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Heidegger's Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal Indications
Author(s): Daniel O. Dahlstrom
Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Jun., 1994), pp. 775-795
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HEIDEGGER'S METHOD: PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS
AS FORMAL INDICATIONS
DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM
To give them as much credit as possible, words possess
only sufficient
efficacy to remind us in order that we may seek things, but not to exhibit
the things that we know by them.
Augustine,
I_n
may
1929, after rejecting
to feel
be expected
Protestant
suggestion
"threatened"
Christians
contemporary
criticisms,
by Kierkegaard's
remarks:
Kuhlmann
Gerhardt
theologian
that
the
De magistro.1
the
is terrified instead about the fact
But present-day
perhaps
Christianity
of its theology put out as revelation,
that everything
that the spokesmen
of
to the original Christian and reformational
understanding
according
devoid of mythologizing,
the term, has been set forth by a philosopher
that is to say, exactly and profanely.2
One
of
the
whether
Heidegger
mann
purge
suggests,
mythological
launched
against
of
appropriation
what
an
he
atheistic
the
by
of existence
Kierkegaard's
Kuhlmann's
element.3
is
paper
following
in fact, as Kuhl
does
raised
ultimately
in his analysis
questions
thought
remark
as
regards
existential
or
theological
of a broader
salvo
of every
is part
naive
contemporaries'
that reduces
the
analysis
his
1
tan
"Hactenus verba valuerunt, quibus ut plurimum tribuam, admonent
non
ut
S.
exhibent
tum ut quaeremus
res,
Operum,
Augustini
noverimus";
the
Latinae Tomus 32 (Paris: Migne,
1841), 1215; Concerning
Patrologiae
Teacher and On the Immortality
of the Soul, trans. George G. Leckie (New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1958), 46.
2
vielmehr dar?ber,
"Aber vielleicht
die heutige Christenheit
erschrickt
nach urchrist
ihrer Theologie
als Offenbarung
da? all das, was die Wortf?hrer
von einem Philosophen
Verst?ndnis
lichen und reformatorischen
ausgeben,
also exakt und profan hergestellt
ohne Mythologisierung,
wird"; Gerhardt
Problem
der
Existenz
"Zum
Kuhlmann,
(Frage an R. Bult
theologischen
10, no. 1 (1929): 51n. Unless
f?r Theologie und Kirche
mann)," Zeitschrift
are my own.
a translation
is indicated all translations
3
49 and n. 1. This purging
"Zum theologischen
Problem,"
Kuhlmann,
or "profane rendering"
Kuhlmann
argues, effectively?
(Profanisierung),
even if inadvertently?exposes
error" of confusing existential
"Kierkegaard's
analysis with theology.
Review
Metaphysics
of Metaphysics
47
(June
1994):
775-795.
Copyright
?
1994
by
the Review
of
776
DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM
of faith
phenomena
and
to the
revelation
"projection"
of
(Entwurf)
Dasein}
The
following
in an opposite
but
moves
paper
direction.
a path similar
is concerned,
paper
along
The
to Kuhlmann's,
not with Chris
tian theologians'
of Heidegger's
but rather with
appropriation
analysis,
of Christian
method.
In lectures
appropriation
theology's
Heidegger's
delivered
at Marburg
and in others given both
in
afterwards
Freiburg,
Heidegger
specifically
a
to
that
is
say,
dicatory" method,
philosophical
or signalling"
certain
by "formally
indicating
before
and
immediately
a "formally
outlines
in
method
that proceeds
methodical
Heidegger's
ture of this method
tion,
how
in his
reflections
and
it is appropriated
on
to show,
from what
The
phenomena.
pose of the following paper is to reconstruct,
principally
lectures,
the basis
pur
in light of
the genesis
and na
that reconstruc
of
he understands
by Christian
theology.
I
Central
dition
is his
to Heidegger's
that
charge
criticism
of the Western
it has
tra
philosophical
over" the world
as
repeatedly
"passed
a phenomenon
as a collection
in favor of nature,
conceived
of sub
or things present.5
stances
this
Dominating
prevailing
conception,
to Heidegger,
as the
is meta-physics,
understood
according
loosely
as they are in some
to regard
insofar
tendency
things as being
only
sense
and thus potentially
to human
available
and accessible
present
concerns.
His contemporaries'
for the integrity
of the hu
arguments
manities
and historical
studies
in
the
face of
(Geisteswissenschaften)
the demand
of nature
for the unity
of a single
method
come
drawn
up short
from
(Naturwissenschaften),
as do the myriad
to refute
attempts
to the same ontological
subscribe
They come up short,
because
they tacitly
the sciences
in Heidegger's
eyes.
psychologism,
assumption
as
4
"Zum theologischen
50-1.
Problem,"
5Kuhlmann,
Martin Heidegger,
Sein und Zeit
Nie
(hereafter,
"SZ") (T?bingen:
zur Geschichte
des Zeit
meyer,
1972), 63-6; Martin Heidegger, Prolegomena
begriffes
(hereafter,
"PGZ"), 2d ed., ed. Petra Jaeger, vol. 20 of the Gesam
1925 (Frankfurt am Main:
tausgabe: Marburg lectures of the summer semester
Vittorio Klostermann,
The Gesamtausgabe
is cited hereafter
1988), 231-51.
as GA followed by the volume number and by the year of its publication
in
all volumes of the GA are published
in Frankfurt
parentheses;
by Klostermann
am
Main.
111
HEIDEGGER'S METHOD
else something
whatever
On that assumption,
may
opponents.6
for it "to be" is for it to be present
it means
said to be, what
or, in
sense
in the broadest
of the term,
to be a scientific
other words,
object
or
over
some
of
knowing
standing
against
namely,
capable
something
their
be
subject
researching
ein Gegenstand).
(gegen?berstehend,
neglect of the world
Philosophical
is thus inHeidegger's
eyes the
"to be" means,
of what
of the forgottenness
which,
despite
expression
with
the mere
of any
is not to be confused
the tradition,
presence
same.
can
of the
Nor
the re
particular
thing or being or collection
trieval
not
"to be" means
of what
a science
that concerns
be
the provenance
some object
itself with
In a muscular
latter
is or can
be
sweep
of which
the philosophical
present.
of science,
at least
only insofar as the
historical
community
narrative,
has not witnessed
the
since
the likes of Hegel or Nietzsche, Heidegger recounts the difficult infancy
idea of a science
of
in the classical
Greek
of this Seinsvergessenheit
in
context
of
the
medieval
the
sciences
its
adolescence
dreamy
being,
of theology,
ern scientific
its maturation
in the unabashed
of the mod
subjectivism
its domination
of nature")
and, finally,
project
("mastery
as technology
in the twentieth
century.
as well
as historical
to Heidegger's
dimension
is a logical
There
or
as
a more
to regard
The tendency
basically
critique.
everything
less objectifiable presence
is facilitated, he insists, by the logical prej
as the property
of a certain
class of
solely
in other words,
is the
The logical prejudice,
as
or judgments
the distinctive
assertions
forms
truth
of construing
or
assertions.
judgments
udice
proclivity
of logos
Heidegger
to privilege
of bearing
truth (Wahrheitstr?ger).7
capable
understands
ways
them, are communicable
and specifying something
cording
matically
to the
the
(specifying
prejudice
of a
predicate
logical
out
it by way of predication).8
Ac
mentioned
sentence
as
Assertions,
of pointing
above,
designating
"true"
a
is paradig
judgment
or
6
Martin Heidegger, Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit
"Lo
(hereafter,
semester
lectures of the winter
1925/26,
gik"), ed. Walter Biemel, Marburg
GA 21 (1976), 92.
