Download Ancient Rome is remembered as one of the greatest military powers

Ancient Rome is
remembered as one of
the greatest military powers
in history, its fame derived
from the fearsome reputation
of the empire's legionnaires.
Lost in the telling, however,
is the important role that
espionage played in Rome's
ascent to empire. _ ..
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were meant to be secret-is
no small
task. But it is not an impossible one. The
intelligence business is as old as civilization itself, and once the steps in the
process have been identified, they can be
traced in almost any civilization that left
historical records.
In the days preceding modern "technical" collection-whereby
sound recording devices, hidden cameras, and
satellites gather data-people were the
only means commanders and political
leaders had to collect the vital information they neede<!to§wvive the plots of
stories. Around 300 B.C., for example,
during the Etruscan wars, the consul Q.
Fabius Maximus sent his brother disguised as an Etruscan peasant into the
Ciminian forest to win over the local
Umbrians to the Roman cause. The
brother was both fluent in Etruscan and
a master of disguise. He was sent to reconnoiter areas into which Roman agents
were said never to have penetrated. The
mission was a resounding success, and
Rome was able to bring Umbrian tribes
a warning to other spies. The Carthaginian general's ability to disguise himself,
to forge documents, to send secret communications, and to surprise the Romans became legendary. And his agents
are said to have had secret hand gestures
that they used as a means of recognizing
one another. Hannibal used such ingenuity to lure the Romans into traps, as
at Lake Trasimene, where he caught the
Roman army between the lake and the
surrounding mountains. This ruse cost
the Romans fifteen thousand killed and
an equal number taken prisoner. His famous victory at the Battle of
Cannae was another trap-a
victory for Hannibal that
cost the Romans dearly in
lost manpower. Although
historians have argued over
exact figures, when Livy tells
us that the rings taken from
dead Roman aristocrats filled
three bushels, we get some
idea of the loss to the Roman
upper classes.
Not only did Hannibal emphasize good intelligence, he
exacted a high price from
agents who did not perform
well. A scout who had mistakenly taken him to Casilinum
and into a trap, when he had
been directed to take him to
Casinum, was crucified as
punishment for his error.
Hannibal had the advantage of being sole commander of his
forces. As leader of the Carthaginian
army and its allies, he was his own chief
of intelligence for fourteen years. It was
not until the Romans put a single commander, Scipio Africanus, in charge of
their armies that they were able to emulate Hannibal's efficient tactics and win
the Second Punic War.
Among other ploys, Scipio directed
spies to reconnoiter enemy camps.
When his siege of Utica stalled, he sent a
legation to the camp of the Numidian
king, Syphax, Centurians disguised as
slaves accompanied Scipio's emissaries.
The legate Gaius Laelius was fearful the
plan would be exposed-that one of the
disguised centurians, Lucius Statorius,
might be recognized since he had previously visited the camp. To protect his
agent's cover, Laelius had him publicly
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caned. The persuasiveness of the deceptive action hinged upon the known fact
that the Romans subjected only persons
low on the social scale to corporal punishment. To the historian, the episode is
of particular interest because it specifically identifies centurions and tribunes
as active participants in espionage missions. While the legates were in conference, the "slaves" were to wander about
the camp and reconnoiter the premises,
making note of entrances, exits, and the
location of each division. They were to
look for the outposts and sentries and
determine whether the camp was more
vulnerable to attack by day or by night.
On each visit, a different group of "slaves"
made the trip, so that every centurion
would have an opportunity to familiarize
himself with the encampments.
When all the information was at hand,
Scipio concluded that a night attack
would be the most effective way to take
the camp, and in addition, he ordered
the Carthaginian and Numidian camps
burned. The Carthaginians, thinking
these were accidental fires, ran out unarmed only to be slaughtered by the
Roman column that was ready and waiting. In this case, intelligence collection
had made possible a successful clandestine operation. Scipio had delivered a
crippling blow to a superior force.
By the time Rome conquered the
Hellenistic kingdoms in the East and
fought the Third Punic War (149-146
the republic on the Tiber had become the center of a Mediterranean empire. Historians still marvel at how much
territory Rome ruled during the middle
republic with the sparse infrastructure
that it had. For example, there was no
postal-communications system, no government intelligence service, no permanent foreign service, and no decisionmaking body other than the cumbersome
three-hundred-man Senate. The Romans
had nothing resembling a diplomatic
corps. They did not send permanent representatives abroad, nor did
they establish offices for
foreign-area specialists at
home. In fact, they did not
even install occupying forces
in the East prior to the late
second century B.C. There
was no diplomatic presence
abroad to implement foreign
policy, to provide cover for
covert operators, or to act as
intelligence gatherers for the
government back in Rome.
