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REVIEWS Take Them at Their Word: The Genuine Threat of Jihad Genocide Richard L. Rubenstein, Jihad and Genocide (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010), $59.95, 251 pp. Alyssa A. Lappen* Concerning Islamic jihad and antisemitism, political correctness has stymied most academics, even in closely related fields. The mainstream press, virtually unwilling to explain or expose genuine Islamic doctrines, has also left a mile-wide void for mass readership. For these reasons, since 1980 non-academics such as the great Swiss scholar Bat Ye’or1 and Ibn Warraq2 have provided the most thorough and 1. Bat Ye’or, The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam, rev. ed. (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickenson University Press, 1985); The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam: From Jihad to Dhimmitude (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996); Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 2001); Eurabia: The EuroArab Axis (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005). 2. Ibn Warraq, The Origins of the Koran: Classic Essays on Islam’s Holy Book (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1998); The Quest for the Historical Muhammed (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2000); What the Koran Really Says: Language, Text, 189 190 JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF ANTISEMITISM [ VOL. 2:189 illuminating works on these subjects—and the ongoing Muslim desire for a global Caliphate intended to eradicate all other faiths. Bat Ye’or, in turn, has ably mentored a new generation of non-academic scholars, including Andrew G. Bostom, M.D.3 Fortunately, since 9/11, ranks of courageous former Muslims like Wafa Sultan,4 Nonie Darwish,5 and M. A. Kahn6 have also enlightened the public. Additionally, best-selling non-fiction writer Robert Spencer has produced over 13 books on Islam and jihad. Thus, the 2010 offering by renowned Holocaust scholar Richard L. Rubenstein, Jihad and Genocide, is a welcome breath of fresh air. Had it been available then, Daniel Goldhagen would have greatly benefited from reading this work before writing his silly book, Worse than War. Islamic tradition commands Muslims to invite those of other faiths (infidels) to Islam. If they refuse the “invitation,” they must pay the annual jizya tax imposed on non-Muslims (especially Jews and Christians, known as “people of the book”). If they reject that request as well, then the Qur’an orders Muslims to mercilessly fight them, as do the “traditions,” reported sayings and deeds of Muhammad known as hadith.7 The same command is and Commentary (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2002); Leaving Islam: Apostates Speak Out (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2003); Why I Am Not a Muslim (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2003); Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Said’s “Orientalism” (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2007); Which Koran?: Variants, Manuscripts, Linguistics (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2009). 3. Andrew G. Bostom, M.D., The Legacy of Islamic Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2005); The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism: From Sacred Texts to Solemn History (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2008). 4. Wafa Sultan, A God Who Hates: The Courageous Woman Who Inflamed the Muslim World Speaks Out Against the Evils of Islam (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009). 5. Nonie Darwish, Now They Call Me Infidel: Why I Renounced Jihad for America, Israel, and the War on Terror (Sentinel Trade, 2007); Cruel and Usual Punishment: The Terrifying Global Implications of Islamic Law (Thomas Nelson, 2009). 6. M. A. Kahn, Islamic Jihad: A Legacy of Forced Conversion, Imperialism, and Slavery (iUniverse, 2009). 