7
existen
aspects of Heidegger's
Certainly one of the most controversial
as
is his appeal to a private logos, namely, the call of conscience
tial analysis
or authentic
the
truth.
the privileged
of
This
of
aspect
logos
Heidegger's
can
for deception
and of public discourse's
proclivities
analysis of conscience
and "the beautiful
be fruitfully compared with Hegel's account of conscience
soul's" regard for language; see G. W. F. Hegel, Ph?nomenologie
des Geistes,
ed. Hans-Friedrich
Wessels
and Heinrich Clairmont
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner,
1988), 428-42.
8SZ, 154-8; Logik, 133-4.
DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM
778
and
assertion,
is legitimately
some thing or object
predicated
is or is believed
of
such
a sentence
to be present
if
only
in precisely
the
or assertion
indicates
and specifies.
that the respective
way
judgment
to point
out something
that purport
in
labels assertions
Heidegger
or "theoretical"
sofar as it is present
Such
"thematic"
assertions.9
are central
assertions
its objects.
or theology,
tigates
matics
cal or practical.
Of the many
physics
itself
or psychology,
entertains
or whether
the fundamental
a science?
be mathe
it be
ontology
use
it not make
undertaken
of thematic
theoreti
be chal
are
means
these
self
in Being
and
or theoretical
to indicate,
and communicate
what
specify,
as the
case of Daseint
in the paradigmatic
Insofar
is presumed,
is not that meaning
of "to be"
assertions
assertions
in order
Does
inves
and
the science
on which Heidegger's
critique might
grounds
and most
trenchant
the most
obvious
perhaps
lenged,
Is not
referential.
Time
to the way
that a science
whether
It does not matter
"to be"
truth
of
thereby
suc
that
does
Or,
systematically
objectified?
Heidegger
an
of
in
that
and
ceed
interplay
presencing
absencing
demonstrating
means
it
for
constitutes
what
the
respectively
humans,
fundamentally
to the extent
and even things ready-to-hand
world,
of the
committed
to the presence
method
Heidegger's
from any other?
In the
world,
investigating
is the demonstration
not
should
Why,
indeed,
interplay?10
means
what
be different
"to be"
was by no means
lost on Heidegger.
challenge
summer
semester
his charge
that the
of 1925, after repeating
over
the
of the
tradition
has
phenomena
passed
philosophical
he ponders:
This
Western
of
"to be,"
self-referential
in a positive way?
to be determined
Yet how, then, is the world
structure
to
the
of the world,
be
said
about
is something
supposed
How
given
9
three levels or
(p. 156n.) Heidegger
distinguishes
SZ, 158; in Logik
to which a theoretical
about some
assertion
modes
of assertions
according
an
constitutes
"extreme."
thing present-at-hand
10
to articulate a clearing (Lichtung)
attempts
Subsequently,
Heidegger
that is neither present nor absent, and comes into its own (ereignet sich) in
in
to the presence/absence
a way irreducible
and manifestness/hiddenness
"Was hei?t denken?" and Martin
terplays; see, for example, Martin Heidegger,
"Aletheia
16)," in Vortr?ge und Aufs?tze
(Heraklit, Fragment
Heidegger,
Zur
136-7,
264, 268; Martin Heidegger,
Neske,
1954), 128-9,
(Pfullingen:
Sache des Denkens
1976), 20-5, 72-4; Martin Heideg
(T?bingen: Niemeyer,
1971), 97. For a useful re
ger, Was hei?t Denkend
(T?bingen: Niemeyer,
sume of these efforts see Thomas Pr?fer, "Glosses on Heidegger's
Architec
in Philosophy
in Thomas Pr?fer, Recapitulations:
tonic Word-Play,"
Essays
of America Press, 1993), 107-9.
D. C: The Catholic University
(Washington,
779
HEIDEGGER'S METHOD
that above all, from the outset,
extreme objectification?11
we
shun every
theory
and precisely
this
These queries of 1925 are not the first or the last time that Heidegger
entertained
account,
tainly
the
self-referential
does
not
Heidegger
does have a method.12
and
methodology
1919 and
between
to his method.
challenge
a methodology,
have
exactly
between
Lying somewhere
are
his method
1930, in the
to this challenge
to respond
by
or way of
acter of his method
semester
In the summer
several
course
invoking
"methodical
By his own
but he cer
a full-blown
reflections"13
of which
he repeatedly
attempts
the "formally
char
indicative"
conceiving
things.14
he acknowledges
of 1930, for example,
to words,
is committed
it is exposed
That
mis
its
essential
content."
of
that, as soon as philosophizing
to an "essential misinterpretation
the view
is precisely
interpretation
been
degger
has
articulated,
sets for himself
to be taken
the goal
as it has
that everything,
insofar
for something
Hei
present-at-hand.
to
of "being able, at least relatively,
also observes:
"Also f?r die Philosophie
handelt
11PGZ, 251. Heidegger
es sich gerade um radikalste Erhellung?philosophisches
kategorial-untheo
Martin Heidegger,
retisches Aufbrechen";
Interpretati
Ph?nomenologische
onen zu Aristoteles,
in die ph?nomenologische
Einf?hrung
Forschung
(here
and K?te Br?ckwer-Oltmanns,
after, "P/?"), ed. Walter Br?cker
Early Frei
lectures of the winter semester
1921/22, GA 61 (1985), 198.
burg 12
der Faktizit?t),
Martin Heidegger,
ed. K?te
(Hermeneutik
Ontologie
Br?cker-Oltmanns,
Early Freiburg lectures of the summer semester
1923, GA
63 (1988), 79.
13
SZ, 27-8, 310-16; PIA, 157.
und Theolo
19-20, 61-2; Martin Heidegger,
UPIA,
"Ph?nomenologie
2d ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Wegmarken,
gie," in Martin Heidegger,
use of formale
has been
Klostermann,
1983), 65-6.
Anzeige
Heidegger's
discussed
and van Dijk; see Otto P?ggeler,
"Hei
by P?ggeler, Oudemanns,
in
Martin
und
Innenlogische
Heidegger:
deggers
Untersuchungen,"
W. Kohler, W. Kuhlmann,
ed. R. Blasche,
and P. Rohs
Au?enansichten,
C. W. Oudemans,
1989), 75-100; Theodore
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
Studies 6 (1990): 85-105;
Heidegger
"Heideggers
'logische Untersuchungen',"
R. J. A. van Dyk, "Grundbegriffe
der Metaphysik:
Zur formalanzeigenden
Struktur der philosophischen
bei
7
Studies
Begriffe
Heidegger," Heidegger
Gadamer
refers to Heidegger's
earlier, frequent use of the
(1991): 89-109.
see Hans-Georg
notion of a "formale Anzeige";
"Die religi?se Di
Gadamer,
in Hans-Georg
mension"
Gadamer, Heideggers
Wege
(1981),
(T?bingen:
J. C. B. Mohr, 1983), 148. Gadamer also addresses
the general issue of Hei
language in his "Heidegger und die Sprache der Me
degger's nonobjectifying
III (T?bingen: J. C. B.