The primary means of assessing problems overseas
became the embassy. The
Senate dispatched small missions of inquiry or advice,
composed usually of three to
five senators of varying qualifications and experience.
They traveled in naval vessels
but without military escort.
These men acted as Roman agents but
were by no means permanently stationed abroad. Embassies were usually
sent to visit kings who had previously
sent deputations to Rome to ask for assistance. Only in times of crisis would
the Senate initiate a mission of inquiry
on its own.
Roman envoys were briefed with instructions and told to deliver warnings,
to give advice, to arbitrate settlements,
to check reports, or simply to look
around. Most of this was done in the
open, but there was always the possibility
of information
being clandestinely
slipped to the envoys by interested parties. We do not know how many retainers
they brought with them who, unnoticed,
could eavesdrop.
While it is reasonable to assume the
Romans sent the emissaries to collect
B.C.),
intelligence, there is no question that
the emissaries were considered spies by
their targets. On his grand tour of the
East in 166 B.C., Tiberius Cracchus and
his entourage were referred to as
kataskopoi (spies) by the Greek historian
Polybius. Appian, another Greek historian, bluntly stated that envoys sent to
Antiochus IV, ostensibly to bring about
reconciliation between him and Ptolemy,
really intended to find out his plans. Antiochus gave these spies such a warm
reception that they sent back glowing
reports. Yet we know from other records
that Antiochus in fact harbored a great
deal of antipathy toward Rome and pursued a policy quite different from the
one he confided to the envoys.
Because rulers in the East had a long
history of using formal intelligence services, they often assumed the Romans
were playing the same game. Genthius,
an IIIyrian king, sometimes chained ambassadors sent by Rome and charged
them with espionage. Other examples of
Roman ambassadors or traders being
suspected, arrested, or executed on espionage charges are not hard to find. Even
Romans traveling in a non-official capacity were mistrusted by provincials.
Roman grain buyers making purchases
from Cumae and Sicily were accused of
spying, and consequently were treated
with extreme hostility by the local
authorities, even to the point of finding
their lives in danger. When Mithridates
VI, king of Pontus, went to war against
the Romans, the first thing he did was
kill all the Romans and Italians in the
main cities of Asia Minor as members of
a possible fifth column. An estimated
eighty thousand Roman and Italian casualties show how seriously Mithridates
took his security problems.
Part of Rome's reluctance to develop a
formal intelligence service stemmed from
the unique way its republican government had developed. The Senate, composed of scions of wealthy, upper-class
families, acted with a certain amount of
class loyalty that allowed the state to
push its interests and expand overseas.
But the senate was not of one mind.
There was always tremendous personal
competition among individuals and families for the wealth and glory that such
conquest created. In order to further
their parochial ends, these men needed
to know what others were doing and
planning, and so they used their private
intelligence networks to advance their
own careers. Much of the behind the
scenes cloak-and-dagger work of senatorial politics is forever lost to us, but it is
not hard to imagine what forms it took.
Certainly political scandal played its part
in launching as well as sinking the careers of numerous senators.
The Romans had no qualms about
using espionage on a personal level.
Every Roman aristocrat had his private
network of business associates, inform-
ers, clansmen, slaves, or agents (male or
female) who could keep him informed on
the latest happenings in the Senate or his
own home. Even Roman architects built
private homes with counterintelligence
in mind. Livius Drusus' architect asked
him whether he would like his house
built "in such a way that he would be free
from public gaze, safe from all espionage
and that no one could look down on it."
Espionage on a small scale became
espionage on a national scale when the
nobility took its family interests into the
foreign-policy arena. But because each
senatorial family had its own private intelligence network, no one group would
have sanctioned the creation of a single
central intelligence organization that
might fall into the hands of a rival faction. Such a collection of individual interests was simply not fertile ground for
spawning a single institution that would
monitor Rome's overseas interests plus
segments of Roman society itself. Even if
such a centralized intelligence body
were assigned only foreign targets, there
might have remained a residual fear that
sooner or later such an apparatus would
be used to advance the interests of one
group over another.
The fact that the intelligence networks were privately owned and operated
can be seen clearly in the late republic.
Sallust, who wrote an account of the
Catiline conspiracy, one of the most
notorious threats to the late republic,
said it was put down by Cicero using
bodyguards, who learned of it through
the consul's wide-ranging espionage
network that included bodyguards.
Pompey and Caesar each had intelligence networks that they used against
each other in the civil war that ultimately
brought down the republic.
Caesar's agents in Rome kept a close
watch on his enemies. Cicero, for example, mentions in a letter that his epigrams
were reported to Caesar, who could distinguish between the authentic ones and
those falsely attributed to him. As long
as Caesar held control of Rome during
the civil war, the city's population
rejoiced with his victories and mourned
his losses, at least publicly. They knew full
well there were spies and eavesdroppers
prowling about, observing all that was
said and done. Caesar's military couriers, the speculatores, were kept busy
delivering intelligence but were also
given espionage assignments.
