* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
Download Shafer-Landua and Ethical Subjectivism - K
Internalism and externalism wikipedia , lookup
Bernard Williams wikipedia , lookup
Catholic views on God wikipedia , lookup
Individualism wikipedia , lookup
Ethics of eating meat wikipedia , lookup
Arthur Schafer wikipedia , lookup
Lawrence Kohlberg wikipedia , lookup
Alasdair MacIntyre wikipedia , lookup
Consequentialism wikipedia , lookup
Jewish ethics wikipedia , lookup
Moral disengagement wikipedia , lookup
Euthyphro dilemma wikipedia , lookup
Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development wikipedia , lookup
Divine command theory wikipedia , lookup
Business ethics wikipedia , lookup
Moral development wikipedia , lookup
Morality throughout the Life Span wikipedia , lookup
Ethics of artificial intelligence wikipedia , lookup
Critique of Practical Reason wikipedia , lookup
Morality and religion wikipedia , lookup
Moral responsibility wikipedia , lookup
Ethics in religion wikipedia , lookup
Moral relativism wikipedia , lookup
Thomas Hill Green wikipedia , lookup
Shafer-Landau and Ethical Subjectivism Normative Subjectivism: An action is morally permissible if and only if the person judging the action takes it to be permissible. Meta-Ethical Subjectivism: Ethical theories, and more generally normative claims of any kind, cannot be true because they merely express attitudes towards actions. Arguments for Normative Subjectivism. Argument from Democracy: 1. If everyone has an equal right to have and voice moral opinions, then everyone’s moral opinions are equally plausible. 2. Everyone does have an equal right to have and voice moral opinions. 3. Everyone’s moral opinions are equally plausible. Objection: Premise 1 is false. Argument from analogy: 1. Opinions about ethical truths are like opinions about other matters of fact, e.g. science or accounting. 2. Though everyone has a right to hold opinions about science and accounting, and to express them, not everyone’s opinions about these matters are equally plausible. The experts generally have more plausible opinions than the novice. 3. It is not the case that everyone’s opinions about ethical facts truths are equally plausible. The Argument from Disagreement. 1. If there is persistent disagreement among informed, reasonable people about a subject matter, then that subject matter does not admit of objective truth. 2. There is persistent disagreement about ethical issues among informed, reasonable people. 3. There are no objective ethical truths. Objections: A. There is more agreement about ethical truths than is generally acknowledged. B. Such disagreement as does exist is often not informed, because a great deal of ‘common knowledge’ to which people appeal in defending their moral claims is often in fact mistaken. C. Premise 1 is false. Argument: 1. There is persistent disagreement among physicists. 2. Such disagreement is disagreement about the objective truth, and such truths exist to be discovered. 3. There can be objectives truths about a subject matter (e.g. physics) about which informed reasonable people persistently disagree. The Argument from Tolerance 1. If normative subjectivism is true, then everyone’s opinions about ethical matters are equally plausible. 2. If everyone’s opinions are equally plausible, then we have to respect and tolerate the opinions of others. 3. If normative subjectivism is true, we must respect and tolerate the opinions of others. Objections: A. Ethical Objectivism does not require that one fail to respect and tolerate the opinions of others (a little humility about whether one knows the ethical truth is always appropriate, even on the assumption that there is such a truth to describe). B. Premise 2 must be false if ethical subjectivism is true. Argument: 1. Suppose normative subjectivism is true. 2. Then tolerant behavior is right just in case someone thinks it is. 3. But similarly, intolerant behavior is right just in case someone thinks it is. 4. Sincerely intolerant persons need not respect and tolerate the opinions of others. The Argument from Atheism 1. If ethics is objective, then God must exist. 2. God does not exist. 3. Ethics is not objective. Defense of Premise 1 1. Suppose God exists and issues commands. 2. Suppose the commands constitute the moral rules governing our behavior. 3. Then ethics is objective because the rules come from God rather than us (if they came from us, then subjectivism would be true). 4. If the rules didn’t come from God, then ethics wouldn’t be objective. (contrapositive of premise 1 in first argument) Objections: A. There need be no law-giver for objective moral rules to hold. Argument from analogy: 1. Moral rules are like rules of logic or mathematics. 2. Rules of logic and mathematics hold independently of their being ordained by anyone or anything. 3. Moral rules can hold independently of their being ordained. B. If ethics is objective, this cannot be because God legislates the rules. Argument: 1. Suppose God legislates the moral rules. 2. Either He does so because these are the right rules, or not. 3. Suppose not. 4. Then God’s commands are arbitrary, and supply no authoritative moral reasons for actions (at most the reasons are prudential—one serve’s one’s best interests by obeying them; but there is no reason to think disobedience is immoral, just stupid). 5. Thus, in this case, ethics is not in fact objective. 6. Suppose God legislates the rules because these are the right rules. 7. Then there must be reasons these are the right rules which are independent of God’s legislating them. 8. Hence, the rules would obtain whether or not God commands that we obey them. 9. In this case, ethics is objective, but not because God legislates the ethical rules. 10. It is not the case that if ethics is objective this is because the rules come from God. Reasons for Rejecting Normative Subjectivism 1. If normative subjectivism is right, then moral criticism is not possible. (Moral Equivalence) 2. If normative subjectivism is right, it is (nearly) impossible to be wrong about what one should do—one (almost) cannot act in an immoral fashion. (Moral Infallibility) 3. Moral Equivalence and Moral Infallibility jointly imply contradictions: it is (according to Hobbes) right for Igor to off Ivan, and (according to Rachels) wrong for Igor to off Ivan. Hence it is both right and wrong for Igor to off Ivan. 4. Contradictions can be remedied only by relativizing ethical claims to particular persons: It would be right for Hobbes, were he in Igor’s place, to off Ivan, but wrong for Rachels. 5. Price of the remedy: normative subjectivism cannot explain why moral disagreement exists. 6. Normative Subjectivism implies that moral views are arbitrary.