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Evidence of a Greater Islamist Movement By Elena Morgan Weschenfelder, BA, CHS-II • Key Words: Shia, Sunni, history, politics, violence Abstract Islamists use sectarian violence, highlighted by the media as a Sunni-Shia conflict, to shape political and geographic boundaries. The Sunni-Shia conflict is primarily an ideological dissension dating back to the first century of Muslim history. The sectarian violence in Iraq, and to a lesser extent in Pakistan, is evidence of the willingness of Islamist groups to use ethnic, religious, and sectarian targets to achieve political ends. Sectarian violence is not limited to Iraq and Pakistan. Islamist groups continue to use these targets across Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe to solidify their extremist following and gain political momentum. T he terminology used in this article is not intended to be offensive to any religion. The author recognizes that the majority of Muslims are moderate and do not support the violent overthrow of any government. Additionally, the use of the term Islamist is not to associate Islam with violence, but to differentiate between the peace-practicing majority of Muslims and the criminal extremists attempting to hijack the religion. The Islamist goal is to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate, a religious government based on sharia (Islamic law), and dominate the regions previously under Islamic rule, uniting all Muslims under this government and thereby globalizing their in- fluence. The geographic area the Islamists are after extends from North Africa to Southeastern Europe and across Central and Southern Asia. Islamists are willing to use any means necessary to achieve this end. The conflict between the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam dates to the 7th century, but recent sectarian violence has its roots more in political events than religious tenets. To say that it is strictly a Sunni-Shia conflict is incorrect and leads readers and policy-makers toward decisions that could ultimately stymie efforts against global terrorism, increasing sectarian violence in the meantime. Sectarian violence is used to describe violence directed toward a religious sect whose beliefs are disparate to the be- liefs of the attackers. This type of violence is seen on a fairly large scale in Iraq, Pakistan, and Indonesia. These events, based on a radicalization of Islam, are being used to further the impact of terrorism. Unknowingly, members of the victimgroups might fund sectarian attacks against Shia Muslims. Continued sponsorship of this type of terrorism is a result of the western world’s ignorance of key differences between the sects and a basic lack of understanding of the pan-Islamic movement. Therefore, although the technicalities of theological differences might not seem to be of much interest, the history must be developed due to its contemporary impact. 16 Inside Homeland Security www.chs.acfei.com Contact your local CHS P&R Team Coordinator today! Log on to www.acfei.com/chs/teams for CHS P&R Team contact information. (800) 423-9737 Succession of Muhammad The historical base of the conflict is the dispute over who should have become the leader of Islam after the death of Muhammad. When the prophet of Islam died in 632 AD, a struggle developed among his followers as to who should assume leadership of the newly established government of converts to Islam. The group of followers who became Sunnis believed the position should go to an elected representative with the consensus of prominent Muslim leaders and leaders of the ummah (body of Muslim believers). The group of followers who became Shiites believed the succession should be based in familial ties and that the successor, Ali, had been named by Muhammad prior to his death. Beyond these established facts, the presentation of events leading to the development of two distinct sects of practiced Islam are often colored by adherence to and ignorance or disbelief of one sect or the other. Khulafa ar Rafidin—Rightly Guided Caliphs Muhammad gathered a core of followers who acted as a counsel and as messengers to the ummah, but the office of the prophet died with Muhammad. This core of believers came to be known as the salafiya—the pious predecessors and/or Muhammad and his righteous companions. The righteous companions who became the first four caliphs were Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali ibn Abu Talib. It was these first four caliphs that Sunnis believed were the rightful leaders of Islam in the 7th century. (800) 423-9737 Abu Bakr. Abdul Kabba ibn Abu Quhaafah changed his name to Abdul Allah when he converted to Islam and is known in Muslim history as Abu Bakr. He was one of the first converts to Islam and a close friend to Muhammad. His daughter, Aisha, became Muhammad’s third wife. Aisha is