7. Qur’an 9:29 commands, “Fight those who believe not in God nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by God and His Apostle, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, [even if they are] of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.” As translated by Yusuf Ali, from Yet Another Quran Browser, http://qb.gomen.org/ QuranBrowser/cgi/bin/retrieve.cgi?version=pickthall+yusufali+khan§hakir§herali+ khalifa+arberry¶almer®odwell§ale™ransliterated&layout=auto&searchstring=009: 27-31, viewed April 26, 2010; see also Sahih Muslim: The Book of Jihad and Expedition (Kitab al-jihad Wa’l-Siyar), as cited in Bostom, Legacy of Jihad, 2005, 2010] TAKE THEM AT THEIR WORD 191 repeated innumerable times by Islamic jurists throughout the course of Muslim history, albeit each one in slightly different wording. The classical Shafi’i jurist Ali ibn Muhammad Al Mawardi (d. 1058), for example, writes in The Laws of Islamic Governance: The mushrikun [infidels] of Dar al-Harb (the arena of battle) are of two types: First, those whom the call of Islam has reached, but they have refused it and taken up arms. The amir of the army has the option of fighting them . . . in accordance with what he judges to be in the best interest of the Muslims and the most harmful to the mushrikun. . . . Sec138-139, from Abdul Hamid Siqqiqi, “Translation of Sahih Muslim,” Muslim Students Association, Book 019, Number 4294: It has been reported from Sulaiman b. Buraid through his father that when the Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon him) appointed anyone as leader of an army or detachment he would especially exhort him to fear Allah and to be good to the Muslims who were with him. He would say: Fight in the name of Allah and in the way of Allah. Fight against those who disbelieve in Allah. Make a holy war, do not embezzle the spoils; do not break your pledge; and do not mutilate (the dead) bodies; do not kill the children. When you meet your enemies who are polytheists, invite them to three courses of action. If they respond to any one of these, you also accept it and wit[h]hold yourself from doing them any harm. Invite them to (accept) Islam; if they respond to you, accept it from them and desist from fighting against them. Then invite them to migrate from their lands to the land of Muhairs and inform them that, if they do so, they shall have all the privileges and obligations of the Muhajirs. If they refuse to migrate, tell them that they will have the status of Bedouin Mu[s]lims and will be subjected to the Commands of Allah like other Muslims, but they will not get any share from the spoils of war or Fai’ except when they actually fight with the Muslims (against the disbelievers). If they refuse to accept Islam, demand from them the Jizya. If they agree to pay, accept it from them and hold off your hands. If they refuse to pay the tax, seek Allah’s help and fight them. When you lay siege to a fort and the besieged appeal to you for protection in the name of Allah and His Prophet, do not accord to them the guarantee of Allah and His Prophet, but accord to them your own guarantee and the guarantee of your companions for it is a lesser sin that the security given by you or your companions be disregarded than that the security granted in the name of Allah and His Prophet be violated. When you besiege a fort and the besieged want you to let them out in accordance with Allah’s Command, do not let them come out in accordance with His Command, but do so at your (own) command, for you do not know whether or not you will be able to carry out Allah’s behest with regard to them. http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/ engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/muslim/019.smt.html (link changed since 2005; last viewed April 26, 2010). 192 JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF ANTISEMITISM [ VOL. 2:189 ond, those whom the invitation to Islam has not reached, although such persons are few nowadays since Allah has made manifest the call of his Messenger . . . it is forbidden to begin an attack before explaining the invitation to Islam to them, informing them of the miracles of the Prophet and making plain the proofs so as to encourage acceptance on their part; if they still refuse to accept after this, war is waged against them and they are treated as those whom the call has reached.8 Rubenstein correctly observes, “We do not know, and perhaps can never know, what proportion of the Muslim world is willing to act upon the imperative of endless jihad until the entire world accepts Allah or the humiliating, subordination of dhimmi status under Islamic domination.” Thus, Muslim scholars who claim to seek interchanges with non-Muslims as equals “are at an enormous disadvantage” (40). After all, Muslims regard Muhammad as the perfect man, and are commanded to emulate him in every way. Therefore, when Osama bin Laden makes this point, who can