Download belle feuille préco Setzer (CD et DVD pour mi

Roman Limes, The Great Wall of China and The Building of Empires
The Roman Empire reached the zenith of its expansion in 116 AD, during the reign of the
Emperor Trajan, who succeeded in conquering Armenia and advancing into Mesopotamia as
far as Ctesiphon, the capital of the Parthian Empire. Thus, during this period, Roman
dominance spread over three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa. Rome established its own
order in the old world: the communication routes were Roman, and the economic and
diplomatic systems, which brought together peoples of widely differing cultures, were also
Roman. So why did this seemingly successful expansion come to a stop?
Rome’s expansionism certainly did halt due to an encounter with peoples more skilled
on the battlefield. In fact, throughout its history, the borders of the Roman Empire were
established by armies, which did not fight in the traditional manner but preferred to set up
ambushes in order to take the enemy by surprise and then retreat rapidly. As Luttwak noted in
his book The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: “The Romans were unable to use their
forces effectively against nations made up of warriors, spread throughout the countryside and
who did not depend upon the survival of an economic and social structure based around cities
and towns. It was therefore for technical and military reasons that the geographical expansion
of the empire reached its limits. These limits were not established for geographical reasons, or
because of distance or particular populations. They were set according to qualitative criteria
and more importantly still, they were restricted by the limitations of coercive diplomacy and
military power. It is for these reasons that the Romans never tried to penetrate the semi-desert
regions of North Africa, the densely forested areas of Central Europe, the plains of today’s
Ukraine, the arid plateau of Iran or the deserts of Arabia1”.
About two centuries before Trajan’s reign, Marcus Licinius Crassus, in order to gain
prestige in relation to two other triumvirs, Julius Cesar and Pompey the Great, tried to
conquer the Parthians, whose territories extended from modern-day Iran as far as Afghanistan.
The military tactics of this Near-Eastern people, which consisted of lightning attacks by its
horsemen and mounted archers, particularly impressed Crassus. He believed however that
these attacks were not the result of tactical finesse, but rather a manifestation of simple
cowardice. In reality these attacks were extremely effective and rapidly sapped the Romans’
resistance, before they were defeated in the only pitched battle of the invasion, at Carrhae, in
53 BC.
During this battle, Crassus paid for his misjudgement with his life. His death was the
tragic conclusion of a military strategy influenced by ambition and greed and which was far
from the strategic principles peculiar to the Roman Empire. The successful conquests and
wars carried out by Rome were not founded on the heroism of its armies or the courage of its
warriors: they were founded on two principles “methodical planning and prudence” (Luttwak
again). Organisation, preparation and the careful management of resources were the keys to
their military success.
These basic principles help us to better understand how the Romans reacted in relation
to the space around them: expansion was motivated by self-interest and was calculated in
nature, and contrary to modern multi-nationals, growth ceased when the costs of annexation
began to outweigh the gains. Those schoolteachers, who on observing the European Limes,
were wont to tell us that the Romans were mistaken in not pushing onwards to the narrowest
section of the continent between Odessa and Kaliningrad, were simply wrong in their
Luttwak, Edward N. The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, from the First Century AD
to the Third (Baltimore, 1976)
1
assertions. Limiting themselves to the banks of the Danube was an attitude dictated by the
principles of prudence and self-interest. Subjugating the Germanic tribes served no strategic
purpose and would have proved to be extremely costly. It was for this reason that in Great
Britain, rather than consolidating “Antonin’s Wall” further to the north yet only 59kms long,
the Romans decided to build the 118km long, fortified frontier of “Hadrian’s Wall”.
The essence of the Romans’ relationship with the space around them is reflected in the
structure of Rome’s frontiers and their progressive evolution over the centuries. During the
Julio-Claudian dynasty, from the time of Augustus to that of Nero, Rome’s military numbers
dwindled to an army composed of just 25 legions. There were no fortified frontiers as we
might imagine them today and security was guaranteed by a network of “client states”, which
were rewarded for their fidelity to Rome. Any eventual uprisings or invasions of importance
were intercepted within the empire itself by mobile legions.
It was only under the Flavian dynasty that the huge task of fortifying the frontiers was
begun. However, the building of defensive walls and watch-towers, did not stop the
development of Roman strategy: in the early years, military strength was based upon the
ability of the militias to come out from behind their fortifications and intercept the enemy
outside these frontiers. Progressively, and above all during the “great 3rd century crisis” these
tactics began to take on an aspect of “defence in depth”, with the development of a system of
“homeland security” protecting the principal communications routes and settlements.
During this period, it was not only the way the Romans saw their own military strategy
that changed, but also their relationship with their “client states”. The success of antiquity’s
most important city-state was based on its ability to create an intercultural “economic
structure”, which gradually transformed it into a “hegemonic empire”. Indeed, it was the
growth of former “client states”, which began to represent the greatest danger to the security
of the populations along the empire’s borders. This was one of the major reasons behind the
progressive development of a strategy of fortification.