Gadamer, Kleinere
taphysik," in Hans-Georg
Schriften
There is also extensive
discussion
of the notion of a
Mohr, 1972), 212-30.
in Theodore
"formale Anzeige"
Kisiel, The Genesis
of Heidegger's
Being and
Time (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University
of California
Press,
1993); re
grettably, a copy of Kisiel's dense and helpful study first came into my hands
of the present article.
after completion
DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM
780
elude"
sary
that misinterpretation;
to reflect on the general
they are all formally
At the beginning
plication";
fundamental
among
"a specific
in the formal
sense
of
observational
method
clear
of pointing
all
that
he
regards
the
"formal
to some
time
tion
that would
foreclose
pursuit
and
connections
to ex
declines
his use
essay,
indication"
of
as a
its preliminary
fixing
at the same
it, while
way
phenomenon,
manner
of unpacking
and the corresponding
"uncritical
into some
any
lapse"
deflecting
sense
of
Jaspers's
refers to a "formal
in
Heidegger
ex
of
of
the
method
step
phenomenological
. .
he maintains,
"a methodical.
indication,
concepts
philosophical
is to be seen."16
Though
Heidegger
in the context
further
of the Jaspers
makes
r?visable
"it is neces
end," he observes,
of philosophical
that
concepts,
or signalling
[formal
indicating
anzeigend].'915
on the
in his critical
of the same period,
remarks
as
concepts
the notion
plain
the notion
character
and
preconceptions
der Weltanschauungen,
problematic
Psychologie
dication"
"to this
of
"a genuine
specific
of
sense"
concep
the phe
nomenon.17
understands
Heidegger
elaborated
thereafter
shortly
What
sively
by a "formal
in the winter
indication"
semester
is exten
of 1921/22.18
15
Die Grundbegriffe
der Metaphysik
Martin Heidegger,
(hereafter,
lectures of the winter
Freiburg
"GM"), ed. Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann,
use of the ex
semester
One customary
1929/30, GA 29/30 (1983), 422, 430.
some sort of reference
is to characterize
that provides
"indication"
pression
and inference.
the starting point for further examination
Along these lines,
a use of "Anzeige"
there is a specific use of the term in medicine
paralleling
as to the treatment of
or direction
"A suggestion
(Oxford English Dictionary
a disease,
to this
which
derived from the symptoms
observed"),
according
the first use of the term in English.
is apparently
Nevertheless,
dictionary
in no way has the same rich array of uses as does "Anzeige."
"indication"
to "Anzeige" are captured by the term
Some of the connotations
attaching
as
it is translated here sometimes
"signal," taken in a broad sense; hence,
an "Anzeige" may
as "signal."
More specifically,
sometimes
"indication,"
an announcement
a notice served or a warning,
(for example, of a
designate
a public
or a death), an advertisement
the "personals"),
(including
wedding
or
a
a
of
stock
of
declaration
bankruptcy,
typically
(for example,
offering
or a prospectus.
in a newspaper),
At various
times Heidegger
appearing
or more
accents
in his use
to one
of "formale
of these
appeals
Anzeige." 16
first refers to a "formally indicat
9-11, 29. Heidegger's
Wegmarken,
in regard to fixing the sense
Bedeutung)
(formed anzeigende
ing meaning"
of the term "method"; he then speaks of the object of the inquiry "fixed in a
Cf. also PIA, 141.
formal indication as existence."
11
11.
Wegmarken,
18
sus
the most
These early Freiburg
lectures
(PIA) contain perhaps
as far as his philosophical
tained self-reflexive
deliberations
by Heidegger,
is concerned.
method
reading for anyone trying to un
They are obligatory
HEIDEGGER'S METHOD
These
lectures
make
781
clear what
had in mind when
he re
Heidegger
as "a specific
ferred in the Jaspers
indication
essay to the formal
step
of the method
of phenomenological
and
"a methodical
explication"
. . . fundamental
sense of all philosophical
That "funda
concepts."
as
mental
of philosophical
sense"
insofar
concepts
they are "formal
is based
indications"
upon
ject of an interpretation
must
the phenomenological
be so articulated
that
insight that the ob
the determination
of the object (in what sense it is) must emerge from the manner
one
which
originally
"has"
originally
becomes
accessible
(wie
The "object" of philosophy
g?nglich wird).19
means"
in the case
nothing
unthematic
but a way
itself is "what 'to be'
of such "having";
in other words,
philosophizing
of comporting
to an original,
oneself
unreflected
an attempt
to "have"
comportment,
(unabgehobenen)
the
"understand"
latter
in
is to say, the manner
in which
it
der Gegenstand
zu
urspr?nglich
it, that
is
or
or
authentically.20
such
locutions
as "having"
"com
(haben),
or
em
to
in
order
porting"
(verhalten),
"understanding"
(verstehen)
that that original,
unthematic
is for
phasize
"having" or "comporting"
some
sort
the most
not
of
meditative
act
of
part
deliberate,
knowing
chooses
Heidegger
Instead
something.
those
locutions
practical,
any way?theoretical,
signify
a human
and so on?in
which
playful,
devotional,
tender,
to something,
relate
a natural
whether
might
himself,
another,
an
an
a
a
mathematical
scientific
object,
artifact,
artwork,
formula,
a dream,
and so on.
The task of philosophy
is to deter
hypothesis,
being
mine
what
determination
and
precise
lates to each
in an
"to be" means
is possible
fundamental
of them
important
only
way
case
of
any
of
(where
latter
and
this
or
the
"retrieving"
re
exists
and
being
this existing
are
and relating
by understanding
a human
in which
respectively
the
sense
cludes,
philosophy's
and radical,"
indeed,
ing it is what
in the
con
logically
Thus, Heidegger
equivalent).
of relating
to its object
is "utterly original
way
such "that even and precisely
the grasp
through
it grasps
and
grasps
what
it is."21
Since
philosophy's
derstand Heidegger's method during the first decade of his professional
career
and his attempts at that time to answer the self-referential
posed
challenges
tradition.
by his 19own critique of the Western
philosophical
27.
20PIA, 18-19, 20, 23; SZ,
Later Heidegger
that original "having" or "comportment"
associates
with what Aristotle
inMetaphysics
as thigein and nous, con
9.10 describes
strued as the prepropositional
having in which what cannot be differentiated
and thus is not subject to predication
discloses
itself (alMhein);
(asyntheta)
see Logik, 179-90.
21
PIA, 60-1; cf. pp. 41-2, 51, 53-4.
782
DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM
"to be" means
is what
"object"
it cannot
portment,
from the outside.
(or more
exactly,
"have"
(understand,
Instead
philosophy
that original,
reenact)
context
of
retrieve)
must
itself
com
original
as it were
its object
that
carry
unthematic
out
"having,"
or enact
so as to
it explicitly.22
appropriate
for this reason
Precisely
as
formal
indications
concepts
some
toward
tively
in the
original
characterizes
Heidegger
philosophical
or signals,
respec
concepts
pointing
task to
comportment,
yet as "a concrete
be completed or performed by [philosophizing] alone" (eine eigene
konkrete VoUzugsaufgabe).23 What is thereby indicated is not given
"in any
and actual
A philo
only "in principle."
sense and hence
in a certain
is accordingly
concept
sophical
"empty"
it
"formal"?"formal"
because
in
the
direction
of some
purely
points
complete
thing that must be performed
by the philosopher,
perfected
the philosophical
but
sense"
or gone through and even fulfilled or
a direction,
moreover,
or "theme"
itself.24
Thus,
"object"
the depiction
of some fact (Sachverhalt),
but
of a way of approaching
what
"to be" means.25
not
that springs
from
Sein und Zeit
is
rather
an indication
II
In Heidegger's
indication"
First,
two
it points
any preemptive
use
and characterization
of the notion
of a "formal
functions
be delineated.
may
principal,
overlapping
to a phenomenon
in such a way
that it eryoins
against
or external
of it.
characterization
The formal indication prevents
any drifting off into blindly dogmatic
fixations of the categorial meaning
for the intrinsic determinacies
of a
kind of object, while what
'to be' means
in its case has not been dis
in other words,
that are independent
and detached
cussed;
fixations,
22
see also note 1 above.