considered by Sunnis to be Muhammad’s favorite wife, but Shiites disagree. After Muhammad’s death, Umar petitioned the ummah in the election of Abu Bakr as successor to the prophet. Abu Bakr’s reign as caliph lasted only 2 years but quelled resistance against Muslim governance in the area now known as Saudi Arabia and initiated the establishment of the Islamic caliphate as a dominant power. According to Shia tradition, Abu Bakr used Umar to force Ali and his followers www.chs.acfei.com to submit to Abu Bakr’s caliphate and denied Ali’s family the inheritance of Muhammad’s property and land. During the turmoil after Muhammad’s death, Umar stormed Ali’s house, trapping the pregnant Fatima (Ali’s wife and Muhammad’s daughter) behind the door. This led to her death and the premature stillborn birth of Muhammad’s grandson. Umar ibn al-Khattab. Also known as Umar al Faruq (Umar the Redeemer), the second caliph was originally resistant to converting to Islam, persecuting Muslims relentlessly. Umar was the father of Hafsa, Muhammad’s fourth wife and a close friend of Aisha. Prior to his death, Abu Bakr named Umar as his replacement, and although several Shia accounts insist Ali rejected the named succession, it is more Inside Homeland Security 17 Contact your local CHS P&R Team Coordinator today! Log on to www.acfei.com/chs/teams for CHS P&R Team contact information. widely believed that Ali submitted to the decision for another caliph in order to preserve a semblance of peace under Muslim rule. Under Umar’s rule the Muslim empire expanded throughout Egypt and Syria and into the Persian empire. Umar laid the administrative structure for an expanded empire by developing the bureaucratic structure of a pan-Islamic state. Prior to his death Umar appointed a council to name his successor, and after his death the position again passed Ali and went to Uthman. Uthman ibn al-Affan. Uthman was from the wealthy Umayyad clan of the Quraysh tribe—the same tribe Muhammad was born into and the tribe that was a bitter enemy of the Muslim movement. According to Sunni tradition, Uthman married Ruqqayah and Um Kuthulm, two of Muhammad’s daughters by Kadijya. According to Shia tradition, the girls were Muhammad’s step-daughters and not in blood lineage to the prophet. As the third caliph, Uthman expanded the empire through North Africa, the Caucasus, and Cyprus, further establishing the pan-Islamic state as a world power. Uthman appointed family members to military and government positions to maintain control over the quickly expanding Muslim territory. This led to extreme corruption and mismanagement, yet the Umayyad Dynasty lasted 89 years. Ali ibn Abu Talib. Ali was Muhammad’s cousin by birth. Ali’s father, Abu Talib, was Muhammad’s uncle and an influential member of the Quraysh tribe. When Muhammad was orphaned Abu Talib took him in and raised him as his son. To return the kindness, when Ali was born Muhammad took him in to raise and educate. Ali is considered by Shiites and some Sunni scholars as the first male convert to Islam, though many Sunni scholars refute this with the claim that Abu Bakr was the first male convert. Ali was chosen as the husband of Fatima, Muhammad’s daughter by Kadjiya. During his short tenure as the fourth caliph, Ali was able to overcome a rebellion engineered by Aisha and her followers. However, he was later murdered by former members of his following who blamed him for not taking control of the caliphate immediately following Muhammad’s death. After Ali’s Death Even though the historical struggle for succession of the caliphate is laid out in multiple hadith (collected stories about Muhammad) and the salafiyah (Islamic reform movement) is contested by both Sunni and Shia sects, the definitive split in the practice of Islam took place after the death of Ali. The governor of Syria and a cousin of Uthman, Muawiyah, never accepted Ali’s position of caliph and insisted on the return of the caliphate to the Umayyad clan. Ali’s son, Hassan, agreed to the return of the caliphate after overwhelming pressure from Umayyad military forces; however, after Hassan’s suspicious death, the subsequent death of Muawiyah, and the appointment of Muawiyah’s son, Yazid, to the caliphate, Hassan’s brother Hussein raised an army to march against the Usurper’s Dynasty. At Karbala, Iraq, on the 10th of the Islamic month Muharram, Hussein and his army were decimated. This battle and defeat were believed by Shiites to be the culmination of the lack of support for the familial line of the prophet by true followers of Islam. This is now commemorated in the Shia ceremonies Ashura, ashura (10 for the 10th of Muharram) and Arbaeen, arbaeen (40 for the 40 days of mourning following the deaths of Hussein and his half-brother Abbas ibn Ali). From this point in history forward, the Shi’at al Ali, (Partisans of Ali) venerated the deaths of Ali and his descendents and