Download Evidence of a Greater Islamist Movement

Evidence of a Greater Islamist Movement
By Elena Morgan Weschenfelder, BA, CHS-II
•
Key Words: Shia, Sunni, history, politics, violence
Abstract
Islamists use sectarian violence, highlighted by the media as a Sunni-Shia conflict, to shape political and geographic boundaries. The
Sunni-Shia conflict is primarily an ideological dissension dating back to the first century of Muslim history. The sectarian violence in
Iraq, and to a lesser extent in Pakistan, is evidence of the willingness of Islamist groups to use ethnic, religious, and sectarian targets to
achieve political ends. Sectarian violence is not limited to Iraq and Pakistan. Islamist groups continue to use these targets across Africa,
Asia, and Eastern Europe to solidify their extremist following and gain political momentum.
T
he terminology used in this
article is not intended to be
offensive to any religion. The
author recognizes that the
majority of Muslims are moderate and do not support the violent overthrow of any government. Additionally,
the use of the term Islamist is not to associate Islam with violence, but to differentiate
between the peace-practicing majority of
Muslims and the criminal extremists attempting to hijack the religion.
The Islamist goal is to re-establish the
Islamic Caliphate, a religious government
based on sharia (Islamic law), and dominate the regions previously under Islamic
rule, uniting all Muslims under this government and thereby globalizing their in-
fluence. The geographic area the Islamists
are after extends from North Africa to
Southeastern Europe and across Central
and Southern Asia. Islamists are willing
to use any means necessary to achieve this
end.
The conflict between the Sunni and Shia
sects of Islam dates to the 7th century,
but recent sectarian violence has its roots
more in political events than religious tenets. To say that it is strictly a Sunni-Shia
conflict is incorrect and leads readers and
policy-makers toward decisions that could
ultimately stymie efforts against global terrorism, increasing sectarian violence in the
meantime. Sectarian violence is used to describe violence directed toward a religious
sect whose beliefs are disparate to the be-
liefs of the attackers. This type of violence
is seen on a fairly large scale in Iraq, Pakistan, and Indonesia. These events, based
on a radicalization of Islam, are being used
to further the impact of terrorism.
Unknowingly, members of the victimgroups might fund sectarian attacks against
Shia Muslims. Continued sponsorship of
this type of terrorism is a result of the western world’s ignorance of key differences
between the sects and a basic lack of understanding of the pan-Islamic movement.
Therefore, although the technicalities of
theological differences might not seem to
be of much interest, the history must be
developed due to its contemporary impact.
16 Inside Homeland Security www.chs.acfei.com
Contact your local CHS P&R Team Coordinator today! Log on to www.acfei.com/chs/teams for CHS P&R Team contact information.
(800) 423-9737
Succession of Muhammad
The historical base of the conflict is the
dispute over who should have become the
leader of Islam after the death of Muhammad. When the prophet of Islam died in
632 AD, a struggle developed among his
followers as to who should assume leadership of the newly established government
of converts to Islam. The group of followers who became Sunnis believed the position should go to an elected representative
with the consensus of prominent Muslim
leaders and leaders of the ummah (body of
Muslim believers). The group of followers
who became Shiites believed the succession
should be based in familial ties and that
the successor, Ali, had been named by Muhammad prior to his death. Beyond these
established facts, the presentation of events
leading to the development of two distinct
sects of practiced Islam are often colored
by adherence to and ignorance or disbelief
of one sect or the other.
Khulafa ar Rafidin—Rightly Guided
Caliphs
Muhammad gathered a core of followers
who acted as a counsel and as messengers
to the ummah, but the office of the prophet
died with Muhammad. This core of believers came to be known as the salafiya—the
pious predecessors and/or Muhammad and
his righteous companions. The righteous
companions who became the first four caliphs were Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and
Ali ibn Abu Talib. It was these first four caliphs that Sunnis believed were the rightful
leaders of Islam in the 7th century.