disagree that “fundamentalists” or “radicals” are not really all that radical? The Qur’an itself, which Muslims suppose to be the direct word of God, as “received” by Muhammad, instructs them to eschew non-Muslims, even non-Muslim family members. As Rubenstein understands quite well, it’s frequently “impossible to distinguish moderate from extremist Muslims.” This is particularly so, since the Islamic doctrine of taqiyya9 (also known as kitman) allows and even encourages Muslims to mask their actual beliefs when involvement with non-Muslims demands that they protect themselves or the Islamic “nation,” known as umma. It’s slightly surprising, knowing all this, that Rubenstein even momentarily considers that the claims of 153 Saudi clerics after 9/11 might be genuine. In May 2002, they issued a missive entitled “How Can We Coexist” in response to the February 2002 declaration by 60 leading U.S. intellectuals regarding the principles of equality and freedom of conscience and faith for which Americans fight (33-40). In it, they seek “more avenues for dialogue and the exchange of ideas,” despite blaming the “causative relationship” of U.S. policies, and Israel and its “loathsome kind of terrorism” for the attacks. Generally, the Saudis whitewash their intentions for the benefit of the uninformed. Their request for more dialogue should more realistically be understood as adept taqqiya. 8. Ali ibn Muhammad Al Mawardi, The Laws of Islamic Governance (London: Taha Publishers, 1996), 60, as excerpted in Bostom, Legacy of Islamic Jihad, 190195. 9. “Taqiyah,” Dictionary of Islam, http://www.answering-islam.org/Books/ Hughes/t.htm (last visited April 20, 2010). 2010] TAKE THEM AT THEIR WORD 193 But Rubenstein deserves kudos for stating the reality: If Muhammad’s actions have forever shaped normative thinking in Islam (which they certainly seem to have done), “the non-Muslim world is not likely ever to see an end to offensive jihad and its ultimate objectives (42).” This observation is a golden nugget. Likewise, Rubenstein gives an excellent analysis of the jihad genocide the Young Turks perpetrated against the Armenians in 1915 and 1916. Less than two weeks after the November 1914 Ottoman declaration of war on the Entente (Britain, France, and their allies), the sultan demanded jihad. As a proxy of the Islamic caliphate (and then the highest cleric in Sunni Islam), albeit an appointee of the Young Turks—Mustafa Hayri Bey the next day issued “a formal (and inflammatory) declaration of jihad ‘against infidels and enemies of Islam.’ ” Very shortly, Arabic jihad pamphlets appeared in mosques throughout the Muslim world, declaring jihad against all unbelievers, excepting the Ottomans’ expedient German allies. The forced conversions of some 100,000 to 200,000 Armenian women and children had the same effect as “outright genocide”—eliminating Christian Armenians—Rubenstein concludes. Similarly, “the Turkish belief that they did no wrong in exterminating the Armenians . . . rests ultimately on the traditions of jihad and the dhimma,” the pact of Umar based on Islamic religious law, which requires the subjugation of non-Muslims (54). The same mentality dominates Muslims today, who perceive that “Islam is under attack.” They consider genocide “a legitimate weapon” against Islam’s supposed enemies, while also accepting the perennial Islamic notion that “defense” is equal to “unremitting jihad,” and is in any case “the single most important Muslim obligation” [emphasis in original, 57]. It bears noting that the equation of jihad with self-defense is not the modern aberration of extremists, but the precise and well-documented teaching of all classical Islamic jurists, from the seventh century through our own.10 In the mid-1930s, as Rubenstein also highlights, leading Muslim clerics considered genocide against the Jewish people an unconditional religious imperative” [emphasis in original, 68]. These figures included both Syrian Sheikh ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam (for whom Hamas named both its “military” wing and rockets), and Jerusalem Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini. Al-Husseini was not to be contented by mere subjugation of the Jewish people in perennial dhimmi status. During World War II, the Mufti often elaborated Islam’s natural affinity with Nazism. He did not merely fight Zionism or Jewish settlement in Palestine; in his words, al-Husseini fought 10. Bat Ye’or, Bostom, M. A. Kahn, ibid. 