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THE CHALLENGE OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR (218-201 BC)
1. And so it was “the Saguntum Affair” which sparked the
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second war between the Roman and Carthaginian states in
218 BC, after the Roman state initiated events and with all
formality made the declaration.
Who was ‘in the right’ with respect to Saguntum is very
unclear.
Polybius (by far the most reliable historian) believed that
it was NOT mentioned in the vital “Ebro Treaty” of 226 BC.
Hannibal had begun to lay siege to it in 219 BC after Rome
had sent the delegation to him warning him not to attack the
city and not to cross the Ebro.
If Saguntum was a Roman ally, Rome sent no help for eight
months.
RIVER EBRO
SAGUNTUM
CARTHAGO NOVA
THE EVENTS OF THE WAR
1. Hannibal left Carthago Nova (Cartagena) [where he had
wintered] in the late spring of 218 BC, crossed the Ebro,
and entered Gaul with (supposedly) 50,000 infantry, 9,000
cavalry, and 37 elephants.
2. a) A Roman fleet under the brothers Gnaeus Cornelius
SCIPIO Calvus and Publius Cornelius SCIPIO was
already on its way to northern Spain.
b) They learnt from intelligence that Hannibal had
crossed the Ebro, but were surprised when they
found out that he had already reached the River
RHONE, north of Massilia (modern Marseilles).
Bust reputedly of
HANNIBAL from
CAPUA
3. Hannibal was able to avoid the Roman troops that
prepared to confront him before he reached the foot of
the Alps in the autumn of 218 BC.
Hannibal’s possible route (controversial) from Carthago Nova,
across the Ebro, across the Rhone and across the Alps
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4.
Unable to check Hannibal in Gaul,
a) one Roman army, under GNAEUS Scipio, moved
to northern Spain to block reinforcements to Hannibal
from the Iberian Peninsula;
b) the other, under PUBLIUS Scipio, returned to Italy, aware
that Hannibal would be invading from the north.
5. a) After the difficult crossing of the Alps, HANNIBAL
arrived in northern Italy with 28,000 infantry (of his
50,000), 6,000 cavalry (of his 9,000), and 20 of his 37
elephants.
b) There (in “Cisalpine Gaul”) the Gallic tribes allied to Rome
had already rebelled forcing the colonists at
PLACENTIA and CREMONA to flee to MUTINA.
c) Although Roman forces relieved the siege of Mutina,
one of Publius Scipio’s legions and 5,000 allied troops
had had to be diverted there to save the community.
PLACENTIA (Piacenza)
CREMONA
(north-east of Piacenza)
MUTINA
(Modena)
217 BC
1. The Senate resolved that the two consuls-elect (Gnaeus
Servilius Geminus and Gaius Flaminius) would each
raise additional armies for the 217 fighting season.
2. a) Gaius Flaminius (who hurried from Rome without performing the
lengthy rites required of new consuls) quickly moved his army
from ARIMINUM (Rimini) to ARRETIUM (Arezzo).
b) His aim was to stop Hannibal crossing into ETRURIA
(where Publius Scipio now had his army).
a) BUT Flaminius was ambushed in a defile on the
shore of LAKE TRASIMENE (south of Arretium) and he
and most of his army wiped out.
b) Scipio had sent a cavalry force to assist - which was
also destroyed.
4. Flaminius’ negligence of the proper rites must have
angered the gods and led to his destruction.
5. There was now nothing to stop HANNIBAL marching
on ROME.
3.
ARIMINUM
(RIMINI)
ARRETIUM
(AREZZO)
LAKE
TRASIMENE
ROME
HANNIBAL TRAPS FLAMINIUS AT LAKE TRASIMENE
5. The road to Rome was open BUT Hannibal moved SOUTH
and tried for an extended period to win over the Greek
states and the Italic peoples of the south.
6. The disaster at Lake Trasimene led the Roman state to
appoint a DICTATOR, QUINTUS FABIUS MAXIMUS,
who would gain the epithet “CUNCTATOR” (‘the Delayer’)
for his strategy of avoiding any pitched battles with
Hannibal’s forces and engaging, instead, in constant
skirmishing – with no immediate negative nor positive
results for Rome.
216 BC
1. In the elections for 216 BC, the electorate chose two
consuls with a more ‘aggressive’ approach: Gaius
Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus.
2. Hannibal, after devastating regions in the south (including
Samnium and the rich region of Campania) captured the
vital supply centre of CANNAE (in Apulia in the south-east of Italy).