(800) 423-9737
Abu Bakr. Abdul Kabba ibn Abu Quhaafah changed his name to Abdul Allah
when he converted to Islam and is known
in Muslim history as Abu Bakr. He was
one of the first converts to Islam and a
close friend to Muhammad. His daughter, Aisha, became Muhammad’s third
wife. Aisha is considered by Sunnis to be
Muhammad’s favorite wife, but Shiites
disagree. After Muhammad’s death, Umar
petitioned the ummah in the election of
Abu Bakr as successor to the prophet. Abu
Bakr’s reign as caliph lasted only 2 years
but quelled resistance against Muslim governance in the area now known as Saudi
Arabia and initiated the establishment of
the Islamic caliphate as a dominant power.
According to Shia tradition, Abu Bakr
used Umar to force Ali and his followers
www.chs.acfei.com
to submit to Abu Bakr’s caliphate and denied Ali’s family the inheritance of Muhammad’s property and land. During the
turmoil after Muhammad’s death, Umar
stormed Ali’s house, trapping the pregnant Fatima (Ali’s wife and Muhammad’s
daughter) behind the door. This led to her
death and the premature stillborn birth of
Muhammad’s grandson.
Umar ibn al-Khattab. Also known as
Umar al Faruq (Umar the Redeemer), the
second caliph was originally resistant to
converting to Islam, persecuting Muslims
relentlessly. Umar was the father of Hafsa, Muhammad’s fourth wife and a close
friend of Aisha. Prior to his death, Abu
Bakr named Umar as his replacement, and
although several Shia accounts insist Ali
rejected the named succession, it is more
Inside Homeland Security 17
Contact your local CHS P&R Team Coordinator today! Log on to www.acfei.com/chs/teams for CHS P&R Team contact information.
widely believed that Ali submitted to the
decision for another caliph in order to preserve a semblance of peace under Muslim
rule. Under Umar’s rule the Muslim empire expanded throughout Egypt and Syria
and into the Persian empire. Umar laid the
administrative structure for an expanded
empire by developing the bureaucratic
structure of a pan-Islamic state. Prior to his
death Umar appointed a council to name
his successor, and after his death the position again passed Ali and went to Uthman.
Uthman ibn al-Affan. Uthman was
from the wealthy Umayyad clan of the
Quraysh tribe—the same tribe Muhammad was born into and the tribe that was
a bitter enemy of the Muslim movement.
According to Sunni tradition, Uthman
married Ruqqayah and Um Kuthulm, two
of Muhammad’s daughters by Kadijya. According to Shia tradition, the girls were Muhammad’s step-daughters and not in blood
lineage to the prophet. As the third caliph,
Uthman expanded the empire through
North Africa, the Caucasus, and Cyprus,
further establishing the pan-Islamic state as
a world power. Uthman appointed family
members to military and government positions to maintain control over the quickly
expanding Muslim territory. This led to
extreme corruption and mismanagement,
yet the Umayyad Dynasty lasted 89 years.
Ali ibn Abu Talib. Ali was Muhammad’s
cousin by birth. Ali’s father, Abu Talib,
was Muhammad’s uncle and an influential member of the Quraysh tribe. When
Muhammad was orphaned Abu Talib took
him in and raised him as his son. To return
the kindness, when Ali was born Muhammad took him in to raise and educate. Ali
is considered by Shiites and some Sunni
scholars as the first male convert to Islam,
though many Sunni scholars refute this
with the claim that Abu Bakr was the first
male convert. Ali was chosen as the husband of Fatima, Muhammad’s daughter
by Kadjiya. During his short tenure as the
fourth caliph, Ali was able to overcome a
rebellion engineered by Aisha and her followers. However, he was later murdered
by former members of his following who
blamed him for not taking control of the
caliphate immediately following Muhammad’s death.
After Ali’s Death
Even though the historical struggle for succession of the caliphate is laid out in multiple hadith (collected stories about Muhammad) and the salafiyah (Islamic reform
movement) is contested by both Sunni and
Shia sects, the definitive split in the practice
of Islam took place after the death of Ali.
The governor of Syria and a cousin of Uthman, Muawiyah, never accepted Ali’s position of caliph and insisted on the return
of the caliphate to the Umayyad clan. Ali’s
son, Hassan, agreed to the return of the caliphate after overwhelming pressure from
Umayyad military forces; however, after
Hassan’s suspicious death, the subsequent
death of Muawiyah, and the appointment
of Muawiyah’s son, Yazid, to the caliphate,
Hassan’s brother Hussein raised an army to
march against the Usurper’s Dynasty.
