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CHAPTER II
HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
In the most general way we can say that
induction is" a kind of inference in which we draw a
general or universal conclusion based on the
observation of particular facts of experience. Induction
,again , establishes conclusion from an observed
particular to an unobserved particular.
The term "Induction"^ in logic is derived from the
Greek word "Epagoge",^ which -was first used by
Aristotle. He used the word "Epagoge" for induction.
Aristotle is the first logician who has dealt with the
nature of induction or inductive inference. According
to him,
'Epagoge' means the establishment of a
universal proposition from its specific
instances of the form "All X's are Y's".^
He uses induction in three of his philosophical
and logical Treatise, namely, Topics, Prior Analytic
and Posterior Analytics.'* According to Aristotle, true
knowledge is always the knowledge of universal. He
regards his logic as a tool or instrument of scientific
research, which can be applied in every field of
knowledge.
According to Aristotle, induction is not the
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only method of establishing universal proposition. For
him syllogistic argument can also be used for
establishing universal proposition .A syllogistic
argument of the form
" All animals are mortal" ; and all men
are animals, therefore, "all men are mortal".
Here the predicate is proved to hold of
the subject of the conclusion by means
of a middle term, and the conclusion is
said to be mediated by or grounded in
its premises.^
In the Topics, Aristotle maintains that induction
consists in this mode of enquiry in which after finding
that a property belongs to some observed member of an
unlimited class, we generalise that some property
belongs to the class as a whole.
hi the Prior Analytic, Aristotle means by
induction that inference in which after observing that a
property belongs to each and every member of a
restricted class, we generalise that, that property
belongs to all the members of that class. This is also
recognised as summative induction by complete
enumeration. The example, which has been given, is:
Man, the horse and the mule are longlived, but man, the horse and the mule
are all the bile-less animals ; therefore,
all the bile-less animals are long-lived.^
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Aristotle presented this argument in the form of a
syllogism. Hence this argument is sometimes known as
"Inductive Syllogism". In this example, we proceed by
the enumeration of all the particular cases; we have
given a list of long-lived animals ; we have also stated
that all these long-lived animals are bile-less animals.
From these acts we arrive at the universal statement
that "all bile-less animals are long-lived". But it is
doubtful as to how far we are right in calling them
'inductive syllogism '. Aristotle , who is the originator
of the theory of syllogism, however, clearly
distinguishes between syllogism and induction.
Syllogism is a form of deductive inference, but
inductive inference as a form of non-demonstrative
inference is non-deductive. From this we cannot call
'induction by complete enumeration' a true form of
induction in so far as it can be presented in the form of
a syllogism.
Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics has given a
different account of induction in which he is concerned
especially with demonstration. Here Aristotle meant by
'induction' that inference in which after finding that a
property belongs to one particular instance, it is
inferred that the same property belongs to all other
similar instances. An example of this form of induction
is the establishment of such truths as 'whatever is
coloured must be extended'. The form of reasoning in it
is:
If in any single instance we can know
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that A - ness is necessitated by B - ness
then we can know that whatever is A
must be B 7
Aristotle maintained by means of this reasoning
that we can estabhsh universal propositions of
unrestricted generalisation. Aristotle thought that we
can apprehend intuitively a necessary and universal
connection as implicit in a particular case. Thus from
the fact that this particular thing is red , and hence
coloured, we can make the generalisation that "All
coloured things are extended ". This is a universal
proposition because there is a necessary connection
between being coloured and being extended.
Although intuitive induction was recognised by
Aristotle, its nature has not been clearly stated by him.
The way in which he used 'intuitive induction' is found
to be sometimes misleading. The term 'intuitive
induction ' is also used by W.E. Johnson. He is of the
opinion that intuitive induction is a genuine form of
induction . When we reconsider Aristotle 's account of
intuitive induction we find here again some difficulties
in the use and application of intuitive induction.
Thus we cannot clearly answer the following questions:
what type of necessity do we get by means of intuitive
induction? How is the necessity or rather the necessary
connection to be apprehended. All these are difficult
questions to answer. Now, we can construct one
apparent argument with premise and conclusion by
saying 'This coloured thing must be extended, therefore.
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all coloured things must be extended'. Hence we have
to say that although intuitive induction is an important
means of establishing generalisations, it is not so easy
to apply them in concrete situations involving the
establishment of scientific generalisations.
W. Kneale has considered that there are three
different kinds of universal proposition established by
three different inductions. These are:
summative induction, intuitive
induction and recursive induction.^
Besides these, there is another type of induction,
which is very often used in the natural sciences. In this
induction the conclusion goes beyond the premises
which are the singular facts of experience. W. Kneale
following J. Nicod and C.S.Peirce called such
induction as 'amphative induction'^. The main aim of
natural scientists when they use induction is to infer
from observed to unobserved matters of fact and in
particular , prediction of inference to the future.
It has generally been thought that the Laws of
Natural sciences are the laws of causal connection and
that the problem of ampliative induction is to give a
method for the discovery of causes. The view that the
scientists always aim at the search for causes is also
maintained by Aristotle. Aristotle tells us that the aim
of the natural scientist is to understand natural change
or process, that is, to know why it takes place and he
must have a clear conception of the possible answer to
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this question. According to Aristotle,
there are four different causes such as
the material, the formal, the efficient
and the final cause. ^^
He considers that all these four different causes are
required for the explanation of any and every change.
But Aristotle, however, never tells us how we are to
discover cause.
According to Aristotle, induction is the basis of
all sciences by which we can obtain universal
conclusion. But he does not try to connect his theory of
induction with his doctrine of the four causes.
Hence, in order to have a proper working out of
the theory for cause we must turn to later philosophers.
It is Francis Bacon who took the first serious
attempt to formulate and justify the procedure of
natural scientists. Aristotle's logical works were
commonly called 'The Organon'^' in which all the
logic-oriented writings of Aristotle were collected by
his pupils after his death. Bacon called his work on
logic the 'Novum Organum',^^ which dealt with the
principles of deduction and stands in contrast with the
Organon.
Bacon begins his work by showing the
advantages to be gainedfi"omknowledge of nature. It is
the true business of man to be the master and
interpreter of nature, because it is only by becoming
acquainted with the laws of nature that we are able to
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take advantages of them for our own ends for ever. In
one of the early sections of his book the Novum
Organum, Bacon writes:
As the present sciences are useless for
the discovery of effects, so the present
system of logic is useless for the dis covery of science.'"^
Bacon is of the opinion that science should
enable us to make predictions, which are useful in our
practical life. He means by 'the present system of
logic', the doctrine of Aristotle. Thus he says that
Aristotle's system or the present system of logic does
not assist to search out the truth, it rather accepts
universal propositions as premises, which have not
been established in proper way.
Bacon says that there are and can exist only two
ways of investigating truth and as such he is also said
to be an advocate of the doctrine of 'Double Truth',
which means :
the truth of reason and the truth of
revelation.''*
The method of nature proposed by Bacon is very
simple. He says that if we would gain new knowledge
regarding nature and regarding laws, we must go to
Nature herself and observe her ways of acting. He
holds that facts about nature cannot be derived from
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logical proposition or from syllogisms but from the
observation of particular facts through careful and
systematic procedures. He also emphasises the
importance of systematic observation and carefiilly
planned experiments and shows that knowledge must
begin with facts of perception and thus he is also said
to be the founder of the inductive sciences.
