Download - Sydney Symposium of Social Psychology

Intergroup Emotions and the Social Self: Prejudice Reconceptualized
As Differentiated Reactions to Out-groups
Diane M. Mackie and Eliot R. Smith
University of California, Santa Barbara and Purdue University
Draft presentation for Sydney Symposium 2001
”Well I suppose we would just try to ignore them, like they didn’t exist, but if that didn’t work we
might need to, you know, show them who’s boss, and put them in their place a bit, if I was still
angry I’d want us to really hurt them, do we have the, you know, upper hand of things, or do
they?” Student response when asked to “think about a time when a group to which you don’t
belong made your group angry – what would your group want to do?”
How might social psychologists explain such specific, and conditional, desires to move
either away from or against another social group? Most social psychological theories explain
discrimination against out-groups as the result of prejudice – a negative evaluation of, dislike for,
and antipathy toward a group and its members. Prejudice is thus seen as a pivotal precursor to
discrimination. This approach has provided many insights. Viewing prejudice in this sense has
encouraged the study of a wide range of assumed determinants of prejudice including
stereotyping, system justification, and self-esteem needs. It also makes possible the application
of sophisticated models of attitude-behavior relations to the issue of whether and when
discriminatory behavior will occur (see Brewer & Brown, 1998; Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, &
Gaertner, 1996; Fiske, 1998; Macrae, Stangor, & Hewstone, 1997; Glick & Fiske, 1998; Mackie
& Smith, 1998a for reviews).
Nevertheless, the adequacy of conceptualizing prejudice as either a positive or negative
evaluation or feeling, and of viewing discrimination as evaluation-consistent behavior, has been
increasingly questioned. One problem with this approach is that it is undifferentiated, in that it
has no theoretical basis for making different predictions about groups who are feared (and thus
negatively evaluated) or hated (and thus negatively evaluated). A second problem with the
approach is that such evaluation is seen as adhering to or being associated with a target category
as a whole in an all-or-none manner. Although some more recent approaches to attitude theory
make multiple evaluations toward objects possible, intergroup theory has tended to reply on more
traditional concepts of evaluations as general, enduring, and facilitating response to the category
as a whole across time and place (see Smith, 1993, for a broader discussion). Once a negative
evaluation becomes associated with the mental representation of a group (and particularly if it
becomes automatically activated as part of the mental representation) that group is negatively
evaluated, regardless of circumstance. A third shortcoming is that even when the intensity of
such evaluations are taken into account, this approach seems somehow unsuited to account for
the virulent nature of some of the acts perpetrated on social groups. Attributing negatively
evaluated trait characteristics to groups seems unlikely to be a motivation for those groups to be
decimated by “ethnic cleansing” campaigns, or systematically enslaved, tortured, or
exterminated. Finally, some commentators have noted that “feelings” of prejudice seem
somehow to linger at the affective level, even when cognitions that feed into evaluations are
modified. Thus, despite their contributions, traditional social psychological approaches to
prejudice and discrimination have been of little help in explaining the wide range of ways in
which out-groups are devalued, discriminated against, and sometimes decimated, depending on
situation, context, and occasion, and sometimes despite considerable change in “rational” bases
for thinking about others (Mackie & Smith, 1998a; 1998b; Schneider, 1996; Smith, 1993).
Intergroup Emotions Theory
We have proposed intergroup emotions theory (Mackie & Smith, 1998; Mackie, Devos, &
Smith, in press; Smith, 1993, 1999; Smith & Ho, in press) as an approach with the potential to
answer some of these shortcomings. IET proposes that behavioral reactions to social groups are
determined by emotional reactions to groups triggered by appraisals of intergroup situations
contexts and occasions. In that the necessary and sufficient condition for appraising the world in
intergroup terms is identification with a social group, IET takes as its foundational assumption
that the self is social and that cognitive, affective, personal, and intergroup phenomenon are fully
integrated in mechanisms that regulate both individual and group action. In the rest of this
chapter we describe intergroup emotions theory in more detail, and then consider results from
our current program of research that offer support for many of the theory’s key assertions.
Finally we discuss some of the unique aspects of this approach compared to traditional
approaches, and what other implications might be expected to follow from an intergroup
emotions perspective.
According to IET, different behavioral reactions to social groups are based on differentiated
emotional reactions to those groups. Such emotional reactions come about, in turn, on the basis
of appraisals of the consequence of situations and events for the benefit or harm of the groups to
which one belongs. In this broad sense, IET is an extension and integration of appraisal theories
of emotion to the intergroup relations domain (Smith, 1993; Mackie & Smith, 1998; see also
Dikjer, 1987).