At Karbala, Iraq, on the 10th of the
Islamic month Muharram, Hussein and
his army were decimated. This battle and
defeat were believed by Shiites to be the
culmination of the lack of support for the
familial line of the prophet by true followers of Islam. This is now commemorated
in the Shia ceremonies Ashura, ashura (10
for the 10th of Muharram) and Arbaeen,
arbaeen (40 for the 40 days of mourning
following the deaths of Hussein and his
half-brother Abbas ibn Ali).
From this point in history forward, the
Shi’at al Ali, (Partisans of Ali) venerated
the deaths of Ali and his descendents and
looked to the bloodline of Muhammad
for guidance. The bloodline of spiritual,
judicial, and political leaders followed by
Shiites is known as the Imamate. The Shia
sect is further divided, based on beliefs in
the number and line of succession for the
Imamate, into the largest sub sect Shia ithna asheri (Twelver Shia). Twelver Shiite believe in a line of succession from the prophet to the twelfth generation ending with
an imam who disappeared. To the Twelver
Shiites, the Imamate, along with Muhammad and his daughter Fatima, are infallible
and the origin of the perfect example to be
followed by Muslims. Ismaili (Sevener Shiites) disagree with the Twelver Shiites on
the succession of the seventh imam and the
progression of the Imamate. Sevener Shiites
believe the Imamate was divine and ended
with the seventh Imam. Zaydi (Fiver Shiites) differ with both sub sects on the fifth
imam and the infallibility of the imamate.
Fiver Shiites believe in “right by might”
succession and are closest to the Sunni in
jurisprudence within Islam.
The global Muslim population is approximately 1 billion. The Shia population
is estimated at 150,000,000 or roughly
15% of the Muslim population. Though it
is a minority sect in Islam, Shia populations
are the majority in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and
Azerbaijan. Yemen has the largest concentrated population of Zaydi, numbering 5
million in the northern mountains of the
coastal state. Azerbaijan is a declared secularist state with a long history, minus the
Soviet era practice of discouraging any re-
18 Inside Homeland Security www.chs.acfei.com
Contact your local CHS P&R Team Coordinator today! Log on to www.acfei.com/chs/teams for CHS P&R Team contact information.
(800) 423-9737
ligion and of tolerance for the practice of
multiple sects of Islam and non-Muslim
religions; however, an Islamist movement
is detectable in Northern Dagestani.
Until 2003 Iraq was ruled by the secular
Ba’athist government made up of mostly
Sunni Muslims. The minority sect in Iraq,
the Sunni Muslim population, has several pockets of Salaf-Wahab extremists in
North Babil, Kurdish-held Sulaymaniyah,
Ninewah, and Al Anbar provinces. SalafWahab is the same fundamentalist sect as
practiced by the Sa’ud family and is the
state religion in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, but adherence to the sect does not
translate to participation in the Islamist
movement. Saudi Arabia is currently fighting Islamist elements attempting to usurp
the authority of the constitutional monarchy currently in place. Bahrain is ruled as
a constitutional monarchy and places the
minority Sunni population of Bahrain as
the authority within the government. In
spite of a failed coup attempt in 1981 by
Iraqi-exiled Ayatollah Taqi Mudarissi, who
is suspected of being backed by Iranian
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the
subsequent clampdown on Shia religious
observances throughout the 1980s, Bahraini officials boast a national environment
free from overt sectarian strife. Shia Muslim
political parties in Bahrain boycotted 2002
elections but are expected to dominate the
political scene in the 2006 elections.
The Twelver Shia practice of jurispru-
(800) 423-9737
dence is maintained with ijtihad (independent judgment) exemplified by a marja
al taqlid (spiritual scholar and leader as a
source of emulation). This is viewed by Islamist scholars as imitation rather than independent judgment and is rejected as valid practice. The practice of veneration that
developed following the deaths of Hussein
and Abbas is loathed and rejected by Sunnis, as they view it as a form of idolatry
and the practice of ignorant people and
unbelievers. The Shia Muslims believe the
overlooking of Ali as the rightful successor
to Muhammad was the beginning of the
persecution of their practiced form of Islam and as a result, has made them victims
throughout Muslim history. Shia Muslims
believe this persecution continues today
in the form of Sunni-dominant practice
and discrimination against Shia Muslims
in predominantly Sunni Muslim states.