Today we could say that republican Rome and to a certain extent, imperial Rome was
not just based on military strength but also on “soft power”. Its frontiers became
progressively “armed and guarded” for both internal and external reasons. Power struggles for
the imperial throne often caused troops to be brought home from the periphery to take part in
internal battles. Outside the Limes, Rome feared that the “client states” would become too
powerful and eventually threaten the integrity of the empire.
It was at this moment tin time that the concept of a “territorial empire” was born, a
concept that would characterise many other nationalistic powers and their relationships with
the rest of the world.
China is often compared with the Roman Empire because of this territorial
characteristic. The Great Wall was not only an enormously ambitious architectural project but
was also the concrete expression of a political attitude. From the first palisades erected during
the 5th century BC to the immense fortifications of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), China’s
idea was to separate the territories considered controllable from those inhabited by the
ungovernable tribes of Mongol or Manchurian origins. Quoting Luttwak once again, we can
employ a description concerning the frontiers of Rome during the Flavian dynasty in
reference to China during this period: “[…] the planning methods used by the Romans in the
frontier zones made it necessary that the inhabitants and territory should be suitable for
organization and development, which would lead to a certain voluntary self-Romanization of
the population in response to the introduction of Roman ideas and manufactured goods. On
the other hand, from a diplomatic point of view, it was necessary that the populations living
outside the frontiers be sensitive to the threats and suggestions used by the Roman system of
indirect control”2.
If we wish to compare the strategic progress of the Roman Empire with that of China,
we cannot however adopt a “determinist” theory of development. It does not necessarily
follow that a “hegemonic” phase (or as we define it, one of “soft power”) should lead to a
“territorial” phase (that we should perhaps define as “hard power”). It is more a question of
alternating phases, which take place during long cycles of imperial rule.
The hegemonic phases allow periods of conquest because the frontiers are not set in
stone. The territorial phase represents the zenith of expansion, that is to say the moment when
the complexity of the exterior situation exceeds the complexity of the internal situation. The
wall defines a frontier and this allows the powers that be to concentrate on the domestic
situation until expansion is possible once again.
Obviously, within an empire, the two aspects of hegemony and territoriality coexist
because the one does not exclude the other. We need to imagine the “building of an empire”
as being characterized by periods, when one phase dominates the other only to go into decline
as the other phase takes over. In the case of an empire, territoriality encloses within its
frontiers something that can be defined as a “national political idea”, that is to say the
grouping together of cultures sharing the same cultural – and therefore economic and social –
ideas.
Present-day China has moved on from a predominantly “territorial” phase to one of
hegemonic expansion since the arrival of Deng Xiaoping through the use of “economic
warfare3”. This is by no means a “new” strategy: it is one that has in fact characterized the
great cycles of “capital accumulation” in recent history and at present-day times, dictating the
growth of merchant Venice, Holland, the British Empire and the United States4.
The arrival of Deng represented the end of Chinese “internal colonialism”: by 1978, the
process, whereby the ethnic Han had practically taken control on a national level, had almost
been completed. After the death of Mao, the civil unrest due to the contrast between the
under-developed Kuomintang opposition and the Communist party also gradually faded
away. The domestic situation had returned to a manageable level and, beyond the Great Wall,
expansion was encouraged at first by the decline of the Soviet Union and then by the end of
the cold war.
China has had much more luck than its Soviet counterpart in the creation of a “Socialist
empire”. Moscow was mired in its phase of “internal complexity” until 1937, the year of
“terror and dreams”, when the crazy but perfectly lucid Stalin transformed Moscow and the
rest of the country into a perfect system for the persecution of dissidents and the development
of a “utopian ideal for a new society5”. The expansionist phase continued during the short and
violent years of the Second World War and resurfaced regularly yet only for short periods
Luttwak, Edward N., op.cit.
Getting away from the omnipresent Luttwak (Luttwak, Edward N. (1990), From
Geopolitics to Geoeconomics. Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce, The National
Interest), we can turn to the 90s French school: Esambert, Bernard (1990), La guerre
économique mondiale, Olivier Orban; and Harbulot, Christian (1992), La machine de
guerre économique, Economica.
4 Braudel, Fernand (1986), Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIe
siècle, Armand Colin; also Arrighi, Giovanni (1996), Il lungo XX secolo: denaro, potere e le
origini del nostro tempo, Il Saggiatore.
5 Schlögel, Karl (2010), Terror und Traum, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag.
2
3
until the catastrophic intervention in Afghanistan during the 80s. The USSR had also to face
up to US expansionism along its frontiers and the globalisation of this conflict from 1945
onwards.
Beijing has not been faced with such obstacles and its growth continues on every
continent.