Generally, an argument is called inductive if,
from the evidence that a specified predicate is true of
certain members of a class, it proceeds to a conclusion
which is a generalisation concerning the whole class
with respect to that predicate. For example, the
following argument is inductive in form:
Lead, iron and silver are metals and become super
conductive at very low temperatures; so probably
aluminium being a metal will be super conductive at
such temperatures also.
We may refer to two different ways in which
induction works. According to the first, induction
proceeds simply through-the enumeration of instances
or induction by simple enumeration. It is maintained
that one generalisation would be better supported than
another in case of more instances in favour of the
former have been observed. Argument by simple
enumeration, the supporters of this view claim, is the
fundamental mode of non-demonstrative inference.
According to the second view, induction
proceeds by the elimination of rival generalisations.
Some philosophers argue that mere enumeration of
instances cannot add any support to a generalisation
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unless it can be shown that the instances are different
from one another. In order to establish the
generalisation that "All ravens are black", mere
observation of similar ravens are not sufficient; one
ought rather to observe ravens at different times of the
year in different geographical regions of different
sexes, of different ages and so on. One ought to
observe ravens that which differ in as many respects as
possible to bring out the sufficient conditions for the
blackness of ravens. According to the supporters of
induction by elimination in induction we should take a
variety of instances. The differences among the
instances are important because they serve to eliminate
the rival generalisation only through the elimination of
which can the generalisation in question be
established. Induction is viewed as a struggle in which
the fittest survive.
Inductive
reasoning
establishes
general
proposition in conclusion on the basis of particular
premises. It is the characteristic of induction that has
made induction inseparable for the search for
knowledge and at the same time poses a serious
problem for the justification of inductive argument.
The simplest kind of induction in which from 'all
observed crows are black' we infer-the conclusion that
'all crows are black' is known as induction by simple
enumeration. It is generally recognised as the basis of
generalisations.
The philosophical method of Bacon is primarily
based on the science where he has emphasised more
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on the importance of induction as opposed to
deduction. He tried to find out some better kind of
induction than what is called induction by simple
enumeration. "Induction which proceeds by merely
simple enumeration", says Bacon,
is a childish affair, and being without
any certain principle of inference it may
be overthrown by a contradictory instance.
Moreover, it usually draws the conclusion
from too small a number of instances,
taking account only of those that are
obvious.'**
This is no doubt an excellent description of the
popular unscientific way of seeking to establish
universal connections between events, just on the
basis of the events found together. Thus Bacon is
right in his criticism of simple enumeration since it
leads to uncertain conclusions and is always exposed
to danger from contradictory instances. The appearance
of a single contradictory instance disproves the
conclusion.
Bacon tries to invent a different kind of
induction. In the history of induction. Bacon is the first
philosopher who advocated induction by elimination.
By the method of elimination. Bacon means that by
relying on the greater force of negative instances we
can establish laws of nature which we cannot establish
directly. Bacon, again, says that
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though the induction which proceeds
by simple enumeration is childish, yet
the induction which is to be available
for the discovery and demonstrations
of science and arts, must analyse nature
by proper rejection and exclusion; and
then after a sufficient number of negatives
come to a conclusion on the affirmative
instances. ^^
Bacon maintains that induction proceeds by the
elimination of rival generalisations. In induction by
elimination we should take a variety of instances and
then only through the elimination of rival
generalisation in question can be established.
Thus we have to observe that induction by
elimination plays a significant role in scientific
generalisations. If we combine enumerative induction
with eliminative induction, it will carry us a long way
towards scientific investigation. But while admitting
the value of eliminative induction we must recognise
the difficulties of this form of induction also. The
difficulty in the first instance is a difficulty in
answering the question: what is it, which has to be
eliminated? Is it circumstances of chances or
something else? In trying to answer these questions we
have to take resort to a number of theories. Further, the
supporters of eliminative induction claim that we must
presuppose certain postulates concerning the behaviour
of nature. But the difficulty lies in finding out the
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proper logical justification for the pre-supposition that
have been made. Again, the conception of scientific
investigation as a 'search for causes' is a limited
conception of the nature and the conception of science.
The notion of causality is an important one in science.
But to identify scientific activity with the inquiry into
the nature of cause is a wrong conception. The famous
British scientist. Sir Eddington has even maintained
that the notion of causality is not at all necessary in the
advanced sciences.
Bacon holds the aim of science is the
discovery of the causes or generating nature. He is
successfiil in searching for order among nature. He also
formulates some method for discovering the causes
among phenomenon in nature. These methods are
popularly believed to express the nature of scientific
method . "Our method of discovering the sciences", he
writes,
is such as to leave little to the sharp ness and strength of men's wits, but
to bring all wits and intellects nearly
to a level. For as in drawing a straight
line, or describing an accurate circle by
the unassisted hand, much depends on
its steadiness and practice, but if a rule
or a pair of compasses be applied, little
or nothing depends upon them, so exa ctly it is with our method. ^^
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Bacon lays down some methods which are
called by him 'Tables''^ for eliminating the rival
generalisations. These tables are the methods for
discovering the causes; they are also the methods for
the elimination of the rival claims towards the
discovery of the causes. But the method of elimination
is bound up with a certain doctrine about the character
of natural laws and we are trying to find out these laws.
These laws are the laws of connection between
generating and generated natures. Bacon has not given
any clear meaning of natures. But he tells us that
nature is a kind of phenomenon of which there may be
many instances . These are only a limited number of
generating natures, which are also called by him
'causes'. He thinks that due to the various possible
degrees of co-ordination of causes, all the
complications of the world are occurring. This process
of co-ordination can be completed satisfactorily if the
generating nature or cause must always be co-present,
co-absent and co-variant in degrees with the
corresponding generated nature or effect. Bacon
introduces three different kinds of tables such as tables
of presence, absence and degrees in order to
understand the evidence collected by observation and
arrange to eliminate the irrelevant hypothesis about the
cause under investigation. Through this process of
eliminating hypothesis we will reach at a single
hypothesis, which cannot be eliminated and that should
be accepted as the true cause.
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At the beginning of the second book of the
Novum Organum, we find that Bacon's theory of
induction depends on his doctrine of generating
natures or cause, but there is no clear explanation of
this doctrine. Like Aristotle, Bacon also considered
that true science is knowledge of causes. Aristotle's
distinction of four causes is apparently accepted by
Bacon because for him this distinction is a correct
account of the different ways in which the word
'cause' is used. Bacon maintains that the doctrine of
material cause, efficient cause and final cause are
useless in science, since material and efficient causes
vary in different instances of the same kind of
happening. The final cause is harmful except in the
human affairs. So he accepts the formal cause alone.