However, the Shia and Sunni Muslims in
Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq
have worked together for well over a millennium to oust oppressors and achieve
common goals.
A large number of Sunni scholars discount the Shiites’ dedication to Islam because they venerate martyrs through pilgrimages to shrines and the depiction of
martyrs in art and ceremonies. These pilgrimages and ceremonies provide Islamist
organizations with symbolic and high-casualty targets. Few Sunni scholars will go
so far as to openly declare Shia Muslims
www.chs.acfei.com
as apostate, but many Islamist groups and
leaders routinely focus on the differential
Shia practices as justification to use violence to exert control over what Islamists
view as takfiri. Takfiri are Muslims who
have deviated from faithful practice and are
worse than kafir (unbelieving infidels). The
Islamist declaration of Shiites as takfiri is
based off takiya, a practice developed during the birth period of Islam and continued
by Shiites during the persecution of Ali’s
family. Takiya allows Muslims to disavow
their faith or take up the practice of locals
in order to protect Islam. The Shiites extend this practice to self-defense and preservation. Ironically, several Islamist groups,
while criticizing Shiites for the practice, use
takiya to cloak the intents and plans of their
organizations against western and secular
governments, as in the case of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001.
Takfir wa Hijra, an Islamist group whose
origin can be traced to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood of the 1960s, openly declares that Shia and moderate Sunni Muslims are takfiri and further blames them
as the reason the greater Arab and Islamic
states are in disarray, are corrupt, and are
struggling economically as they sit on the
greatest supply of wealth in the world (oil).
This ideological base outlines a purification
of Islam and the Muslim holy land and an
establishment of the Islamic Caliphate as
the means to restore Islam and Arabs to
their 11th and 12th century glory.
Inside Homeland Security 19
Contact your local CHS P&R Team Coordinator today! Log on to www.acfei.com/chs/teams for CHS P&R Team contact information.
Takfir wa Hijra recruits disenfranchised
young men in much the same way the Soviet Union developed insurgent armies to
fuel communist uprisings in Latin America.
The follow-on Islamist groups like al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya are full of recruits
and leaders who have been disenfranchised
in some way, exiled from their homeland,
and or oppressed economically, politically,
or religiously (e.g., Ayman Zawahiri, Abu
Musab Zarqawi, Osama bin Laden, Abu
Bakar Bashir, Noordin Mohammed Top,
and/or Khalid Shaikh Muhammad). As the
fundament of contemporary sectarian violence is an adherence to a radically exclusive
belief, Indonesian violence, which consists
of primarily Christian targets, is included, as
it is viewed by its violent proponents as the
attacking of the moderate western-focused
government of predominantly Sunni members by members of an Islamist movement.
Escalation in Iraq
Though the media portrays current ShiaSunni violence in Iraq as an inevitable spiral
into civil war after the loss of an authoritarian government, the recent escalation in the
targeting of Shia shrines indicates Islamist
desperation. Attempts to destabilize the
Iraqi government and prevent the country
from achieving political milestones, such as
successful elections and the constitutional
referendum, were met by Shia and Sunni
Iraqis alike. The recent attempts by Islamists
to terrorize the population into boycotting
the elections didn’t work, though it did
work in the first election.
The Shia violence against Sunnis during the fall of Baghdad in 2003 held heavy
overtones and reference to the historical
oppression of Iraqi Shiites. Though recent
attacks on Sunnis might be considered
retaliation for attacks on Shia shrines, it
is more likely retaliation for 40 years of
secular oppression of the majority Shia
population by the Ba’ath party. This violence began immediately with the fall of
Baghdad in 2003 and was contained for
several months by an administrative deBa’athification of the government. When
the Sunni Minister of Interior, Naqib al
Sammara’i, was replaced in April 2005 by
Shia Bayan Sulagh Jabar, a disturbing trend
of renegade de-Ba’athification in the form
of kidnappings, unlawful imprisonments,
and executions appeared in news reports by
July 2005. Soon after, Abu Musab Zarqawi
successfully played on sectarian prejudice
and fear of retaliation against the deposed
Sunni minority in Iraq. He initiated an
Islamist purification campaign against the
majority Iraqi Shiites. A purification based
on ideology is unlikely, as the exceptions
outlined in Zarqawi’s declaration included
Shia dynastic heir Muqtada al Sadr and his
followers. Sadr, though currently engaged
politically, has made multiple attempts to
destabilize the western-supported government of Iraq, an apparent aim of al Qaeda
in Iraq, and has called for the unity of Sunnis and Shiites and Kurds and Arabs against
western involvement and presence in Iraq.