looked to the bloodline of Muhammad for guidance. The bloodline of spiritual, judicial, and political leaders followed by Shiites is known as the Imamate. The Shia sect is further divided, based on beliefs in the number and line of succession for the Imamate, into the largest sub sect Shia ithna asheri (Twelver Shia). Twelver Shiite believe in a line of succession from the prophet to the twelfth generation ending with an imam who disappeared. To the Twelver Shiites, the Imamate, along with Muhammad and his daughter Fatima, are infallible and the origin of the perfect example to be followed by Muslims. Ismaili (Sevener Shiites) disagree with the Twelver Shiites on the succession of the seventh imam and the progression of the Imamate. Sevener Shiites believe the Imamate was divine and ended with the seventh Imam. Zaydi (Fiver Shiites) differ with both sub sects on the fifth imam and the infallibility of the imamate. Fiver Shiites believe in “right by might” succession and are closest to the Sunni in jurisprudence within Islam. The global Muslim population is approximately 1 billion. The Shia population is estimated at 150,000,000 or roughly 15% of the Muslim population. Though it is a minority sect in Islam, Shia populations are the majority in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan. Yemen has the largest concentrated population of Zaydi, numbering 5 million in the northern mountains of the coastal state. Azerbaijan is a declared secularist state with a long history, minus the Soviet era practice of discouraging any re- 18 Inside Homeland Security www.chs.acfei.com Contact your local CHS P&R Team Coordinator today! Log on to www.acfei.com/chs/teams for CHS P&R Team contact information. (800) 423-9737 ligion and of tolerance for the practice of multiple sects of Islam and non-Muslim religions; however, an Islamist movement is detectable in Northern Dagestani. Until 2003 Iraq was ruled by the secular Ba’athist government made up of mostly Sunni Muslims. The minority sect in Iraq, the Sunni Muslim population, has several pockets of Salaf-Wahab extremists in North Babil, Kurdish-held Sulaymaniyah, Ninewah, and Al Anbar provinces. SalafWahab is the same fundamentalist sect as practiced by the Sa’ud family and is the state religion in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but adherence to the sect does not translate to participation in the Islamist movement. Saudi Arabia is currently fighting Islamist elements attempting to usurp the authority of the constitutional monarchy currently in place. Bahrain is ruled as a constitutional monarchy and places the minority Sunni population of Bahrain as the authority within the government. In spite of a failed coup attempt in 1981 by Iraqi-exiled Ayatollah Taqi Mudarissi, who is suspected of being backed by Iranian Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the subsequent clampdown on Shia religious observances throughout the 1980s, Bahraini officials boast a national environment free from overt sectarian strife. Shia Muslim political parties in Bahrain boycotted 2002 elections but are expected to dominate the political scene in the 2006 elections. The Twelver Shia practice of jurispru- (800) 423-9737 dence is maintained with ijtihad (independent judgment) exemplified by a marja al taqlid (spiritual scholar and leader as a source of emulation). This is viewed by Islamist scholars as imitation rather than independent judgment and is rejected as valid practice. The practice of veneration that developed following the deaths of Hussein and Abbas is loathed and rejected by Sunnis, as they view it as a form of idolatry and the practice of ignorant people and unbelievers. The Shia Muslims believe the overlooking of Ali as the rightful successor to Muhammad was the beginning of the persecution of their practiced form of Islam and as a result, has made them victims throughout Muslim history. Shia Muslims believe this persecution continues today in the form of Sunni-dominant practice and discrimination against Shia Muslims in predominantly Sunni Muslim states. However, the Shia and Sunni Muslims in Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq have worked together for well over a millennium to oust oppressors and achieve common goals. A large number of Sunni scholars discount the Shiites’ dedication to Islam because they venerate martyrs through pilgrimages to shrines and the depiction of martyrs in art and ceremonies. These pilgrimages and ceremonies provide Islamist organizations with symbolic and high-casualty targets. Few Sunni scholars will go so far as to openly declare Shia Muslims www.chs.acfei.com as apostate, but many Islamist groups and leaders routinely focus on the differential Shia practices as justification to use violence to exert control over what Islamists view as takfiri. Takfiri are Muslims who have deviated from faithful practice and are worse than