Bacon is more interested in science for
attaining the method of induction. The procedure of
induction, which is formulated by him, is highly
contributed to the advancement of science, which
followed. Like Newton, Bacon is also known as the
chief exponent of scientific method. Bacon is in
agreement with Galileo when rejecting the doctrine of
final cause. He wishes to discover, for example,
the nature of heat, which he has supposed
to consist of rapid irregular motions of the
small .parts of bodies, lists of cold bodies
and lists of bodies of varying degrees
of heat. By this method he expected to
arrive at general laws, in the first instance.
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the lowest degree of generality from a
number of such laws and so on .''^
A suggested law should be tested by being
applied in new circumstances; if it worked in these
circumstances it will be confirmed to that extent.
Bacon is of the opinion that mere orderly arrangement
of data will make the right hypothesis obvious. But as
a rule, the framing of hypothesis is the most difficult
part of scientific work and it is the part where great
ability is indispensable. As such no method has been
found which will make it possible to invent hypothesis
by rules. The mere multiplicity of facts in the case of
hypothesis is confusing unless there is a way of
determining relevance among the facts. Hence we can
say that Bacon insufficiently emphasises on hypothesis
which brings his inductive method as faulty.
Though Bacon is more interested in science yet
he has missed most of what is being done in science in
his days. He does not accept the Copemican theory,
but no proper arguments are advanced by him. The
work of Vesalius, the pioneer of modem anatomy, is
not known to him. Even the work of his medical
attendant, Harvey is unknown to him. Harvey has
discounted the circulation of the blood, which he
publishes after the death of Bacon.
Though Bacon has discredited simple
enumeration properly, even today the problem of
induction by simple enumeration remains unsolved.
J.S.Mill formulates four canons of inductive method to
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find out the cause. But Mill has to confess that this law
is to be completely based on the basis of induction by
simple enumeration. Sciences depend upon certain
theoretical concepts and such theoretical concepts are
collected by some subordinate induction in a very
comprehensive way. These comprehensive inductions
are confirmed by some instances, which is induction
by simple enumeration. Bacon and his followers do
not find out any way out of it. It remains
unsatisfactory.
But it is Bacon who introduces the notion of
science as systematic study. In the words of Thomas
Fowler,
he stood like a prophet on the verge of
the Promised Land, bidding men to
leave without regret the desert that was
behind them, and enter with joy fulness
and hopefulness on the rich inheritance
that was spread before them. ^"
All the achievements of the modem world are
because of the contribution of science in the
seventeenth century. The seventeenth century is not
only important for scientific investigation but also for
philosophy. Until the seventeenth century, there was
nothing of important in philosophy. A new and quite
different method of acquiring knowledge was proposed
by the great Frenchman Descartes, who took
mathematics as a process to which all knowledge
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should conform. According to him the true method of
knowledge is to begin with general principles whose
truth could not be doubted and to reason from them to
the necessary character of particular facts. Descartes
believes that it is possible to discover certain universal
propositions from which all truths could be derived
from reason. Thus Descartes and his followers
emphasised more on deduction rather than upon
induction and more on reasoning rather than on
observation and experiment.
In- England, in the seventeenth century, it
was atleast assumed that all discoveries were made by
the use of the rules and methods of Bacon. Most of the
philosophers of this century were scientists. One of the
first writers to attempt to explain the method used by
the natural sciences was Sir John Herschel. 'Discourse
on the study of Natural Philosophy' was his famous
work. Later on, we fmd anther philosopher William
Whewell, who followed the former and undertook to
write his 'History of the- Inductive Sciences', which is
also followed after sometime by the Philosophy of
Inductive Sciences.
It was Robert Boyle who was greatly
influenced by Bacon's conception of science. Boyle
was a scientist. Following up the work of Galileo and
Toriceli, Boyle demonstrated that air has both weight
and elasticity. Though his conclusion stirred many but
it was not universally accepted. He was famous for his
discovery of a law - Boyle's Law - where he showed
that in a given quantity of gas at a given temperature,
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pressure is universally proportional to volume. He
encouraged scientists to write relatively brief
experimental essays rather than general treatises. Boyle
in his book 'Philosophy' emphasised on the
fruitlessness. of apriory philosophical reasoning the
disputes regarding which could be settled by
experiment. Boyle was not really opposed to theorising.
Scientists, he says,
should set themselves diligently to make
experiments and collect observations,
without being over forward to establish
principles and axioms.
He holds that through theories we never come to
the fmal conclusion, they should be thought of as the
best but actually they are capable of improvement.
Boyle further says that it is the task of the scientists to
develop theories that are clear, simple and as
comprehensive as possible. This point has been
discussed in his essay about the "Grounds of the
Mechanical Hypothesis" which 1 am not going to
discuss elaborately here.
Some other scientific theories like the
theories of Copernicus and of Newton are also great
discoveries of the same century. Copernicus introduced
the heliocentric hypothesis to replace the geocentric
one. He was right to call his theory a hypothesis but the
opponents of his theory described it as wrong in
thinking it a new hypothesis, which is undesirable.
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Some philosophers truly point out that there were no
known facts at the time of Copernicus which
compelled the adoption of his system rather there were
several which militated against it. The assumption of
Copernicus is tentative. But Copernicus could not
forward any conclusive evidence in favour of his
hypothesis and thus his theory was kept in abeyance
for a long time by the later astronomers.
In the same century the differential and
integral calculus was invented independently by
Newton and Leibnitz. This calculus is the instrument
for almost all-higher mathematics. Newton in his
'Newton's Pfincipia' had calculated the orbits of some
comets and that they were as obedient as the planets to
the law of gravitation. It is believed that whatever
Newton achieved as the fmal and complete, the initial
way was prepared by Copernicus and others. Newton
defined 'force' as the cause of change of motion, i.e.; of
acceleration .His law of universal gravitation can be
enunciated thus:
Every body attracts every other with a
force directly proportional to the product
of their masses and inversely proportional
to the square of the distance between them.^^
The notion of cause is conceived imaginatively as the
sort of thing that we experience when we push or pull.
For this reason, force was considered as one counter
example to gravitation, which acted at a distance;
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Newton himself opined that there must be some media
through which it was transmitted. But after a while it
was found that;
without the assumption of any medium
or force all equations can be written."^"^
In the eighteenth century we find the famous empiricist
philosopher David Hume with his remarkable
teachings in the field of philosophy. It is believed that
Hume entered into his philosophy under the influence
of Hutcheson who was interested in morals. Hutcheson
holds that all kinds of moral judgment approval and
disapproval, especially the judgment of value of
whatever type are generally based on feeling. By this
process of feeling, Hutcheson opened up a new scene
of thought to Hume. His influence in Hume was
mainly of the inversion of the roles ordinarily ascribed
to passion and reason respectively. Accordingly,
Hutcheson's teaching appears in a new and
revolutionary way when Hume reformulates it in his
fundamental maxim that
Reason is and ought only to be the slave
of the passions.^'*
Hume was also influenced by Locke and Newton
Hume agrees with Newton for his scientific methods
and with Locke for his introduction of two different
sources of knowledge - namely, sensation and
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reflection. Hume declares that the outcome of the Work
of Newton can be said to be of two fold , one is
negative and the other is positive. The negative
conclusions are less important in respect of general
philosophy and metaphysics than that of positive
conclusions.