This is a repetitive theme among Sunni political and religious groups in Iraq—a variant to the government message “One Iraq”
that is easily adopted by opposing groups
for their own agendas.
Each period of violent escalation in Iraq
was preceded by achieving political milestones or followed by the announcement
of political liaisons and plans. The 2003
fall of Ba’athist Baghdad was immediately
followed by the annexation of several state
mosques by Shiites, and several exiled Shia
religious leaders returning to Iraq with
strong political followings were targeted
and assassinated. The development of the
Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS) as a
political entity for the congregation of former Ba’athist Sunnis was quickly followed
by the murder of key AMS members’ relatives. The February 2004 agreement to
move up the political timeline in Iraq and
transfer sovereignty to an Iraqi interim
government by June 2004 was followed by
suicide bombings in Karbala and Khadimiyah during Ashura—ostensibly the first
international view of large-scale sectarian violence in Iraq that occurred 2 weeks
prior to the first anniversary of the Iraq
invasion by U.S. forces. The 2004 Iraqi
campaign season started with bombings
of Christian churches and Shia mosques
that were sites for election registration or
voting sites. A Christian-Shia alliance developed even though Christians had more
freedom and position than Shiites during
Saddam’s reign. This alliance, forged during the campaign season, was followed by
the kidnapping of several Christian Bish-
ops and priests. The successful election in
January 2005 was followed by multiple
suicide bombing attempts during Ashura,
none of which were nearly as successful as
the three 2004 Ashura attacks. The March
2005 seating of the Interim Governing
Council was followed by a bombing of a
marketplace outside a police station taking
applications and passing out paychecks in
Hillah. The incident occurred 3 days after
the second anniversary of the Iraq invasion
by U.S.-led forces.
Escalation in Pakistan
Since joining the multi-national coalition
against global terrorism, Pakistani President and Army Chief of Staff Pervez Musharraf has suffered setback after setback in
the movement toward a more moderate
Islamic influence and the establishment
of a secular central government in Pakistan. Since his January 12, 2002, speech
denouncing all acts of terrorism and his
pledge to fight Islamic extremism within
Pakistan, President Musharraf has faced
increasing casualties as a result of religious
violence. This escalating violence is most
likely undermining support for Musharraf,
as Islamist immigrants and citizens believe
he is too liberal for the good of Pakistan.
Pakistan’s Shia Conference opposed the
1947 formation of Pakistan, preferring instead a united India. However, that would
make Shiites an approximately 35-millionstrong Pakistani minority and valued target.
Shia mosques have routinely been targeted
since 1997, and attacks have increased in
frequency and casualties since 2002. The
Sunni Tehrik, a political party made up of
Sufi followers from the Belravi school of
thought, has been cited as an Islamist target because of its moderate mystic Islamic
beliefs and work toward tolerance within
and outside of the Muslim world. The
most recent example was the April bombing during a celebration honoring the birth
of Muhammad. Islamist groups abhor this
type of celebration. However, no group has
stepped up to claim the attack, and Pakistani authorities have not released information on suspected groups.
Escalation in Indonesia
Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous country and has the highest concen-
20 Inside Homeland Security www.chs.acfei.com
Contact your local CHS P&R Team Coordinator today! Log on to www.acfei.com/chs/teams for CHS P&R Team contact information.
(800) 423-9737
trated population of Muslims in the world.
Considered a moderate Muslim state, it is
seen as an increasingly valuable partner in
the war against Islamist militants in Southeast Asia. With the reversal of Indonesia’s
terrorism policy following the October
2002 Bali attack, the freedom movement
previously enjoyed by Islamists throughout
Indonesia has been restricted. The restriction has decreased centralized command
of the independently operated cells but
doesn’t seem to have reduced the number of attacks planned or conducted. The
proliferation of Islamist cells and offshoots
of Jemaah Islamiyah has resulted in an increase in violence directed against western
and Christian targets in an apparent effort
to call into question the ability of the Indonesian government to protect its citizens.