Caesar coordinated his intelligence
assets well. In this he stands out as an
individual who could make the best of
the republican system. He established a
rapid message and information transport system via couriers, and he also had
scouts and spies who used counterintelligence techniques, such as codes and
ciphers, to prevent his military plans
from falling into the hands of the enemy.
His successor Augustus had a better
opportunity to develop the system Caesar had started. Augustus may have been
heir to Caesar's ideas, or perhaps he just
instinctively knew what the new empire
needed. But in any case, he was shrewd
enough to realize that such intelligence
reforms were long overdue. Augustus'
first intelligence-gathering and dissemiMHQ
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nation-related innovation was the establishment of a state postal and messenger
service called the cursus publicus, which
replaced the inadequate republican system of private messengers.
By furnishing a means of transport
and communications, Augustus built
the rudiments of what was to become
the imperial security service. Now there
would be an official, permanent, and
reliable way to communicate political
and military intelligence. Like the Babylonians and Persians before them, the
Romans combined their road network
with a centrally administered communications system to help ensure
the security of the emperor and the
stability of the empire.
Although the cursus publicus
provided a reliable means of transmitting important
intelligence,
sending dispatches by this method
did not ensure sufficient security if
there was a traitor within the system. Secret and not-so-secret communications often played a critical
role in political events.
The emperor Caracalla (A.D.
211-217) was warned of a plot
against his life as the scheme was
being hatched by his successor
Macrinus (217-218). The warning
came from Materianus, the officer
in charge of the urban cohorts during Caracalla's frequent absences
from Rome on campaign. The message was sealed and given with
other letters to the courier of the imperial post. The courier completed his journey at normal speed, not realizing what
he was carrying. Caracalla received the
mail, but instead of reading it himself,
turned the daily dispatches, including
the warning from Materianus, over to
Macrinus, who promptly disposed of the
incriminating letter. Because he was
afraid Materianus might try a second
communication, Macrinus also decided
to dispose of Caracalla.
Quite frequently intelligence couriers
doubled as political assassins. The emperor Gordian sent a secret letter that is
described by the historian Herodian as
having been folded in a manner that was
"the normal method used by the emperor
to send private, secret messages." No further details are given, but evidently such
messages were sealed in a certain way and
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carried by special messengers. In Gordian's case, the message was sent to the
governor of Mauretania Caesariensis as
part of a covert operation. The agents
were disguised as messengers from Maximinus, the emperor's enemy. The governor, Vitalianus, usually went to a small
room, off the public court, where he
could scrutinize the dispatches carefully.
The agents then were instructed to inform him that they were bringing secret
instructions from Maximinus and to request a private audience in order to pass
these secret instructions on personally.
While Vitalianus was examining the
seals, they killed him with swords hidden under their cloaks.
As the system of the cursus publicus
developed, the couriers were drawn increasingly from the army, especially
from the speculatores. The duties of the
speculatores were not limited simply to
carrying messages. They could also be
used for undercover activities such as
spying, arresting political figures, guarding suspects and detainees, or executing
condemned men. The Gospel of st. Mark
6:27 indicates that it was a speculator
who was sent to the prison with an execution order for John the Baptist.
With the reign of Domitian (A.D.
81-96), or possibly Hadrian (117-138),
came another innovation that added
more manpower to this intelligence network. The supply section of the imperial
general staff provided personnel who
could work as intelligence agents. Supply
sergeants, called frumentarii, whose
original functions had included the purchase and distribution of grain, were now
turned into intelligence officers. Because
these men were constantly traveling on
logistical assignments, they were in a
position to watch over the army, the imperial bureaucracy, and the local population. They could report back on any
situation that was 'of interest to the emperors. That emperors came to rely on
this system is shown by the fact that the
frumentarii began to replace the
speculatores as intelligence couriers and eventually as secret police.
Although their three main duties
were as couriers, tax collectors, and
policemen, like the speculatores before them these officers were used in
many capacities involving state security. By the third century there is extensive evidence of their use as spies.
No one seemed to be immuneprominent generals, lowly Christians, senators, and subversives all
came under their scrutiny.
In the city of Rome the frumentarii worked closely with the urban
police force. Their secret service
duties, besides investigating and
arresting, eventually came to include political assassination. Not
only did the emperor avail himself
of their services, but pretenders to
the throne, such as Macrinus, used
the frumentarii to further their careers.
How the service was used or abused
depended on the emperor. Alexander
Severus is praised for choosing only
honest men, but at other times complaints arrived about their corruption.
