Download Supplemental Notes on Aristotle Philosophy 2

Supplemental Notes on Aristotle
Philosophy 2 - Epperson
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
For Aristotle, ethical action is always ‘end oriented’ -- teleological.
Action conducive to man’s true good, rather than action right or wrong in itself.
‘Every art and every inquiry, every action and choice, seems to aim at some good;
whence the good has rightly been defined as that at which all things aim.’ (EN, 1094 a 13)
There are different goods and subordinate goods; the good is the good at which all things, and all
sub-goods aim. It is this good which Aristotle seeks to discover.
It is political or social science which studies the good for man. State and individual have the
same good, but it is greater in the State. (Echoes of The Republic.) Ethics is therefore a branch
of political/social science.
Q: What is the good of man? Cannot be answered exactly, mathematically, since the subject is
Man, which cannot be determined with mathematical exactitude. (EN 1094 b11)
Math: Deductive; begins with general principles and argues to conclusions
Ethics: Begins with the conclusions (moral judgments) and argues to the general
principles. (Eudemian Ethics (1216 b 32)
Presupposes natural tendencies implanted in man intrinsically which follow general
tendencies toward harmony and proportion, etc. Problem is establishing a sense of
ethical OBLIGATION, since these are not connected in any way to an Eternal Law of
God (this was done by the Christian philosophers of the Middle Ages who were inspired
by Aristotle).
Practical ethics, generally intended by Aristotle to justify the moral judgments of people who
were at the time generally looked upon as being good and virtuous. (EN 1094 b27). Not that he
was arguing a priori from the concept of an ‘ideal man’; he believed in the intrinsic normative
sense of morality and ethics in all people—founded in nature, and not merely in political,
cultural, and social traditions.
The End in Life: Happiness (typical Greek view). But happiness is relative. Moral virtue
is not the end because that can go along with inactivity and misery. Happiness must be an
activity and must exclude misery. (EN A4 ff)
Since it must be an activity of man, one should examine activities which are exclusively
human: Not growth or reproduction, not sensation…. It is the activity of REASON, or
activity in accord with reason.
Happiness is not virtue itself, but activity in accord with virtue (virtues being both
intellectual and moral types) Must be over a lifetime and not just over brief periods. (EN
1100a4, 1101 a 14-20)
Happiness via virtue includes the more common forms of happiness—i.e. pleasure, since any
free and unimpeded activity entails pleasure. External goods are helpful and even required (in
moderation) in this regard (against the Cynics) (EE 1214 b 25).
Aristotle is not, again, over-hostile towards earth; not overly transcendental.
His treatment of Ethics begins with:
1. an examination of the general nature of good character and action
2. the leading moral virtues—those which can be followed via reason
3. the virtues of the intellect.
4. ends with an examination of the Ideal Life—life of activity in accordance with virtue
 the life of the truly happy man.
*General Goodness and Character:
Start by having a capacity for it, but must be developed by practice; by doing virtuous
acts—objectively virtuous acts (to avoid the viscous circle) (EN BI 1103 a 14-b 26);
virtuous acts we may not know are virtuous and good in themselves. The vicious circle is
avoided by distinguishing between 1) acts which create the good disposition, and 2) acts
which flow from the good disposition once it has been created.
Virtue is a disposition which has been developed out of a capacity by the proper exercise
of that capacity. (There are problems, of course, differentiating between the development
of objectively moral values and the socially/culturally/parentally moral values; but
Aristotle doesn’t deal with these.
Aristotle says that a ‘completely right’ action must be not only ‘externally’ the right
thing in a given circumstance, but also done from a right motive, proceeding from a
moral agent acting precisely as a moral agent. (EN 1105 b 5)
* Virtue as related to Vice
All good actions have an order of proportion. Virtue is a mean between two extremes (vices) in
regard to feeling or action:
1. vice through excess
2. vice through defect (EN B 6 ff)
Re: a feeling like confidence, for example: excess = rashness; defect = cowardice.
A moral virtue for Aristotle is, then, ‘a disposition to choose, consisting essentially in a mean
relatively to us determined by a rule, i.e. the rule by which a practically wise man would
determine it.’ (EN 1106 b 36 – 1107 a 2)
Practical wisdom is essential to a virtuous man, and Aristotle attaches more value to
morality via an enlightened conscience than to an a priori theoretical morality.
The determination of the ‘mean’ and the two ‘extremes’ is ‘relative’ (quote above); it cannot be
objectively calculated. Sometimes preferable to err on the side of excess, sometimes on the side
of defect. Mediocrity is not the good, however; only as an aid in definition; axiologically,
good/virtue is excellence.