3. a) The Senate determined that Hannibal must be forced into
an open battle.
b) It authorized the consuls to raise double armies – which
would add four legions to those already shadowing
Hannibal.
c) This brought the Roman forces to eight legions which,
with their attached allied units, meant as many as 90,000
troops (Roman citizens and allied forces) under arms.
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5.
The forces of the two sides clashed at CANNAE on 2nd
August 216 BC.
Despite Roman forces being much more numerous,
Cannae was a total disaster for Rome.
THE BATTLE FORMATIONS AT CANNAE
CANNAE
THE MAJOR BATTLES OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR
6. a) According to Polybius, 70,000 on the Roman side were
killed and 10,000 captured at Cannae.
b) Livy’s numbers are smaller (but not necessarily more accurate).
c) Polybius says the Carthaginians lost 5,700 dead:
4,000 Gauls, 1,500 Spaniards and Africans, and 200
cavalry.
7. Whatever the numbers, this was a very serious outcome
for Rome and news of the defeat caused total panic in the
city of Rome.
8. BUT, for reasons that are not clear, Hannibal (again) did
not march on Rome.
9. Instead, from 215 BC, he broadened his field, applying a
wider strategy of trying to “encircle” the Italian
peninsula - by seeking allies outside Italy.
215 – 206 BC
1. In 215 BC two excellent opportunities allowed Hannibal to
implement his strategy of trying to “encircle” Italy.
2. a) Demetrius, who had gone to MACEDONIA from
Illyria when the Roman state had intervened there
to suppress piracy, was able to influence the 15year old king, PHILIP V of MACEDON, who had
just taken the throne, to form an alliance with
Hannibal.
b) In SYRACUSE, in south-eastern Sicily, the 15-year old
HIERONYMUS (who had succeeded to the throne of
is grandfather Hiero II) was persuaded to form a
similar alliance, AND
c)
in SARDINIA an anti-Roman rebellion gave opportunities for
Carthage to strengthen its links there.
MACEDONIA
SARDINIA
SYRACUSE
THE “ENCIRCLING” GAVE HANNIBAL ALLIES IN
MACEDON, SICILY, AND SARDINIA
3. Given
a) the serious set-back Rome experienced at Cannae,
b) the Roman loss also of a consular army to the Gauls in the
north of Italy in 216 BC,
c) Hannibal’s new alliances, and
d) the change of allegiance to Hannibal of quite a number of
Rome’s allies in Italy after Cannae (although not the Greek city states
or the “Latin colonies” of the south), the prospects for a successful
strategy on Hannibal’s part seemed good – especially if he
could continue with a series of victories in Italy.
4. i) BUT he found, more and more, that he now had to
offer protection to his new allies in Italy against a
Rome which seemed unendingly able to raise new
forces and mount a counter-offensive.
ii) This limited his flexibility and lost him much of the
initiative that should have been in his hands.
5. Even though Hannibal was still able to launch a very
robust campaign and Rome now had to divert forces to
Spain, Sicily, Sardinia, and Illyria, the Roman state, by
lowering the age of recruitment from 18 to 16 and
enrolling slaves, was able to maintain 20 legions under
arms, 16 of them in Italy.
6. a) Of crucial importance to Hannibal’s success would be
the relief of the second city of Italy, CAPUA (in Campania),
to which the Romans were laying siege.
b) To draw Roman forces away, in 211 BC he marched on
Rome - although there was little chance that he would
be able to take the city.
c) His ruse was unsuccessful.
7. Although things had not yet tipped decisively in Rome’s
favour in Italy, the situation there was improving.
8. For some time things ebbed and flowed, but in 208 BC
Rome was able to retake TARENTUM [in the far south] which
had gone over to Hannibal in 210 BC.
9. a) In 207 BC Hannibal’s brother HASDRUBAL crossed the
Alps and arrived in northern Italy, after wintering in
Gaul, with a 20,000-strong army from Iberia.
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b) Hasdrubal passed down the east coast of the Italian
peninsula as far as Umbria without incident, BUT
c) Roman forces were able to intercept him and defeat
and kill him along with 10,000 of his troops.
10. By now PUBLIUS CORNELIUS SCIPIO
AFRICANUS MAIOR (Scipio the Elder) had appeared
on the scene and, with his playing a greater and greater
role, the tide was to turn very much in Rome’s favour.
EARLIER IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA
211 BC
1. In 211, the Scipio brothers of the earlier generation, had
both lost their lives in Spain, Publius having joined his
brother Gnaeus there much earlier.
2. i) They had been confronted in southern Spain by
HASDRUBAL (before, of course, he ever set out for Italy) .
ii) Hasdrubal had received reinforcements, including a
whole new army from Carthage.
