Download Water, climate and conflict: security risks on the increase?

Briefing note
Water, climate and conflict:
security risks on the increase?
This briefing note explores the multidimensional relationship between water, climate
change, human security and political conflict. The relationship between human
security and water- and climate-related stressors such as floods, droughts and
reduced food availability is quite straightforward. The relationships between water,
climate and political conflict, however, are complex and depend strongly on political,
economic, societal and cultural contexts. Water and climate conditions in the world
are expected to change dramatically due to population growth, further economic
development and climate change. It is projected that these developments will lead
to increased water stress affecting conflict risks at local, national and river-basin
levels. Also, the implementation of mitigation policies may unintentionally aggravate
water stress and competition.
We draw the following five main conclusions:
1) The effects of climate change and future competition over water should
be explicitly accounted for in current development policies at river basin,
national and local levels.
2) The complexity of the climate-water-conflict interaction requires policy
development processes integrating economic, mitigation, adaptation, social,
and security policies.
3) Since local social and cultural contexts are crucial factors, the participation of
local communities in policy development will be important for reducing security
and conflict risks.
4) The river-basin scale remains key to reducing transboundary tensions,
organising joint fact-finding processes and building cooperation between
communities and countries.
5) The complexity of water, climate and conflict interaction – combined with
expected (but uncertain) future developments and global commitments with
respect to mitigation, adaptation and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
– requires the development of a global cross-sectoral monitoring and evaluating
process, fusing data, knowledge and experiences from local to global level.
This may contribute to a better understanding, accelerate learning processes
and fuel the development of promising strategies and measures to reduce
future tensions and conflicts.
W. Ligtvoet, J. Knoop, S. de Bruin, D. van Vuuren, H. Visser, K. Meijer, R. Dahm & L. van Schaik
APRIL 2017
Clingendael Briefing Note
Increasing importance of water
Water plays a critical role in development
strategies at global, regional, national and
local levels. Many aspects of water can
threaten human security, for example floods
from rivers or the sea as well as water
pollution, but water scarcity is regarded as
the most important water issue in relation
to political tension and conflict.1 A sufficient
and reliable water supply is needed for
agriculture and households. It is also needed
for industries and energy production.
In situations where water has become
scarce, competition over water (and the
remaining fertile land) has the potential
to spark tensions between users at levels
ranging from local communities up to
international river basins. Acknowledging the
complexity of the interaction between the
biophysical environment, human security and
political conflict, this briefing note focuses on
their possible interrelationships, considering
also future climate change and socialeconomic developments (Figure 1).
The number of people affected by climateand water-related disasters is significant but
unevenly spread around the world.2 For the
period 2004-2014, 58% of disaster deaths
and 34% of people affected by disasters
have occurred in countries that also appear
in the top 30 of the Fragile States Index.
It has been estimated that between 1980
and 2015, there were 40,000 fatalities each
year (on average) as a direct result of
weather-related disasters. In the same time
period, 175 million people were affected in
other ways.3 In comparison, violent conflicts
resulted in an average estimated at 80,000
fatalities per year in the period 1989-2015.4
Munich Re reported more than 1,000 natural
disasters worldwide in 2015 – most of them
water related (Figure 2A). Figure 2B shows
that water-related conflicts, as reported by
Adelphi, ranging from tensions and riots
to armed conflict, are geographically less
widespread than water-related natural
disasters and fewer in number, with just
119 conflicts over the 1945–2016 period.5
It is expected that water stress will increase
in the future: 1.6 billion people already live
in countries with physical water scarcity
and in the next two decades, this number
may double for several reasons.6 First of all,
population growth means that more people
will be living in flood-prone or water-scarce
areas. Second, economic development could
increase the demand for water. Third, it is
expected that, among other effects, global
warming will lead to changes in precipitation
patterns, and the distribution and types of
extreme weather events. Finally, renewed
mitigation policies following the Paris
Agreement in 2015 may enhance the use
of renewable sources of energy like energy
crops and hydropower. As a result of these
developments, flood risk and water-stress
patterns may change, especially in parts of
the world that are less prepared.7,8
5
6
1
2
3
4
2
IPCC (2014). Climate change 2014: Synthesis report,
Contributions of Working Groups I, II and III to
the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, Summary for
Policymakers. Genève, Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change.