Goodness
Deficiency
Badness
Excess
Horizontal line = ontological dimension
Vertical line = axiological dimension
Virtue () is ontologically a mean (); and axiologically, it is an excellence
or an extreme ().
Courage, for example: neither boldness, nor cool foresight; a synthesis of the two, and it
is the SYNTHESIS which prevents the virtue of courage from lapsing into idiotic daring
and cowardice.
This is not only sensible, but demonstrates his being influenced by the Greek aesthetic.
* Presupposition of Freedom for Morality
Action under physical external compulsion or from ignorance precludes accountability. Fear isn’t
enough, however, since action is still voluntary in this regard. (EN  I, 1100)
Being angry or drunk doesn’t count, either, since these cause action in ignorance, but not
from ignorance. (EN  I 1110 b 24-7).
Also, action done in ignorance is voluntary if subsequently apologized for; non-voluntary
if not apologized for (EN , 1110 b 18) ;)
Holds, with Socrates, that no man acts against knowledge; anyone who does a wrong act does
not know at the moment of the action that the act is wrong. (EN, H); but he is not unaware of the
moral struggle (EN 1102 b 14); formally, though, he upholds the Socratic position.
* Will
Like Plato, no really distinct concept of will; but he defines ‘choice’ as ‘reasonable desire’ (EN
1139) and does not identify preferential choice () with either desire by itself or
reason by itself.
*Analysis of Moral Process (EN 111 b 26)
1. Agent desires an end
2. Agent deliberates, seeing that B is a means to A; C the means to B, etc until
3. Agent perceives that some particular means can be done here and now.
4. Agent chooses this means that presents itself to him as practicable here and now
5. Agent does the act.
If virtuous activity is always voluntary and virtue and vice are in our power, then it must follow
that Socrates’ doctrine is false. Again, formally, he agrees with the Socratic doctrine, but he
does allow, for example, that bad habits which produce bad actions are the fault of the agent,
who could have refrained from the habit in the first place, etc. The Aristotelian formal treatment
of ethics does not do justice to the concepts of moral weakness and evil.
* Aristotle’s Treatment of Moral Virtues is useful in analyzing virtues; courage as defined as a
mean allows one to distinguish it, through analysis, from pseudo-courageous acts.
Also, his insistence that the mean is a ‘relative mean’ and that it cannot be objectively calculated
mathematically shows his bent towards practicality and empiricism. (EN 1106 a 36 – b4)
As a result, his treatment of virtue is partially determined by contemporary Greek
aesthetics—the ‘great souled’ and self-respecting man who is the measure of ethical
action… (slow in step, deep in voice and sedate in speech…) (EN 1124 b9 – 1125 a16)
* Justice
Treated in Book V. Justice entails:
1. what is lawful
2. what is fair and equal
Two kinds of justice:
1. ‘Universal’ Justice:
Laws of the State should extend objectively over all of life
Agrees with Plato re: the positive and educative function of the State.
2. ‘Particular’ Justice:
a. Distributive Justice: State divides goods among citizens according to
geometrical proportions—merit.
b. Remedial Justice: Proceeds according to arithmetical proportions.
1. Civil Law: (dealing with voluntary transactions)
2. Criminal Law: (dealing with involuntary transactions)
Justice is a mean between acting unjustly and being unjustly treated (EN 1133 b 30-2); not really
acceptable, though, and obviously intended to bring it into line with his concept of virtue.
Generosity becomes a vice in this scheme, for example.
But elsewhere he says that Justice isn’t really a mean like the other virtues; it simply
produces a state midway between A having too much and B having too much. (EN 1133
b 32). This shows his grounding of ethics in practical matters rather than merely
theoretical matters; but it also, at the same time, shows his attempt to achieve theoretical
consistency re: the other virtues, for example…
Also draws the distinction between actions that are materially unjust, arguing that intention is a
mitigating factor. Unintended damage should not be weighed the same as intended damage, and
in this way ‘equity’ becomes a superior type of justice compared to ‘legal’ justice, which is too
general for application to all particular cases. (EN 1137 b 26-7)
* Division of Intellectual Virtues
2 rational faculties of Intellectual Virtues:
1. Scientific Faculty
by which we contemplate objects that are necessary and admit of
no contingency,
2. Calculative Faculty
faculty of opinion, concerned with objects that are contingent.
The intellectual virtues of the Scientific Faculty are:
1. episteme: ‘the disposition by virtue of which we demonstrate’ and which has regard to proof.
(EN 1139 b 31-2)
2. nous:
intuitive reason, whereby we grasp a universal truth after experience of a certain
number of particular instances and then see this truth or principle to be selfevident. (EN Z 6, 1140 b 31 – 1141 a8)
The union of episteme and nous is theoretical wisdom (‘sophia’) and is directed to the highest
objects—not only those of Metaphysics but also those of the Natural Sciences. The
contemplation of these belongs to the ideal life of man.