Hume regarded that all kinds of knowledge have
their origin in sense-perception. He holds that there is a
considerable difference among the perceptions of our
mind. As such there are two kinds of perceptions, one
is called, 'impression' and the other is called 'ideas'. In
the language of Hume, a man when feels the pain of
excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth is
the impression and when he afterwards recalls to his
memory the sensation of heat or pleasurable warmth or
anticipates it by his imagination is called his ideas.
The classification of perception is mainly based
on the degrees of force and vivacity. Impressions are
our more lively perceptions which arise when we hear
or see or feel or love or hate or desire or will, that is all
our sensations, passions and emotions as they first
appear in our mind. Impressions arise immediately
from nature. By the term 'impression', Hume means all
our lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or
love, or hate, or desire, or will.
Ideas when simple are like impressions but are
fainter. Every simple idea has a simple impression,
which resembles it, and every simple impression has a
correspondent idea. Simple ideas in their first
appearance are derived from simple impression.
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Simple impression always precedes the corresponding
simple ideas. But there are some complex ideas like
'golden mountain', where the ideas cannot be preceded
by impressions but on an examination it will be clear
that the complex idea is derived from simple
impression of 'gold' and 'mountain'. On the other
hand, complex ideas are those which do not resemble
impressions. Hence, there is a close connection
between the impressions and ideas.
Thus knowledge can be derived from
compounding,
transposing,
arguementing
or
diminishing the materials supplied by the impression
and ideas.
There are two important works of Hume, one
'The Treatise of Human Nature' and the other is 'An
Inquiry Concerning Human Understandings'. Hume in
both his Treatise and in Inquiry maintains that an idea
is the same thing as an image. Hence, we can say that
to form an idea is to form image. This is only possible
in the sense that our ideas are the copies of impressions
from which they are derived. This copying does not
mean any process of referring. But when Hume
assumes that ideas are copies, it seems to follow that
ideas always represent their impression. But the
problem is : How can the ideas be copies or mental
pictures without referring to their original impression
from which they are copied? Here Hume does not give
us any clear-cut notion of referring. Again Hume also
uses the word 'idea' as synonymous to 'thought',
meaning rather than to an image. Ideas are mental
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images, and as such these are private and not public.
Regarding the relation of impression and ideas, we can
say that impressions are ultimate, complete in
themselves and non-representative by nature and the
ideas are derivative, essentially representative and as
such incomplete in themselves.
Further, Hume proceeds by holding that we
cannot have the idea of 'general' because all general
ideas are nothing but particular ones. Hume also refers
to the notion of 'abstract ideas' which are in
themselves individual but they may become general in
their representation. A.H. Basson has shown that
Hume proceeds to prove the universal
correspondence with the help of "a
report, a request, and a challenge".First
of all he reports that all his own ideas
are copies of previous impressions; he
then requests us to search our own mind
and be conceived of the same and last
of all he throws a challenge to his opponents to specify a simple impression
that has not a correspondent idea or a
simple idea that has not a correspondent
impression. ^^
Thus we find that the first two arguments with
regard to the report and the request are psychological
and with regard to challenge it is factual. Hume has
given us two arguments, one is psychological and the
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Other is logical to prove that idea cannot be possible
without impression , i.e. no impression no idea. As
Prof. Tapan K. Chakraborty writes:
In the psychological argument Hume
asks us to look into our own mind
and assures us that we will find every
idea as being derivedfi"oma corresponding impression. ^^
But this psychological argument to Hume to the
origin of ideas has some inconsistencies.
One of the important inconsistencies is that this
argument only can state a contingent relation between
an impression and an idea. But this type of necessary
relation is unfounded in Hume's theory for which the
problem arises as to how can any argument concerning
the matter of fact prove that:
there is a necessary relation between
impression, the causes and the ideas,
the effects.^^
The logical argument to the origin of ideas may
not be said to be derived fi"om original impression at
the first sight but on a clear examination we can say
that they can be derived from our own operations of
mind, that is, by reasoning.
Hume again holds the view that ideas caimot
hang loose or joined by chance but there is a bond of
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union between thoughts or ideas of the mind. This
bond of relation of ideas appears to be the guiding
principle of Hume's psychology and philosophy. This
principle also has a direct connection with his theory of
causation. This bond of relation between ideas is called
'association of ideas'.
Hume uses this principle in two different ways
both in his Treatise and in Inquiry. In the Treatise, it is
the tendency of one idea to suggest another while in the
Inquiry, it is the principle of connection among ideas.
These two senses of association are confused and
confusing. Hume makes a distinction in the Treatise
between natural relations and philosophical relations.
But such distinction has not been made in the Inquiry.
This principle also has a direct connection with his
theory of causation.
Before Hume, the relation of causation had
been more or less assimilated by the perception of mere
observation like A and B, where A is above B, or B is
right of A, but not that A causes B. It is found to be
mistaken according to Hume. Hume for the fu*st time
made really serious challenge to this view. It is
believed that modem philosophy of causation begins
with Hume. Hume has given definition of cause both
in his Treatise of Human Nature and Inquiry
Concerning Human Understanding. It may be here
noted that Hume's analysis of the problem of causality
in the Treatise is somewhat different fi"om that in his
Inquiry, but the conclusion in both the versions is
exactly the same. In his "Inquiry", before developing
(30)
his theory of causality, Hume has shown that all the
objects of human reason or enquiry have two kinds of
distinction, viz; those concerning 'Relations of Ideas'
and those concerning 'Matters of Fact'. This distinction
of reasoning is not totally missing in the Treatise. In
the Treatise, Hume also makes similar distinction
between two kinds of relations one is natural and the
other is philosophical. He has made a list of three
different varieties of natural relations viz; resemblance,
contiguity in time or place and cause and effect. Hume
speaks of seven different kinds of philosophical
relations, viz; resemblance, identity, relations of time
and place, proportion in quantity or number, degrees in
any quality, contrariety and causation. Out of these
relations, the relation of causality can only yield
certainty of belief beyond the moment of actual
experience. Hume is also of the opinion that all
reasoning concerning matters of fact seems to be
founded on the relation of cause and effect. By means
of the relation of cause and effect we can go beyond
the evidence of our memory and senses. But their
evidences would not give any generalised conclusion.
As such, we always find a wide gap between the
evidence of senses which is confined to the present
memory and memory which assures us of the past and
the conclusion which includes not only the present or
the past but also the future, which we draw regarding
all our knowledge about matters of fact and real
existence. Hume has tried to show that our knowledge
of cause and effect is not attained by reasoning aprioi
(31)
but it is rather based on and derived from experience.
So he also tried to prove that causes and effects are
discoverable not by reason but by experience.
After proving that causal reasoning is neither
intuitive nor demonstrative, Hume proceeds to
conclude that it is truly derived from our experience of
particular objects constantly conjoined with each other.
By constant conjunction is meant the constant
repetition or regular recurrence of two kinds of similar
events according to a constant pattern of contiguity and
succession. This relation of constant conjunction
cannot comprise the idea of necessary connection.
