always
accompanied and guided by a new type of quantum field, described
by the wave function. He had independently rediscovered and
improved the pilot-wave theory proposed by de Broglie already in
the 1920s (for an appraisal of de Broglie's contributions see
Bacciagaluppi and Valentini, 2009; for a critical perspective on their
discussion see Holland, 2011).
Bohm's theory was not, however, a return to classical physics.
Although his 1952 theory was deterministic, already in 1954 he
published with Vigier a stochastic version of the theory, thus
underlining that the key point of the theory was the possibility of a
quantum ontology, not the issue of determinism (Bohm and Vigier,
1954; see also Bohm and Hiley, 1993, ch 9). Also, as Bohm and Hiley
brought out more clearly later (1975), the Bohm theory was nonlocal and suggested the need for a new holistic description of
quantum system. Now, we already saw above that a certain kind of
quantum wholeness was a key aspect of Niels Bohr's interpretation
of quantum theory. So while there is a sense in which the Bohm
theory differs from Bohr (e.g. in enabling us to analyse or “break”
Bohr's indivisible quantum phenomenon conceptually in terms of a
particle guided by a quantum field), there are also important
similarities.
Bohm's interpretation was initially resisted, but is today more
and more widely acknowledged as one of the key possible interpretations of quantum theory. Later on further ontological
models were proposed, for example Everett's 1957 “many worlds”
interpretation and Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber's 1986 objective
collapse theory, and currently the nature of quantum reality is
intensively debated within the philosophy of physics community
(see e.g. Saunders et al. eds. 2010; Ney and Albert eds. 2013). We do
not know which ontological interpretation (if any) is correct, but
each may reveal something significant about the nature of physical
reality at a very fundamental level. One should note that there are
by now also different versions of the Bohm theory. Much attention
has in recent years been given to a minimalist version known as
“Bohmian mechanics” (see e.g. Goldstein, 2013). Bohm himself
developed since the mid-1970s, with Basil Hiley, a philosophically
5
more radical version they called the “ontological interpretation”,
culminating in their 1993 book The Undivided Universe. We will
here be concerned with Bohm and Hiley's later development of the
Bohm theory (for an insightful and entertaining presentation of the
€nen et al., 2015).
Bohm theory, see Towler, 2009; see also Pylkka
In particular, we will consider what the Bohm theory can offer in
place of Bohr's “quantum phenomenon”. The key point is that in
Bohm's quantum ontology, too, the object and the apparatus
participate irreducibly during a measurement. This means that the
phenomena that reveal themselves in the apparatus (i.e. the results
of measurement) typically cannot be referred to the object alone,
but only to the totality of apparatus and object. This is very reminiscent of Bohr's view, but with the difference that we can now
understand the way in which this peculiar, irreducible role of the
quantum phenomenon is a result of the holistic features of the
quantum reality of particles and field.
Bohm and Hiley also explain their philosophical position in
some detail in The Undivided Universe. Although they are emphasizing the possibility of a consistent quantum ontology, it is clear
that they are not advocating any simplistic form of scientific realism. For example, when they explain their general world-view and
consider epistemic issues, they say: ”ultimately all of our thought
[including theories] can be regarded as appearance, not to the
senses, but to the mind” (1993: 322). Now, does this mean that
theories, in the end have to do with the way the world appears to be
rather than the way the world is? This sounds like a concession to
Bohr's approach that emphasizes that we cannot go beyond phenomena when dealing with atomic objects.
Traditionally ontology refers to the way the world is. A brief
etymological detour gives us some useful terminology. According to
one interpretation, the word “ontology” comes from the Greek
logos peri ta onta, where ta onta means “the beings”, logos has
meanings like “word”, “speech”, “reason”, and peri means “around”,
and perhaps in this context “about”. So “ontology” originally would
have meant something like “reasoning about the beings” (Sampo
Vesterinen, private communication). So, in these terms, are Bohm
and Hiley reasoning about the beings or about the way the beings
appear? Or do they suggest that everything is, in the end
appearance?