It is at this point that we must ask ourselves if the development of a “commercial
empire” really makes sense. The main idea, as with the concept of territoriality, is that the
development of new markets is a good idea as long as the profits outweigh the costs. From
this point of view, Beijing is following in the footsteps of the great cycles of accumulation of
the past but in a more highly evolved manner6. The British Empire was criticized by Marxist
historians for its concepts of domination and oppression but it was also criticized by liberals
because “[…] The fact that imperialism distorted the market – using every possible method,
from the use of force to preferential tariffs in order to shape it to the advantage of the mother
country – was in the long term to the disadvantage of the British economy7”.
The Americans have resisted the temptation to colonize, or at least to do it in the same
way as the British. Washington has stimulated the growth of democratic, liberal and
integrated economies and has thus protected the clearly defined frontiers of Europe and Asia
(for example its support for Japan). In the areas where the frontiers are less clearly defined
such as the Middle East or Africa, the US has financed the growth of “client states” and
rewarded the “tribal chief” of the moment, whether it is Reza Pahlavi (Iran) or Hosni
Mubarak (Egypt).
Contemporary China has never imposed political models on its major commercial
partners and has limited itself to creating a system of “economic protectionism” in its trade
with foreign countries. The internal political cohesion exemplified by the ultra-conservative
Central Party has allowed the Chinese to manage their exterior growth in a “careful and
administrative” way rather than in a “heroic and ephemeral” way. Their external power is
based on domestic stability and their international objectives are based on their national goals.
The drive towards imperial growth is provided by ideals, which go much deeper than simply
the economy. It is the concept of “exceptionalism, whether it is British, American or Chinese,
which has led to the fear of global takeover – the economy is merely an instrument.
It is not really credible to imagine that the “disinterest” shown by the Chinese towards
the political models of outside counties represents the long-term strategy of Beijing’s relations
with the rest of the world. This state of affairs is only possible during the “expansive” phase
of the empire. As the years go by, other risks will appear: whether we like it or not the
exchange of merchandise certainly has a political meaning. Beijing was obviously playing
politics when during the 2008 economic crisis it injected billions of dollars into the Russian
energy industry at the heart of the Russian economy. The Chinese are also playing politics
with their lukewarm criticism of North Korea and Iran concerning their nuclear ambitions and
it has certainly been for political reasons that China has shown support for the beleaguered
regime of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe.
If we take all this into consideration, we might come to the conclusion that China is not
yet an empire but simply a national force in a phase of conquest. It will only take on an
Braudel and Arrighi both insist that the great cycles of accumulation should not be
interpreted as being “sequential” but it is difficult not to notice that each new
imperialist/capitalist project has included certain aspects of the previous cycles and has
simply refined their use. This was above all true for the USA following on from the
British Empire and is true today as far as the Chinese cycle is concerned.
7 Ferguson, Niall (2003), Empire. How Britain Made the Modern World, Allen Lane.
6
imperial status if it succeeds in imposing a system of values together with social, economic
and political notions… and only if China accepts the responsibility of being an empire.
Today, certain dynamics exist, which might oblige Beijing to return to the territorial
phase. An increasing number of internal conflicts have come to the surface and in certain
areas the idea of nationhood is in decline. The Sino-Russian frontier, a zone of violent
conflicts over the past centuries might well be the first area to “wobble” in case of a return to
territoriality. During the last phase of the Roman Empire, the troops garrisoned along the
Germanic Limes had acquired some of the physical and cultural aspects of the barbarian tribes
resulting in a number of blonde legionnaires, who were considerably taller than their Roman
counterparts. In China, decades of the “one child per family” policy have lead to a large
majority of men among the population and on the Sino-Russian border this has led to many
trans-national marriages.
In western China, the Uyghur population of the Xinjiang province is becoming less and
less enamoured with the central model and the “advantages of rebellion” are becoming more
attractive than those associated with fidelity. At the moment, China is only an “empire”
within its own frontiers and these signals suggest that in this area Beijing has already returned
to a state of territoriality (if it had ever ventured away from this state).
Other countries considered as “client states” are in the process of learning productivity
and workplace organization from the Chinese. Even the USA is in a process of reorganization,
taking less and less interest in the politics of others, while dreaming of plans for a return to a
growth in exports.
The cycle of hegemony and territoriality can only be broken when such destructive
elements enter into the game and it is for this reason that the Chinese Empire, in order to
prove itself, must confront them.
The world outside of China has become more and more complex since the 90s and it is
for this reason that Beijing must show itself capable of introducing reforms in response. The
planned economy of the Central Party was successful in a fragmented world – such as the
situation post 1989 – however from now onwards China will be subject to new and different
forces. As in ancient Rome, these forces might result in struggles for power between different
factions and lead to the disintegration of the country. Or they might lead to the birth of a new
China, which would colour a large part of the globe in red. Or perhaps the central state will
read the situation correctly and hold on to national power. This would effectively mean a real
change of epoch. We however, as old Europeans at heart, have a little difficulty in believing
that this will all come to pass.
Translation by Chris Atkinson and Jerome Reese