Appraisal theories of emotion (Ellsworth, 1991; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman,
1984; Scherer, 1988; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) conceptualize personal emotions as
complex reactions to specific situations or events that include quite differentiated cognitions,
feelings, and action tendencies. Specific emotions experienced by an individual are triggered by
appraisals (cognitions or interpretations) of whether an event appears to favor or harm the
individual's goals or desires and whether the individual has the resources to cope or not, for
example. Other important dimensions of appraisal appear to be the locus of causality of the
event or action, as well as the certainty of the outcome. Depending on their particular
configuration, cognitive appraisals trigger specific emotional experiences (Ellsworth & C. A.
Smith, 1988; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and emotionrelated behavior tendencies (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz,
1994). Anger at another individual, for example, is typically conceptualized as resulting from
appraisals that the other has harmed the self and that the self is strong. Such anger in turn leads to
tendencies to aggress against that other.
Of course the appraisals that such theories appeal to involve the individual self and produce
individual emotion. Most appraisal theorists agree in principal that the essence of appraisal
involves the question "Does this situation affect me personally?" (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p.
31). But as Smith (1993) pointed out, the self implicated in emotion relevant appraisals clearly
need not be only an individual or personal self. Indeed, one of the most powerful
transformational notions in contemporary social psychology is the recognition that the self and
social are not in any fundamental way distinct. That is, not only are individuals “in” groups, but
groups are “in” individuals.
This recognition is grounded in social identity and self-categorization theories (Tajfel, 1978;
Turner 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). According to these theories,
the process of social identification leads group members to perceive themselves as
interchangeable exemplars of the group rather than as unique individuals. As a result, they
highlight the similarities between themselves and other in-group members (Mackie, 1986; Simon,
1998; Simon, Pantaleo, & Mummendey, 1995). They confuse their own characteristics with
those typical of the group (Smith & Henry, 1996; Smith, 2001). In other words, in-groups and
in-group memberships become part of the self. The social extension of the self--the
incorporation of an in-group as part of the self (Smith & Henry, 1996) – provides the means by
which an in-group can acquire affective and emotional significance (Cialdini et al., 1976).
When groups and group memberships become part of the self in this way, events may be
appraised in terms of their implications for such groups. Intergroup appraisals are
interpretations of situations or events that bear on group, rather than personal, concerns: events
do not necessarily affect individuals, but may help or hurt their membership groups. There is
ample evidence that people can evaluate events as having positive and negative implications for
membership groups even when they believe they are personally untouched. For example, people
often report that their group is discriminated against, even while feeling that they personally are
not (Taylor, 1978). As another example, imagine that you immigrated legally to Australia from
New Zealand. A new Australian law is proposed to provide amnesty to all other New Zealanders
who are in Australia illegally. Support for such a law, because it is seen as promoting the ingroup, in all likelihood rests on intergroup appraisals, since its passage will have no implications
for the self personally. Thus the actions of ingroups and outgroups may be interpreted in terms
of whether the help or harm the in-group, and whether the in-group does or does not have the
resources to cope with the action.
Such intergroup appraisals are assumed to trigger group-based, or intergroup, emotions.
Following appraisal theories, specific patterns of such appraisals will trigger specific emotions.
For example, an action that harms the in-group and is perpetrated by a strong out-group (perhaps
suggesting that the in-group does not have the resources to cope with the threat) should invoke
fear. On the other hand, when the in-group is appraised as having the resources to deal with an
out-group’s negative action, anger is the theoretically more likely emotion to be triggered. Once
again, such emotions may be experienced on behalf of the group, as a function of group
membership, regardless of whether the individual self is implicated or not. As the home team
wins or loses, so too may joy or sadness be experienced, even by those who never get closer to
the action than a television screen (Cialdini et al., 1987).
Just as individual emotions are self-regulatory, so too do intergroup emotions have a social
regulatory function. Extensions of appraisal theories of emotion are particularly useful for the
attempt to predict intergroup behavior because they view behavior tendencies as an integral
aspect of the emotion. That is, anger involves the impulse, desire, or tendency to take action
against the source of the anger, just as fear involves the desire to move away from the source of
the fear. Thus intergroup emotions should give rise to specific intergroup action tendencies,
allowing the prediction of which among a range of behavioral options group members are more
likely to choose. Importantly, these action tendencies are not just predicted by specific
antecedent conditions, but are assumed to be mediated by the experience of a particular emotion.