Evidence of an increasingly influential Islamist movement was seen in the March
2006 demonstrations outside the American Embassy in Jakarta sponsored by the
Hizbut Tharir (Liberation Party), which
used banners that read, “Now is the time
for the Caliphate to rule the world with
Sharia” and “Crush the Zionist America
and Israel.”
Attempting to weed out nationalism,
separatism, and ethnic strife from the current Sunni-Shia conflict is unwise. Islamist
propaganda uses these loyalties to further
the ultimate goal of domination. The Taliban, as an alien Islamist movement, successfully fomented ethnic strife in Afghanistan to oust the communist government left
in place after the Soviet withdrawal and to
usher in an Islamist theocracy. The influence of radical Islamist beliefs is in place in
Afghanistan, as was clearly demonstrated
when Islamist Afghani clerics demanded
the execution of Abdul Rahmann because
he converted to Christianity.
Further escalation of sectarian violence
is inevitable as Islamist movements gain
political and geographic ground. The focus for Islamist recruitment is in areas
containing many poor, disillusioned, and
unemployed young men. The former Soviet satellite countries, including the Baltic
and Central Asian states and South Eastern
Asia, recovering from economic crisis provide more than sufficient recruiting pools.
Sectarian violence in Iraq and Pakistan will
continue to expand to include not only
(800) 423-9737
Shia Muslims and non-Muslims, but also
moderate or secular Sunnis.
To prevent their identity from being diluted, Islamists tend to be exclusive and do
not tolerate the existence of other forms
of worship within or around themselves.
Rather than tolerating other forms of worship, they attempt to convert members of
other faiths to their faith. When such a religion has the support of the force of arms,
it normally follows a policy of persecuting
members of other religions to compel them
to convert. If the politicians do not improve
the conditions of life in these developing
democracies, the population will express its
discontent through political movement toward Islamist ideology. In countries where
Muslim populations are significant minorities there should be a focus on including
Muslim populations in national and regional assimilation, thereby ensuring equitable
economic and cultural status.
Works Consulted
Abbas, H. (2005). Pakistan’s drift into extremism: Al-
lah, the army and America’s war on terror. New Delhi:
Pentagon Press.
Abedin, M. (2006) The Iraqi media’s response to
recent sectarian tension in Iraq. Terrorism Focus, 3(10).
Retrieved May 19, 2006, from http://www.blallalala.
com
Ahmad, I. D. (2001, March 12). The iconoclasts
of Afghanistan. Islam Online. Retrieved May 21,
2006, from http://www.islam-online.net/English/Politics/2001/03/article6.shtml
Alleged defector from Bin Laden group testifies in
New York. (2001, February 6). Islam Online [New York].
Retrieved May 21, 2006, from http://www.islamonline.
net/English/News/2001-02/07/article2.shtml
Al-Zarqawi declares war on Iraqi Shia. (2005, September 15).
At least Bahrain is trying to address Sunni-Shiite
divisions. (2006, May 12). The Daily Star E-journal.
Retrieved on May 19, 2006, from http://bahraini.tv/
?p=590
Atti, M. A. (2000, October 31). Islamic scholar calls
for unity. Islam Online [Doha]. http://www.islamonline.
net/English/News/2000-10/31/article2.shtml
Azerbaijan. (2006) CIA World Factbook. Retrieved
May 22, 2006, from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/aj.html
Baghdad library in flames. (2003, April 13). Agence
France-Presse [Baghdad]. Retrieved May 21, 2006, from
Lexis-Nexis.
Bahrain. (2006). CIA World Factbook. Retrieved May
22, 2006, from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/ba.html
Barton, G. (2004). Indonesia’s struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the soul of Islam. Sydney: UNSW Press.
Batatu, H. (1981). Iraq’s underground Shia movements: Characteristics, causes, and prospects. Middle
East Journal, 35, 578-94.
Bill, J. A. (1984). Islam, politics, and Shi’ism in the
Gulf. Middle East Insight, 3(3), 3–12.
www.chs.acfei.com
Chew, A. (2006, March 6). 5,000 rally outside US
embassy. New Straits Times.
