A Conceptual Map of Scientism
... other than the natural sciences, such as the humanities, have nothing to add to the natural sciences if properly carried out. The questions asked in, say, psychology and philosophy, are nonsensical or obscure. We should abandon the subject matters of these disciplines altogether. For example, Otto ...
... other than the natural sciences, such as the humanities, have nothing to add to the natural sciences if properly carried out. The questions asked in, say, psychology and philosophy, are nonsensical or obscure. We should abandon the subject matters of these disciplines altogether. For example, Otto ...
Popper and Xenophanes - ORCA
... supplement knowledge through accumulations of observed or experienced instances, as a deep-seated illusion. Relatedly, he also rejected verificationism, both as a theory of meaning and (more importantly) as either a potential theory of knowledge or a criterion of demarcation between science and non- ...
... supplement knowledge through accumulations of observed or experienced instances, as a deep-seated illusion. Relatedly, he also rejected verificationism, both as a theory of meaning and (more importantly) as either a potential theory of knowledge or a criterion of demarcation between science and non- ...
Merleau-Ponty`s transcendental theory of perception - SAS
... metaphysics. From this it follows that the evaluation of Merleau-Ponty's claims about perception need to be cast in terms remote from those that a philosopher of mind applies to a theory of perception. Though I will not attempt here a full evaluation, I will set out what I take to be the basic justi ...
... metaphysics. From this it follows that the evaluation of Merleau-Ponty's claims about perception need to be cast in terms remote from those that a philosopher of mind applies to a theory of perception. Though I will not attempt here a full evaluation, I will set out what I take to be the basic justi ...
Two Meanings of Disenchantment
... than spells, myths, and magic. Scientific rationalization means that “there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather than one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted.” Weber is careful to distinguish the potential ca ...
... than spells, myths, and magic. Scientific rationalization means that “there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather than one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted.” Weber is careful to distinguish the potential ca ...
Dennett and Phenomenology - Center for Subjectivity Research
... thereby leave anything important out, since all conscious experiences you know of, or believe you have, will per definition be included. And experiences you don’t believe you have will be nothing to you anyway (Dennett 2003, 20). If you get rid of the first-personal dimension, what you will be left ...
... thereby leave anything important out, since all conscious experiences you know of, or believe you have, will per definition be included. And experiences you don’t believe you have will be nothing to you anyway (Dennett 2003, 20). If you get rid of the first-personal dimension, what you will be left ...
CLEMENS, JUSTIN Title - Minerva Access
... philosophy itself, the dispute regarding Being primarily turns on the question of an appropriate method: that is, should one go the way of language, literature, law, logic, mathematics, intuition, experience, or something else? It is primarily by recourse to mathematics - more precisely, post-Cantor ...
... philosophy itself, the dispute regarding Being primarily turns on the question of an appropriate method: that is, should one go the way of language, literature, law, logic, mathematics, intuition, experience, or something else? It is primarily by recourse to mathematics - more precisely, post-Cantor ...
Platonic Meditations: The Work of Alain Badiou
... philosophy itself, the dispute regarding Being primarily turns on the question of an appropriate method: that is, should one go the way of language, literature, law, logic, mathematics, intuition, experience, or something else? It is primarily by recourse to mathematics - more precisely, post-Cantor ...
... philosophy itself, the dispute regarding Being primarily turns on the question of an appropriate method: that is, should one go the way of language, literature, law, logic, mathematics, intuition, experience, or something else? It is primarily by recourse to mathematics - more precisely, post-Cantor ...
Problems in Applying Peirce to Social Sciences
... philosophers, who take inspiration from Peirce while considering modernity, maintain that though we have been modern, this was not any foredoomed cultural fate. An alternative has been available all the time during the course of modernity, and Peirce’s philosophy is one example of it. This is the le ...
... philosophers, who take inspiration from Peirce while considering modernity, maintain that though we have been modern, this was not any foredoomed cultural fate. An alternative has been available all the time during the course of modernity, and Peirce’s philosophy is one example of it. This is the le ...
Applying Peirce to Social Studies – Some Do`s and Don`ts
... philosophers, who take inspiration from Peirce while considering modernity, maintain that though we have been modern, this was not any foredoomed cultural fate. An alternative has been available all the time during the course of modernity, and Peirce’s philosophy is one example of it. This is the le ...
... philosophers, who take inspiration from Peirce while considering modernity, maintain that though we have been modern, this was not any foredoomed cultural fate. An alternative has been available all the time during the course of modernity, and Peirce’s philosophy is one example of it. This is the le ...
Epistemological Vs - Birkbeck, University of London
... Mostly in this book I have speculated on causes, not justifications . . . . Even in the case of bodies, . . . , I offered no hope of justification. I entertained no thought of translating talk of bodies into talk of sense impressions, . . . I asked how, given our stimulations, we might have develope ...