Thus both prediction of, and intervention in, intergroup action tendencies is possible from this
perspective.
In sum, the experience of intergroup emotion is predicated on social identification. When
social identity is salient, intergroup appraisals occur. When appraisals occur on a group basis,
intergroup emotions are experienced: emotions are experienced on behalf of the in-group, and the
in-group and out-group become the targets of emotion. Specific intergroup emotions lead to
differentiated intergroup action tendencies and behavior. Such differentiated intergroup behavior
occurs because of and is mediated by specific intergroup emotions that have been triggered by
particular appraisals of situations or events related to social identity. From the perspective of
intergroup emotions then, prejudice is an emotion experienced with respect to a social identity as
an ingroup member and discrimination is emotion-triggered behavior.
Evidence Supportive of Intergroup Emotions Theory
Several lines of research converge to provide support for the various processes posited
by the intergroup emotions approach. In this section we review research from our own
laboratories that is consistent with a) the role of social identification b) the occurrence of
intergroup rather than personal appraisals, c) the triggering of specific emotional reactions and
behavioral tendencies toward groups, and finally d) the crucial role of intergroup emotions in
determining the impact of appraisals on those action tendencies.
The role of social identification. The experience of intergroup emotion is predicated on
social identification. It is only when an individual sees him or herself as an interchangeable
member of a group, rather than as an unique individual, that the world can be appraised in terms
of group rather than individual outcomes and that emotions can be experienced on behalf of
fellow group members, whether or not the individual is directly affected. Gordijn, Wigboldus,
Hermsen, & Yzerbyt (1999) provided evidence supportive of this position when they focused
participants' attention on either their similarities or on their differences (manipulating social
categorization, and at least by intention identity) with people who were harmed by a third party.
They found that participants were angrier and less happy when similarities rather than
differences with the harmed group were salient. This suggests both that emotions can be
experienced on behalf of others, and that the emotion experienced will depend on who those
others are.
Evidence from our own research program (Silver, Mackie, & Smith, 2000) is also
consistent with the idea that when membership in a group is salient, events that happen to fellow
group members, even if not directly to the self, can trigger emotional reactions. In one study, for
example, we asked our female participants to imagine that they were walking alone at night down
a local street and that they were accosted by another individual who accused them unjustly of
breaking his car’s side mirror. Given the context – an unsubstantiated accusation made to a lone
female on a deserted street at night -- our participants imagined that they would feel relatively
weak in the situation. Moreover, when asked to report the emotions they thought they would
experience in such a situation, participants reported substantial levels of fear and low levels of
other negative emotions such as anger, contempt, and sadness. These results thus replicated a
decade of research on personal emotion, confirming that appraisals of the potential benefit or
threat in a situation, as well as the ability to cope with those potential outcomes, can trigger
individual emotions.
Our interest, of course, was whether the same processes occurred when group
identifications were salient. In the first set of relevant comparisons, we asked other participants
to imagine themselves in the same scenario either as a single University of California, Santa
Barabara (UCSB) student being accosted by a single member of an out-group, a Santa Barbara
City College Student (SBCC - this we termed the mere categorization condition) or as one of a
group of UCSB students accosted in the same way by a group of SBCC students (the intergroup
comparison). Results in both these conditions were almost identical to those in the individual
condition. Thus, participants imagining themselves as a group member or as one of a number of
group members reported experiencing as much emotion of a similar kind as when they imagined
themselves as an individual in the situation.
Of course, even in these categorized and intergroup situations, participants could still
imagine that the events were happening to them personally. In the second relevant set of
conditions then, we described exactly the same course of events happening to another
unidentified individual, an individual in-group member, or to a group of in-group members, in
interaction with another unidentified individual, an individual out-group member, and a group of
out-group members, respectively. Once again we asked participants to report their emotions, and
preliminary analyses indicate that when imagining the events happening to another individual,
participants reported feeling little fear, and much less than when they were individually and
personally involved. In contrast, more fear was expressed when the events were portrayed as
involving an in-group member, and also when they were described as involving multiple
members of the in-group. The level of fear reported in these conditions was no different from
that reported in the equivalent “self-involved” conditions. If borne out by complete analysis,
these results would provide consistent evidence that categorization with a group allow an
individual group member to feel emotion on behalf of the in-group, even when events do not
directly impact that individual. The emotions reported in these conditions are thus good
evidence for intergroup emotion – emotion experienced because of the impact of events on a
group to which one belongs.
