Download Sir William David Ross: (1877

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Sir William David Ross:
(1877-1971)
The Right and the Good (1930):
An introduction to Intuitionism as a
Model of Ethics:
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Ethical Intuitionism.

Ross combines aspects of Mill and Kant in what may be termed as “ethical
intuitionism.”

Against utilitarianism: Ross contends that we have an intuitive knowledge of
the rightness and wrongness of acts that doesn't amount to the evaluation of the
consequences of our actions.

Unlike Kantianism, Ross contends that this intuitive knowledge doesn't consist
of a set of moral absolutes that can not be overridden.

In sum, Ross contends that our moral principles present us with prima facie
duties.


Prima facie means “on first appearance” or “on the face of it.”
While these duties' value is not upon circumstances, their applicability is so
dependent. Ross contends that circumstances are extremely important in
determining our overall duty, and here our perception of the situation is also
extremely important.
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1. An Introduction
Ross advocates ethical intuitionism: We know the basic
truths of ethics by intuition; intuitive recognition is neither
reason nor feelings; there is also no special intuitive faculty
which enables us to clearly know what is our duty is in a
given situation.
We do have a “sense” but it is “highly fallible”; it is the only
guide we have to our duty (pp. 41-42).
Consider: when you are in the right circumstance, you can
see what is right and what is wrong. Though highly fallible,
it is self-evident.
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Consider the following:
Ross states:
“I suggest “prima facie duty” or “conditional duty” as a brief way of
referring to the characteristic (quite distinct from that of being a duty
proper) which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind (e.g.,
the keeping of a promise), of being an act which would be a duty
proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is
morally significant… [there is] is a prima facie rightness of certain
types of act… [this] is self-evident; not in the sense, that it is acting
for one’s self-interests evident from the beginning of our lives… but
in the snese that when we have reached sufficient moral maturity
and have given sufficient attention to the proposition it is evident
without need of further proof” (pp. 19-).
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1. An Introduction
Whether this faculty is implanted in us by God or
part of our nature that distinguishes us from other
creatures, it is a sense we have, and if we are
receptive to it and honest about it we cannot deny its
existence.
He lists 7 prima facie (conditional duties we know):
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1. An Introduction

Ross contends that there are at least six types of prima facie duties:
1. Duties of Fidelity: those that rest upon previous acts of my own (promising and
reparation);
2. Duties of Gratitude: those that rest upon previous acts of others (gratitude);
3. Duties of Justice: those that rest on the fact or possibility of a distribution of
pleasure or happiness (justice);
4. Duties of Beneficence: those that rest on the fact that there are others whose
condition we may make better (benevolence);
5. Duties of Self-Improvement: those that rest on the fact that we may make
ourselves better (self-improvement);
6. Duties of Non-Maleficence: those that rest on our obligation to not injure others
(non-maleficence);
-He does not claim his list of prima facie duties is an ultimate list.
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Prima Facie Duty

In sum, moral knowledge arises first when a notice a feature of the situation we are in
which makes a moral difference to how we should behave here. But we immediately notice
that what matters here must matter in the same situation wherever it appears. Thus, we
discover a moral principle by intuitive induction from what the initial case contains.

Ross held that the principles we come to know are self-evident to us, but form this means
only that no more is needed to reveal their truth to us as general guides to our behavior
than what is in the case before us.

Prima facie means “on first appearance” or “on the face of it.” This means they can be
overridden by other duties when a conflict occurs in a situation. In contrast, actual duty or
duty proper is our obligatory responsibility, no matter the nature of the occasion.
According to
Ross, "duty proper" is a "toti-resultant" property that is determined by looking at the total
situation—and this usually involves considering a number of different (and conflicting)
prima facie duties!

Ross insists that when an act is a prima facie duty, this is an objective fact about it—it is a
duty. Its "prima facie" character comes from considering the action in this single light
alone. That is, being a prima facie duty is a "parti-resultant" property of an action—it is an
objective fact about the act from a single perspective.
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Prima Facie Duty

While these prima facie duties' value is not upon circumstances,
their applicability is so dependent. Ross contends that
circumstances are extremely important in determining our overall
duty, and thus perception of the situation is extremely important.