Peters, K. and M. Budimir (2016). When
disasters and conflicts collide. London, Overseas
Development Institute.
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of
Disasters (CRED) (2016). Emergency Events
Database (EM-DAT).
Melander, E., T. Pettersson and L. Themnér (2016).
“Organized violence, 1989-2015.” Journal of Peace
Research 53(5).
7
8
Lukas Rüttinger, Dan Smith, Gerald Stang, Dennis
Tänzler and J. Vivekananda (2015). A New Climate
for Peace: taking action on climate and fragility
risks, Adelphi, International Alert, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, European Union
Institute for Security Studies.
World Bank Group (2016). High and Dry: Climate
Change, Water, and the Economy. Washington DC,
The World Bank.
World Meteorological Organization (2016).
The Global Climate in 2011-2015. Weather
Climate Water. Geneva.
Jiménez Cisneros, B. E., T. Oki, N. W. Arnell,
G. Benito, J. G. Cogley, P. Döll, T. Jiang and
S. S. Mwakalila (2014). Freshwater resources.
Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and
Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change. Cambridge, United Kingdom
and New York, NY, USA, Cambridge University
Press: 229-269.
Clingendael Briefing Note
3
Figure 1
Conceptual representation of the interactions between the physical
environment, human security and political conflict. As explained in the text,
the interactions are complex and context sensitive.
Figure 2A
Geographical overview of natural disaster events reported for the year 2015 by
Munich RE (2016). Climate- and water-related disasters form a major part of the total.
Clingendael Briefing Note
Figure 2B
Overview of water-related conflicts over the period 1944-2016, as reported in
A New Climate for Peace, combined with water-stress areas as given by Wada
et al. (2011).* The timeframes of the shown conflicts and water-stress events at
the same location do not necessarily coincide.
* Wada, Y., L. P. H. van Beek, D. Viviroli, H. H. Dürr, R. Weingartner and M. F. P. Bierkens (2011). “Global monthly
water stress: 2. Water demand and severity of water stress.” Water Resources Research 47(7): n/a-n/a.
Climate change and
water issues high on the
international agenda
Decades of debate and negotiations on
climate policy led to the Paris Agreement
2015.9 Also, the relationships between
climate change, water and its impact on
human security, political stability and
economic stability are receiving growing
global attention. For example, the recent
annual risk assessment reports by the
World Economic Forum warn that failure to
adapt to climate change is one of the major
risks facing the world economic system.10,11
9
UNFCCC (2015). ADOPTION OF THE PARIS
AGREEMENT, Proposal by the President - Draft
decision -/CP.21, United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change.
10 World Economic Forum ( 2011). Water Security:
The Water-Food-Energy-Climate Nexus
Island Press.
11 World Economic Forum (2016). The Global Risks
Report 2016 Geneva.
4
Moreover, the Nobel Peace prize awarded
to the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change) was motivated by the
possible role of climate change in enhancing
conflict. The New Climate for Peace initiative,
commissioned by the G7, and the installation
of the Planetary Security Conference itself
in 2015, also reflect this growing concern.
Today’s politicians, at all government levels,
are increasingly aware of climate change
and its possible impacts. But local cultural
and social practices are often not sufficiently
taken into account when mitigation and
adaptation policies are developed and
implemented, leading to maladaptive
outcomes.12
Actions to address the impacts of climate
change and improve human security are
visible at all levels, ranging from irrigation
12 Adger, W. N., J. Barnett, K. Brown, N. Marshall and
K. O’Brien (2013). “Cultural dimensions of climate
change impacts and adaptation.” Nature Climate
Change 3(2): 112-117.
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projects for food production to health
and energy programmes, and from local
and national adaptation strategies to the
adoption of universal goals such as the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
and the Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction. Many SDGs are directly
or indirectly related to water. There are
committees aiming to improve collaboration
between countries bordering river basins
to prevent the occurrence of flood events,
water scarcity situations and water pollution.
Such collaboration could reduce the chance
of transboundary conflicts that might arise
from inter alia the construction of dams for
hydropower production and for irrigation.