23 Ibid., 60-1, 80, 169-71;
PIA, 34, 60-1; the German ear may well hear the notion of a prospect
in this use of the "Anzeige"; see note 15 above.
In describing
the philosoph
ical act and, as discussed
relies heavily
below, the act of believing, Heidegger
on the terms "vollziehen"
and "Vollzug."
As in the case of "Anzeige" it is
to note connotations
that are not conveyed
important
by a single term in
In "Vollziehen"
there is a sense of executing,
English.
carrying out, and
but also a sense of accomplishing,
and fulfilling.
performing
perfecting,
24
58.
25PIA, 32-4, 51,
in Sein
repeatedly
Heidegger
employs the notion of a formal indication
see SZ, 52-3, 114, 116
und Zeit, without,
any further explanation;
however,
see Oudemanns,
17, 179, 231, 313-15;
"Heideggers
'logische Untersuchun
gen',"
85.
783
HEIDEGGER'S METHOD
the preconception,
from the presupposition,
of the interpretation.26
to this function
refers
Heidegger
tive"
(hinweisend-prohibitive)
garded
as
cept
as a specific
instance
a formal
indication
of a philosophical
concept
as the
explicitly
function.27
of this
is said
[Korrektion, that is,Mitleitung]
the context,
"referring-prohibi
be
re
might
(In what
the philosophical
con
a corrective
guide
function,
to provide
to theology.28)
as a formal
and the time
The second function
indication
is to reverse
the
a reversal
is entertained,
whatever
of objectifying
that
customary
who
transforms
the individual
this sec
philosophizes.
Accordingly,
to as the "reversing-transforming"
is referred
ond function
function.29
way
The first of these functions illuminates why Heidegger utilizes the
two
terms
"indicating"
and
"formal."
The
indicating
as a pointing
is preliminary (Ansatz); it is binding for
(anzeigend als hinweisend)
the investigation, giving it direction and principles, but as preliminary
is not
itself meant
object
of the
phasize
that
cation,
tomary
26
to specify
investigation.30
the philosophical
is not predetermined?or
or arbitrary ways.31
or "authentic"
sense
in any adequate
the
The term "formal"
to em
is employed
as it is a formal
insofar
indi
concept,
at
Thus
least
Heidegger
not
in any
number
lays great weight
of cus
on the
von In
in eigenst?ndige,
"Die formale Anzeige verwehrt
jede Abdrift
Interpretationszusam
Interpretationsvorgriff,
terpretationsvoraussetzung,
und Interpretationszeit
blind dogmatische
Fixationen
des
menhang
abgel?ste,
un
Sinnes zu Ansichbestimmtheiten
einer auf ihren Seinssinn
kategorialen
142.
diskutierten
PIA,
Gegenst?ndlichkeit";
27
This function of the philosophical
PIA, 34, 141-2.
concept as a "for
mal indication" comprises
the Husserlian
way of appropriating
Heidegger's
For Heidegger's
account of the transcendental
and eidetic reduc
epoch?.
tions elaborated by Husserl see PGZ, 135-39.
An excellent discussion
of the
Husserlian
Husserlian
Medita
epoch? is to be found in Robert Sokolowski,
tions: How Words Present Things (Evanston: Northwestern
University
Press,
1974), 28172-81.
igt das formal anzeigende
Korrektiv des on
"Philosophie
ontologische
zwar
und
vorchristlichen
des
Gehaltes
tischen,
theologischen
Grundbegriffe";
65.
Wegmarken,
29
rpjie "reversal" function amplifies
and clarifies the "prohibitive"
func
tion by indicating that the bracketing
involved
"ist
nicht
(Ausschaltung)
getan
mit einem einmaligen methodischen
Diktat, sondern sie ist der mit dem Voll
zug des Philosophierens
st?ndig gleichzeitliche
Kampf der philosophischen
faktischen
ihre
faktische
153.
Interpretation
gegen
eigene
Ruinanz"; PIA,
While the first function, as an appropriation
of the Husserlian
epoch?, may
be regarded as phenomenological,
the second
is theological
in a
function
sense that w?l be made clearer below.
30
32.
31PIA,
"F?r den Anzeige- und Verweisungscharakter
besagt die Bestimmung
DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM
784
fact
the
that
he
concepts
employs
are neither
nor
"formally
logical"
say,
(or, one might
but "formally
"for
indicating"
in
Formal
his
not
at
formal
all
view,
really
logic is,
signalling").
a
it springs from
that has already
been deter
region of objects
manner
of comprehension?"assembling
and a corresponding
"formally
mally
since
mined
thematic,"
so as to put
a "formally
Similarly,
(ordnendes
Sammeln)32
use of "neighboring"
makes
schemata
and
interpretation
access
the original
to the
instead of itself retrieving
notions,
or
what
is
indicated
is not
"formally
By contrast,
signalled"
thematic"
"settled"
objects.33
as
given
in order"
contrast,
comparison,
is understandable
dicated"
or carries
out
some
activity
characterized
concepts
first
this
function.
exemplify
manner
"I," while
of being
that
at the same
of
understandable
what
insofar
only
himself.
Several
tions"
and
already
complete
and classification;
something
through
is "formally
in
instead,
as the philosopher
performs
as "formal
by Heidegger
The "am" in "I am" points
indica
to the
is involved,
attention
away from the
deflecting
time insuring
that it not be taken as an instance
ex
The concept
of "death"
refers
to the most
is."34
"something
treme possibility
in terms
at
while
the same
himself,
of which
a human
being
can
understand
a conception
of
thereby
precluding
as something
of the her
The "as-structure"
death
present-at-hand.35
or
as
in
meneutical
is
involved
understanding
taking
using something
such
and
such,
for
example,
time
using
something
as a chair
or using
a
'leer' bedeutet:
und doch ent
'formal' etwas Entscheidendes!
Gegenstand
sondern gerade
'leer' und Rich
Nicht beliebig und ohne Ansatz,
scheidend!
33.
PIA,
bindend";
tung bestimmend,
anzeigend,
32
PIA, 20, 162-4, 178. Even the principle of noncontradiction,
Heideg
in this connection,
is conditioned
contends
by a "specific logic of order
ger
see pp. 163-4.
ing"; 33
174.
34PIA, 80,
SZ, 116. The
10-11, 29-30; PIA, 172-4; see, however,
Wegmarken,
in PIA is extensive:
and the "formally indicative"
list of "formal indications"
of philosophy"
"the definition
(pp. 20, 32, 43, 59-60, 63, 66, 72); "determina
and "con
tions" and "observations,"
specifically
"comportment"
regarding
of philosophizing"
tent" (pp. 52-3, 55); "the determinations
(pp. 57, 183); "to
be" (p. 61), "caring" (pp. 89-90, 98); "the object of philosophy,"
namely, what
of starting for an "exis
in life, facticity
"to be" means
(p. 113); the method
of the
tenziellen
Interpretation"
(p. 134); the characterization
kategorialen
nature of the act of caring (p. 137); the characteristics
of "ruin
kairological
and the "counter-movement,"
ation" (Ruinanz)
namely, philosophy
(pp. 140
1,183); "nothing" (p. 145); the way of illuminating the sense of a philosophical
of the theme (Gegen
"life" and the definition
(pp. 158-9);
presupposition
"I
am"
and
the
"am I?" (pp.
of
question
philosophy
(p.
171),
st?ndlichkeit)
174-5).35
GM, 425-9;
cf. SZ, 240.
