quine`s argument from despair
... problematic (1946, 57-77). Still, their problems were worse on the doctrinal side. For
Quine, it was Hume who showed that it is impossible to establish a deductive relation
between theory and evidence even if both are couched in the same sensory language;
neither general statements nor singular stat ...
Popper and Xenophanes - ORCA
... experienced instances, as a deep-seated illusion. Relatedly, he also
rejected verificationism, both as a theory of meaning and (more
importantly) as either a potential theory of knowledge or a criterion of
demarcation between science and non-science. For the true path of
Enlightenment consisted in n ...
... either (i) does not depend on any input beliefs and tends to yield truths or (ii) depends on
input beliefs and tends to yield truths when the input beliefs are true.
Reliabilism faces several problems. For instance, it has difficulty explaining why
thinkers who are unreliable through no fault of the ...
Scientific Explanation- Causation and Unification
... phenomena can be shown to be fundamentally similar”8. Phenomena in this context
means regularities in the nature.
Causal concept of explanation is based on Salmon’s definition of causality as causal
interaction. Causal interaction is “an intersection of two processes …[in which] both
processes are m ...
... legitimate external questions are pragmatic in nature: Should we adopt this framework?
Would it be useful?
Carnap thus becomes a pluralist about ontological commitment—explicitly so, in the
sense that he associates distinct ontological commitment with distinct linguistic frameworks, and at least im ...
The Futility of any Anti-Metaphysical Position
... emphasized. It is perhaps, following Comte’s positivism that Rudolf Carnap asserts that
metaphysics is an expression of an attitude toward life. Metaphysics he says, originated from
mythology. The daily fears of the early man he says, gave rise to mythology and from mythology
into poetry which in tu ...
moving beyond unification and modeling: a reconsideration of
... is quantum field theory, we then begin to accept an ontology
not of things but of structures. For this reason, the appeal to
quantum field theory begins to undermine the very project
of constructing an ontology, properly understood as studying things, which indicates that there are other ways of doi ...
the liberalism of karl popper
... excluded by scientific laws. Such an identification would
indeed be contrary to Popper’s fallibilism: it would also
contradict Popper’s affirmation that “... it is necessary to
recognise as one of the principles of any unprejudiced view
of politics that everything is possible in human affairs; and
The cognitive and the social - Christophe Heintz
... psychologists describe how and why the description is possible. Macnamara, however, explains
the human possibility of doing logic with the basic principles of logic. When he considers our
access to logical connectors he merely asserts that logical connectors are already in our minds.
The use we make ...
quine - University of St Andrews
... judged by the same pragmatic criteria as all the rest in the
web of belief.
We could pick other logical constants – but picking
`is male’ just wouldn’t serve any useful purpose.
The logical constants we picked work fine, so we stick to
them. We can change that, and pick others, but we won’t.
MEDIAEVAL THOUGHT-EXPERIMENTS: The Metamethodology of
... very directly toward early modern science. . . the whole enterprise of many a medieval
scholar who treated motions was worlds away from that of Galileo and his confrères. . .
medieval discussions of motion should not be viewed solely as providing some kind of
background from, or against which, earl ...
Epistemic Line of Explanation for Experimental
... of causality and those on the importance attributed to laws. Let us start from the
latter, with Railton, who maintains:
“Where the orthodox covering-law account of explanation propounded by
Hempel and others was right has been in claiming that explanatory practice in
the sciences is in a central way ...
Epistemic Virtues and Epistemic Values
... various places hands, feet, a head, and other pieces, very well depicted, it may be,
but not for the representation of a single person; since these fragments would not
belong to one another at all, a monster rather than a man would be put together from
A little later in the Preface, Copernicus ...
Induction Synonyms epagōgē, inductio Abstract How induction was
... animal chews by moving the lower jaw; that animal does; the other animal does. If we
conclude that all animals chew by moving the lower jaw, the conclusion will be
overturned when we discover the Nile crocodile, for it moves the upper jaw.
For an example of a reliable induction, Ockham (c. 1287–134 ...
Popper`s Double Standard of Scientificity in
... himself, had criticized the methodology (inductive method) classical empiricism
employed in order to show how we arrive at scientific laws. According to this method,
one is justified, under certain conditions, in generalizing from a finite number of
observation statements to a universal statement, i ...
Socializing Naturalized Philosophy of Science
... evaluate hypotheses and lead them to choose the best ones. The mechanisms that each scientist possesses are simulated by a computer program
called ECHO, which simulates, among other things, Darwin's selection
of the evolutionary hypothesis. If each scientist possesses mechanisms
for selecting the be ...
Popper`s Paradoxical Pursuit of Natural Philosophy - Philsci
... were the first to struggle with central problems of natural philosophy in something like
their modern form. Their ideas, most notably the idea that there is an underlying unity or
invariance in nature, the idea of symmetry, and the idea that nature is made up of atoms
in motion in the void, have ha ...
... deduction, where the result must be true if the major and minor premises are true. The act of insight
that “the beans are from this bag” may not be true at all, as someone else outside our purview might
have put them there. Nevertheless an abductive inference strikes us often as a reasonable (workin ...
information technology problems in the context of logic of science
... technology” (S. Lem). This information is used
functionally without becoming “the pabulum for
reflection”, even less “the reflection for information”.
This phenomenon of absence of necessary formation
aligns the fundamental and applied “non-existence” of
contemporary history, which does not compreh ...
... one big, persistent assumption about the universe, namely that it is such that no disunified or aberrant
theory is true. It assumes that the universe is such that there are no pockets of peculiarity, at specific
times and places, or when specific conditions arise (gold spheres, gold and diamond dust ...