Several good examples of collaboration show
that the (sub)river basin scale may be the
suitable geographical scale for improving
cooperation in future situations of tension
and/or scarcity.13
Future socio-economic
developments lead to increased
water competition
Future economies might have a higher
demand for water than today. First of all,
population is projected to grow to nine
billion in 2050. The World Bank estimates
that demand for water for agriculture will
rise by around 50%, urban water use will
rise by 50%, and demand for water for
energy production could increase by up to
85%.14 Also other studies show that under a
business-as-usual socio-economic scenarios,
water demand could increase which may
lead, in some regions, to harsh competition
over water resources and to changing power
relations.15 It should be noted, however, that
current water use is often quite inefficient.
Therefore, scenarios that assume increasing
efficiency can also show stable or even
decreasing water consumption.
13 Brochmann, M. and N. P. Gleditsch (2012).
“Shared rivers and conflict – A reconsideration.”
Political Geography 31(8): 519-527.
14 Ibid 6.
15 Harvey, M. and S. Pilgrim (2011). “The new
competition for land: Food, energy, and
climate change.” Food Policy 36: S40-S51.
5
Global warming may lead to
further water stress
Global climate change will affect water
security through changes in precipitation
patterns, evapotranspiration, and changes
in extreme weather patterns. In general, it
is expected that on average there will be
more precipitation. The pattern of change,
however, is very heterogeneous: some
areas will have more precipitation, others
less. In addition, higher temperatures
will also increase the evapotranspiration
rates. Studies on the impact of climate
change (both through changing means and
changing extremes) remain very uncertain.
Depending on future global socio-economic
developments, global mean temperature
is expected to rise 3-5°C by 2100 in the
absence of any new and stringent climate
policies. Even if the ambitious targets of Paris
are implemented, global mean temperature
would still rise by 1.5-2°C compared to preindustrial levels. Thus, despite effective
mitigation policies many regions will
nevertheless be affected by changing
precipitation patterns and changing water
availability.16
Mitigation responses following
the Paris Agreement could also
have consequences for water
stress
Mitigation responses may intensify water
stress in certain regions, thus impacting on
water-related human security and political
conflict. Depending on implementation,
the increased use of hydropower could
cause local conflicts due to involuntary
displacements and ecological issues, or
could interfere with the political interaction
between countries in transboundary river
basins. The increased production of biomass
for bio-energy could also lead to intensifying
competition for land and water for food
production. Figure 3A shows regions where,
in 2050, water stress could intensify due to
16 Ibid 1.
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increased energy and food crop production.
Figure 3B shows regions with significant
potential for new hydropower facilities,
indicating river basins where political
conflict and tension over the construction of
dams and use of water may be more likely,
6
especially in politically unstable or tense
regions. In some transboundary river basins,
for example the Nile basin, Mekong basin,
and the Indus, Ganges and Brahma Putra
system, political tensions around water seem
to be building up rather than easing.
Figure 3A
Regions where competition over land and water may intensify due to increased
food and energy crop production in 2050.
Figure 3B
Regions where tensions on river basin level may intensify due to
increased hydropower production.
Clingendael Briefing Note
What we know: different
roles of water in political
or violent conflict
In response to growing knowledge regarding
climate change and its effects on the
water system, international organisations,
governments, universities and a broad
spectrum of research institutes are
giving more priority to understanding the
relationships between climate change, water
and security issues. This has resulted in a
wide range of studies and methods. There is
little dispute about the link between water
and human security, and there is a high level
of consensus on the significant increase in
the impacts of water-related disasters and
competition for water.17 Reducing the impacts
of weather-related hazardous events is a
major aim of climate adaptation and disaster
risk reduction policies, which are supported
on a global scale by the SDGs and Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.
There is substantially less consensus in
the scientific community regarding the
interaction between water and political or
violent conflict. Publications assessing the
interaction between climate change factors
and the role of water in political security
provide different conclusions, reflecting not
only differences in the focus and views of the
authors, but also differences in the methods
applied (qualitative or quantitative), the
spatial and temporal scales, geographical
focuses, the contexts of each respective
study, and the variables selected. Different,
sometimes even conflicting, perspectives
are found in literature concerning the role
of climate and water with respect to social
disruption and conflict. These approaches
do not per se exclude each other.
17 Adger, W. N., J. M. Pulhin, J. Barnett, G. D. Dabelko,
G. K. Hovelsrud, M. Levy, Ú. O. Spring and C. H.
Vogel (2014). Human Security. Climate Change
2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part
A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of
Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY,
USA, Cambridge University Press: 755-791.