HEIDEGGER'S METHOD
as
chair
not
to sit on
something
construes
Heidegger
to emphasize
rashly
that
785
this
or
to stand on, and so on.
something
as
a
formal
"as-structure"
indication
in order
this relation
must
to the derivative
assimilated
be grasped
relation
on
its own
of two
terms,
things
and
presum
ably present together and capable of being so indicated and specified
(predicated) in a theoretical judgment.36
These
it evident,
if it is not so already,
make
that Hei
on the formality
of philosophical
is some
concepts
are
not
understood
concepts
Philosophical
clearly
examples
emphasis
degger's
what misleading.
by him as being so devoid
errant
determinations
presumptive
concept's
cipled"
themes
of content
to preclude
they are unable
of their meaning.
A philosophical
that
is, as he puts it, a "binding"
referring
(Hinweis)
as his remarks
one.37 Moreover,
about formal logic
as formal
reveal, philosophical
concepts
of objects
presupposed
by
indications
and "prin
and formal
exclude
at
concepts
specific
sciences?insofar,
as
the
means
into
what
case
in
"to
be"
the
of these objects
least,
inquiry
access
the original
to them) has been put off or ignored.
(and, thereby,
The methodological
governed
losophy.
to the second
(the
dence
we
ascribed by Heidegger
as formal
indications
concepts
his
by
specific
understanding
This characteristic
is perhaps
sophical
strives
functions
function
of the formal
for an understanding
of "to be"),
significance
that words
speak
(with
about.
talking
even more
concepts
what
they
point
evident
in regard
indication.
Because
philosophy
of something
that is highly questionable
it stands
in conflict with
the easy confi
and that, when
customary
usage are reliable
or ourselves),
we generally
know what we are
as "philo
that Heidegger
understands
concepts
are not, at least for the most
"formal indications"
in their
others
The
sophical"
and, hence,
or technical
part, neologisms
concepts.
derived
from the way of life that informs
because
of this origin, however,
Precisely
"formal
to philo
are thus, as is to be expected,
of the aim and content
of phi
as a warning
at all common.38
indications"
to is not
they are themselves
use of language.
the normal
Instead
such
Heidegger
designates
access
that authentic
to
In fact,
that access
runs
36
424-5.
37GM,
168-9.
PIA,
19-25, 56-61,
38
See note 15 above.
The formalization
of everyday expressions
cre
a certain distance
to them, allowing us to
ates, as Oudemans
aptly observes,
look at them.
"In diesem Mitgehen mit der Durchschnittlichkeit
des Allt?g
lichen und mit der ?berlieferten
versucht Heidegger
durch For
Ontologie
der Begriffe
zu lassen"; Oude
eine gewisse Distanz
entstehen
malisierung
99.
manns,
"Heideggers
'logische Untersuchungen',"
786
DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM
to the customary
into the usual ways
of con
(Sturz)
"plunge"
the talk is less than explicit
and the interpre
sidering
things, where
tation remains
The
and
factual necessity
very "possibility
implicit.39
counter
...
as the method
one must
the formal
indication
from which
as
in
he
this
he
would
later
in
it
Sein
und Zeit,
put
begin"
"plunge" or,
in the "fallenness"
of human
to
in the propensity
existence,
namely,
some
to
the
of
In
other
the
yield
anonymity
public
words,
opinion.40
is required
to invert the normal
and way
of
philosopher
perspective
of
questions,
posing
erally
toward
the gen
away from particular
namely,
beings
and unexamined
horizon
within
which
they are re
unspoken
encountered
spectively
and
the manner
of being
that they do.
as "fife" and "existence"
direct attention
have
indications
such
Thus, formal
to a specific
but unthematized
and implicit meaning
of "to be," a mean
a
of which,
because
it is unthematized,
ing the understanding
requires
certain
reversal.41
In these
into
lectures
how
elaborates
the "plunge"
early
Heidegger
is a "movement"
characteristic
of the way we
in fact
we
are
on
care of ourselves,
live:
bent
but on the
taking
the world
typically
world's
is to say, in terms of what
in the eyes
that means
a
we
no
As
result,
ourselves,
longer are familiar with
even when
on
confronted
with
the other
ourselves.42
Philosophy,
counter
is "a movement
to this plunge
into the world"
hand,
running
movement
This
atten
directs
(eine gegenruinante
Bewegtheit)}3
terms,
of the world.
tion,
to be
sure,
that
at what
it means
"to be" within
the
concrete
situ
39
For Heidegger's
definition
of this "plunge"
"formally-indicating"
see PIA, 131, 136-7, 139-40,
143-55.
(Sturz)40 or ruination (Ruinanz)
unaus
Leben erhellt,
in irgendwelcher
"Sofern alles im faktischen
dr?cklicher
Rede steht, in unabgehobener
faktischer ruinanter Interpretation
. .der formalen
und faktische Notwendigkeit.
'ist', liegt darin die M?glichkeit
. . ."; PIA,
als Ansatzmethode
134.
mentions
four
Anzeige
Heidegger
in PIA, 140-1.
characters
of ruination
"formally-indicative
[Ruinanz]"
41
88.
42GM, 430; PIA, 19-20, 80,
here is the content
PIA, 136; cf. pp. 130-2,142.
Plainly foreshadowed
of the structural division of inauthenticity
and authenticity
(or, perhaps bet
so central to the argu
ter, not being and being my own self: Eigentlichkeit)
ment and rhetoric of Sein und Zeit.
In this connection
Oudemans
identifies
a noteworthy
shift in Heidegger's
In the early Freiburg years, he
thinking.
as the paradoxical
is depicted
movement
both within
contends,
philosophy
and counter to the total movement
of Ruinanz,
only by pushing
succeeding
as and by "emptiness" and "nothingness."
the latter to its limits, characterized
in SZ Heidegger
ascribes a distinct
By contrast,
topos to authenticity
and,
refers to a prevailing
indifference
toward in
perhaps more fundamentally,
as well as authenticity;
authenticity
Oudemanns,
"Heideggers
'logische Un
101-4.
91-3,
tersuchungen',"
43
PIA, 153.
787
HEIDEGGER'S METHOD
can make
this meaning
clear,
Philosophy
"the most
fundamentally
appropriate
however,
only by articulating
"
sense
des Seinssinns)
and
of what
it means
'to be'
(das Ureigene
to life.44
To
and its "binding
character"
that meaning
by bringing
ations
out
carry
this
task
life.
"Philosophy
in each
philosophy
from
its downfall
is itself
ing,
is, in Heidegger's
is a fundamental
re-trieves
authentically
[Abfall], a taking back which,
also
noted,
is initially unthematic
one's
comportment
equivalently,
what
and,
it in the winter
puts
the basis
semester
of a transformation
of 1929/30,
of human
At the end of Heidegger's
he employs
cifically
sertions.
of an "indication"
the notion
phenomenological,
While
the worldly
One
in
oneself
and world.
itmust
can
As
Hei
be understood
itself only in and
Dasein."46
lectures of the 1925/26 winter semester
categorial"
assertions
at-hand,
phenomenological,
as something
present-at-hand,
in order
assertions
to distinguish
"spe
as
from "worldly"
present
point out something
assertions
refer to Dasein,
not
categorial
the understanding
of
but as something
or
on
a
the
of
the
reversal
thinker.47
part
transposition
requires
concedes
that, insofar as the "phenomenologi
again Heidegger
which
Once
cal,
search
a trans
entails
philosophizing.
without
putting
that "what philosophy deals with generally discloses
on
it back
life, taking
as a radical
life."45
thematize
degger
the philosophical
of living itself, such that
case
reversal
question
to live
eyes,
manner
as already
(Umstellung),
individual
of
the
(Verwandlung)
This
formation
not
life.
of everyday
categorial
worldly
assertion"
(apophantic)
present-at-hand."48
it shares
is articulated,
and thereby means
assertion
However,
the
structure
"something
of a
at first
he adds:
even if it is made
A worldly
assertion about something present-at-hand,
in the context of a mere naming, can directly mean what has been said,
while an assertion about Dasein
each assertion about
and furthermore
assertion
in order
requires,
being, each [phenomenological]
categorial
a reversal
to be understood,
the reversal of the understanding,
in the
direction
of what has been indicated, which
is never some
essentially
thing
present-at-hand.49
44
168-9.