194 JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF ANTISEMITISM [ VOL. 2:189 “world Judaism, the hereditary enemy of Islam (das Weltjudentum, den Erbfeind des Islams).” Rubenstein reinforces this point with his own emphasis upon al-Husseini’s October 1944 speech to Bosnian Muslim SS chaplains: “The friendship and common effort of the Muslims and Germans have become stronger . . ., because the latter is developing in many respects parallel to the Muslim worldview,” the Mufti told them (98-99). Indeed, Islam considers Jews agents of the devil. As Bostom has noted in Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism, Islamic eschatology envisions an army of Jews accompanying the devil before their final defeat in the apocalyptic battle on Judgment Day.11 In other words, as Rubenstein correctly notes, Islamic antisemitism long pre-dated Nazism. He shows that Hitler’s henchmen often mimicked jihad ideology. The “world’s highest ranking Nazi fugitive,” Alois Brunner, found refuge in Syria, from where in October 1987 he told the Chicago Sun-Times via telephone that the Jews all “deserved to die because they were the devil’s agents and human garbage. I have no regrets and would do it again” (100). SS major Dr. Johann von Leers (1902-1965) adopted Islam and in 1956 moved from Argentina to Egypt, where he died. Von Leers likewise defined Nazi genocide against the Jewish people in the terms equivalent to those of Islamic jihad. Exterminating Europe’s Jews was “was fully justified as a form of retribution and self-defense” (100). Hitler himself repeatedly lauded Islam during his “teatime ‘historical speculation,’ ” Albert Speer wrote in his memoirs, published in English in 1970. Hitler considered Arabs “racially inferior.” Nevertheless, he deeply appreciated Islam’s jihad doctrine, “that believed in spreading the faith by the sword and subjecting all nations to that faith” (100-102). Hajj Amin al-Husseini’s jihad doctrine infused his Nazism, and vice versa. This alone is no revelation. Yet Rubenstein’s work is quite useful as it relates to current events. It makes mincemeat of the disingenuous arguments of European Muslim Brotherhood leader Tariq Ramadan, for example, on the affinity of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, his grandfather, with al-Husseini. On April 8, 2010, at New York’s Cooper Union, Ramadan profusely denied al-Banna’s appreciation of the Mufti’s Nazi connection. As George Packer ably retorted, al-Banna littered his own remarks, researched in the original Arabic, with praise for both Nazism and fascism. Still, Ramadan refused to denounce al-Banna’s personal Nazi proclivities, despite their obvious mesh with classical jihad ideology. Ramadan weakly attempted to 11. Bostom, Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism, 63, 166, 642. 2010] TAKE THEM AT THEIR WORD 195 deny the accuracy of al-Banna’s direct quotes. He disconcertingly insisted, too, on masking his grandfather’s outright hatred for Jews within the “context” of al-Banna’s contemporary fight against Zionism.12 In his final three chapters, Rubenstein addresses Arab oil revenue as fueling global jihad, especially inside increasingly Islamized Europe; Iran’s genocidal mania and its equally genocidal nuclear aspirations; and the underlying causes of 20th- and 21st-century Islamic raging at Israel and the West. Rubenstein also discusses much of the West’s tacit acceptance of Islamic attacks on Israel, despite their openly antisemitic themes. Rubenstein astutely emphasizes that both Western and Israeli attempts to resolve the Arab war against the Jewish state with territorial concessions are fundamentally flawed by their failure “to take into account the religious dimension of the conflict” (165). He states this critical point all too politely. He also buries it a little too deeply behind discussions of historical Christian animosity for Jews and historical Islamic antisemitism. Yet, he quite successfully conveys the intensity of contemporary Islamic reflections of Jew-hatred. He cites, for example, highly regarded clerics like Egyptian Amin al-Ansari (174-175) and the Qatar-based spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Yusuf al-Qaradawi; the latter’s arguments adhere to classical Islamic law. In effect, the Jewish people in establishing their own state to rule themselves, without institutional discriminatory taxes, ridicule, persecution or regular periodic mass murder, “were