kafir (unbelieving infidels). The Islamist declaration of Shiites as takfiri is based off takiya, a practice developed during the birth period of Islam and continued by Shiites during the persecution of Ali’s family. Takiya allows Muslims to disavow their faith or take up the practice of locals in order to protect Islam. The Shiites extend this practice to self-defense and preservation. Ironically, several Islamist groups, while criticizing Shiites for the practice, use takiya to cloak the intents and plans of their organizations against western and secular governments, as in the case of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Takfir wa Hijra, an Islamist group whose origin can be traced to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood of the 1960s, openly declares that Shia and moderate Sunni Muslims are takfiri and further blames them as the reason the greater Arab and Islamic states are in disarray, are corrupt, and are struggling economically as they sit on the greatest supply of wealth in the world (oil). This ideological base outlines a purification of Islam and the Muslim holy land and an establishment of the Islamic Caliphate as the means to restore Islam and Arabs to their 11th and 12th century glory. Inside Homeland Security 19 Contact your local CHS P&R Team Coordinator today! Log on to www.acfei.com/chs/teams for CHS P&R Team contact information. Takfir wa Hijra recruits disenfranchised young men in much the same way the Soviet Union developed insurgent armies to fuel communist uprisings in Latin America. The follow-on Islamist groups like al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya are full of recruits and leaders who have been disenfranchised in some way, exiled from their homeland, and or oppressed economically, politically, or religiously (e.g., Ayman Zawahiri, Abu Musab Zarqawi, Osama bin Laden, Abu Bakar Bashir, Noordin Mohammed Top, and/or Khalid Shaikh Muhammad). As the fundament of contemporary sectarian violence is an adherence to a radically exclusive belief, Indonesian violence, which consists of primarily Christian targets, is included, as it is viewed by its violent proponents as the attacking of the moderate western-focused government of predominantly Sunni members by members of an Islamist movement. Escalation in Iraq Though the media portrays current ShiaSunni violence in Iraq as an inevitable spiral into civil war after the loss of an authoritarian government, the recent escalation in the targeting of Shia shrines indicates Islamist desperation. Attempts to destabilize the Iraqi government and prevent the country from achieving political milestones, such as successful elections and the constitutional referendum, were met by Shia and Sunni Iraqis alike. The recent attempts by Islamists to terrorize the population into boycotting the elections didn’t work, though it did work in the first election. The Shia violence against Sunnis during the fall of Baghdad in 2003 held heavy overtones and reference to the historical oppression of Iraqi Shiites. Though recent attacks on Sunnis might be considered retaliation for attacks on Shia shrines, it is more likely retaliation for 40 years of secular oppression of the majority Shia population by the Ba’ath party. This violence began immediately with the fall of Baghdad in 2003 and was contained for several months by an administrative deBa’athification of the government. When the Sunni Minister of Interior, Naqib al Sammara’i, was replaced in April 2005 by Shia Bayan Sulagh Jabar, a disturbing trend of renegade de-Ba’athification in the form of kidnappings, unlawful imprisonments, and executions appeared in news reports by July 2005. Soon after, Abu Musab Zarqawi successfully played on sectarian prejudice and fear of retaliation against the deposed Sunni minority in Iraq. He initiated an Islamist purification campaign against the majority Iraqi Shiites. A purification based on ideology is unlikely, as the exceptions outlined in Zarqawi’s declaration included Shia dynastic heir Muqtada al Sadr and his followers. Sadr, though currently engaged politically, has made multiple attempts to destabilize the western-supported government of Iraq, an apparent aim of al Qaeda in Iraq, and has called for the unity of Sunnis and Shiites and Kurds and Arabs against western involvement and presence in Iraq. This is a repetitive theme among Sunni political and religious groups in Iraq—a variant to the government message “One Iraq” that is easily adopted by opposing groups for their own agendas. Each period of violent escalation in Iraq was preceded by achieving political milestones or followed by the announcement of political liaisons and plans. The 2003 fall of Ba’athist Baghdad was immediately followed by the annexation of several state mosques by Shiites, and several exiled Shia religious leaders returning to Iraq with strong political followings