Democratic Iraq? (2004, April 22). BBC News. Retrieved May 21, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/3608729.stm
Farhadian, C. (Ed.). (2005). Christianity, Islam and
nationalism in Indonesia. New York: Routledge.
Farooqi, A. (2003). Prolonged Iraq war will fan more
conflicts: Experts. Islam Online [Amman]. Retrieved
May 21, 2006, from http://www.islamonline.net/english/news/2003-04/02/article03.shtml
Fisk, R. (2003). A civilization torn to pieces. Retrieved May 21, 2006, from http://www.
robert-fisk.com/articles227.htm
Geertz, C. (1968). Islam observed: Religious development in Morocco and Indonesia. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Gilmartin, D. (1988). Empire and Islam: Punjab and
the making of Pakistan. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Gotlieb, Y. (1981) Sectarianism and the Iraqi state. In
M. Curtis (Ed.), Religion and politics in the Middle East.
(3rd ed., pp. 153-61). Boulder: Westview Press.
Hamid, A. (1971). Muslim separatism in India. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
Haqqani, H. (2005). Pakistan: Between mosque and
military. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Hardy, R. (2004, April 5). Sadr’s radicalism appeals to
the young. Retrieved May 21, 2006, from http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3600369.stm
Hefner, R. (2000). Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization in Indonesia. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Hodgson, M. (1955). How did the early Shia become
sectarian? Journal of the American Oriental Society, 75(1),
1-13.
Imleji, M. (1999, December 12). Mufti of
Egypt calls on Muslims to send zakat to Chechnya. Islam Online [Cairo]. Retrieved May
22,
2006
from
http://www.islamonline.net/
iol-english/dowalia/news-12-12/topnews1.asp
Indonesia. (2006). CIA World Factbook. Retrieved May 22, 2006, from http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/id.html
Indonesia gets U.S. aid against terror. (2002, August
2). BBC News.
Iran. (2006). CIA World Factbook. Retrieved
May 22, 2006, from http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/ir.html
Iraq. (2006). CIA World Factbook. Retrieved
May 22, 2006, from http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/iz.html
Khan, A. (2000, October 11). Taliban and Iran to
reconcile. Islam Online [Chicago]. Retrieved May 22,
2006, from http://www.islamonline.net/iol-english/
dowalia/news-2000-oct-11/topnews6.asp
Khan, B. (1998, September 6). Fate of Bamiyan Buddha statues hangs in balance. The News International.
Retrieved May 21, 2006, from http://www.rawa.org/
bamyan.htm
Lewis, B. (2002). The assassins: A radical sect in Islam.
New York: Basic Books.
Lewis, B. (1993). Islam in history: Ideas, people, and
events in the Middle East. Chicago: Open Court.
Luthra, D. (2004, April 4) Warnings of civil war in Iraq. BBC News [Basra]. Retrieved May
21,
2006,
from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
programmes/breakfast/3599623.stm
Minault, G. (1982). The Khilafat movement. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Mitchell, R. (1993). The society of Muslim brothers.
Inside Homeland Security 21
Contact your local CHS P&R Team Coordinator today! Log on to www.acfei.com/chs/teams for CHS P&R Team contact information.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Momen, M. (1985) An introduction to Shi’i Islam.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Osama Bin Laden: Wanted by west, hero to many in Islamic world. (2000, August 30). Islam Online [Washington
and Kabul]. Retrieved May 22, 2006, from http://www.
islam-online.net/iol-english/dowalia/news-2000-August-30/topnews8.asp
Over 100 Islamists arrested in Tajikistan in
2000. (2001, January 29). Islam Online [Dushanbe]. Retrieved May 22, 2006, from http://
islam-online.net/English/News/2001-01/30/article10.
shtml
Pakistan. (2006). CIA World Factbook. Retrieved May
22, 2006, from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/pk.html
Pakistani Shi’ites observe Ashura against all odds.
(2000, April 16). Agence France Press[Islamabad]. Retrieved May 22, 2006, from Lexis-Nexis database.
Pakistan’s Shiites mourn martyr. (2001, April 5).