A Realist Theory of Science
... can allow a transitive dimensions and satisfy criterion (1)’; so that, in
this respect, it is an improvement on empiricism. According to such a
dynamized transcendental idealism knowledge is given structure by a
sequence of models, rather than a fixed set of a priori rules. However
in neither its s ...
HOLISM AND REALISM - Jacques Maritain Center
... degree of knowledge that is not empirical science at all: the philosophy
of nature. Located at the end of the spectrum most distant from
inductive knowledge, this philosophical knowledge genuinely accesses
intelligible essences in themselves.
Maritain relies on this metaphysical account of the abstr ...
the critique of positivism
... relationships between the items here distinguished.
(1) According to the positivist conception of science, science aims at the explanation and prediction of
observable phenomena by presenting these as derivable from general laws that hold in all regions of
space and time. The truth or falsity of the ...
Unity and Revolutions: A Paradigm for Paradigms
... has been implicit in the methods of physics since Galileo. It has persisted throughout all
theoretical revolutions from Galileo’s time to our own. It might be said to be a paradigm
for the assessment of Kuhnian paradigms. It is accepted as a permanent item of scientific
knowledge independent of empi ...
Unity and Revolutions: A Paradigm for Paradigms - Philsci
... The electro-weak theory of Weinberg and Salam partially unifies the electromagnetic and
weak forces. The quark theory of Gell-Mann and Zweig brought greater unity to the
theory of fundamental particles: a large number of hadrons were reduced to just six
quarks. Quantum chromodynamics brought furthe ...
Inductivism is the traditional model of scientific method attributed to Francis Bacon, who in 1620 vowed to subvert allegedly traditional thinking. In the Baconian model, one observes nature, proposes a modest law to generalize an observed pattern, confirms it by many observations, ventures a modestly broader law, and confirms that, too, by many more observations, while discarding disconfirmed laws. The laws grow ever broader but never much exceed careful, extensive observation. Thus freed from preconceptions, scientists gradually uncover nature's causal and material structure.At 1740, David Hume found multiple obstacles to use of experience to infer causality. Hume noted the illogicality of enumerative induction—unrestricted generalization for particular instances to all instances, and stating a universal law—since humans observe sequence of sensory events, not cause and effect. Humans thus perceive neither logical nor natural necessity or impossibility among events. Later philosophers would select, highlight, and nickname Humean principles—Hume's fork, problem of induction, and Hume's law—although Hume accepted the empirical sciences as inevitably inductive, after all.Alarmed by Hume's seemingly radical empiricism, Immanuel Kant identified its apparent opposite, rationalism, as favored by Descartes and by Spinoza. Seeking middle ground, Kant identified that the necessity bridging the world in itself to human experience is the mind, whose innate constants thus determine space, time, and substance and determine the correct scientific theory. Though protecting both metaphysics and Newtonian physics, Kant discarded scientific realism by restricting science to tracing appearances (phenomena), not unveiling reality (noumena). Kant's transcendental idealism launched German idealism—increasingly speculative metaphysics—while philosophers continued awkward confidence in empirical sciences as inductive.Refining Baconian inductivism, John Stuart Mill posed his own five methods of discerning causality to describe the reasoning whereby scientists exceed mere inductivism. In the 1830s, opposing metaphysics, Auguste Comte explicated positivism, which, unlike Baconian model, emphasized predictions, confirming them, and laying scientific laws irrefutable by theology or metaphysics. Finding experience to show uniformity of nature and thereby justify enumerative induction, Mill accepted positivism: the first modern philosophy of science, which, simultaneously, was a political philosophy whereby only scientific knowledge was reliable knowledge.Nearing 1840, William Whewell thought that the inductive sciences, so called, were not so simple, after all, and asked recognition of ""superinduction"", an explanatory scope or principle invented by the mind to unite facts, but not present in the facts. Mill would have none of hypotheticodeductivism, posed by Whewell as science's method, which Whewell believed to sometimes, via other considerations upon the evidence, render scientific theories of known metaphysical truth. By 1880, C S Peirce had clarified the basis of deductive inference and, although recognizing induction, proposed a third type of inference that Peirce called ""abduction"", now otherwise termed inference to the best explanation (IBE).Since the 1920s, although opposing all metaphysical inference via scientific theories, the logical positivists sought to understand scientific theories as provably false or true as to strictly observations. Though accepting hypotheticodeductivism to originate theories, they launched verificationism whereby Rudolf Carnap tried but never succeeded to formalize an inductive logic whereby a universal law's truth with respect to observational evidence could be quantified as ""degree of confirmation"". Asserting a variant of hypotheticodeductivism termed falsificationism, Karl Popper from the 1930s onward was the first especially vocal critic of inductivism and verficationism as utterly flawed models of science. In 1963, Popper declared that enumerative induction is a myth. Two years later, Gilbert Harman claimed that enumerative induction is a masked effect of IBE.Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book—explaining that periods of normal science as but a paradigm of science are each overturned by revolutionary science whose paradigm becomes the normal science anew—dissolved logical positivism's grip in the Anglosphere, and inductivism fell. Besides Popper and Kuhn, other postpostivist philosophers of science—including Paul Feyerabend, Imre Lakatos, and Larry Laudan—have all but unanimously rejected inductivism. Among them, those who have asserted scientific realism—that scientific theory can and does offer approximately true understanding of nature's unobservable aspects—have tended to claim that scientists develop approximately true theories about nature through IBE. And yet IBE, which, so far, cannot be trained, lacks particular rules of inference. By the 21st century's turn, inductivism's heir was Bayesianism.