... Mostly in this book I have speculated on causes, not justifications . . . . Even in the case of bodies, . . . , I offered no hope of justification. I entertained no thought of translating talk of bodies into talk of sense impressions, . . . I asked how, given our stimulations, we might have develope ...
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD AS AN EMPIRICALLY RESPONSIBLE
... social scientists than philosophers, and does his image need to be so exactly accurate? There are competing interpretations around about, say, John Dewey, as we know. My answer is that Mead’s general reputation has prevented many philosophers from seeing that his philosophy of mind can be taken as a ...
... social scientists than philosophers, and does his image need to be so exactly accurate? There are competing interpretations around about, say, John Dewey, as we know. My answer is that Mead’s general reputation has prevented many philosophers from seeing that his philosophy of mind can be taken as a ...
quine`s argument from despair
... a conceptual program and argues that neither of them can be carried out satisfactorily. On the doctrinal side, Hume’s problem of induction prevents us from deducing our beliefs about the world from basic observation statements. On the conceptual side, Quine criticizes the epistemologist’s attempts t ...
... a conceptual program and argues that neither of them can be carried out satisfactorily. On the doctrinal side, Hume’s problem of induction prevents us from deducing our beliefs about the world from basic observation statements. On the conceptual side, Quine criticizes the epistemologist’s attempts t ...
Rhetoric and the Incommensurability
... It is not clear what contact, if any, Lamprecht and Stuart had with each other. They surely knew each other on some level; both were active professional philosophers in an overlapping period, at established U.S. schools, at a time when the philosophical community was not large.5 Nor is it clear how ...
... It is not clear what contact, if any, Lamprecht and Stuart had with each other. They surely knew each other on some level; both were active professional philosophers in an overlapping period, at established U.S. schools, at a time when the philosophical community was not large.5 Nor is it clear how ...
MSWord
... epistemological view that is often taken to be a consequence of such a metaphysical view. This is the claim, roughly, that scientific knowledge is the form of knowledge, and scientific understanding is the only kind of understanding that deserves the name.2 “Philosophy is not one of the natural scie ...
... epistemological view that is often taken to be a consequence of such a metaphysical view. This is the claim, roughly, that scientific knowledge is the form of knowledge, and scientific understanding is the only kind of understanding that deserves the name.2 “Philosophy is not one of the natural scie ...
DERRIDA/CIXOUS, CIXOUS/DERRIDA Prof. Claire Colebrook
... or sounds, but he makes little mention of biography. The philosopher’s living thought – say Husserl’s beginning as a philosopher of mathematics who commenced his career explaining the possibility of numbers psychologically, but then had to confront the problem of truth and validity beyond any worldl ...
... or sounds, but he makes little mention of biography. The philosopher’s living thought – say Husserl’s beginning as a philosopher of mathematics who commenced his career explaining the possibility of numbers psychologically, but then had to confront the problem of truth and validity beyond any worldl ...
A Phenomenological Critique of the Idea of Social Science
... have as their object “man” suffer rampant disagreements because they presuppose, rather than consider, what is meant by “man”. It is our intention to show that the root of the crisis is that social science can provide no formal definition of “man”. In order to understand this we propose a phenomenol ...
... have as their object “man” suffer rampant disagreements because they presuppose, rather than consider, what is meant by “man”. It is our intention to show that the root of the crisis is that social science can provide no formal definition of “man”. In order to understand this we propose a phenomenol ...
Session 1 Rationalism –v
... • Philosophy always comes with caveats and warnings, including this! • There is no substantial consensus as occurs in, perhaps, physics (except possibly in the style, presentation or practice of philosophy) • Everything is contested – there will different views on all issues, including: – Key terms ...
... • Philosophy always comes with caveats and warnings, including this! • There is no substantial consensus as occurs in, perhaps, physics (except possibly in the style, presentation or practice of philosophy) • Everything is contested – there will different views on all issues, including: – Key terms ...
Conceptions of Determinism in Radical Behaviorism
... What exactly is the radical behaviorists’ stance on determinism? Although a complete answer to the first question is more complex than space allows, an important part of this answer will stem from our response to the second question. As this paper will illustrate, there seems to be no standard defin ...
... What exactly is the radical behaviorists’ stance on determinism? Although a complete answer to the first question is more complex than space allows, an important part of this answer will stem from our response to the second question. As this paper will illustrate, there seems to be no standard defin ...
A Conception of Philosophical Progress
... I reject idealistic positions because they set standards that are impossibly and unnecessarily high, while ignoring the legitimate, achievable, epistemic products of philosophy that indicate progress. If we judge progress in an idealistic manner, because we do not have independent access to the trut ...