7
A main body of literature considers water as
a subdominant factor in the conclusion of
conflict studies. These studies highlight that
conflicts result from a mix of factors, such as
population size, demographic composition,
governmental structures, poverty and
inequality, ethnic fractionalisation, religious
differences, history of conflicts in the area
or presence of neighbouring conflict.18, 19,
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
These conclusions do
not provide direct perspectives for action
regarding the role of water in conflict but,
following the pre-cautionary principle,
18 Selby, J. and C. Hoffmann (2014). “Beyond scarcity:
Rethinking water, climate change and conflict in
the Sudans.” Global Environmental Change 29:
360‑370.
19 Theisen, O. M., H. Holtermann and H. Buhaug
(2011). “Climate wars? Assessing the claim that
drought breeds conflict.” International Security
36(3): 79-106.
20 von Uexkull, N. (2014). “Sustained drought,
vulnerability and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan
Africa.” Political Geography 43: 16-26.
21 von Uexkull, N., M. Croicu, H. Fjelde and H. Buhaug
(2016). “Civil conflict sensitivity to growing-season
drought.” Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 113(44): 12391-12396.
22 Turner, M. D. (2004). “Political ecology and the
moral dimensions of “resource conflicts”: the case
of farmer–herder conflicts in the Sahel.” Political
Geography 23(7): 863-889.
23 Gemenne, F., J. Barnett, W. N. Adger and G. D.
Dabelko (2014). “Climate and security: evidence,
emerging risks, and a new agenda.” Climatic
Change 123(1): 1-9.
24 Allouche, J. (2011). “The sustainability and
resilience of global water and food systems:
Political analysis of the interplay between security,
resource scarcity, political systems and global
trade.” Food Policy 36: Supplement 1 3-8.
25 Bernauer, T. and T. Siegfried (2012). “Climate
change and international water conflict in Central
Asia.” Journal of Peace Research 49(1): 227-239.
26 Butler, C. K. and S. Gates ibid.”African range wars:
Climate, conflict, and property rights.” 23-34.
27 Gleditsch, N. P. Ibid.”Whither the weather? Climate
change and conflict.” 3-9.
28 Schleussner, C.-F., J. F. Donges, R. V. Donner and
H. J. Schellnhuber (2016). “Armed-conflict risks
enhanced by climate-related disasters in ethnically
fractionalized countries.” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 113(33): 9216-9221.
29 Theisen, O. M. (2012). Climate clashes? Weather
variability, land pressure, and organized violence in
Kenya, 1989-2004: 81.
Clingendael Briefing Note
this view would still warrant international
efforts to ensure that activities in the
field of mitigation and adaptation do not
increase tensions.
A second group of studies underline the
direct role of climate and water in political or
violent conflicts. These studies statistically
link the rise of conflicts to climatic and
environmental changes; this supports the
perspective of climatic change and changing
water security being a major threat to
security risks globally.30, 31, 32 In line with this
group of scientific studies, more policyoriented studies present global warming and
water-related issues as the ‘ultimate threat
multiplier’ for conflict33 or label them as key
drivers of conflict in the coming decade.34
8
and enhanced collaboration rather than to
increased tensions and/or conflict.38, 39, 40, 41, 42
Finally, there is an extensive number of
studies providing examples of water being
used as a weapon or powerful strategic
tool in political conflict situations. For
example, strategic destruction, occupation or
poisoning of dams, wells or treatment plants
occurred in Iraq, where ISIS closed dam
gates to cut off water. In Brazil, landowners
poisoned the wells of insurgent indigenous
tribes.43, 44 And in 2014 Ukraine cut off the
water supply of Crimea by closing the sluices
in the North Crimean Canal, which led to
acute water shortages, as Crimea receives
80% of its fresh water from that canal.45
A third group of publications focus on water
and climate change as an opportunity for
peace. Some studies suggest that, although
pressure on water resources and competition
between countries might increase, there are
many examples of collaboration in national or
international river basins that result in better
understanding and cooperation between
parties with conflicting interests.35, 36, 37
These studies therefore indicate that future
climate change may lead to conversations
Water, climate and conflict in
the future: security risks on
the increase?
30 Hsiang, S. M. and M. Burke (2014). “Climate,
conflict, and social stability: what does the
evidence say?” Climatic Change 123(1): 39-55.