Hume points out that our external perception does not
provide us with the idea of necessary connection with
regard to the question of a necessary connection
between a cause and an effect. All events seem to be
extremely loose and separate. One event follows
another but no tie between them can be observed.
Similarly, we have no sense impression of any force or
power passing from the cause to the effect. When a
moving ball begins to move all that we actually
perceive is that at a particular moment the movement
of the first ball is followed by that of the second.
In reply of the question, what is Hume's
conclusion about our knowledge of causation? Hume
says that our knowledge of causation is based on
observation and experience. We observe that objects
succeed one another that similar objects are constantly
conjoined, that heat follows flame, cold follow snow.
Having found in many instances that any two kinds of
(32)
objects have always been conjoined, we infer that the
objects are causally related, that one is the cause and
the other is the effect. After the constant conjunction of
two objects, such as heat and flame, weight and
solidity, we are determined by custom to expect the
one from the appearance of the other. Our experience
of the constant conjunction of events produces a belief
in their connection. Experience of repeated succession
produces in our mind the habit of expectation. The
custom or habit is nothing objective but it is
subjective. The idea of causation is an operation of the
mind and thus it cannot be objectified.
Hume's theory of causation is logical
outcome of empiricism. Custom or habit is the only
principle, which helps us to expect burning from fire.
From the fact that fire has burnt in the past, we infer
that fire will do the same in ftiture. Hume asks one
what grounds is this inference made? The answer is
that the perception of similarity amongst natural
objects - the belief that the cause of nature is always
uniform. But it should be admitted that the
resemblance of the past to the future is an assumption
and this cannot be taken as a rule. We cannot claim
with certainty that in the past, the causes similar in
appearance will not produce dissimilar effects in
ftiture.
The inference from experience that 'Hundred
observed crows are black ', we can establish a general
proposition that 'All crows are black '. But to draw
such an inference we always require a medium or a
(33)
premise. Hume is of the opinion that the principle of
the Uniformity of Nature cannot serve as the missing
premise . Because this principle cannot be established
by probability of future being like the past rules on the
experience that past has been uniform. Hume thus
shows the problem and makes sure that it is difficult to
obtain a satisfactory solution of it. The problem, with
which Hume is faced, has ultimately come by tradition,
to be known as 'the problem of induction'.
Hume is regarded as the upholder of the
traditional problem of induction as this problem was
raised in its clearest form by him. According to
Keynes;
the argument by induction - inference
from past particulars to future gener alisation - was the real object of his
attack.^*^
Finding that some crows are black we want to
establish that all crows are black. In this case, we are to
'leap in he dark' which is known as the 'hazard of
induction'. There is no certainty whether what is true
of the particular will also necessarily be true of the
universal implies the truth of the particular but not vice
versa. Hume's doubt concerning the validity of such
inference from the known to the unknown is genuine,
and the problem, which he has raised regarding the
validity of induction, is generally considered as the
problem of induction, which is again regarded as a
04)
genuine problem
There are two aspects of the problem raised
by Hume -one is psychological and the other is logical.
Hume maintains that to give a psychological solution
to the problem by stating that it is a customary belief of
men to believe in inductive conclusion and to rely
upon them for the guidance of practical life. However,
Hume could not give a logical solution to the problem.
Hume even hinted at the impossibility of giving a
logical solution to the problem.
Hume's theory of causality has been
criticised by several modem critics among whom
Immanuel Kant, Prof Alfred Whitehead and Samuel
Alexandar deserve special mention.
In the 'Transcendental Analytic' of his
"Critique of Pure Reason", Kant explains the principle
of causality.
It is widely held that Hume not only denied
the conception of cause as power or force but he
further denied the necessary connection which is supposed to entail between a cause and an effect. As an
empiricist, Hume often says that experience could
reveal merely the succession of two events like, heat or
flame, pain and pleasure, love or hate, light or shade
constantly but no tie or link is found between them.
This constant experience of succession when repeated
again and again gives rise to constancy of conjunction.
This experience of constant conjunction, in its turn,
when it has occurred often enough produces in the
mind a habit of inferring one event from the other.
(.)5)
Hence, the so-called necessity is not really there in the
observed cases but it is in us, in the observer. It is by
virtue of our habit or expectation we have the idea of
necessary determination into the objects of our
experience. This is exactly subjective rather than
objective and as such one question is asked by Hume:
with what right do we add to our experience of uniform
succession the idea of necessary connection?
According to some interpreters, Hume's answer to this
question is quite simple: we obviously none.
It is believed that the objections which are
offered by Kant are the answers to Hume's criticism of
the theory of causality. Kant says that objective
succession or succession in the object cannot be
understood without assuming the causal relation. As a
matter of fact, without the presupposition of the
principle of causation, we cannot distinguish between
mere succession in our apprehension and apprehension
of succession that is subjective and objective
succession. Hence this principle of causation, as Hume
supposed, is not derived from our objective experience.
It is rather the very presupposition of such experience.
It is therefore an apriori in our knowledge situation.
Without the presupposition of such principle we have
no right to assume any succession in the objects and
cannot say that anything actually happens or follows
upon anything else. Kant tried to rehabilitate the
objective validity of the idea of causal connection by
pointing out that the causation is not derived from
experience but is a categories of understanding which
(36)
transforms the matter experienced through sensibiHty
into the objects of knowledge. It is the principle of
causality itself, according to Kant, the principle of
objectivity implicit in the experience of succession.
The causal principle, therefore, is valid for all objects
of the phenomenal world but to us, the human beings,
it is not a product of sensation but something given in
the frame work of the phenomenal world. Hume
commits the mistake when he starts his method by
cutting all the ties and links among the events and
complains that there is no such connection whatever.
Prof Alfred Whitehead is actually a man of
science and he tries to establish the framework of
philosophy with the help of physical science.
According to him Hume's theory does not make any
effort to modem science. In other words, Hume's view
of cause and effect without any causal connection
seems to him a cart without a horse .In his opinion if
Hume had approached the problem from the scientific
point of view, no difficulty would be faced by him.
The difficulties of Hume, he finds, due to
the fact that he starts with simple location and ends
with repetition. Hume's belief is that causal relation
cannot be achieved through our immediate impression
of memory and senses. As a result, the manner of
connection is beyond our impression and senses. The
idea of connection is derived from our repetition of
past impression. But Hume overlooks that the
repetition stands exactly in the form of cause effect
relation. It obtains between two events, of which, one
(37)
precedes the other, the preceding one is called cause
and the succeeding one is called the effect. Hence
Hume fails to provide experience of any necessary
connection of objects.
Alexandar also has given some answers to
Hume's criticism of causal principle. His criticism is
mainly based on his famous metaphysical view of
space and time.
To Alexandar space-time is a system of
motion. Again he maintains that any motion within the
space-time is continuous with some other motion. As
space-time is a system of motion it is also known as a
continuous system. He elucidates the notion of
causality as a relational continuity between two
different motions. In other words, it is a relational
continuity between one substance and another within a
space-time whole. Causation must proceed from before
or after. Again, cause though continuous, it occurs
prior to the effect. On the basis of his theory,
Alexandar criticises Hume's view by saying that Hume
does not accept the assumption that the causal process
is a continuous process. That is why he fails to fmd any
connection between cause and effect. As a matter of
fact, at first, Hume himself cuts the link or bond
between them and lastly denies their underlying
connection.