were targeted and assassinated. The development of the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS) as a political entity for the congregation of former Ba’athist Sunnis was quickly followed by the murder of key AMS members’ relatives. The February 2004 agreement to move up the political timeline in Iraq and transfer sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government by June 2004 was followed by suicide bombings in Karbala and Khadimiyah during Ashura—ostensibly the first international view of large-scale sectarian violence in Iraq that occurred 2 weeks prior to the first anniversary of the Iraq invasion by U.S. forces. The 2004 Iraqi campaign season started with bombings of Christian churches and Shia mosques that were sites for election registration or voting sites. A Christian-Shia alliance developed even though Christians had more freedom and position than Shiites during Saddam’s reign. This alliance, forged during the campaign season, was followed by the kidnapping of several Christian Bish- ops and priests. The successful election in January 2005 was followed by multiple suicide bombing attempts during Ashura, none of which were nearly as successful as the three 2004 Ashura attacks. The March 2005 seating of the Interim Governing Council was followed by a bombing of a marketplace outside a police station taking applications and passing out paychecks in Hillah. The incident occurred 3 days after the second anniversary of the Iraq invasion by U.S.-led forces. Escalation in Pakistan Since joining the multi-national coalition against global terrorism, Pakistani President and Army Chief of Staff Pervez Musharraf has suffered setback after setback in the movement toward a more moderate Islamic influence and the establishment of a secular central government in Pakistan. Since his January 12, 2002, speech denouncing all acts of terrorism and his pledge to fight Islamic extremism within Pakistan, President Musharraf has faced increasing casualties as a result of religious violence. This escalating violence is most likely undermining support for Musharraf, as Islamist immigrants and citizens believe he is too liberal for the good of Pakistan. Pakistan’s Shia Conference opposed the 1947 formation of Pakistan, preferring instead a united India. However, that would make Shiites an approximately 35-millionstrong Pakistani minority and valued target. Shia mosques have routinely been targeted since 1997, and attacks have increased in frequency and casualties since 2002. The Sunni Tehrik, a political party made up of Sufi followers from the Belravi school of thought, has been cited as an Islamist target because of its moderate mystic Islamic beliefs and work toward tolerance within and outside of the Muslim world. The most recent example was the April bombing during a celebration honoring the birth of Muhammad. Islamist groups abhor this type of celebration. However, no group has stepped up to claim the attack, and Pakistani authorities have not released information on suspected groups. Escalation in Indonesia Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous country and has the highest concen- 20 Inside Homeland Security www.chs.acfei.com Contact your local CHS P&R Team Coordinator today! Log on to www.acfei.com/chs/teams for CHS P&R Team contact information. (800) 423-9737 trated population of Muslims in the world. Considered a moderate Muslim state, it is seen as an increasingly valuable partner in the war against Islamist militants in Southeast Asia. With the reversal of Indonesia’s terrorism policy following the October 2002 Bali attack, the freedom movement previously enjoyed by Islamists throughout Indonesia has been restricted. The restriction has decreased centralized command of the independently operated cells but doesn’t seem to have reduced the number of attacks planned or conducted. The proliferation of Islamist cells and offshoots of Jemaah Islamiyah has resulted in an increase in violence directed against western and Christian targets in an apparent effort to call into question the ability of the Indonesian government to protect its citizens. Evidence of an increasingly influential Islamist movement was seen in the March 2006 demonstrations outside the American Embassy in Jakarta sponsored by the Hizbut Tharir (Liberation Party), which used banners that read, “Now is the time for the Caliphate to rule the world with Sharia” and “Crush the Zionist America and Israel.” Attempting to weed out nationalism, separatism, and ethnic strife from the current Sunni-Shia conflict is unwise. Islamist propaganda uses these loyalties to further the ultimate goal of domination. The Taliban, as an alien Islamist movement, successfully fomented ethnic strife in Afghanistan to oust the communist government left in place after the Soviet withdrawal and to usher in an Islamist theocracy. The influence of radical Islamist