Ross claims there could be several characteristics which make an
act right, and so prima facie duties are not reducible to some one
characteristic or formula.

It is a pluralistic model. Ross claims there are several characteristics
which make an act right, and they are not reducible to some one
characteristic or formula.
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1. An Introduction
Therefore, when you have a genuine intuition of rightness
or wrongness, you cannot help recognizing that it is an
ethical truth. Having the ethical tuition without recognizing
it as an ethical truth would be like seeing a square without
seeing that it is square. And if you don’t get these intuitive
ethical insights, it is because you are deceiving yourself,
lying, or your intuitive sense is severely disabled.
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2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model
A..
This pluralistic approach states that we have a number prima
facie duties:
 A prima facie duty (also called "conditional duty") is a
"characteristic . . . which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain
kind . . . , of being an act which would be a duty proper if it were
not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant."
1. A prima facie duty is more an account of the materials from
which we must make a selection than it is an account of our
actual obligations.
2. In our daily life we are more frequently than not confronted
with conflicting and competing prima facie duties.
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2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model
B. There is an absolute obligation to obey the prima facie duty that is
the most “weightiest” in a given situation. These prima facie duties
will assist in determining the content of the moral ought.
1. These duties are not all-inclusive.
2. They are not in a prearranged harmony of ranked priority nor do
they occur singly.
3. These duties may contract each other in a given situation but
because one of them is most apropos or most weighty, there is an
absolute obligation to obey.
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2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model
4.
There are a few general "rules of thumb" to follow in judging
which prima facie duties are "more incumbent" than others in
various situations--e.g., causing no harm is generally more
incumbent than generosity.
5.
There is no ranking among the prima facie duties that applies to
every situation. Each situation must be judged separately.
6.
We apprehend our prima facie duties in much the same way that we
apprehend the axioms of mathematics or geometry: we do so by
reflecting on "the self-evident prima facie rightness of an individual
act of a particular type."
7.
"The moral order expressed in [the principles of prima facie duties]
is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe . . . as
is the . . . structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or
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arithmetic."
Example:

Most duties are prima facie, not absolute, duties.
So, they can be overridden by other duties when
a conflict occurs in a situation:

A1
A2

A3

A4

A person ought not lie.
A person ought to act with compassion
toward others.
A person ought to respect another’s
autonomy.
A person ought to act to protect others when
they cannot protect themselves.
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Example:
A1-A4 propositions would elicit a prima facie duty for the person to
follow the prescription. However, consider the following situation:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Your professor is dying.
Your professor is in great psychic and moderate physical
distress.
Your professor has always had an intense fear of death
and disease and has never handled bad news well.
The physician tells you that if your professor can
maintain a positive attitude, he can live another year
relatively pain free. If he becomes overly agitated, his
condition will worsen, his physical pain will increase
greatly, and his death will be much sooner.
You are sitting with him and he asks you whether he will
be all right (meaning that he won’t die but will get better).
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Example:



All the various moral maxims A1 to A4 can be
applied to this situation. We are not deciding
under which ethical rule to subsume this action;
all four apply.
The problem is that they prescribe different
actions.
A1 and A3 asserts that we tell prof. the truth and
try to make it go as easily as possible. If he
really knew that a positive attitude will help him
live, then he could be part of his own cure. This
decision would make A1 and A3 supervene A2
and A4.
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Example:
A2 and A4 suggest that he is not that type of a
person. He will never take it well. Him him what
you will, he will be unable to handle the news.
He has a history of handling illnesses that were
much minor as if they were fatal and as a result
has gotten worse. It is truth that this time might
be different, but you don’t think so. You will act
in Prof’s best interests and conceal information
from him because he needs protectio. This
decision would make A2 and A4 supervene A1
and A3
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Example:
Which decision is the best to make? Which
of these pairs of moral maixms ought to
overrule the others? Clearly, they all can
be properly ascribed to the situation, but
since the dictate contradictory actions, it is
necessary to choose one pair over the
other. Since the duties involves are prima
facie, not absolute, one duty may override
another. This leads to the priority problem.
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Priority Problem:

For the ethical intuitionists, the ultimate solution to the competing maxims
that should supervene is decided by level 2 intuition.