Thus we fmd that Hume has drawn his
theory of causation on the basis of the ultimate
consequences of the presuppositions of empiricism. If
our knowledge is within the boundary of impressions
(38)
and their copies or ideas and the self is nothing but a
mere collection of sensations then we have no
universal and necessary knowledge; the notion of cause
is reduced to the idea of temporal succession of habit
or custom. It is also illusory to assume either a spiritual
or a material substance as the cause of our sensations.
Hence Hume's theory of causation triggered a violent
reaction which again came to occupy an important
place near the middle of the nineteenth-century in
France with the rise of positivism. Positivism
developed from the doctrines of Hume and Hartley and
attained its super form in the logic of John Stuart Mill.
Although Mill did not deny the influence of Auguste
Comte who was regarded as the propounder of France
positivism. Mill is actually the follower of his own
father, James Mill and also of David Hartley and
Jeremy Bentham.
Mill's entire theory of logic is founded on the
laws of association. Mill tries to show that a real
inference moves from particular case to another
particular case. Mill thinks he has shown that all real
inference is inductive in character. Induction is
ordinarily defined as inference from particular cases to
general laws, but Mill argues that
this inference is an inference from
particular cases to particular case P
Mill has given two definitions of induction,
which are as follows :
(39)
The first definition is :
Induction is the operation of discovering and proving general propositions.
The second definition is :
hiduction, then, is that operation of the
mind by which we infer that what we
know to be true in a particular case or
cases, will be true in all cases which
resemble the former in certain assignable
respects. In other words, induction is the
process by which we conclude that what
is true of the whole class or that what is
true at certain times will be true in similar
circumstances at all times.^^
In addition to this Mill says that induction
consists in drawing inferences from known cases to
unknown cases. Mill says that this process of induction
is quite different from the so-called 'perfect induction',
which consists of the complete enumeration of all the
cases, that fall under a limited group. Again, induction
is not the same as imperfect induction, which consists
in ascribing the character of general truths to all
propositions, which are true in every instance that we
happen to know of
Mill maintains that induction must go
beyond the impressions given in experience . This he
justifies by assuming the principle of Uniformity of
Nature as the ultimate major premise of all the
induction. Every induction may therefore be expressed
(40)
syllogistically thus :
Major premise — Under the same condition, the same
event will occur (Principle of Uniformity of Nature).
Minor premise — Under the conditions x,y,z, the event
E is observed to occur.
Conclusion — Therefore, under the condition x,y,z , E
will always occur.
But in accordance with Mill's general doctrine
of inference this major premise, which he identifies
with the Law of Causation, is itself an instance of
induction by simple enumeration from other induction
of the same kind.
Mill maintains that for the justification of
inductive generalisations we must proceed with the
assumption of the Uniformity of Nature. But Mill's
argument begs the question or it may be said to involve
the paradox of induction, because Mill maintains that
all induction needs affirmation by means of the Law of
Causation, whereas this law itself is confirmed by
means of minor inductions by simple enumeration.
Mill distinguishes between induction proper and
induction improperly so-called. Induction improperly
so-called are perfect inductions based on parity of
reasoning and colligation of facts. Induction proper
includes scientific induction, unscientific induction or
induction by simple enumeration and analogy. Mill
maintains that inductions improperly so-called are
processes simulating induction. He regards unscientific
(41)
induction and analogy as alike to scientific induction
in some respects but fall short of scientific induction.
Mill holds that all inductive enquiries are a search for
causes. He maintains that there is no other uniformity
in the events of nature than that which arises from the
Law of Causation. According to Mill, inference in the
true sense, is a passage from one particular to another.
Mill holds that
inference exhibits the proof when we
start from a particular fact of experience
and pass on directly to another.^'
Our experience begins with particular facts and
not with general truths. In other words, we infer the
conclusions on the strength of similarity. Hence a fact
which does not resemble another fact in any way
cannot be inferred from the other .The attainment of
true knowledge can be made through induction
because it is basically inference from particular to
particular. According to Mill, induction is at bottom a
passage from particular to particular. He holds,
the general propositions are but collections
of particulars.^^
Mill holds that in unscientific induction we are
usually concerned with cases of co-existence of
phenomena rather than with their causal connections.
But scientific induction no doubt starts from
(42)
enumeration of particular facts of observation, but it is
something more. Here we carefully scrutinize the
instances by varying the circumstances. Then we
eliminate the irrelevant factors, which do not stand the
test of variation. According to Mill, there are several
ways of varying the circumstances. The five
experimental methods are such ways of varying the
circumstances.
Thus the first and the foremost condition of a
scientific induction is that we have to proceed in
accordance with the several experimental methods.
Secondly , in scientific induction we are concerned
mainly with causal generalizations . For this purpose,
the instances enumerated are to be carefiilly arranged
as antecedents and consequent. In this way we are
supposed to discover what is the cause or effect of any
given phenomenon. Moreover, scientific induction
constitutes proof as much as its conclusions follow
necessarily fi-om the premises. The methods of
experimental enquiry have been described by Mill as
not merely the methods of discovery but of proof
Mill formulates that induction must be a
search for cause. He understands causation in the
humian sense, that is to say, as a relation between
events involving constant conjunction, and he tries to
dispense with the notion of necessary connection by
defining a cause as an unconditional and invariable
antecedent of the effect. The methods, which Mill
proposed for the discovery of causes, are adaptations of
Bacon's induction by elimination. Mill considered that
(43)
the aim of science is to discover and prove causal
relation among phenomena in nature.
Mill offers a number of independent methods
each conceived as a positive argument or even as a
proof of causal connection. In all Mill has five
methods, the method of agreement corresponding to
the requirement of co-presence, the method of
difference, corresponding to the requirements of coabsence, the joint method of agreement and difference,
the method of residues and the method concomitant
variation corresponding to the requirements of covariation which are really superfluous. Mill formulates
these methods for the determination of causal relation .
These methods are said to be the methods of
elimination.
The eliminative method is concerned with
finding out a certain kind of event as the cause of the
phenomenon under investigation. On the plea that it is
the only characteristic which satisfies the requirements
of becoming a cause. But this argument would not
have any value if it were not established that there is
some cause for the phenomenon. The statement that
there is some cause for the phenomenon can be only
derived from the law of causation, namely, every event
must have a cause. But how are we assured of the truth
of this law? Mill is an extreme empiricist, who follows
the tradition of Hume, and he will therefore admit no
apriori proof of the principle, which he requires. We
can say only that the principle is itself established by
induction. A similar suggestion is to be found in
(4-1)
Hume's 'A Treatise on Human Nature'. Hume is of the
opinion that the principle of causation is not necessary
for knowledge or for any scientific reasoning because
this principle does not necessarily arise from
observation and experience. For Hume it is an
incidental remark and not a part of an attempt to justify
induction. But Mill wishes to show that his procedure
for finding causes is valid.