There is thus at least prima facie a creative tension between the
claim that their theory gives us an ”ontology” and the claim that
theories constitute ”appearances”. As already mentioned, this
tension is particularly interesting when considering the relation of
their view to that of Bohr. One might think that the whole point of
an ontological interpretation of quantum theory is to try to go
beyond Bohr's “quantum phenomenon”. Indeed, this is what Bohm
and Hiley (1993: 25-6) set out to do. But as we will see, in the end
their quantum ontology suggests that the relation between
“appearance” and the underlying reality or “essence” in a quantum
situation is radically different from that in classical physics. Their
view has some striking similarities to Bohr's view, while there are
significant differences as well.
4. Bohm and Hiley on appearance and essence
To understand Bohm and Hiley's (hereafter BH) views about
“appearance” and “essence” in the quantum domain, as described
in The Undivided Universe, it is useful to first consider their view
about scientific theories in general. They propose that there is no
final theory. This implies limitations to what we can say about the
universe as a whole on the basis of a scientific theory. For example,
we cannot decide on the basis of a particular theory, such as
quantum theory, whether the universe is ultimately deterministic
or indeterministic. And thus we cannot use physical theories to
draw conclusions about, say, the ultimate limits of human freedom
€nen, P., The quantum epoch!e, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology (2015), http://dx.doi.org/
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10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2015.08.014
6
€nen / Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology xxx (2015) 1e9
P. Pylkka
(BH 1993: 3).
Their view here resembles that of Kant, who held that physical
theories only apply to the phenomenal world, while the thing-initself remains unknown. Thus any determinism that physical theories may involve does not limit human freedom insofar as this is
grounded beyond the phenomenal world. Colin Marshall (2012)
describes Kant's view succinctly:
“Kant holds that much of reality remains unknowable, yet he
takes this to be a desirable result, for it precludes scientific
considerations (which only concern the appearance-based
properties of objects) from ever ruling out freedom of the will
…”
Although BH's emphasis on ontology may suggest to some that
they are engaged with pre-Kantian (Aristotelian) metaphysics, we
will see that the issue is more complex than that. Indeed BH's
emphasis on the limits of theories resembles in some ways Kant's
view that the Ding-an-Sich is unknowable. However, we will see
below that BH assume in a realist fashion that there is a sense in
which limited domains of mind-independent reality can be known.
In this sense they differ from Kant and connect with critical scientific realism (e.g. Niiniluoto, 1999). Their focus on ontology also
connects them with the ontological concerns of Heidegger and
Merleau-Ponty.
It is clear from the above that BH do not expect that physics will
lead to a ”Theory of Everything”. Rather, they propose that “…
nature in its total reality is unlimited, not merely quantitatively, but
also qualitatively in its depth and subtlety of laws and processes”
(BH 1993: 321). Indeed, Bohm put forward such a notion of
”qualitative infinity of nature” already in his 1957 book Causality
and Chance in Modern Physics.
BH then note that if nature is qualitatively infinite in the way
suggested above, it makes it possible that what we at any given
time consider reality may always turn out to be “mere appearance”
in relation to some more fundamental “essence” which scientific
research may discover. However, such discoveries may require
speculative new concepts which go far beyond what can be
observed at the time of their proposal. This emphasis on the value
of concepts about the currently unobservable domain again connects BH strongly with the realist tradition in the philosophy of
science. A key role that concepts about currently unobservable
domains or levels can have is that they help us to detect evidence
which otherwise might not be recognized at all. For example, the
atomic hypothesis (going back to Democritus) made people alert to
the kind of large-scale evidence that could support the existence of
atoms. By making use of such evidence the initially unobserved
atoms have become part of the observable domain (BH 1993: 194).