Level 1 intuition: a person grasps the truths or existence of the principles. The
principles are the starting points of systems of knowledge (e.g., a person ought
not to lie) (pg. 19).They are known immediately.
Level 2 intuition deals not with the principles by themselves but with principles
situated in life. At this level, we are dealing with what we need to make actual
ethical choices. To understand this operation we need to consider two functions
(a) recognition and (b) application.


Recognition is the process by which we determine the particular action before us (e.g.
woman is pregnant and considering an abortion; is she exercising autonomy or
contemplating murder of an unborn).
Application: When an intuition become an element in this mode, one maxim
actually supercedes another in its force. It is not the case that one maxim more
correctly describes the situation. Rather, there is an instance of genuine conflict
that must be resolved.

Thus in level two, intuitionism operates to provide a priority ordering among competing
maxims, all of which can be properly ascribed as applying the situation in question. So,
level 2 operates as the recognition of the appropriate moral maxim in a given situation,
and in cases that involve more than one competing maxim, Intuitionism provides a
priority in application by making one maxim the more important.
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2. Significant Points:
C. Ross is a moral realist: Rightness and goodness are objective
features in the world in the way that shape, size, and masses are.
D. When are attitudes are appropriate it is because something is the
way we think it is: it is really good, bad, right, or wrong.
E. If X is good or right it is because X has a property or quality of
goodness or rightness.
F. It is the existence of our moral properties that make our moral
judgments true. If there were no moral properties, there would be
no truth for the moral properties make our moral judgments true.
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2. Significant Points:
G.
We do not live in an objective valueless world.
Rather, there is no reason to think that the universe is
valueless. Thus, some of our moral judgments are true
and what makes them true is the presence of the relevant
objective value.
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2. Significant Points:
H. Ross was a non-naturalist realist: moral properties cannot be understood in
wholly non-moral terms.
I. If you define “right” as meaning derived from natural moral sentiments, you are
putting forth a non-moral naturalistic definition. If you define good as meaning
“such that it ought to be desired”, you are putting forth a non-naturalistic
explanation.
J. Ross doesn’t deny that certain empirical facts will be relevant to deciding
whether we ought or ought not act in a certain way. His point is that when all
the empirical facts are in, there is still a further moral judgment to be madenamely that these empirical facts make a certain act right or good.
K. Ross also believes that these moral properties are simple, meaning they are not
in combination with two or more properties or relations. And if it is simple it
cannot be defined. So, rightness or goodness is indefinable.
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2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model
L.
There are a variety of relations among individuals that are morally
significant--including potential benefactor-potential beneficiary,
promiser-promisee, creditor-debtor, wife-husband, child-parent,
friend-friend, fellow countryman-fellow countryman, and others.
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2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model
M. There is are differences between prima facie duty and an actual,
absolute, duty proper:
1. Actual duty or duty proper is our obligatory
responsibility, no matter the nature of the occasion.
2. Whenever I have to make a moral decision in a situation in which
more than one prima facie duty applies, I must "study the situation
as fully as I can until I form the considered opinion (it is never
more) that in the circumstances one of them is more incumbent than
any other. . . ." The prima facie duty I judge to be "more incumbent
than any other" in the situation is probably my "duty proper" or
actual moral obligation.
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2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model:
N. List of prima facie duties (not exhaustive):
FRG-NI-J-B-SI
1. Fidelity (Keep one’s promise);
2. Reparation (make up for wrongs done to others);
3. Gratitude (gratefulness and return the same);
4. Non-Injury (not to harm others);
5. Justice (prevent or correct mismatch between person’s
pleasure or happiness and their merit);
6. Beneficence (generosity)
7. Self-Improvement (improve one’s condition).
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3.
Differences to Consider:
A. Ross agrees with G.E. Moore that defining ethical
predicates in terms of natural predicates commits the
naturalistic fallacy. However, he disagrees with Moore’s
view of consequential ethics, believing that he commits a
fallacy as well, namely, believing that good-maximization is
the only content of the moral “ought.”
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3.
Conscience Theorists:
B. Infallible conscience theorists who subscribe to the view
that we always have immediate or direct knowledge of our