‘Wisdom or philosophy may be defined as the combination of intuitive reason and science, or as
scientific knowledge of the most precious things, with the crown of perfection, so to speak, upon
it.’ (EN 1141, a 9-2)
‘There are other things in the universe of a nature far more divine that his, as for example, the
starry heavens of which the universe is built. From all of which it is clear that wisdom is a
combination of science and the speculative reason, directed to the noblest objects in creation.’
(EN 1141 a 33 -b 3)
The intellectual virtues of the Calculative Faculty are:
1. art (techni) ‘the disposition by which we make things by the aid of a true rule’ (EN 1140 a 910)
2. practical wisdom (phronesis) ‘a true disposition towards action by the aid of a rule, with
regard to things good or bad for men.’ (EN 1140)
a. narrow sense: concerned with the individual’s good
b. wider sense: concerned with the family, household. Economics
c. widest sense: concerned with the State = political science
Practical wisdom is concerned with the practical syllogism: A is the end, B is the means,
therefore B. This is an ethic based on a hypothetical imperative as opposed to a Kantian
categorical imperative; but Aristotle might say that The Good as end is different from a
typical freely-chosen end, such that the means to the Good amounts to a categorical
imperative.
He also recognizes that there is some value to doing B even though one is ignorant of the
major premise A. (EN 1141 b 14-22)
Re: Socrates’ notion that all virtue is a form of prudence (practical wisdom), Aristotle
says partly right and partly wrong: No virtue can exist without prudence. (EN 1144) Soc:
All virtues are forms of reason; Aristotle: All virtues are reasonable. ‘Virtue is not only
the right and reasonable attitude, but the attitude which leads to right and
reasonable choice, and right and reasonable choice in these matters is what we mean
by prudence.’ (EN 1144)
Again, all grounded in earthly action rather than solely in the Ideal.
Practical wisdom is therefore necessary for the truly virtuous man,
a. ‘as being the excellence of an essential part of our nature.’
b. inasmuch as ‘there can be no right choice without both prudence and
virtue, seeing that the latter secures the choice of the right end, and the
former the choice of the right means to its attainment.’ (EN 1145 a 2-6)
But practical wisdom, which illuminates the means to the end of virtue, is not the same as
‘cleverness’ which is the faculty by which a man is enabled to find the right means to any
particular end, including a bad end. Bad people can be clever, too. Practical wisdom or
prudence is moral insight, and presupposes virtue, whereas cleverness does not
presuppose virtue.
Aristotle realizes that a man can do right without being a good man; to be good, his
action must be done because it is good, and for this prudence is needed. (EN 1144 a 13)
Natural virtues are possible (courage without gentleness, etc) but moral virtue requires
practical wisdom. Also, ‘given the single virtues of prudence, all the virtues necessarily
follow from it.’ (EN 1144 b 32-45)
Socrates was right in holding that no virtue can exist without prudence, but wrong
to say that all virtues are forms of prudence. He made the means the end, in other
words.
In the Nic. Ethics, he compares those who thing they will become good by
mere theoretical knowledge to patients who listen attentively to what the
doctor says but carry out none of his orders.’ (EN 1105)
* Summary
‘If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance
with the highest virtue and this will be that of the best thing in us.’ (EN 1177)
Reason—intellectual and philosophical activity—is the faculty which when exercised constitutes
perfect happiness: An intellectualist worldview he shared with Plato. The precise relation
between moral action (practical wisdom) and the highest type of human happiness is left
obscure, but he makes clear in the Ethics that without moral virtue there can be no true
happiness.
Reasons why man’s highest happiness comes from to  (EN K, 7)
1.
Reason is the highest faculty of man and theoretic contemplation is the highest
activity of reason.
2.
We can keep up this form of activity longer than any other, than bodily exercise,
eg.
3.
Pleasure is one of the elements of happiness, and ‘philosophy is admittedly the
pleasantest of activities in which human excellence manifests itself.’ ‘The
pleasures of philosophy at least appear to be wonderfully pure and reliable, nor
indeed is it surprising if the life of him who knows is pleasanter than that of the
learner.’
4.
The philosopher is more self-sufficient than any other man. ‘The thinker is able to
pursue his studies in solitude and the more of a thinker he is, the more capable he
is of doing so.’
5.
Philosophy is loved for its own sake and not for the sake of any results that accrue
from it. In the field of practical activity, it is not ht action itself that is desirable,
but some result to be attained by means of the activity. Philosophy is no mere
means to a further end.
6.
Happiness implies leisure, whereas the practical virtues find their exercise in war
and politics, which are not leisurely activities.