The similarity between the mere categorization and the truly intergroup conditions is also
instructive for the role of categorization. Given the similarity, it appears that the mechanism of
activating group membership is enough to invoke the same kinds of processes that might occur in
the presence of multiple other group members, consistent with other findings. On the other hand,
there are circumstances under which we expect the fact of the presence of multiple members of a
group to make a difference in felt emotion relative to when one is a the sole representative of a
group. These differences probably play out particularly in the role of appraisals of the situation,
and thus become relevant in the following section.
Of course the experiments reported here focus on categorization into group membership.
As much research suggests (see Hogg and Abrams, 1987 for a review), membership in a group is
not the same thing as identification with the group. Different group members may be
differentially identified with the group, and IET suggests at least that the more highly identified
the member, the more easily intergroup emotions should be experienced. Although not designed
directly to test this idea, results from another series of studies (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000)
provide some support for the role of identification in producing these effects.
In these studies, participants were asked to identify themselves as members of one or the
other of two groups defined by adherence to conflicting values. For example, participants
identified themselves as supporting equal rights for homosexuals or opposing such rights. They
did this by marking themselves as an X in one of two circles identified by in-group and out-group
labels. After various manipulations designed to influence appraisals, we measured anger and
fear (in Studies 1 and 2) and anger and contempt (in Study 3) toward the outgroup. The relevant
finding for our purposes here was that the relationship between appraisals and emotions was
significantly, although not completely, mediated by identification.
Evidence for intergroup appraisals. According to IET, group membership turns
appraisal into an intergroup activity. Events are now assessed as either helping or hurting the ingroup, as being caused by the in-group or out-group, or as suggesting in-group or out-group
strength, for example. We have studied intergroup appraisals in two different ways.
First, in two different studies we asked participants to recall, and then describe,
situations in which they experienced, for example, anger, disgust, fear, happiness or pride, either
as an individual or as a member of a group (Smith, Miller, & Mackie, 2000). Participants then
made several ratings of their descriptions, including questions about relevant dimensions of
appraisal. Analyses of these ratings show dimensions of appraisal predictable from interpersonal
appraisal theory. That is, events that lead to anger appear to involve threat, assumed intention,
and a sense that there are resources to cope with the threat. Events eliciting fear, on the other
hand, involve threat, uncertainty, and a pervasive feeling of weakness. The findings were
consistent and compelling: ratings of appraisal dimensions differed significantly by emotion
condition but produced very few interactions with whether participants described individual or
intergroup situations. Thus, as we had predicted, intergroup situations, at least those involving
emotion, appear to be appraised along dimensions previously identified as important in
interpersonal emotion contexts.
There was one consistent dimension along which some emotions differed in individual
and group contexts, however. When we asked about situations that triggered anger or disgust at
the in-group, ratings of self-blame and self responsibility were reliably higher in the individual
than in the group situation. This makes sense because situations involving the in-group allow for
diffusion of responsibility – one can feel that the group has done something wrong but not feel as
bad about it as when you personally committed the negative act. Nevertheless, this one
systematic difference merely highlighted the uniformity of the results: virtually no differences in
appraisals of individual versus intergorup situations.
We have also studied intergroup appraisals by describing intergroup situations that
feature different dimensions of appraisal and assessing whether they evoke different emotions.
Mackie et al (2000), for example, manipulated the perception of in-group or out-group strength in
a situation of intergroup threat. Once participants had identified themselves as members of one
of two opposing groups, we manipulated the collective support apparently enjoyed by the ingroup. We did so by exposing participants to a series of alleged newspaper headlines, which
appeared to reflect popular and political support either for their own group or for the out-group.
In one case, for example, participants read 16 headlines such as "Assembly passes Gay Equal
Rights Bill" or "Gay activists given hearing by governor," "Polls show majority support equal
rights for gay couples, intermingled with only 3 headlines proclaiming sentiments like "Court
turns back gay rights appeal." In the other condition the ratio of supportive to non-supportive
headlines was reversed. This technique reliably induced appropriate perceptions that the ingroup or out-group was in a position of relative strength. We then assessed emotions felt toward
the out-group. With all else held constant, the manipulation of perceived in-group versus poutgroup strength had profound effects on experienced emotions. Those perceiving the in-group to
be strong reported considerable anger at the other group, whereas those in the weak condition
reported none. Thus how intergroup situation are appraised on critical dimensions can trigger
quite different intergroup emotions., consistent with a key tenet of IET.