3. a) The Scipios had divided their forces and had each
fought in the region around Corduba and Murcia – at
CASTULO and ILORCA.
b) The division of their armies had proved disastrous for
them, as each of them had been killed.
4. a) Dissension among the Carthaginian forces (who did not coordinate their efforts) enabled the Roman survivors to escape
north of the Ebro.
b) This failure of the Carthaginian commanders to work
together gave time for new Roman forces to arrive in
Iberia in 210 BC under the command of SCIPIO
AFRICANUS (son and nephew respectively of the two
dead commanders).
5. Instead of attacking immediately the two Carthaginian
armies in the south, SCIPIO struck first at CARTHAGO
NOVA (the capital of Carthaginian Spain) and succeeded in taking it.
6. a) In 208 BC, SCIPIO AFRICANUS had been able to
defeat HASDRUBAL at BAECULA (at the upper reaches of
the Guadalquivir) but was not able to prevent him from
leaving Spain with the intention of joining his brother
Hannibal in Italy (as we saw earlier).
b) Hasdrubal left his commanders to deal with the
situation in Spain.
c) Despite receiving additional forces from Carthage,
the Carthaginians were defeated in 206 BC at ILIPA,
just north of Seville – bringing the war in Iberia to an
end, very much because of SCIPIO’s excellent
generalship.
7. MAGO, the brother of Hannibal and Hasdrubal, having
failed in a desperate last attempt to retake CARTHAGO
NOVA in 205, left from the Balearic Islands for Italy
where he would finally be defeated in 203 BC.
The general area of most of
the battles
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NORTH AFRICA
Having “contained” Hannibal in Italy, the Romans spent
most of 205 BC preparing troops in Sicily to carry the
war to North Africa, which they did in 204.
Having landed, Roman forces ravaged the rich Bagradas
valley Carthage depended heavily for its food supplies
and besieged the important coastal city of UTICA.
a) This led to a political reversal domestically at
Carthage itself.
b) The “Barcids” (those who supported the war
policy) were ousted by the large landowners.
c) Thirty of their leaders approached SCIPIO
AFRICANUS (overall commander of Rome’s forces in North
Africa) and negotiated peace terms with him.
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HANNIBAL had been recalled.
a) His return gave fresh hope to “the war party” and,
b) although a delegation arrived from Rome to inform
SCIPIO that the peace terms he had proposed had
been accepted by the Senate,
c) the attitude and activities of “the war party” at
Carthage led Scipio to determine that the issue
needed to be settled once and for all by the decisive
military defeat of Carthage.
a) Hannibal and his forces must be forced to submit
first.
b) The submission of the city of Carthage, if
necessary, would follow.
UTICA
VALLEY
of the
BAGRADAS
(the modern Oued
Medjerda)
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8.
a) SCIPIO brought HANNIBAL to battle at ZAMA
(100 miles south-west of Carthage) on 19th October 202 BC.
b) The two armies were fairly evenly matched
- about 40,000 on each side.
c) It proved to be a “slogging match” – but a Roman
victory.
a) Roman losses were ‘modest’ (perhaps 2,500).
b) Carthage lost huge numbers (perhaps 50% killed
and a high percentage taken prisoner).
[Hannibal went on to have a career as a business man and politician]
9.
Carthage sued for peace after Zama and this time Rome’s
terms were VERY severe.
“Battle of Zama”
Cornelis Cort (1567)
Henri-Paul Motte (1890)
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THE PEACE TERMS of 201 BC
Carthage was forced to give up ALL of its interests in
the IBERIAN PENINSULA.
Carthage was forced to pay a war indemnity of 10,000
talents [300 tons] in silver.
Carthage’s navy was limited to 10 ships (so that the
state could ward off pirates).
Carthage was forbidden to raise an army or engage in
military activity without Rome’s permission.
[The fourth term allowed Carthage’s neighbour, the kingdom of NUMIDIA
(Rome’s ‘client’), to engage in low-level raiding of Carthaginian territory
for decades]
After the war:
1. Carthage was ruined economically with little opportunity
to recover its losses on the sea or on the land, even in
north Africa – except within its own territory.
2. a) Hannibal became a businessman, then a
politician.
b) He went into exile in Asia Minor in 195 BC
where he became involved in regional politics
and, about 183 BC, committed suicide rather
than be handed over to the Romans.
3.
a) Publius Cornelius SCIPIO AFRICANUS (Scipio
the Elder) returned to Rome as the most influential
man politically until he withdrew from public life in
184 BC.
b) Those associated with him (especially if part of his ‘extended
family’) carried great weight too for quite some
time – being elected, for example, to some of the
leading annual offices in the state.