As secret police agents, the frumentarii
participated in the persecution of Christians. They were among the chief agents
who spied on Christians and had them
arrested. The soldier who supervised
Saint Paul in Rome while he was awaiting
trial was a frumentarius. Early Church
historian Eusebius reports the tale of a
Christian named Dionysius who was
being hunted by the secret police. He hid
in his house for four days. Meanwhile the
Irumentarius was searching high and low
but never thought to search the man's
house. Dionysius made his escape with
the help of the Christian underground.
In another incident, a frumentarius
was sent to arrest Cyprian, later sainted,
but the Christians, who had their own
intelligence network during the persecutions, found out about the arrest
order and warned him to go into hiding.
Many ancient sources mention "soldiers without uniforms" arresting Christians or performing other secret service
duties, but it is not always possible to
know if these were trumentarii. Since any
soldier could be seconded for police duties, the imperial government had a large
range of personnel from which to choose
for these kinds of duties.
Their activities did not endear
the trumentarii to the general
public. Roman administrators
could be arbitrary, authoritarian,
and corrupt. When they became
involved in tax collecting and
detecting subversion, the temp- !!!
tations to corruption were even ~
g
greater. A third-century writer ~
described the provinces as "en- ~
slaved by fear," since spies were ~
a
everywhere. Many Romans and s
~
people in the provinces found it ~
impossible to think or speak ~
freely for fear of being spied ~
upon. The snooping of the fru- ~
meniarii became rampant by the
late third century, and their behavior was compared to that of a
plundering army. They would
enter villages ostensibly in pursuit of political criminals, search
homes, and then demand bribes from
the locals.
The emperor Diocletian disbanded the
trumentarii because of the massive
number of complaints he received from
his subjects, but he actually had no
intention of giving up such an essential
intelligence source. He simply replaced
them with members of another organization, who would perform the same
counterintelligence and security tasks
but under a different name. These new
men were called agentes in rebusgeneral agents. The blandness of the title
belies their actual secret functions. They
performed a wide range of intelligence
activities almost identical to those of the
Irumentarii. The two major differences
were that the agentes were civilians, not
soldiers, and they were not under the
jurisdiction of the praetorian prefect, the
commander of the Praetorian Guard;
rather they were directed by an official
called the "master of offices." Since the
master of offices controlled other groups
that had intelligence functions-such as
the notarii, the imperial secretaries-by
the mid-fourth century the master of
offices became, in effect, the minister of
information. The new corps of agents
was also more numerous than it had
been under the previous system, reaching as many as twelve hundred men.
The growth of bureaucracy in the late
empire created another use for spies:
I
surveillance of other ministries of state.
The central government would send
intelligence officers from the imperial
court to other departments of the bureaucracy to spy on both their superiors
and subordinates alike. Instead of remaining loyal to the emperor, they cooperated with, rather than spied on, the
superiors they thought could help their
careers. Often charges of treason were
hurled at political rivals rather than real
traitors, with the consequence that the
security of the empire was compromised.
During the late empire, the Roman
government institutionalized its information services and espionage activities
to an extent unknown during Augustus'
time. And yet can we say intelligence
activities kept the emperor any safer?
Probably not. Only a minority of emperors
died a natural death. Seventy-five per-
cent of them fell to assassins or pretenders to the throne. In order to be
safe, the emperor relied on many groups
to provide him with intelligence. The distinguishing characteristic of espionage in
the late empire is that no one department carried it out alone. Many groups,
civilian and military, were assigned tasks
that involved some surveillance.
Did all this spying make Rome more
secure on its borders or make its leaders
well informed about its enemies? Again
the answer is no. Foreign intelligence
continued to be collected by the traditional means, that is, by the military scouts-the exploratores and
speculatores. Large mobile units
of exploratores were stationed in
border areas, where they were
used to monitor enemy activity
beyond the empire's limits. This
was straightforward military reconnaissance. There is little evidence to suggest that the Romans
placed their own agents among
foreign powers. The one exception
is a passage from the fourthcentury Roman historian Ammianus Marcellinus in which he
talks about a group called the
Arcani who evidently were paid
by the Romans to "snoop among
the savages" and report what they
saw. Even they eventually became corrupt and had to be removed. Unfortunately for us, the
detailed description of these activities was lost with Ammianus' history
of Constans, which has not survived.
Despite their protestations to the contrary, the Romans were heavily involved
in espionage, but it cannot be said that
they ever established a formal intelligence service. The closest they came was
in using groups like the trumentarii and
the agentes in rebus for various internal
security tasks. Protecting the emperor
and keeping him on the throne became
so crucial after the third century that
most of Rome's intelligence activities
were focused inward. Ironically, for all
their reputation as empire builders, the
Romans were never as good at watching
their enemies as they were at watching
each other.
ROSEMARySHELDON
is professor of ancient
history at the Virginia Military Institute.
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