BH emphasize that deeper explanations often imply the limited
validity of what were previously the basic concepts, while the latter
are recovered only as approximations or limiting cases (BH 1993:
322). They point out that this relationship of concepts prevails not
merely in physics but is typical of the whole of our experience. As
an example they consider what takes place as we go round a circular table: “What we see immediately is an ever-changing elliptical shape. We have learned to regard this changing shape as a
mere appearance. The essence (i.e. the true being) is considered to
be a rigid circular object.” (BH 1993: 322) However, further investigation shows that the table is an atomic structure. The rigid circular object is now considered as appearance, while the essence is
the set of constituting atoms. But yet deeper studies show that even
the atom is an appearance, while the essence is a nucleus surrounded by electrons. And even these nucleonic particles were seen
to be appearances, while the essence was a set of yet more
fundamental particles such as quarks, gluons, preons or else sets of
excitations of strings (BH 1993: 322).
The ontological lesson is that “… matter is turning more and
more into empty space with an ever more tenuous structure of
moving elements” (BH 1993: 322). This is even more so in quantum
field theory which treats particles as quantised states of a field that
extends over the whole space.
BH then draw attention to the fact that in this historical development something has been constant. There is a pattern in which at
each stage certain features are regarded as appearance while other
features are regarded as of an essence which explains the appearance on a qualitatively different basis. What is taken as essence at
any stage, is later seen to be appearance of a still more fundamental
essence (BH 1993: 322). This means that ultimately everything
plays both the role of appearance and that of essence, as depicted in
Fig. 1.
BH suggest that this pattern never comes to an end. They take
this to imply that ultimately all of our thought, including our theories, can be regarded as appearance, not to the senses, but to the
mind. They add that what science is aiming for is that these appearances be correct. Correctness here means that the actions
flowing from them, such as experiments, be coherent with what
the appearances would imply. Incorrect appearances are thus
“either mistaken or illusory”.
They illustrate this idea with the example of the table. To have
the appearance of an elliptical object is correct only in a very
limited sense. If we bring in the thought that the object is a rigid
circle we obtain a more nearly correct overall set of appearances,
while the thought of the atomic structure makes the whole set still
more nearly correct and so on.
The example illustrates how we are constantly extending the
appearances with the aid of thought. The ultimate reality is “unlimited and unknown” e it is somewhat like Kant's das Ding an Sich.
However, “its successive appearances serve as an ever more accurate guide to coherent action in relation to this reality” (BH 1993:
323). One might wonder how this compares with the idea of
approaching the final truth. BH emphasize e in a somewhat
phenomenological vein e that our theories are not primarily forms
of knowledge about the world but rather, they are forms of insight
that arise in our attempts to obtain a perception of a deeper nature
of reality as a whole. They add that we should not expect the
development of theories ever to come to an end any more than we
would look forward to a final sense perception (BH 1993: 323).
5. Ontology vs. appearance
We have seen above that BH suggest that even our basic concepts and categories of thought are ultimately appearances. This
also applies to the basic concepts of their own ontological interpretation. So, we might ask, are they doing “quantum ontology” or
“quantum phenomenology”? Are they reasoning about the beings
or about the way the beings appear? Specifically we could ask, if
physics essentially involves reasoning about the way the beings
appear, what is the point of making an ontological interpretation of
Fig. 1. The pattern of appearances and essences.
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€nen / Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology xxx (2015) 1e9
P. Pylkka
quantum theory? This is, roughly, the question I put to David Bohm
in London in the spring of 1991, in the course of the many philosophical discussions I had with him while working on my PhD
thesis. The Undivided Universe was then a manuscript and I had read
and commented the draft of ch 14.2. As far as I can remember,
Bohm's reply to this question was added to the manuscript and can
be found in pp. 324-5 of the book. It seemed to me that Bohm's
strong focus on ”appearances” and ”theories as perception” leaned
toward an empiricist, pragmatist, anti-ontological or anti-realist
interpretation of science (rather than realist or ontological). This,
of course, seemed to be in contradiction with the very name of BH's
interpretation (“ontological interpretation”), included in the subtitle of their book.