Islam Online [Islamabad]. Retrieved May 21, 2006,
from http://www.islam-online.net/English/News/200104/06/article10.shtml
Qutb, S. (1997). In the shade of the Quran. Alexandria, VA: Al Saadawi Publications.
Qutb, S. (1993). Milestones. Chicago: Kazi Publications, Inc.
Roux, G. (1965). Ancient Iraq. Cleveland: World
Publishing.
Saudi Arabia. (2006) CIA World Factbook. Retrieved
May 22, 2006, from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sa.html
Sluglett, P., & Farouk-Sluglett, M. (1978). Some reflections on the Sunni/Shia question in Iraq. British Society for Middle East Studies [London], 5, 79–87.
Tewily N. (2006, January 31). Indonesia looks for
new group’s links to al Qaeda. Reuters.
Tohme, N. (2000, January 3). Lebanese army tightens net on Takfir Wa Hijra group. Agence France Press [Sir
Denniyeh]. Retrieved May 22, 2006, from Lexis-Nexis
database.
Viviano, F. (2006). The Kurds in control. National
Geographic, 209(1), 26.
Yemen. (2006) CIA World Factbook. Retrieved May
22, 2006, from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/ym.html
Zakki H. (2006, March 1). Al Qaeda aid in Indonesia
attacks cited. Philadelphia Inquirer.
Zarqawi 2004 letter to al Qaeda leader. Retrieved
on May 19, 2006, from http://www.state.gov/p/nea/
rls/31694.htm
CE Test: One credit available with the completion of this test.
Learning Objectives for: “Sunni-Shia Conflict: Evidence of a Greater Islamist Movement”
After studying this article, participants should better understand the following:
1). The basis and nature of the Sunni-Shia conflict.
2). The historical development of the Islamic caliphate.
3). The contemporary timeline of sectarian violence.
4). Possible terror tactics to catalyze political momentum for sympathetic groups or halt political
momentum of adversaries.
CE Test for “Sunni-Shia Conflict: Evidence of a
Greater Islamist Movement”
1.) The conflict between Sunni and Shia muslims dates back to the:
A. First century.
B. Seventh century.
C. Twelfth century.
D. Nineteenth century.
2.) Sunni muslims believe the rightful transfer
of leadership from Muhammad went to the:
A. Shahanshah of Persia and the Sassinid Dynasty,
Yazdgerd III.
B. Eastern Roman Empire and Pope Honorius I.
C. Caliphate of the four righteous companions in
succession: Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthmann, and Ali.
D. Quraish Tribe.
Payment Information: $15 per test
3.) Sectarian violence is a term used to describe
violence directed toward:
A. A religious sect of believers variant or disparate
to the attackers.
B. Western economic targets.
C. A political party.
D. The Shia Imamate.
4.) Three countries that are currently experiencing large-scale sectarian violence are:
A. Taiwan, the Philippines, and Brunei.
B. Angola, Morocco, and Liberia.
C. Iraq, Pakistan, and Indonesia.
D. Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon.
5.) The Sunni-Shia conflict is due to:
A. Economic disparity.
B. An ideological difference in the history and development of Islam.
C. An indiscernible mindset.
D. End soon.
(Identifying information: Please print legibly or type the following:)
Name:
Phone Number:
Address:
City:
State:
Zip:
Credit Card #
Circle one:
check enclosed
Name on card:
MasterCard
Visa
__________
Signature
American Express
Exp. Date:
Date
Statement of completion: I attest to having completed the CE activity. Please send the completed form, along with your
payment of $15 for each test taken. Fax: (417) 881-4702, or mail the forms to ACFEI Continuing Education, 2750 E.
Sunshine, Springfield, MO 65804. If you have questions, please call (417) 881-3818 or toll free at (800) 423-9737.
About the Author
Elana Morgan Weschenfelder, BA, CHS-II, has studied politics, religion, and
cultural issues as an intelligence analyst for 20 years. Most recently she completed
a contract assignment as the senior intelligence analyst at the Joint Interrogation
and Debriefing center in Iraq. Currently, she is a freelance writer conducting an
independent study of the closed community threat in Europe.
22 Inside Homeland Security www.chs.acfei.com
Contact your local CHS P&R Team Coordinator today! Log on to www.acfei.com/chs/teams for CHS P&R Team contact information.
(800) 423-9737