The occurrence of intergroup emotion and associated intergroup action tendencies. The
argument that different appraisals of intergroup situations produce differentiated intergroup
emotions is also a critical assertion of the IET approach. The argument is not just that different
appraisals produce different emotions, but that they produce quite distinct negative emotions,
rather than a generalized negative reaction. The best evidence for this assertion come from
Mackie et al (2000). In all three studies, participants were asked to describe their emotions on a
number of Likert scales . Analyses of responses to these questions revealed clearly differentiated
negative emotions. For example, factor analyses revealed that responses to items related to fear
(fearful, anxious, worried, frightened) were closely related to one another but quite different
from the closely related responses to items tapping anger (annoyed, irritated, angry, mad) or
contempt (disgusted, contemptuous, repulsed). Moreover, specific manipulations of intergroup
appraisals increased reported experience of fear, while decreasing anger, and vice versa. Far
from producing generalized negative affect, our manipulations indicated that quite different,
quite separate, and quite specific negative emotions could be generated. These results were
confirmed in Silver et al (2000). Factor analyses once again indicated that intergroup anger and
fear were quite separate and that particular appraisal dimensions affected one without affecting
the other.
A different kind of evidence for the occurrence of intergroup emotions comes from the
recall paradigm studies already described (Smith et al., 2000). When participants described
situations in which they had experienced an emotion either as an individual or as a group
member, and then rated the intensity of that emotion, only a single difference for the
individual/group factor was found. Consistent with the appraisal differences noted earlier,
participants rated themselves as experiencing less guilt in situations where they experienced guilt
as a group member rather than as an individual. For all other emotions assessed, however, there
were absolutely no differences in the intensity of feelings experienced in personal and intergorup
situations.
Interestingly, one of our studies (Mackie et al., 2000, Experiment 3) indicated that
intergroup anger and intergroup contempt could not be separated. Given the different bases for
these emotions at the interpersonal level, and given that that they are associated with quite
different behavioral tendencies, this result was very surprising. It may well be that these
emotions are not distinct at the intergroup level, at least in situations involving norm violations
which may cause both anger and disgust (a possibility we are currently exploring). More
mundanely, however, these results may reflect linguistic idiosyncrasies of our participants. It
appears that our student population use the words disgusted and disgusting to describe anger and
events worthy of anger. They also consider any event that causes them frustration to be a norm
violation, thus using the term much more broadly than do social psychologists. To distinguish
anger from contempt, with their supposedly quite different approach and avoidance
consequences, we will need to be much more specific and articulate with this particular
participant population.
Despite this result, the overall picture from analyses of intergroup emotions is clear.
Different intergroup situations can trigger separate, different, and distinct emotions directed
toward the out-group and in-group. With the exception of guilt, these emotions don’t differ in
intensity from the same emotions experienced in individual situations. Moreover, these emotions
do not seem to be a by-product of generalized negative evaluation: different negative emotions
increase or decrease depending on the situation quite independently of one another.
Our interest in inter-group emotion was of course prompted by their association at the
interpersonal level with action tendencies – the desire, urge, or intention to take a particular form
of action. The data from studies completed so far provide consistent evidence that different
inter-group emotions are associated with quite distinct action tendencies . In Mackie et al. (2000)
for example, we asked participants to indicate desires to take a number of different kinds of
actions, ranging from leaving the out-group alone (items like "I want to avoid/have nothing to do
with/keep at a distance from/get away from them") to trying to hurt them (items such as “I want
to confront/oppose/argue with/attack them"). Factor analysis indicated that the items representing
moving away from the other group were closely associated and quite distinct from the multiple
closely associated items that reflected movement against the other group. Moreover,
manipulations of appraisals that made the in-group appear strong and that had produced anger
increased the desire to take action against the out-group, while having no impact on behavioral
tendencies to avoid the out-group.
