* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
Download Why Now…….Why Here June 25, 2007
Survey
Document related concepts
History of biological warfare wikipedia , lookup
2015–16 Zika virus epidemic wikipedia , lookup
Steven Hatfill wikipedia , lookup
Yellow fever wikipedia , lookup
Biological warfare wikipedia , lookup
Influenza A virus wikipedia , lookup
Middle East respiratory syndrome wikipedia , lookup
Herpes simplex virus wikipedia , lookup
West Nile fever wikipedia , lookup
Yellow fever in Buenos Aires wikipedia , lookup
United States biological defense program wikipedia , lookup
Bioterrorism wikipedia , lookup
Antiviral drug wikipedia , lookup
Ebola virus disease wikipedia , lookup
Orthohantavirus wikipedia , lookup
Transcript
National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories What will be studied? What are the risks? Part II October 1, 2007 Presenters Mark Klempner, MD Associate Provost for Research Director, NEIDL Institute Jack Murphy, PhD Professor of Medicine and Microbiology Chief, Section of Molecular Medicine Co-Director, NEIDL Institute The NEIDL will study NIAID Category A, B, & C agents Category A: Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) Clostridium botulinum Yersinia pestis (plague) Francisella tularensis (tularemia) Variola major (smallpox) and other pox viruses (smallpox virus can only be studied at the CDC BSL-4 facility by international convention – and will not be studied at the NEIDL) Viral Hemorrhagic fevers Arenaviruses LCM, Junin, Machupo, Guanarito, Lassa Bunyaviruses Hantaviruses Rift Valley Fever Flaviviruses Dengue Filoviruses Ebola, Marburg The NEIDL will study NIAID Category A, B, & C agents Category B: Burkolderia pseudomallei (meliodosis Coxiella burnetii (Q fever) Brucella sp. (glanders) Ricin toxin Epsilon toxin (Clostridium perfringes) Typhus fever (Rickettsia prowazeki) Protozoa Cryptosporidium parvum Cyclospora cayatenensis Giardia lamblia Entamoeba histolytica Toxoplasma Microsporidia Other viruses Food and Water-borne Pathogens West Nile virus Diarrheagenic Escherichia coli LaCross Pathogenic Vibrios (e.g., V. cholerae) California encephalitis Shigella sp. Venezuelan equine encephalitis Salmonella sp. Western equine encephalitis Listeria monocytogenes Japanese encephalitis virus Campylobacter jejuni Kyasanur forest virus Yersinia entercolitica Viruses Calciviruses Hepatitis A The NEIDL will study NIAID Category A, B, & C agents Category C: Emerging infectious diseases Nipah virus Hantaviruses (other) Tickborne hemorrhagic viruses Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus Tickborne encephalitic viruses Yellow fever Multi-drug resistant Mycobacterium tuberculosis Influenza Other Rickettsias Rabies The following agents must be studied under BSL-4 containment. 1) Central European tick-borne encephalitis 2) Congo-Crimean hemorrhagic fever 3) Ebola 4) Guanarito 5) Hendra/Nipah 6) Junin 7) Kyasanur Forest disease 8) Lassa 9) Machupo 10) Marburg 11) Omsk hemorrhagic fever 12) Russian Spring-Summer encephalitis 13) Sabia http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/rac/guidelines/guidelines.html BSL-4 agents that will not be studied at the NEIDL Smallpox - by international convention smallpox can only be studied in the U.S. at the CDC BSL-4 laboratory in Atlanta, Georgia Monkey B virus - there is only one laboratory that has been contracted by the NIH to study Monkey B virus – Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia Who has the BSL-4 expertise & what will they study when the NEIDL opens? Dr. Tom Geisbert – Ebola, Marburg, Lassa, Nipah (likely) ~ 20 years experience working at BSL-4; work has lead to prototype vaccine for Ebola Joan Geisbert – Ebola, Marburg, Lassa, Nipah (likely) ~ 25 years experience working at BSL-4; work has involved the training of most all BSL-4 investigators in the U.S. and has assisted in development of prototype vaccine for Ebola Dr. Elke Muhlenberger – Ebola, Marburg, Nipah (likely) ~ 15 years experience working at BSL-4; work has focused on the molecular biology of Ebola and Marburg virus What are the risks to the community from the NEIDL? Material Form Community Risk 1 hemorrhagic fever viruses liquid negligible – transmission by intimate contact with infected bodily fluids 2 anthrax liquid negligible – liquid contains spore dispersion 3 tularemia liquid negligible - no person to person spread 4 MDR tuberculosis liquid Negligible from the NEIDL – agent is already in the community 5 Protein Toxins (e.g., botulinum, ricin) liquid negligible – “chemical” There are many safeguards to minimize risks to protect the community Building system and design Experienced BSL-4 investigators have & are being recruited Rigorous safety and security Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that must be followed by researchers Agents are stored as frozen liquid in inventoried small volumes Single vial thawed for individual experiments There are many safeguards to minimize risks to protect the community ■ Limited access to the NEIDL and security checks of persons and property ■ Collaborative Training Programs with city agencies ■ Integration of staff and knowledge with BMC clinicians ■ Institutional Biosafety Committee oversight of experimental protocols all ■ Boston Public Health Commission regulations & oversight ■ Massachusetts Department of Public Health ■ NIH and CDC guidelines, regulations & oversight How do we decide what will be studied in the NEIDL? ■ Expertise of investigators who have been and will be recruited to the NEIDL institute ■ Programmatic initiatives instituted by the NEIDL (e.g., MDR- tuberculosis) ■ Ongoing research programs at BUMC which require high containment laboratories (e.g., tularemia) ■ The funding of research grant submissions to support individual research programs in the NEIDL ■ Regulatory approval of individual research programs and protocols by both institutional committees (e.g., IBC) and Boston Public Health Commission How Will the Community Know What’s Being Studied? Institutional Biosafety Committee (public representation) NEIDL Institute Executive Committee (public representative) NEIDL External Scientific Advisory Committee Boston Public Health Commission Community Liaison Committee Mass. Department of Public Safety The NEIDL is Accountable to Independent Public Health and Safety Officials LOCAL Institutional Biosafety Committee Boston Public Health Commission Boston Fire Department Boston Inspectional Services Boston Water and Sewer Commission STATE Massachusetts Department of Public Health Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection Massachusetts Water Resources Authority FEDERAL Centers for Disease Control U.S. Department of Transportation U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Occupational Health & Safety Administration National Institutes of Health U.S. Department of Agriculture Nuclear Regulatory Commission Q&A