frege on identity statements
... issues that animated his thinking are brought forth in his early work, and
much of his subsequent thought can be seen as attempting to find the
most cogent and coherent packaging to express these ideas.1 One place
where this can be seen most graphically is in Frege’s known remarks on
identity statem ...
Essence and Modality The Quintessence of Husserl`s Theory Kevin
... Both Husserl and Frege argue, against formalist theories, that sense or meaning understood as constituted by rules or prescriptions is grounded in sense or meaning
which is not so constituted. Thus Husserl says that differently shaped and coloured
things become chess-figures “durch die Spielregeln, ...
Why did Hume call his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals
... The answer why Hume regarded his Enquiry to be the best of his works, stated
dogmatically, goes like this: Of all his philosophical works, and arguably of all his
writings, the Enquiry shows the greatest degree of systematic coherence, thus it is the
work approaching most closely Hume’s philosophic ...
Epistemological Vs - Birkbeck, University of London
... But why all this creative reconstruction, all this make believe? The stimulation
of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately,
in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction
really proceeds? Why not settle for psychology! (Quine ( ...
... Given some interpretations of the necessity operator, Dummett clearly intends this. A
verificationist meaning theorist does not think that verificationism is a parochial truth
about us, our language, and the world. Rather, it is supposed to reflect some deep truth
about the nature of language, thoug ...
The Logic of Logical Revision
... Given some interpretations of the necessity operator, Dummett clearly intends this. For a
verificationist meaning theorist, verificationism is supposed to reflect a deep truth about
the nature of language, thought, and any possible world. Dummett holds that it is
necessary that all truths are knowab ...
The “Silence” of Wittgenstein and Kraus
... That silence is not just an emptiness, but rather something to be used in the
context of showing something that cannot be said, may account for Wittgenstein’s
reported admiration of George Fox, the seventeenth-century charismatic and
mystical genius who gathered together the “peculiar” people called ...
Popper and Xenophanes - ORCA
... experienced instances, as a deep-seated illusion. Relatedly, he also
rejected verificationism, both as a theory of meaning and (more
importantly) as either a potential theory of knowledge or a criterion of
demarcation between science and non-science. For the true path of
Enlightenment consisted in n ...
The One Fallacy Theory
... nevertheless appears valid or good in whatever way is in question. So far I agree.
But what is meant by "appears valid" or "appears good"? The psychological
criterion takes it that an argument appears valid or good just in case ordinary
people are likely to be taken in by the argument and to think i ...
- Free Documents
... the goal of minimizing loss and it is clear that the relationship between logic and
decisionmaking is rather subtle. as well as those in other disciplines such as computing.
concerned with asking when statements are consistent and when they are inconsistent.
Important goals of logic include characte ...
quine`s argument from despair
... problematic (1946, 57-77). Still, their problems were worse on the doctrinal side. For
Quine, it was Hume who showed that it is impossible to establish a deductive relation
between theory and evidence even if both are couched in the same sensory language;
neither general statements nor singular stat ...
What Can We Know A Priori?1 C.S.I. Jenkins Draft only. Please
... Moreover, there are various other motivations for believing in the a priori which Devitt
does not address. I shall not attempt an exhaustive list of these here; many depend on the
details of particular epistemological views that Devitt presumably rejects. For example,
Field’s nonfactualism about epi ...
Wittgenstein`s Tractatus Logico
... negative facts: suppose that we have a list of atomic facts f1 . . . fn . Now consider
some true sentence ‘not-S.’ Is the truth of ‘not-S’ determined by f1 . . . fn ? It seems
not. For f1 . . . fn are atomic facts, and there is nothing to prevent a series of atomic
facts from being consistent both w ...
... part of an explanation of a truth, the theory of which is then part of an explanation of what
people do with language such as issue speech acts and infer. Robert Brandom (1994) seeks to
reverse this (following Michael Dummett (1993)) by reversing the usual order of explanation of
correct inference. ...
analysis of knowledge, assertion, verification
... that notion requires. Once the rational reconstruction has been fixed as a criterion of
material adequacy, one can apply a particular theory (with its philosophical and empirical
assumptions) which saves the phenomena explicated in the rational reconstruction. Of
course, there can exists cases in wh ...
Wittgenstein`s Ph.D Viva
... ‘How are you Moore, nice of you to come all this way’, but ‘Logical
so-called propositions shew the logical properties of language and
therefore of the Universe, but say nothing’.17 That was a strange
thing to be told as soon as I stepped off the boat.
Wittgenstein: Why? It’s true. The fundamental t ...
Normative Ethics, Normative Epistemology, and Quine`s Holism
... our moral standards themselves. Science, thanks to its links with observation, retains some title to a correspondence theory of truth; but a coherence theory is evidently the lot of ethics\".} Quine has also maintained that
when empiricism reached its fifth and most recent milestone it assimilated e ...