... I reject idealistic positions because they set standards that are impossibly and unnecessarily high, while ignoring the legitimate, achievable, epistemic products of philosophy that indicate progress. If we judge progress in an idealistic manner, because we do not have independent access to the trut ...
Nietzsche Against the Philosophical Canon
... vindicating conclusions which the philosophers already find morally attractive given their psychological needs. Philosophers are, as Nietzsche says, all really lawyers advocating for a cause. As Nietzsche explains, again in Beyond Good and Evil, “the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy ...
... vindicating conclusions which the philosophers already find morally attractive given their psychological needs. Philosophers are, as Nietzsche says, all really lawyers advocating for a cause. As Nietzsche explains, again in Beyond Good and Evil, “the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy ...
is discontinuous bergsonism possible?
... knowledge”, that“both one and the other depend upon experience,” (Bergson 1944, 196) and in the Essai that “we [can] witness the superposition or, even better, the intimate fusion of many ideas that, once dissociated, seem to exclude themselves from each other in logically contradictory terms” (Berg ...
... knowledge”, that“both one and the other depend upon experience,” (Bergson 1944, 196) and in the Essai that “we [can] witness the superposition or, even better, the intimate fusion of many ideas that, once dissociated, seem to exclude themselves from each other in logically contradictory terms” (Berg ...
Introduction. - philosophica
... decline of progress. To study the phenomenon of complexity in itself, one should separate it from other issues like progress, as was presumably already understood by Charles Darwin. In a certain sense, it can be argued that complexity has been studied for over two thousand years. We live in a comple ...
... decline of progress. To study the phenomenon of complexity in itself, one should separate it from other issues like progress, as was presumably already understood by Charles Darwin. In a certain sense, it can be argued that complexity has been studied for over two thousand years. We live in a comple ...
The Futility of any Anti-Metaphysical Position
... days, Physics was seen as the ultimate science, while epistemology dethroned metaphysics as heir to the throne of philosophy. Physics threatened to become metaphysics, while metaphysics seriously groaned under the tutelage of physics. To gain relevance, philosophers abandoned the act of philosophizi ...
... days, Physics was seen as the ultimate science, while epistemology dethroned metaphysics as heir to the throne of philosophy. Physics threatened to become metaphysics, while metaphysics seriously groaned under the tutelage of physics. To gain relevance, philosophers abandoned the act of philosophizi ...
Economics Imperialism: Concept and Constraints
... facts it can be used to explain. This is why the idea of “classes of facts” appears in the characterization of “the Consilience of Inductions from different and separate classes of facts” (Whewell 1847, 95). So characterized, Whewell presents consilience as a virtue of theories and adds another rela ...
... facts it can be used to explain. This is why the idea of “classes of facts” appears in the characterization of “the Consilience of Inductions from different and separate classes of facts” (Whewell 1847, 95). So characterized, Whewell presents consilience as a virtue of theories and adds another rela ...
Philosophy of science
Philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of science. The central questions of this study concern what qualifies as science, the reliability of scientific theories, and the ultimate purpose of science. This discipline overlaps with metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology, for example, when it explores the relationship between science and truth.There is no consensus among philosophers about many of the central problems concerned with the philosophy of science, including whether science can reveal the truth about unobservable things and whether scientific reasoning can be justified at all. In addition to these general questions about science as a whole, philosophers of science consider problems that apply to particular sciences (such as biology or physics). Some philosophers of science also use contemporary results in science to reach conclusions about philosophy itself.While relevant philosophical thought dates back at least to the time of Aristotle, philosophy of science emerged as a distinct discipline only in the middle of the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivism movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Thomas Kuhn's book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) brought into the mainstream the word ""paradigm"", meaning the set of concepts that define a scientific discipline in a particular period. In his book, Kuhn challenged the established view of ""scientific progress as a gradual, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on rationally chosen experimental frameworks"".In the 21st century, someTemplate:Which? thinkers seek to ground science in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity of nature. Many philosophers of science, however, take a coherentist approach to science, in which a theory is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole. Still others, and Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994) in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the ""scientific method"", so all approaches to science should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones. (Feyerabend remains in the minority among philosophers of science.) Another approach to thinking about science involves studying how knowledge is created from a sociological perspective, an approach represented by scholars like David Bloor and Barry Barnes. Finally, a tradition in Continental philosophy approaches science from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.Philosophies of the particular sciences range from questions about the nature of time raised by Einstein's general relativity, to the implications of economics for public policy. A central theme is whether one scientific discipline can be reduced to the terms of another. That is, can chemistry be reduced to physics, or can sociology be reduced to individual psychology? The general questions of philosophy of science also arise with greater specificity in some particular sciences. For instance, the question of the validity of scientific reasoning is seen in a different guise in the foundations of statistics. The question of what counts as science and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in the philosophy of medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, of psychology, and of the social sciences explore whether the scientific studies of human nature can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and by social relations.