45PIA,
cf. p. 88.
PIA,
80;
46
423.
GM,
47
In order to avoid possible
it should be noted that this use
confusion,
of "specifically phenomenological,
is replaced in Sein und Zeit by
categorial"
the use of "existential"
and contrasted with the use of "categorial."
Heideg
in the winter semester of 1925/26.
ger is48
plainly groping for terminology
410.
49Logik,
"Eine weltliche
auch wenn
?ber Vorhandenes,
sie in einem
Aussage
DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM
788
The uphill task that Heidegger
be
to kick
able
away
the very
concepts,
sertions,
"objectifying"
make
his climb.
sets for himself
ladder
and
He must
is obvious.
or
("worldly"
so on) on which
as
"theoretical"
he
to
is forced
own perspective,
this ladder may be character
Heidegger's
as a "scientific
in
it
this regard
and
is
that Heidegger's
method,"
of a "formal indication"
and a "formally
indicative method"
conception
From
ized
takes on added significance.
Throughout
the decade
of the 1920s
the sort of investigation
cautiously
appropri
distinguished
Heidegger
own
ate to specific
from
his
sciences
inves
("ontic")
("ontological")
of "to be."
He did not eschew
the term
into the meanings
tigations
in characterizing
his own project,
however.
in the summer
semester
scientific
philosophy"
"science"
to "our
following
declares
as the science,
philosophy
of being,
the latter
indeed,
characterizing
In the final Marburg
lectures
"objectification
[sic] of being."51
to speak of a "philosophical
later he continues
science."52
the summer
even
the
as the
a year
referring
1925, Hei
of lectures
the
of
the philosophizing
logic, the topic
as "the science
of truth."50
he
semester,
"Phenomenology,"
of being" and at the end of
in Sein und Zeit,
"is the science
characterizes
degger
After
semester
"absolute
Towards
1927 he describes
of
science"
the close
of those
even more
in his
and
final Marburg
lectures,
however,
his
first lectures
subsequent
stay) at
(of
is unmistakeably
altered
of philosophy
emphatically
the characterization
Freiburg,
he now urges,
is "more original"
in this respect.
Philosophy,
to characterize
and degrading
science
and it is both deceitful
ophy as a science.53
than
any
philos
eine
Nennen vollzogen
ist, kann direkt das Gesagte meinen, w?hrend
und
weiterhin
?ber
?ber
Dasein
Sein,
jede kategoriale
jede Aussage
Aussage
zu ihrem Verst?ndnis
der Umstellung
des Verstehens
be
notwendig
Aussage
nie Vorhandenes
auf das Indizierte selbst, das wesenhaft
darf, der Umstellung
ist"; Logik, 410 n. 1.
2-3, 184, 190; Logik, 10-11.
50PGZ,
51
466.
It is difficult to rec
48; GP, 15-17, 459-60,
SZ, 37; Wegmarken,
von Sein") with Oudemans's
oncile this last quotation
("Vergegenst?ndlichung
to
foundation
had no illusions about giving a scientific
claim that Heidegger
as
a
was
of
his
science
and
that
characterization
philosophy
philosophy
see Oudemans,
"Hei
chiefly a rhetorical means of warding off Schw?rmerei;
90.
deggers52 'logische Untersuchungen',"
der Logik im Aus
Martin Heidegger, Metaphysische
Anfangsgr?nde
lectures of the summer semester
ed. Klaus Held, Marburg
gang von Leibniz,
blo?en
GA 26 (1978), 11, 70.
1928,53
Ibid., 287; GM, 2-3, 22-4, 30; see also the previous note.
Heidegger's
are
character
of his early philosophy
views about the scientific
changing
Last
Review
Meta
traced in Daniel O. Dahlstrom,
Word,"
of
"Heidegger's
41, no. 3 (March 1988): 593-6.
physics
HEIDEGGER'S METHOD
789
of a scientific
of philosophy
is self
rejection
understanding
to
in
be
but
view
of
meth
the
sure,
critical,
hardly surprising
especially
considerations
his demand
that philosophical
odological
prompting
as
be
"formal
indications."
The
of
concepts
very purpose
regarded
This
that demand
is to avoid
or scientific
theoretical
and
of objectification
of things.
thematization
are
"objectification"
sort
the
synonymous
characteristic
in other
or,
of a
If, indeed,
"science"
words,
if science
can thematize its subject matter only by objectifying the latter, that is
its subject matter
only insofar as it can be consid
then given Heidegger's
of philos
understanding
a
to distance
for
thematization
itself
philosophical
to say, by regarding
ered present-at-hand,
ophy, it is necessary
from
science.
For
about
the theme
of the present
this development
character
indicative"
of the same
the end
is, Heidegger's
(that
of a "scientific philosophy")
of philosophical
in which
lectures
as
to regard philosophy
some
of
proclamation
worldview,
cepts
least
as
understood
to a relative
is particularly
from
departure
significant
the notion
is the fact that the appeal to the "formally
it. Toward
survives
concepts
he declares
that it is as embar
as
science
rassing
be
what
paper,
he
"formal
insists
it is to regard
it as the
con
that philosophical
indications"
degree"?the
in order
misunderstanding
that
to avoid?"at
all concepts
are objectifying.
What
is difficult
stresses
Heidegger
about
that
philosophical
they be regarded
be traced to philosophizing
in-the-world
that
at the
same
Being-in-the-world
in a fourfold
being.54
unthematically
itself.
time
brings
way,
the reason
concepts?and
as formal
indications?can
Philosophizing
aims
about
is a way of being
at determining
this way
of
what
it is (sich vollzieht)
as an emotional
state (Be
namely,
a
or projecting,
sort
an ab
of
specific
understanding
findlichkeit),55
or less public
into a more
and a way of talking.
In
sorption
domain,
each of these mutually
dis
ways
complementary
being-in-the-world
or implicitly,
that temporality
is its most
the
task
of
is to
Therefore,
philosophizing
"is always
there"
upon what
unthematically
already
(immer
a
da ist).
is
kind
of
Philosophizing
(Nach-voU
"re-iterating"
closes,
again
basic horizon
reflect
schon
ziehen),
unthematically
or meaning.
repeating in an explicit fashion the path (iter, Weg) that we
54
13.
55GM,
The difficulty of translating
this term is aptly described
in Hubert L.
on
A
Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World:
Commentary
Heidegger's
Being and Time
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 168-9.
DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM
790
are constantly following (iterare, vollziehen),
it means
what
from
as "care," "life,"
. . .
"a, concrete
an)
such
concepts
(zeigen
alone"
"to be"
(eine
to what
eigene
konkrete
a well
retrieving (Wiederholen)
of
Philosophical
forgottenness.
indicate
"as," "world," and "existence"
task to be carried
out by philosophy
in other words,
they
Vollzugsaufgabe);
is always
there but must
be ex
unthematically
already
can
occur
its "retrieval"
which
and "reiteration"
only through
pressed,
senses
the
described
above).