Mill recognises that his suggestion appears to
involve a circle, but he says that the induction is used
to establish the principle of universal causation is not
the same as that which pre-supposes the principle. But
Mill's attempt to use the method from the
establishment of the principle of universal causation is
fallacious.
The objection is not that the principle needs no
empirical justification, being already certain and a
priori, but rather that no empirical justification can be
given for it. Although Mill thinks he can prove that for
every phenomenon there is a cause, Mill is not sure
that for every phenomenon there is only one cause. He
admits that there may be plurality of causes. Thus he
says that 'poisoning is a cause of death', although we
certainly do not believe that 'all deaths result from
poisoning'. But if we admit the possibility of
alternative causes we cannot eliminate candidates for
the possession of cause on the ground that the effect
has occurred without their preceding. That is to say.
Mill's method of Agreement becomes useless. Mill was
aware of this and spoke more highly to the method of
(45)
Difference than the others because he thinks it would
survive the .admission of a plurality of causes. Our
reasoning depends only on the principle that nothing
can be the cause of a phenomenon, which occurs
without being followed by the phenomenon.
When we further review Mill's view we find
that in his opinion the investigation of nature is started
by assuming all enumerative induction with true
premises prove their conclusions. In his views,
enumerative induction is the better place to start
investigation rather than the other. Any methodology
which attempts to test scientific invesfigation without
using such assumptions would not provide any
justification for believing particular investigation. Thus
Mill holds that our starting assumption should be
properly modified. But it is found that enumerative
induction over some sorts of cases produce many
generalisations which are falsified. We can now say
that such induction will provide little support for their
conclusions.
Again, we find that Mill's discussion of
refinement of enumerative induction is the very basis
of his description of any methodology, which seems to
be the closer to the actual practice of many scientists.
In his view we could attain some high level
conclusions about the world and about the kind of
causes of a particular investigation by the repeated use
and refinement of enumerafive induction. An important
high level conclusion can be shown to be certain by
saying that all events have a cause. Finally, Mill claims
(•46)
that in our everyday life we use a number of
generalisations to guide our experimental practice
where particular kinds of causal agents are likely to be
found. But we shall narrow down the potential causes
of an event and the method of elimination is for that.
This account of Mill seems to fit well to the day
to day scientific practice of a scientist. Even the
biologists by relying on such assumptions and on
observation are able to narrow down the causes of flu
epidemics to a possible viral agents. They arrive at the
cause, the specific virus, by using further procedures.
But Mill's experimental methods are become
useless by the advancement of the mechanical
revolution. In the 20^'' century, it is Popper, who puts
some objections to Mill's account of causation by
saying that an eliminative method cannot be said to do
the work it purports because the number of causal
agents is infinite. But Popper neglects the view that
most of the methods of Mill which are generally
prepared to be used only after enumerative induction
has provided a background field of knowledge which
narrows down the possibilifies. Mill also holds that the
refutation of hypothesis plays an important role in
induction whereas it plays in other ways a very
important role in the epistemology of Popper.
Popper, is of the opinion that Mill's account
provides some help only to the ordinary work of
scientists and as such he does not remove the
possibility of error from science. His assumption of
background knowledge might be mistaken with the
(47)
works of the researchers. When the causal hypothesis
which remain unrefuted cannot be established by the
eliminative inquiry, Mill recognises that we need to
return to our background assumptions and we should
consider their cogency. Yet he claims that by using
such methods science has proved to be remarkably
successful. The idea of presumption behind this that as
times go on we turn back to our assumptions less to
less and this will strengthen our knowledge which is
justified by enumerative induction. Popper says:
Mill's account may be objected
by two objections, these are
(a) Mill does not produce an
adequate logic of discovery and
(b) too much emphasise, on
enumerative induction, he presents
an inadequate logic of justification.
A logic of discovery is a method
by which we can
discover
scientific generalisations or laws
on the basis of experience. A logic
of justification is a method by
which we can justify' scientific
generalisations or laws on the basis
of experience."^"^
Hence, we find, there are several logical and
technical difficulties in Mill's account of experimental
or inductive methods. In the history of induction,
(48)
Mill's philosophy of science is an example of the
inductionist's point of view . Thus Mill has made an
unjustified leap from a statement about what takes
place in a single experiment to. such a generalization
that what takes place in one experiment will take place
also in other experiments.
In the nineteenth century the most important
name is that of an American, Charles Senders Peirce
who has done notable work in almost every branch of
logic. He was a mathematician and to him nothing
could be clearer than mathematics. Peirce upholds the
view that logic is not purely a formal enquiry but it
must have a psychological point of view and by this
process of psychology he means that logic must have
the account of the nature of inference. In natural
sciences there is a special type of induction which is
called by Peirce and other modem logicians
implicative induction'. In this induction the conclusion
goes beyond the premises which are the singular facts
of experience. One of the principal aims of natural
scientists when they use induction, is to make possible
rational inference from observed to unobserved matters
of fact, and in particular prediction of inference to the
future. It has generally been thought that the laws of
natural sciences are the laws of causal connection and
that the problem of implicative induction is to give a
method for the discovery of causes. Implicative
induction is an induction in which we establish a
general proposition directly, from the observed facts of
experience. It is again concerned with the
(49)
establishment of a causal connection among the facts
and events under consideration. But implicative
induction presents a very narrow conception of
induction. Of course, the notion of cause is a very
important one in science. But it is applied to a limited
sphere of scientific enquirer, and the search for causes
cannot be identified with the whole process of
scientific investigation.
Peirce considers that inference is a form of
enquiry, which has three different types such as
deduction, induction, and abduction. Induction, as
formulated by Peirce, is a process of scientific inquiry
by which we can test the statistical hypothesis which
rests on the presupposition that by a fair sample of
cases, what is true in a certain percentage of cases is
likely to be true in the same percentage to the whole of
the class of those cases. He is fond of statistical
example. This process of induction can be understood
in relation to two procedures, such as statistical
deduction and abduction.
Abduction is the only mode of scientific
inference where we infer from a surprising fact to an
explanatory fact on the ground that if the explanation
were true then there will be no surprising fact. The
scientist can reach the explanatory hypothesis by the
process of abduction.
Regarding statistical deduction, Peirce is of the
opinion that the conclusion of statistical deduction is
said to be valid because the conclusion, which is drawn
by it, is true in most of the time. Abduction is the
(50)
creative formulation of statistical hypothesis, which is
a kind of inversion of statistical deduction. Abduction
and induction, however, have conventional features.
When the three procedures, namely, induction,
statistical deduction and abduction are used in
combination then induction becomes the selfcorrecting method. Abduction and induction are
having the unconventional features. The scientists
could achieve explanatory hypothesis by means of
abduction. By the method of pragmatism, a hypothesis
can be tested. The value of induction, according to
Peirce is that it establishes new general proposition,
which needs its own independent verification and thus
it may be true. Peirce's process of induction has a close
relationship with the theory of probability. Peirce is of
the opinion that the theory of probabilities is simply
the science of logic quantitatively treated, it is a
science where a certain conclusion follows from given
premises.