beliefs is in place in Afghanistan, as was clearly demonstrated when Islamist Afghani clerics demanded the execution of Abdul Rahmann because he converted to Christianity. Further escalation of sectarian violence is inevitable as Islamist movements gain political and geographic ground. The focus for Islamist recruitment is in areas containing many poor, disillusioned, and unemployed young men. The former Soviet satellite countries, including the Baltic and Central Asian states and South Eastern Asia, recovering from economic crisis provide more than sufficient recruiting pools. Sectarian violence in Iraq and Pakistan will continue to expand to include not only (800) 423-9737 Shia Muslims and non-Muslims, but also moderate or secular Sunnis. To prevent their identity from being diluted, Islamists tend to be exclusive and do not tolerate the existence of other forms of worship within or around themselves. Rather than tolerating other forms of worship, they attempt to convert members of other faiths to their faith. When such a religion has the support of the force of arms, it normally follows a policy of persecuting members of other religions to compel them to convert. If the politicians do not improve the conditions of life in these developing democracies, the population will express its discontent through political movement toward Islamist ideology. In countries where Muslim populations are significant minorities there should be a focus on including Muslim populations in national and regional assimilation, thereby ensuring equitable economic and cultural status. Works Consulted Abbas, H. (2005). Pakistan’s drift into extremism: Al- lah, the army and America’s war on terror. New Delhi: Pentagon Press. Abedin, M. (2006) The Iraqi media’s response to recent sectarian tension in Iraq. Terrorism Focus, 3(10). Retrieved May 19, 2006, from http://www.blallalala. com Ahmad, I. D. (2001, March 12). The iconoclasts of Afghanistan. Islam Online. 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Learning Objectives for: “Sunni-Shia Conflict: Evidence of a Greater Islamist Movement” After studying this article, participants should better understand the following: 1). The basis and nature of the Sunni-Shia conflict. 2). The historical development of the Islamic caliphate. 3). The contemporary timeline of sectarian violence. 4). Possible terror tactics to catalyze political momentum for sympathetic groups or halt political momentum of adversaries. CE Test for “Sunni-Shia Conflict: Evidence of a Greater Islamist Movement” 1.) The conflict between Sunni and Shia muslims dates back to the: A. First century. B. Seventh century. C. Twelfth century. D. Nineteenth century. 2.) Sunni muslims believe the rightful transfer of leadership from Muhammad went to the: A. Shahanshah of Persia and the Sassinid Dynasty, Yazdgerd III. B. Eastern Roman Empire and Pope Honorius I. C. Caliphate of the four righteous companions in succession: Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthmann, and Ali. D. Quraish Tribe. Payment Information: $15 per test 3.) Sectarian violence is a term used to describe violence directed toward: A. A religious sect of believers variant or disparate to the attackers. B. Western economic targets. C. A political party. D. The Shia Imamate. 4.) Three countries that are currently experiencing large-scale sectarian violence are: A. Taiwan, the Philippines, and Brunei. B. Angola, Morocco, and Liberia. C. Iraq, Pakistan, and Indonesia. D. Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon. 5.) The Sunni-Shia conflict is due to: A. Economic disparity. B. An ideological difference in the history and development of Islam. C. An indiscernible mindset. D. End soon. (Identifying information: Please print legibly or type the following:) Name: Phone Number: Address: City: State: Zip: Credit Card # Circle one: check enclosed Name on card: MasterCard Visa __________ Signature American Express Exp. Date: Date Statement of completion: I attest to having completed the CE activity. Please send the completed form, along with your payment of $15 for each test taken. Fax: (417) 881-4702, or mail the forms to ACFEI Continuing Education, 2750 E. Sunshine, Springfield, MO 65804. If you have questions, please call (417) 881-3818 or toll free at (800) 423-9737. About the Author Elana Morgan Weschenfelder, BA, CHS-II, has studied politics, religion, and cultural issues as an intelligence analyst for 20 years. Most recently she completed a contract assignment as the senior intelligence analyst at the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing center in Iraq. Currently, she is a freelance writer conducting an independent study of the closed community threat in Europe. 22 Inside Homeland Security www.chs.acfei.com Contact your local CHS P&R Team Coordinator today! Log on to www.acfei.com/chs/teams for CHS P&R Team contact information. (800) 423-9737