(in
on this retrieving,
as Hei
"the methodical
Reflection
reflection"
point
calls
degger
it, is itself mandatory.
not be a kind of afterthought
the
That
is to say,
(Nachgetragenes),
the method
may
but rather must be
"as an essential
part of the exe
In other words,
the definition
of
a "formal
and hence
indication."57
developed
interpretation
through
cution of the interpretation
itself."56
philosophy
is itself
philosophical
Ill
is an obvious
between
characteriza
similarity
Heidegger's
as
and
of philosophical
the nature
"formal
indications"
concepts
as
a
score
a
in
Much
and
of certain
artistic
script?in
compositions.
contrast
to a sketch?something
is expressed
and formulated
but in
that what
it is can only be realized
such a way
by being performed
There
tion
insofar as the philosophi
Indeed,
interpreted,
(rehearsed,
staged).58
a statement
is
is not so much
about what
cal text, on this account,
as it is a score or script to be performed,
in a certain
present-at-hand
means
sense
Is it possible,
of
the question,
concepts
by
philosophical
as formal
means
Rather
to thematize
what
"to be"
without
indications,
objectifying
cannot
be
to
in the case of Dasein*?
put
legitimately
Heidegger.
the question
has to be put to his readers.59
56
157; see also Martin Heidegger,
SZ, 308, 310-16,
391; PIA, 80, 133-4,
4th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
und das Problem der Metaphysik,
Klostermann,
1973), 232.
57
elaborates
"die for
PIA, 19-20, 32-4, 43; on these pages Heidegger
Definition
der Philosophie."
malanzeigende
58
of perform
"In the drama, as inmusic,
the work is a compliance-class
to a Theory of
of Art: An Approach
ances"; Nelson Goodman,
Languages
Hackett,
1976), 210.
Symbols
59 (Indianapolis:
This character of Heidegger's
thinking figures in Rorty's rejection of
recourse of maintaining
to avoid Heidegger's
Okrent's admonition
dangerous
about the truth of what "to be" means are not really assertions
that assertions
in such recourse;
at all. Rorty finds nothing reproachable
if pragmatism
does
Kant
791
HEIDEGGER'S METHOD
In later
close
of artistic
proximity
ical thinking.
example
The
himself
Heidegger
a
to
nonobjectifying,
language
composing
he observes,
Thinking,
of composing."60
at Drew
gathered
neighborhood
of theologians
Heidegger
on
reflections
proceeds
in a 1964
Similarly,
"Poetic
composition
suggests,
of an excellent,
nonobjectifying
fact that this last remark was
theologians
is not
philosophical
concepts
to the nature
insignificant.
as formal
similarity
to what he understands
of artistic
philosoph
its path "in the
letter to a group
down
University
the
pursues
in Madison,
New
can
[Dichtung]
serve
Jersey,
as an
and speaking."61
thinking
a
made
in
letter addressed
to
If Heidegger's
of
characterization
a
indications
possesses
significant
even
it
has
closer
ties
composition,
as the theological
formation
and development
The relation of Christian theology to its faith and
of Christian belief.
on Heidegger's
own understanding
to existence,
that of philosophizing
are profoundly
of theology
and philosophizing,
homologous.
The deep
between
belief
and exis
affinity begins with parallels
as "a manner
belief
understands
of existing"
that is
Heidegger
more
from and by what
is "timed")
becomes
literally,
developed
(or,
in it and with
what
is
believed:
the
revealed
crucified
God
it, namely,
. . .
. . aus dem, was
in und mit
dieser Existenzweise
(
gezeitigt.
....
aus
der
If
dem
offenbar wird,
Geglaubten
gekreuzigte
Gott).62
tence.
is replaced with
"existence,"
with
"believed"
"temporality,"
this account
of belief mirrors
closely
"revealed"
"belief"
then
the
tom of the analysis
of Dasein
the revelation
Moreover,
oughly historical
originally
happen
"participants"
corresponding
by historicity"
but
above
the structure
in Sein
und
in which
(geschichtlich),
happened,
(immer noch
with
"disclosed,"
clear
just
it becomes
that
and
how
lies at the bot
Zeit.
the Christian
believes
is thor
not only in the sense that it in fact
all
in the
sense
that
it continues
to
The revelation
thus makes
believers
geschieht).
in the happening
that
revelation
In a
is.63
(Geschehen)
it means
for Dasein
"to be" is "constituted
way what
(durch Geschichtlichkeit
konstituiert),
not so much
in
like to see it "take
have anything to say about such a truth, then he would
"
on Heidegger
the form of a proposal.
See Richard Rorty, Essays
and Others
Press, 1991), 38n.; and Mark Okrent, Hei
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988), 292.
degger's
(Ithaca: Cornell University
60 Pragmatism
an den, der in derselben
"Darum ist es gut, an den Nachbarn,
N?he
zu denken"; Martin Heidegger,
zur Sprache,
6th ed. (Pful
wohnt,
Unterwegs
nonetheless
insists
lingen: Neske,
1979), 173. See also pp. 195-6.
Heidegger
on the difference
between
and thinking (Denken).
composing
(Dichten)
61
78.
62Wegmarken,
52.
Wegmarken,
63
53.
Wegmarken,
792
DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM
the sense
has
the
that Dasein
structure
has
a history
the
ecstatic-temporal
of
ground" of which
formation
of revelation.65
losophizing completes and perfects
situation,
Belief
is not an
as something
over against
standing
is
rather part of the development
Theology
in the sense
that it participates
all the more
of belief
in order
happening,
of theology
in the happening
explicitly
as existing,
it
the "hidden
that,
is the finitude of temporality.64
"object"
(Gegenstand)
it (ihr gegen?berstehend).
and
as in the sense
to appropriate
Likewise,
the act
itself (sich vollzieht)
and develop
bring the specific theme of the philosophizing
that
of phi
in a historical
situation
so as "to
in its binding character
to life."66
that
itself
God"
In belief,
is placed
before God and,
the entire Dasein
. . . becomes
this
existence
struck
revelation
"the
by
in its forgottenness
a reversal
signifies
That
of God."67
phrase
"being
before
placed
of existence
der Ex
(ein Umgestelltwerden
as a mode
is a "rebirth
of historically
in
of the Dasein
that history
factually
believing,
is to say,
belief
istenz).
on
existing,
which
begins
in accordance
the part
the happening
with
with the meaning
has
been
already
The
indeed, such
to
revealed
posited."68
in that history
to which,
of revelation,
a definite
of revelation,
uttermost
end
What
here happens
in belief,
namely,
"being placed before God" and the rebirth (Umgestelltwerden
Wiedergeburt),
sal and retrieval
und
in Heidegger's
method
that rever
und
which,
(Umstellung
Wiederholung)
again parallel
a finite future into the forefront
of belief, move
of the
respectively
become
to the dynamics
of Dasein.69
analysis
With
similarities
In belief?as
belief
and existence,
the structural
between
parallels
are
and
between
apparent.
philosophy
already
theology
in the sense of the happening
existence
the historical
of
these
revelation?theology
"historical
uniquely
as its goal.
its origin as well
and legitimated
motivated
science,"
has
Hence
by belief,
it is a
aim
64
161.
65SZ, 376, 382, 386; PIA,
54-5.
51,
Wegmarken,
66
see also p. 62.
67PIA, 169;
53.
Wegmarken,
68
Sinn des Glaubens
"Der eigentliche
existenzielle
ist demnach: Glaube
=
nicht im Sinne einer momentanen
Und zwar Wiedergeburt
Wiedergeburt.
als Modus des
mit irgendeiner Qualit?t,
sondern Wiedergeburt
Ausstattung
des
faktischen
Daseins
in der
Existierens
gl?ubigen
geschichtlichen
der Offenbarung
die mit dem Geschehen
anhebt; in der Geschi
Geschichte,
?u?erstes
chte, der schon dem Sinne der Offenbarung
gem?? ein bestimmtes
53.