Peirce establishes for the first time that
induction is the best mode of reasoning about the
unknown, which finally leads to a true generalisation.
It is also related to the idea that our experiences are
random fair samples from the larger totality. Pierce
says that the heart and the essence of induction are the
constant tendency of the inductive process to correct
itself and thus the validity of an inductive argument
leads to a true generalisation in the long run. Induction
is a process where we generalise from a number of
cases of which something is true, and infer that the
(51)
same thing is true of a whole class.
Peirce's view of induction as self-correcting
process, which is the essence of induction, remains
obscure. Thus Peirce's method of induction cannot
wholly accepted.
Hence we have to pass on to another modem
thinker, Karl Popper, who first gave philosophical
reflection to the problem of demarcating science from
pseudo science in general and from metaphysics in
particular. Popper is the first to give a serious attention
to meta-science. hi his "The Logic of Scientific
Discovery" Karl Popper opposes the view that the logic
of scientific discovery is identical with inductive
methods. The supporters of inductive logic maintained
that we should be able to fmd the way of justifying
inductive inference if we try to establish a principle of
induction.
Popper holds that the starting-point of science is
the critical examination of myth which arises from our
inborn dogmatism and not from observations. He also
holds that the scientists are not asked to explain their
transition from observations to theories and so also
there is no problem of induction. Induction, like
science, is a myth, which is always invalid, and thus it
cannot be justifiable.
Popper, however, argues that the principle of
induction cannot be a logical truth like a tautology or
an analytical statement because if it is so the question
of the justification of induction would not have been
raised. Now, if it is not analytic, it must be a synthetic
(52)
Statement, that is, a statement whose negation is not
self-contradictory but logically possible. So the
question arises: why such an inductive principle should
be accepted at all and how we can justify its
acceptance on rational grounds. The only way to justify
induction is to make use of inductive inference.
Popper develops his ovm theory, which he
describes as the theory of deductive method of testing.
Popper does not accept the verifiability theory of
meaning. He is in support of falsifiability criterion of
the empirical and scientific character of a theory. He
maintains that it is impossible to form a hypothesis by
the process of induction because hypothesis is formed
by some sort of imagination; it cannot be formed by
observation alone. We cannot say that observation is
pure regulative principle since observation is always
selective and guided by some anticipatory theories.
Knowledge is possible by Popper with the
hypotheses, which are imaginary, and such hypotheses
are science rather than myth. Popper's theory states
that a hypothesis must be tested empirically only and
then only it can be advanced. Thus some hypotheses
are more falsifiable than others are and the more
falsifiable a hypothesis, the less is probability. It is the
task of the scientists to formulate the most falsifiable
hypothesis. The theory, which is advanced by Popper,
is the hypothetical-deductive method. Popper says that
we may call it deductivism in contrast to inductivism.
He maintains that we must clearly distinguish between
the psychology of knowledge and the logic of
(53)
knowledge. Psychology of knowledge deals with the
empirical facts and the latter deals with logical
relations. Belief in inductive logic is largely due to a
confusion of psychological problems with the
epistemological ones.
Popper's theory consists in the formulation of
a tentative hypothesis and deduction of conclusion
from the hypothesis. The purpose of the testing of the
theory by way of empirical applications of the
conclusions which can be derived from it is to find
how far the new consequences of the theory stand up to
the demands of practice. The procedure of testing here
is also deductive. Certain singular statements, which
are accepted previously, are also deduced from the
theory. Now if the singular conclusions are acceptable
or verified then the theory has for the time been passed
its test. But if the conclusions have been falsified, then
their falsification also falsifies the theory from which
they are logically deduced. Popper has adopted
falsifiability as the criterion for deciding whether or
not a theoretical system (hypothesis) belongs to
empirical science.
Popper characterises the falsifiability of a theory
by the logical relations holding between the theory and
the class of 'basic propositions'. By 'basic
propositions' he means all self-consistent singular
statements of a certain logical form. Popper argues that
a hypothesis carniot be constructed by a set of basic
propositions because a universal proposition could not
be equivalent to any set of singular propositions. So
(54)
general hypothesis cannot possibly be established by
induction.
(55)
References
1. Kneale, William
PROBABILITY AND INDUCTION
Oxford, the Clarendon press, 1949,
part II, p-24
2. Ross,W.D.
ARISTOTLE'S PRIOR AND
POSTERIOR ANALYTICS.
Oxford, 1949, p-47
3 . Ibid
p-51
4. cf Vonright, George
Henrik
THE LOGICAL PROBLEM
OF INDUCTION
Oxford, Basi Blackwell (second
edition)!957, chap-I, p-8
5. Kneale, William
PROBABILITY AND INDUCTION
Oxford, the Clarendon press , 1949
part II pp-24-25
6. Ibid
p-25
7. Ibid
pp-30-31
8. Ibid
p-43
9. Ibid
p-44
10. Ibid
p-47
11. cf Kneale, William
and Kneale ,Martha
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC
Oxford , the Clarendon press 1962,
p-23
(56)
12. cf. Kneale , William
PROBABILITY AND INDUCTION
Oxford , the Clarendon press , 1949,
part II, p-48
13. Ibid
pp - 48-49
14. Ibid
p-49
15. Creighton, Edwin James
and Smart, R . Harold
16. Kneale, William
AN INTRODUCTORY LOGIC
New York, The Macmillan Co.
1959,p-231
PROBAILITY AND INDUCTION
Oxford , the Clarendon press, 1949
part II, p- 49
17. Cohen, R.Morris and AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC
Nagel Ernest
AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD
Alhed publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1968,
p-24
18. Kneale, William
PROBABILITY AND INDUCTION
Oxford, the Clarendon press, 1949,
part II, p-51
19. Russell Bertrand
A HISTORY OF WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY
Unwin Hyman Ltd.,London 1979
p-528.
20. Edward, Paul
21. Ibid
p-358
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
Macmillan Publishing Co. London,
1972,vol. IV,p-239
(57)
22. Russell, Bertrand
A HISTORY OF WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY
Unwin Hyman Ltd., London, 1979,
pp-520-521.
23. Smith, Norman kemp
24. Ibid
THE PHILOSOPHY OF DAVID
HUME
Macmillan & Co. Ltd., New York,
St. Martins Press, 1960, p-45
pp-57-58
25. Basson,A.H.
DAVID HUME
Palican Series, 1958,
p-36
26. Chakraborty, Tapan Kumar
27. Ibid
HUME'S THEORY OF
CAUSALITY
Minerva Associates
(publication) Pvt. Ltd. 1979,
p-31
p-15
28. Keynes, J.M.
A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY
Macmillan & Co. 1972, p-272
29.. Mill, LS.
A SYSTEM OF LOGIC
Orient Longmans Pvt. Ltd. 1961
BookniChapt.II,p-186.
30. Ibid
p-188
31. Ibid
p-190
(58)
32. Ibid
p-209
33. Couvalis, George
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE
Sage Publications, London,
Thousand Oaks, New Delhi,
1997, p-82