actual duty. Ross responds:
1. They fail to take into account the complexity of the
situational setting and all that is involved therein.
2. They fail to face up to the fact that there are honest
differences of opinion between people of good character
as to what ought to be done in a given context.
3. They simply assume that there is no problem about
selecting one’s actual duty from among the variety of
moral claims simultaneously incumbent upon a
person in a particular situation.
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3.
Utilitarians:
“It is plain, I think, that in our moral thought we consider
that the fact that we have made a promise is in itself
sufficient to create a duty of keeping it, the sense of duty
resting on remembrance of the past promise and not on
thoughts of the future consequences of its fulfillment.
Utilitarianism tries to show that this is not so, that the
sanctity of promises rests on the good consequences of the
fulfillment of them and the bad consequences of their
nonfulfillment. It does so in this way: it points out that
when you break a promise you not only fail to confer a
certain advantage on your promise but you diminish his
confidence, and indirectly the confidence of others, in the
fulfillment of promises….
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3.
Utilitarians:
It may be suspected…that the effect of a single keeping or
breaking of a promise in strengthening or weakening the
fabric of mutual confidence is greatly exaggerated by the
theory we are examining. And if we suppose two men
dying together alone, do we think that the duty of one to
fulfill before he dies a promise he has made to the other
would be extinguished by the fact that neither act would
have any effect on the general confidence? Anyone who
holds that neither act would be suspected of not having
reflected on what a promise is.”
The Right and the Good, 37-39.
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3.
Utilitarians:
C. He rejects utilitarianism for two reasons:
1. Single Criterion. He Rejects them on the ground that the single
criterion upon which an actual obligation is supposed to restnamely, whatever maximizes good-is both too simple for the
diverse circumstances we face and too restricted in it scope.
2. Violates common sense. Imagine that we could bring about
slightly more good by breaking a promise to benefit someone to
whom we had made no promise. Ought we then to break the
promise? Surely not.
Consider this interesting portion where he defends the fact that his
theory does not reduce to a mere production of good consequences:
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3.
D.
Kant
Ross also rejects Kant on the basis of common sense:
1.
Kant embraced exceptionless duties (e.g., the
duty to keep promises). But common sense
recognizes exceptions to these duties. Imagine a
case where keeping a trivial promise would
cause much harm. Ought we then to keep the
trivial promise? Surely not.
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4. Advantages:
1.
2.
Deontological yet flexible in view of what prima duty will
best fit situation.
Appeals to common sense. We don’t get tangled up in ethical
theory and confused by moral speculation.
3.
Feelings about right and wrong have a distinctive force that
is appealing.
4.
Acknowledges real moral conflicts and says we must choose
the weightier principle in that situational setting.
5.
We naturally tend towards Kantian-type principles.
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5. Potential Objections:
1.
The list of prima facie duties is unsystematic and follows no logical
principle.
Response: The list is not complete.
2.
Provides no principle for determining what our actual moral obligations
are in a particular situation.
Response: There is no reason to assume that they will be the same in any
given situation.
3.
List of prima facie duties is without justification; how can we be sure it is
accurate?
Response: Apprehending what is self-evident; we don’t overturn our moral
convictions just because they conflict with some moral theory.
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5. Potential Objections:
4. Don’t our intuitions change or evolve in view of
interaction with culture.
5. Clearly people can have different intuitions about
moral issues.
6. How can we decide which intuitions we should trust.
Consider the following response…
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Response:
“We have no more direct way of access to the facts about
rightness and goodness and about what things are right or
good, than by thinking about them; the moral convictions of
thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of ethics just
as sense perceptions are the data of natural science. Just as
some of the latter have to be rejected as illusory, so have some
of the former; but as the latter are rejected only when they are
in conflict with other convictions which stand better the test of
reflection. The existing body of moral convictions of the best
people is the cumulative product of the moral reflection of
many generations, which has developed an extremely delicate
power of appreciation of moral distinctions; and this the
theorist cannot afford to treat with anything other than the
greater respect. The verdicts of the moral consciousness of the
best people are the foundation on which he must build….”
~ The Right and the Good, pg. 46-7.
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