Ende gesetzt ist"; Wegmarken,
69SZ, 391-2.
793
HEIDEGGER'S METHOD
of the state of belief.70
its part in abetting
the development
ing at doing
In other words,
is
the
of the
conceptual
self-interpretation
theology
of belief which
historical
"first unveils
existence
itself in belief
and
In a directly
for belief."71
only
fashion
corresponding
ex
Heidegger
plains how philosophy has its origin and its goal in factual life. Phi
is thereby a kind of "historical
losophy
knowledge";
out "the temporality
it carries
of the authentic
which
from
(again much
its fall
into
both
Thus,
human
existence
tion,
it back
the world,
bringing
and theology
philosophy
and accordingly
Because
cations."
like theology) philosophy
employ
such
already
existence
or belief
and
of such
of
this
become
existence.72
as
"formal
indi
as he or she authen
like
"the
in any
is the
(in the case of
stance
toward
it is always
of the
authenticity
case;
upon
respectively
urges
between
Heidegger
connection
of
and a transforma
or believes
is dependent
up
"fallenness"
or "rebirth" (Wiedergeburt).
a transformation,
the entire
does
1929/30,
thentic
existence
the
insofar
sure, "being-in-the-world,"
zu Gott),
Verhalten
takes place
What
"there."
matters,
however,
trieval" (Wiederholung)
basis
to authentic
To be
theology).
God"
(das
through
ideally lifts Dasein
concepts
a reversal
tically exists (in the case of philosophy)
precisely,
historicity"
assume
concepts
signal
can understand
them only
a person
or, more
a
"re
Only on the
in the winter
semester
inauthentic
and
au
conceivable.
The concepts that break [this connection]
open are only then capable of
of properties
and
being understood when they are not taken as meanings
of something
but rather are taken as indi
present-at-hand,
furnishings
cations or signals
[Anzeigen] for this, that the process of understanding
must first disentangle
itself from the ordinary conceptions
of the partic
ular being and explicitly
transform
itself into the being-there
[Da-sein]
within
it.
Only
on the basis
not
attending,
what
it means
Just
as
anthropologists,
of such
simply
to say
a transformation
to what
that
is a philosopher
of
capable
are or how
are
but
they
used,
things
they are.
do not understand
theologians
so Heidegger
does
not
themselves
understand
as
himself
closet
as
an
70
55-7, 61.
71Wegmarken,
55.
Wegmarken,
72
390-1.
73SZ, 384-5,
dieser Begriffe meint und sagt
GM, 428. Also, "Der Bedeutungsgehalt
er bezieht,
er gibt nur eine Anzeige,
nicht direkt das, worauf
einen Hinweis
von
da?
der
Verstehende
diesem
darauf,
Begriffszusammenhang
aufgefordert
seiner selbst in das Dasein zu vollziehen"; GM, 430.
ist, eine Verwandlung
DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM
794
Yet
existentialist.74
quately
humans
the
texts
on
the
What
question.
last few
is the
pages
method
indicative"
or, more
precisely,
on a Christian
as a directive
is modeled
of human
understanding
attending
the theological
considered
"formally
function
degger's
mational
can no more
be
question
to precisely
what
it means
ontological
can
than
"to be"
from
the
without
addressed
ade
for
is evident
fact
that Hei
its transfor
theological
existence.
It is therefore hardly surprising when Heidegger
in 1921 chastises
him against
the likes of Kierkegaard
for measuring
and Nietz
no
"I am no philosopher,"
have
illusions
"and
insists,
Heidegger
at all comparable";
"I am a Christian
rather
of even doing
anything
a
are
of
to be
The
remarks
those
still
thinker,
maturing
theologian."75
L?with
sche.
but
sure,
they
philosophy
are made
at a time when
on
department
the method
in lectures
in a
Heidegger,
and subject matter
of philoso
phy, is hammering out his methodological
tactic of taking philosoph
as formal
indications.
ical concepts
The aim of this paper has been to elaborate
method,
Heidegger's
as he conceived
it in the 1920s, and to demonstrate
how the method
in fundamental
stands
insists
ways
by theology.
that philosophy
this claim might
that the ontic, Christian
simply as a reminder
a particular
is (for example,
God
of what
being
to be confused
with
the ontological
of
question
be taken
question
theological
or revelation)
is not
what
"to be" means.
On
the claim
mann)
analysis
thetical
size
from what
under
is appropriated
Heidegger
this appropriation,
To be sure, despite
Heidegger
On the one hand,
is in principle
"a-theistic."76
regard
of authentic
how
to Christian
Heidegger's
the other
some
Kuhl
(for example,
the
fact
that
obscuring
Heidegger's
existence
is not neutral,
but in fact anti
hand,
as a ruse,
human
theology.77
method
In the same
calls
vein, still others
empha
for a transformation
also on the
part of the theologian, but without providing the possibility of a return
to theology.78
74
n'est pas celle de
63; "La question
qui me pr?ocuppe
Wegmarken,
et en tant que
de l'homme; c'est celle de l'?tre dans son ensemble
l'existence
de
37e
de
la
soci?t?
Martin
Bulletin
philosophie,
tel";
fran?aise
Heidegger,
no.
in
his
"Brief
?ber
also
5
193.
See
Humanismus,"
Weg
ann?e,
(1937),
marken,75 329-30.
in a private letter to L?with, cited by Gad
The remarks are contained
142.
"Die religi?se Dimension,"
amer; see Hans-Georg
Gadamer,
76
in ihrer radikalen,
sich auf sich selbst stellenden
mu?
"Philosophie
a-theistisch
sein"; PIA, 197; see also pp. 196, 199.
prinzipiell
Fraglichkeit
77
51.
"Zum theologischen
Kuhlmann,
Problem,"
78
96.
Oudemans,
'logische Untersuchungen',"
"Heideggers
795
HEIDEGGER'S METHOD
of understanding
another
way
is, however,
Heidegger's
of "a-letheia"
that of
Just as the meaning
presupposes
so Heidegger's
in terms of
method
is only understandable
of the ontic science,
Chris
that is to say, his understanding
There
"a-theism."
hiddenness,
his theism,
in Sein und Zeit that at the bottom
claims
theology.
Heidegger
of Dasein
of the existence
there lies
of the ontological
interpretation
If
Christian
of
authentic
"a specific,
ontic
existence."79
conception
tian
theology,
as suggested
on
these
source
is a prominent
of Hei
pages,
to suppose
then there is ample reason
method,
philosophical
degger's
which
ontic conception
that that specific
a
not
in
strict
while
theological
orating,
it is an ontic sci
Though
theology.
as Heidegger
himself
emphasizes,
as in formally
assertions
signalling
apart from Christian
prehensible
Christian
ence,
consists,
theology
not so much
in making
theoretical
the revelation
entails.80
formulating
but rather
ein
and
derstanding
refrains
from elab
Heidegger
is
nevertheless
incom
sense,
and the transformation
of the believer
in
ontology
what
is present-at-hand,
the presencing-and-absencing
of Das
fundamental
So, too, Heidegger's
about
theoretical
propositions
in formally
the authentic
its understanding
not
consists,
signalling
transformation
of Dasein,
the
thinker,
its un
entails.
The Catholic University
79
The ontic grounding of the ontological
SZ, 310.
see SZ, 278; GP, 466.
quently80 cited by Heidegger;
Wegmarken,
56-8, 60-1.
of America
investigation
is fre