In their answer to this type of criticism BH (1993: 324-5) point
out that every theory is not only a mere appearance. It is more: its
basic concepts must be said in some sense to reflect reality within its
own domain. How does this differ from other ontological theories?
In other ontological theories in physics it is either implied or
asserted that such basic concepts correspond to independently
existing realities, for example, not dependent on context or deeper
levels of being. In BH's approach the basic concepts of a given
theory may reflect a reality that is inherently dependent either on
context or on deeper levels or on both.
BH thus emphasize that ”ontology” is ”reasoning about dependent beings”, not reasoning about substances (in the sense of
ontological independence). Their view constitutes a kind of
monism: there is only one independent being, the unlimited and
unknowable totality.
To understand this better, let us follow them in reconsidering
the example of the table (BH 1993: 324). In what sense are the
elliptical appearances of a circular object ”realities”? Consider
the light coming from the object to the eye and how the eye
makes an elliptical image, carried into the brain. This is an
essential part of the reality corresponding to the elliptical
appearance. This reality is not independently existent. It depends
on a context including the above process, especially on the circular object which is the essential meaning of the elliptical appearances. But then even the circular object is found to be
dependent for its existence on a wide range of contextual parameters, e.g. temperature and especially the atomic constituents
etc. as we go through a series of deeper essences and appearances (BH 1993: 325).
6. Appearance and essence in the quantum domain
What about the quantum domain? Remember our question: are
BH reasoning about the beings or about the way the beings appear?
How would they answer this question in the quantum domain?
They say, interestingly, that in the quantum domain it is no longer
possible, even in their ontological approach, to move from
appearance to the essence in the way we have described above.
Why not? They emphasize that the ”beings” in a typical quantum
experiment participate irreducibly in each other. This means that it
is not possible to locate (individuate) the essence that is supposed
to underlie a given appearance.
Consider measuring the momentum of a particle in classical
physics. The ”appearances” show themselves in the measuring
instrument. The ”essence” can be thought of as the property
(momentum) possessed by the particle. The measuring instrument then typically reveals the momentum that the particle had
before the measurement. There is, of course, always a disturbance involved, but this can be accounted for in principle
without limit. However, it does not work like this in the quantum
domain, where the observed system and the measuring instrument participate irreducibly in each other. BH emphasize that the
7
appearance (measured value) cannot typically be traced into an
underlying essence (state of the observed system before the
measurement). Instead, we have to consider appearance and
essence (system þ apparatus) as a totality (BH 1993: 325). The
appearances show themselves as large-scale results that are
observable in the apparatus, while the essence is the whole
quantum ontology of quantum fields and particles, including
those of the apparatus and the observed system. The observed
momentum typically reflects the state in which the observed
system was left after the measurement process is over. In this
sense the observed momentum reflects the whole experimental
context; and it seems that ”undivided wholeness” is lurking
behind the appearances at the quantum level. This is very
reminiscent of Bohr's “indivisible quantum phenomenon”. But
we can now understand how this indivisibility is a result of the
underlying holistic quantum ontology.
7. Does Bohm and Hiley's ontological interpretation
constitute a form of scientific realism?
Let us summarize Bohm and Hiley's view about appearance
and essence. They say that each form of thought of the essence is
an appearance which however also reflects a reality. They
emphasize that this reality is always dependent for its existence as
well as for its qualities and properties on broader contexts and
deeper levels. This is one of the senses in which the theory is
ontological, in spite of the fact that all thought gives appearances.
Also, BH's approach provides a reflection of reality that is in the
form of a totality, including the measuring instruments along with
everything else. This implies that BH's approach is a kind of
endophysics in the sense that it is not possible to eliminate the
effect of the measuring apparatus in, say, momentum
measurements.
Is BH's approach realism? Note that in their theory observations
of position really disclose position (Bohm and Hiley, 1993: 109-10).