31 Hsiang, S. M., K. C. Meng and M. A. Cane (2011).
“Civil conflicts are associated with the global
climate.” Nature 476(7361): 438-441.
32 Hendrix, C. S. and I. Salehyan (2012). Climate
change, rainfall, and social conflict in Africa: 35.
33 Defence Intelligence Agency ( 2012). Global Water
Security. Intelligence Community Assessment,
Defence Intelligence Agency U.S.
34 Ibid 4.
35 Wolf, A. T. (2007). “Shared waters: Conflict
and cooperation.” Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour.
32: 241‑269.
36 Gartzke, E. (2012). “Could climate change
precipitate peace?” Journal of Peace Research
49(1): 177-192.
37 Slettebak, R. T. Ibid.”Don’t blame the weather!
Climate-related natural disasters and civil conflict.”
163-176.
38 Wolf, A. T. (2007). “Shared waters: Conflict
and cooperation.” Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour.
32: 241‑269.
39 Gartzke, E. (2012). “Could climate change
precipitate peace?” Journal of Peace Research
49(1): 177-192.
40 Matthew, R. (2014). “Integrating climate change
into peacebuilding.” Climatic Change 123(1): 83-93.
41 Ibid 14.
42 Stefano, L. d., J. Duncan, S. Dinar, K. Stal,
K. M. Strzepek and A. T. Wolf (2012). “Climate
change and the institutional resilience of
international river basins.” Journal of Peace
Research 49(1): 193-209.
43 CNN (2015) “Iraq: ISIS fighters close Ramadi
dam gates, cut off water ro loyalist towns.”
44 Fox News (2012) “Brazil police investigate
indigenous claim that creek in sacred land was
poisoned.”
45 BBC (2014) “Russia fears Crimea water
shortage as supply drops.”
The above shows that the interrelationship
between water, climate and political conflict
is complex and dependent on regional,
national or local contexts. Expected
changes in important drivers like population
growth, economic development and
climate are likely to affect water stress and
increase competition for water. Accepting
that conflicts are often attributed to a
combination of different causes, ranging
Clingendael Briefing Note
from cultural, societal and political issues to
growing competition for natural resources,
we cannot ignore the fact that in the future
water insecurity will play a greater role in
conflict situations in areas prone to water
scarcity, and also in areas affected by
extreme events such as floods and droughts.
Current violent conflicts, such as in Syria
and Yemen, have been linked by several
scholars to prolonged water scarcity.46, 47, 48
But several conflict researchers at most only
partially endorse those claims, arguing that
other factors such as political, economic
and societal conditions undeniably play a
dominant role.49, 50, 51, 52 Furthermore, changing
geo-political relationships in the context
of climate change can increase tensions
between countries in transboundary river
basins.53, 54, 55
46 Gleick, P. H. (2014). “Water, Drought, Climate
Change, and Conflict in Syria.” Weather, Climate,
and Society 6(3): 331-340.
47 Kelley, C. P., S. Mohtadi, M. A. Cane, R. Seager and
Y. Kushnir (2015). “Climate change in the Fertile
Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian
drought.” Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 112(11): 3241-3246.
48 Robins, N. S. and J. Fergusson (2014).
“Groundwater scarcity and conflict – managing
hotspots.” Earth Perspectives 1(1): 1-9.
49 De Châtel, Francesca (2014). ‘The Role of Drought
and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising:
Untangling the Triggers of the Revolution.’
Middle Eastern Studies 50, no. 4: 521-35.
50 Gleick, P. H. (2014). “Water, Drought, Climate
Change, and Conflict in Syria.” Weather, Climate,
and Society 6(3): 331-340.
51 Robins, N. S. and J. Fergusson (2014).
“Groundwater scarcity and conflict – managing
hotspots.” Earth Perspectives 1(1): 1-9.
52 Kelley, C. P., S. Mohtadi, M. A. Cane, R. Seager and
Y. Kushnir (2015). “Climate change in the Fertile
Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian
drought.” Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 112(11): 3241-3246.
53 Rahaman, M. M. (2012). “Hydropower ambitions
of South Asian nations and China: Ganges and
Brahmaputra Rivers basins.” International Journal
of Sustainable Society 4(1-2): 131-157.
54 Stefano, L. d., J. Duncan, S. Dinar, K. Stal, K. M.
Strzepek and A. T. Wolf (2012). “Climate change
and the institutional resilience of international river
basins.” Journal of Peace Research 49(1): 193-209.