Jani Hakkarainen. Hume`s Scepticism and Realism: His Two
... when it comes to explaining why we think this (in 1.4 of the Treatise) Hume goes
through great pains to demonstrate that neither the senses nor reason can supply
us with our pre-philosophical belief which is, rather, the result of natural instinct
(which combines with the imagination to resolve case ...
Aspects of Visual Epistemology: On the “Logic” of the Iconic Dieter
... of relationships is revealed – together with their discursive connections – since
thinking from now on means speaking, while knowledge manifests itself in
propositions, which refer to the world and whose references are realized in true/
false distinctions. Otherwise, like transposed modes of speech, ...
... deduction. He tried to find out some better kind of
induction than what is called induction by simple
enumeration. "Induction which proceeds by merely
simple enumeration", says Bacon,
is a childish affair, and being without
any certain principle of inference it may
be overthrown by a contradictory i ...
What if all truth is context-dependent?
... • the background factors are capable of being recognised later on;
• the world is regular enough for such models to be at all learnable;
• the world is regular enough for such learnt models to be at all useful when
applied in situations where the context can be recognised.
While this transference o ...
Quine on "Alternative Logics"
... with its translations. Thus, semantic criteria for determining the
meaning of a linguistic expression are based solely on (communitywide) dispositions to respond verbally in a uniform manner when
prompted by the same nonverbal stimulations. Semantic criteria,
then, are merely causal regularities wit ...
Behold the Non-Rabbit: Kant, Quine, Laruelle
... This paper is about inuiviuuation, theory, and experience, and will
examine the way in which these concepts are intertwined in the work of
three very different philosophers. More precisely, I will be fore grounding
the theme of individuation but only in order to use it as a lens through
which to foc ...
... have the same meaning, then (independent of the fact that they are verification and
falsification transcendent) it is completely unclear how we could possibly communicate
information with them. Thus, pending an answer to this challenge, the anti-realist’s
commitment to the Recognition Thesis and Ver ...
EXPERIENCE AND PERCEPTUAL BELIEF
... prompt their acceptance, and may always turn out to be mistaken. There is the everpresent sceptical possibility of illusion or hallucination. The basic statements contain
universal terms and are ‘theory-laden’, so that future experience may not fit with
them. An earlier response to ‘scepticism regar ...
Logical positivism and logical empiricism, which together formed neopositivism, was a movement in Western philosophy that embraced verificationism, an approach that sought to legitimize philosophical discourse on a basis shared with the best examples of empirical sciences. In this theory of knowledge, only statements verifiable either logically or empirically would be cognitively meaningful. Efforts to convert philosophy to this new scientific philosophy were intended to prevent confusion rooted in unclear language and unverifiable claims. The Berlin Circle and the Vienna Circle propounded logical positivism starting in the late 1920s.Interpreting Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, logical positivists identified a verifiability principle or criterion of cognitive meaningfulness. From Bertrand Russell's logicism they sought reduction of mathematics to logic as well as Russell's logical atomism, Ernst Mach's phenomenalism—whereby the mind knows only actual or potential sensory experience, which is the content of all sciences, whether physics or psychology—and Percy Bridgman's musings that others proclaimed as operationalism. Thereby, only the verifiable was scientific and cognitively meaningful, whereas the unverifiable was unscientific, cognitively meaningless ""pseudostatements""—metaphysic, emotive, or such—not candidate to further review by philosophers, newly tasked to organize knowledge, not develop new knowledge.Logical positivism became famed for vigorous scientific antirealism to purge science of talk about nature's unobservable aspects—including causality, mechanism, and principles. Still, talk of such unobservables would be metaphorical—direct observations viewed in the abstract—or at worst metaphysical or emotional. Theoretical laws would be reduced to empirical laws, while theoretical terms would garner meaning from observational terms via correspondence rules. Mathematics of physics would reduce to symbolic logic via logicism, while rational reconstruction would convert ordinary language into standardized equivalents, all networked and united by a logical syntax. A scientific theory would be stated with its method of verification, whereby a logical calculus or empirical operation could verify its falsity or truth.In the late 1930s, logical positivists fled Germany and Austria for Britain and United States. By then, many had replaced Mach's phenomenalism with Neurath's physicalism, and Carnap had sought to replace verification with simply confirmation. With World War II's close in 1945, logical positivism became milder, logical empiricism, led largely by Carl Hempel, in America, who expounded the covering law model of scientific explanation. The logical positivist movement became a major underpinning of analytic philosophy, and dominated Anglosphere philosophy, including philosophy of science, while influencing sciences, into the 1960s. Yet the movement failed to resolve its central problems, and its doctrines were increasingly criticized, most trenchantly by W V O Quine, Norwood Hanson, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and Carl Hempel.