Similar results came from the study in which conditions designed to suggest in-group
weakness produced fear. In these conditions, participants indicated wanting to move away from
the out-group and certainly showed no desire to confront it. Thus both sets of studies indicated
that manipulation of inter-group appraisals and emotions could be used to predict quite specific
patterns of inter-group behavior, at least in terms of action tendencies. And once again,
additional cross-methodological converging evidence was provided by our recall studies. When
participants rated how likely they would be to perform a series of either approach or avoidance
kinds of behaviors in situations prompting a wide range of emotions, there were once again few
differences between individual and intergroup conditions. When it came to arguing with,
confronting, and attacking, for example, people reported as much willingness to do so in the
intergorup as interpersonal condition. Of course, action tendencies do not always translate into
actual behavior. However, even prediction of the desire or intention to take certain kinds of
action is a significant advance in the intergroup sphere. The assumed (and found) association
between emotions and specific action tendencies also allows the theoretical weight of other
approaches, such as the extensive literature and the consistency between intentional behavior to
be brought to bear in the inter-group domain.
The crucial function of intergroup emotion. The defining feature of IET is the argument
that the impact of intergroup appraisals on intergroup behavior is mediated by intergroup
emotions. Evidence for this relationship is provided by performing path analytic assessments of
the extent to which the impact of intergroup appraisals on intergorup action tendencies is
mediated by the experience of the appropriate emotion. The first evidence that emotions
significantly mediated this relationship came from Mackie et. al, (2000). As noted above, our
manipulations of whether the ingroup was in a relatively strong versus weak position vis-à-vis
the outgroup resulted in the predicted occurrence of intergorup anger and the desire to take action
against the outgroup. Of most interest here, mediational analyses indicated that the effects of
perceived in-group strength on offensive action tendencies were mediated by anger. Other
analyses indicated that even though the emotions of anger and contempt had not been
distinguishable in these studies, the desire to move away from the group, and only this action
tendency, was mediated by contempt for the outgroup. These results confirm the hypothesis that
the impact of intergroup appraisals on intergroup action tendencies is caused by the experience
of a distinct intergroup emotion.
Converging evidence came from the study of intergroup fear (Silver et al., 2000). In this
study too, the impact of perceived weakness on the tendency to move away from the group was
significantly reduced when fear was introduced as a mediator. The relationship between
perceived weakness and the tendency to move away and avoid the outgroup was as strong in the
mere categorization and true intergorup conditions as it was in the interpersonal conditions, and
this relationship was as strongly mediated by reported emotions. Thus intergroup emotions
mediated the relationship between intergorup appraisals and intergroup action tendencies, just as
personal emotion mediated the impact of personal appraisals on approach and avoidance.
In sum, these studies demonstrate the validity and usefulness of intergroup emotions
theory as regards the ability to predict specific intergroup action tendencies (specifically, the
desires to move against or away from the outgroup) from intergroup emotions (such as anger and
fear) and to trigger those intergroup emotions via intergroup appraisals (relative strength or
weakness, perceptions of fairness and uncertainty, etc.). In particular, the results provide
evidence for the key assertion of the theory: that it is the experience of the intergorup emotion
that determines how intergorup appraisals will be translated into action tendencies toward the
outgroup.
Unique Contributions of Intergroup Emotions Theory
IET is distinct from previous approaches to understanding prejudice in several ways.
First, responses to different outgroups under different circumstances (including stereotypes,
feelings, and behavioral discrimination) can be differentiated. Rather than prejudice being
merely "negative," specific patterns reflecting different emotions such as anger, fear, or disgust,
and associated action tendencies, should be identifiable. Second, group members may
experience the range of these distinct emotions both about the in-group and the out-group. Focus
on the former provides a new model for viewing the emotional (rather than evaluative)
component of group membership. Focus on the latter provides new theories of prejudice and
discrimination. Third, this new model allows for the possibility that an out-group may be
stereotyped in positive ways yet still generate negative emotions. Fourth, this approach suggests
an integration of the emotion-coping literature into intergroup relations, suggesting a range of
ways (emotion based or problem based) in which people can negotiate intergroup relations.
Fifth, this approach puts emphasis on the social regulatory function of social emotions. That is,
just as emotion is seen as regulating personal behavior and interpersonal interaction, so too can
intergorup emotion be seen as regulating group behavior and intergroup interactions. We have of
course, focused on the latter, tracing the role of appraisals of what events mean for the ingroup
on the production of emotions toward the outgroup that then can guide interaction with them.
However IET also presupposes a similar range of and role for emotions within the in-group.
Feelings of “identification” with various ingroups might be better understood in terms of the
emotions generated about that group - ingroups about which we feel pride, joy, gratitude or
shame may all have different effects on our group-mediated behavior. Finally, because IET
assumes a unique causal role between emotions and intergroup behavior, it allows for unique
ways of thinking about interventions to improve intergroup relations.
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