55 Bagla, P. (2010). “Along the Indus River, Saber
Rattling Over Water Security.” Science 328(5983):
1226-1227.
9
This political conflict is an example of how
water in already politically tense regions can
be used as an expression of power rather
than a source for collaboration. Historically,
examples of water used as means for
repression are found in several conflicts,
ranging from power struggles over water
in the Israel-Palestine conflict, to tension
between farmers and herders over water
and land issues in a district of Kenya.56, 57, 58
Without action, these existing conflicts
could intensify around water.
Uncertainties require better
understanding of the interplay
between future changes in
the biophysical system and
human security and political
conflict risks
As has been shown, assessing the role of
climate change and water with respect to
social and political insecurity is complex,
because of its intertwinement with regional,
national and local cultural, political
and socio-economic variables. We find
publications stressing the importance
of social, cultural and political contexts,
publications arguing that climate change
and water are a ‘threat-multiplier’, and
publications demonstrating that (at riverbasin scale) water may lead to collaboration
rather than conflicts, while on the other
hand, some publications show that in
political conflict areas water often is used
as a strategic tool. Most of the literature
is based on historical or actual situations.
In view of changing future conditions and the
expected growing competition over water
in the future, it is necessary to explore how
the findings of these analyses could best
be used to analyse the future development
of conflict risks. To better deal with future
56 Pacific Institute Water Conflict Chronology Timeline.
57 Zeitoun, M. (2008). Power and water in the Middle
East: The hidden politics of the Palestinian-Israeli
water conflict, IB Tauris.
58 Campbell, D. J., H. Gichohi, A. Mwangi and
L. Chege (2000). “Land use conflict in Kajiado
District, Kenya.” Land Use Policy 17(4): 337-348.
Clingendael Briefing Note
uncertainties in developing strategies at
local, national and regional levels, a better
understanding is needed of the interplay
between the biophysical system and the
social and political system, and the possible
consequences of future developments under
different scenarios. Such a search for better
understanding would require increased
interaction between scientific, societal and
political communities, further integration
of scientific domains, and the building of a
shared knowledge base fusing knowledge
from local to global scale. We suggest the
following focal points to improve knowledge
building and understanding, and to build and
improve collective capacity to develop riskreducing strategies.
Integration of expected future
changes in water impacts in
development and security policies
If at local, national and regional levels the
negative effects of climate change through
sea level rise and the future competition over
water would be explicitly acknowledged in
development and security policies, this could
help to reduce future security and conflict
risks. In this paper we have focused on water
scarcity and political conflict, but sea level
rise and deterioration of water quality are
serious threats as well. Sea level rise will
affect small island states and coastal regions,
and result in increasing displacement and
migration of people.59 In Bangladesh alone,
sea level rise could result in the displacement
of more than 20 million people, posing an
enormous challenge to the national and
regional community.60 The availability of
water is determined by both volume and
quality. In many regions without proper
management, water quality is expected
to deteriorate due to increased pollution,
thus affecting the availability of clean water
for human and economical use.61
59 Ibid 1.
60 Ministry of Environment and Forests (2009).
Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action
Plan 2009, Government of the People’s Republic
of Bangladesh.
61 OECD (2012). OECD Environmental Outlook
to 2050; the consequences of inaction,
OECD Publishing.
10
Available data and models allow for
increasingly better analyses of present
situations and future developments on
different scales. Therefore, in policy
development processes, responsible
institutions can benefit from an improved
science-based understanding of present
and future challenges.
Integration of science and policy
domains to improve understanding
and build effective response
mechanisms
The challenge for the coming years respect
to climate change, water and conflict will
be achieving a better understanding of the
interplay between water, other contextual
factors and human and political security.
Both improved scientific understanding and
bridging scientific, political and societal
communities may be needed in order to
reduce future climate- and water-related
security risks. Building a better and shared
understanding would thus require joint
efforts from scientific, societal and political
communities geared to improving: i) our
knowledge of the causal and contextual
factors involved; ii) awareness of potential
‘hotspots’ now and in the future; and,
iii) insight into options for preventive
strategies and actions in the short and
long term.