not faithful to the [covenant].” Real or not, al-Qaradawi perceives a Jewish betrayal of an erstwhile promise to remain under the dhimma, the Islamic legal pact requiring that all non-Muslim peoples be eternally and institutionally demeaned, and subservient to Islam. And this perception alone, according to al-Qaradawi, gives all Muslims “a license to kill all Jews” (175-177). Genocidal Islamic intent has often been openly expressed in shocking European and North American street demonstrations, from London and Paris to Washington, D.C., Ft. Lauderdale, and Montreal. Rubenstein graphically describes many such events, sourced to videos recorded during each one. (pp. 177-180) And he reminds readers of the November 2008 jihadist massacre of at least 195 people in Mumbai, by perpetrators focused 12. This reviewer was present at Cooper Union on April 8, 2010. See also George Packer, “Interesting Times: An Evening with Tariq Ramadan,” The New Yorker, April 9, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2010/ 04/an-evening-with-ramadan.html (visited April 11, 2010); and Brendan Goldman, “An Islamist in professor’s garb: Tariq Ramadan returns to America,” American Thinker, April 15, 2010, http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/04/an_islamist_in_ professors_garb.html (viewed April 26, 2010). 196 JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF ANTISEMITISM [ VOL. 2:189 on the murders and grotesque disfigurements of all Jews at Nariman House, the Chabad Jewish center. This attack especially, Rubenstein argues, represented an emulation of Muhammad’s life. He notes that Sirat Rasul Allah— Muhammad’s earliest surviving biography by Muslim hagiographer Ibn Ishaq—reports him to have said, “Kill any Jew that falls into your power” (180-184).13 Rubenstein believes that murderous contemporary Muslims are merely victims of the Sudden Jihad Syndrome. The book would have been stronger had he instead returned to his correct early conclusion that we simply do not and cannot know how many Muslims ascribe to the classical jihadist ideology represented in these actions. For, as Rubenstein also notes, even supposing potential actors totaled under 5% of all Muslims worldwide, they could alarmingly number up to 65 million globally (116). More important, no mainstream Islamic cleric today espouses any determination to reform—much less eliminate—jihad war doctrine, totalitarian, genocidal, statist, or discriminatory statues embedded in shari’a law. Ridiculous and hypocritical as it is, for example, Tariq Ramadan’s 2003 call for a temporary Islamic “moratorium” on stoning women (and men) fell on deaf ears in the Islamic world. The entire discussion transpired in the West. Even seven years on, Islamic clerics aren’t the least interested in the idea.14 Indeed, Ramadan himself reveres the genocidal al-Qaradawi, who not coincidentally also condones wife-beating. Despite some minor weaknesses, however, Rubenstein’s brief 250page book gives an excellent introduction to the latest reverberations of classical Islamic jihad law and antisemitism. Readers will find the writing pristine and the research meticulous and precisely documented. Western and Israeli leaders should take some sage advice from this highly esteemed Holocaust scholar. First, genocidal threats “are deadly serious and can neither be dismissed nor ignored” (vii). Second, whether Islamic rage at the West is endemic to the entire Muslim world, or remains “isolated” among a minority of 65 million, the powerful Islamic leaders and clerics promising genocide mean what they say. We risk annihilation unless we take them at their word, for to them, “nothing less than genocide will suffice.” 13. Citing Alfred Guillame, trans., The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ibn Ishaq’s Sirat Rashul Allah (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 369. 14. Clive Davis, “Searching for Ramadan,” Spectator, May 30, 2007, http:// www.spectator.co.uk/clivedavis/31307/searching-for-ramadan.thtml (visited April 5, 2010); see also Christiane Amanpour, “Iraq’s election; fighting terrorism, Sudan to divide,” CNN, Apr. 11, 2010, http://archives.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1004/11/ ampr.01.html (viewed April 21, 2010). 2010] TAKE THEM AT THEIR WORD 197 *Alyssa Lappen is a U.S. poet and investigative journalist whose work focuses on the Middle East and related issues. She is a senior fellow at the American Center for Democracy.