The idea of measurement as being able to disclose pre-existing
properties seems to be characteristic of realism in the traditional
sense. But this is not the case for momentum, as we have emphasized. Typically, the momentum that is measured is created in the
act of measurement which means that pre-existing momentum
values are not disclosed by the act of momentum measurement. As
Arthur Fine (1996) has emphasized, with respect to all other variables than position the Bohm theory is not realist in such traditional
sense.
We have also seen how BH emphasize that the reality that our
theories can reflect is always a dependent reality. They assume that
the reality that science is dealing with at any stage is inherently
dependent either on context (e.g. temperature) or on deeper levels
(e.g. atomic structure) or on both. At the quantum level there is the
special feature that the object and observing apparatus participate
irreducibly in each other. This dependence has major philosophical
implications for them.
So, does BH's interpretation constitute a form of scientific realism? We have seen that it is realism in the sense that the independent reality of the universe is assumed, as well as the possibility
to perceive the deeper nature of reality as a whole with our theories. However, many features of traditional realism are denied.
Theories are primary forms of insight (perceptions, ”appearances to
the mind”), they are not primarily forms of knowledge about the
world. Truth is not primarily correspondence between theories and
reality, even if a correct theory ”reflects” reality within its own
domain. An important aim of science is to develop ”correct” theories (appearances to the mind). ”Correctedness” is evaluated not in
terms of correspondence between propositions and states of affairs
but in terms of pragmatic criteria. For according to BH
€nen, P., The quantum epoch!e, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology (2015), http://dx.doi.org/
Please cite this article in press as: Pylkka
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€nen / Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology xxx (2015) 1e9
P. Pylkka
correctedness of a theory requires that the actions flowing from it,
such as experiments, be coherent with what the theory implies (cf.
Bohm and Pylkk€
anen, 1991). And the assumption that reality is
infinite and unknown implies that science cannot reach a final
”Theory of Everything”.
Paraphrasing Kant, Arthur Fine (1996) has suggested that ”reality without disclosure is blind”. BH assume that we can never
disclose the whole of the ultimate reality, because it is unlimited
and unknown. Is such a BH-style reality without disclosure blind?
One thing to note here is that no absolute limits to disclosure are
assumed, so the veil is always in principle removable. Also, when
BH's quantum ontology is situated into the broader implicate order
framework, with the introduction of higher levels of organization,
the way is opened to understanding creativity and biological evolution in a new way (Bohm, 1980 ch 7; Bohm and Hiley, 1993; ch 15;
Bohm and Peat, 2002; cf. Kauffman and Gare, 2015; for a further
discussion of analogies between thought and quantum processes,
€nen, 2014).
see Pylkka
8. Concluding reflections
We started off by considering the relationship between phenomenology and the revolutionary philosophical implications of
quantum and relativity physics. We then noted how Niels Bohr's
interpretation of quantum theory implies the need for a certain
kind of epoch!
e or suspension of assumptions about reality at the
quantum level. We further saw how even in the context of Bohm
and Hiley's ontological interpretation of quantum theory it is not
straightforward to adopt the “natural attitude” toward the empirical phenomena. For example, a momentum measurement cannot
be understood as a revelation of a pre-existing well-defined property of the observed system. Thus even the Bohm-Hiley interpretation implies the need for a kind of epoch!
e. We have to suspend our
natural classical tendency to assume that from the observable
large-scale results of measurements we can infer the pre-existing
state of the observed system.
It is not clear how literally we should take the analogy between
Husserl's epoch!
e and the varieties of quantum epoch!
e we have
briefly sketched above. In Husserl's case an important aim of the
epoch!
e or “bracketing” is to enable the unbiased study of conscious
experience. In Bohr's case suspending assumptions of reality at the
quantum level is a crucial part of his subtle notion of complementarity, which captures the mutual exclusivity of certain
experimental quantum phenomena. In Bohm and Hiley's case the
need to suspend the move from appearance to essence in the
context of, say, momentum measurements is a result of the radically participatory nature of quantum ontology. While not denying
that these cases are different, it seems fair to say that in all of them
the epoch!
e serves the achievement of a clearer and more truthful
picture of the domain under interest.
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