As stated above, the literature shows that
social and cultural dimensions are important
factors in conflicts, and that the engagement
and empowerment of civil society and local
communities in local and national policy
development is of importance for successful
water and land management strategies that
will also reduce the risks of social disruption
and violent conflict.62 Insight into experiences
of these more integrated and participative
approaches in different regions and at
different levels may improve understanding
and fuel learning processes as a basis for
more effective response mechanisms.
62 Yasuda, Y. (2015). Rules, norms and NGO Advocacy
Strategies. Hydropower Development on the
Mekong River. London, Routledge - Earthscan.
Clingendael Briefing Note
River basins remain key for
adequate transboundary
management in reducing
conflict risks
Transboundary river basins cover half of
the global surface area, hosting 40% of the
world’s population, and encompassing more
than 260 transboundary rivers and lakes in
145 countries. The growing competition for
water due to rising demand for agricultural
and energy production, and household and
industrial use, requires better cooperation
within transboundary river basins and lakes,
especially in regions with high population
growth and increasingly negative effects
of climate change. As mentioned above,
in some transboundary river basins like
the Nile basin, the Mekong basin, and the
Indus, Ganges and Brahma Putra system,
political tensions around water seem to be
building up rather than easing, underlining
the need for functioning and effective
river-basin committees and for political
commitment from the countries involved.
A shared understanding of both the physical
constraints and options in the transboundary
setting, and the economic, social and cultural
setting of countries and peoples, is key to
developing consistent policies and reducing
conflict risks.
Tracking security risks and
improving the collective ability
to assess and prevent future
tensions and conflicts
Building on the above, a potentially forceful
and important further step to fuel and
accelerate learning processes, and bridge
different levels and communities, could
be the development of a global reflexive
monitoring and evaluation process focusing
on security risks: how are we (the world
community) doing with respect to water,
11
climate and human security and political
conflicts in various regions? What progress
is being made in reducing risks? What
strategies are applied, what can we learn
from them and what do they mean for future
security risks? On a global scale, there
are processes, for instance, around global
biodiversity (Global Biodiversity Outlook
reports) and global environmental quality
(Global Environmental Outlooks). And
following the Paris agreement, the SDG
agreement and the Sendai agreement
processes are expected to be designed
focusing on monitoring and evaluating
respective global commitments.
In ‘de-risking’ the world following the Paris
2015 agreement, explicit attention must
be given to policy outcomes in terms of
human security and political conflict. In
building a reflexive process focusing on
security issues, the involvement of scientific
domains (bio-physical world), social and
policy domains, economic and funding
domains, military and security domains,
and non-governmental and grassroots
organisations would be required. Building
such a transdisciplinary and inclusive
community with reflexive mechanisms will
be an important condition for joint factfinding processes, bridging science and
practice, and improving understanding of
the links between water, climate, climate
policies and tensions and conflicts at
different levels. How such a multi-scale and
multi-community reflexive process could be
facilitated is still an open question. Given the
global efforts on building monitoring and
evaluation processes following the Paris and
Sendai agreements and the adoption of
the SDGs, the involvement of international
organisations such as UN bodies seems
of importance.
About the Planetary Security Initiative
The Planetary Security Initiative aims to help increase awareness,
to deepen knowledge, and to develop and promote policies and
good practice guidance to help governments, the private sector
and international institutions better secure peace and cooperation
in times of climate change and global environmental challenges.
The Initiative was launched by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in 2015 and is currently operated by a consortium of leading
think tanks headed by the Clingendael Institute.
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 @PlanSecu
 The Planetary Security Initiative
 The Planetary Security Initiative
E-mail: [email protected]
Website: www.planetarysecurityinitiative.org
About the authors
Willem Ligtvoet is Programme Manager Water Climate and Adaptation
at PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency
Joost Knoop is Senior Researcher at PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency
Sophie de Bruin is Researcher at PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency
Detlef van Vuuren is Professor in Integrated Assessment of Global
Environmental Change at the Faculty of Geosciences of Utrecht
University and Senior Researcher at the PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency
Hans Visser is Senior Statistician at PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency
Karen Meijer is Senior Researcher at Deltares
Ruben Dahm is Senior Researcher at Deltares
Louise van Schaik is Head of the Clingendael International Sustainability
Centre and Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Institute
The briefing note is also part of a project for the Netherlands government on global water
challenges. For more information, please contact Willem Ligtvoet [email protected]
or Karen Meijer [email protected]