Download Shafer-Landua and Ethical Subjectivism - K

Shafer-Landau and Ethical Subjectivism
Normative Subjectivism: An action is morally permissible if and
only if the person judging the action takes it to be permissible.
Meta-Ethical Subjectivism: Ethical theories, and more generally
normative claims of any kind, cannot be true because they merely
express attitudes towards actions.
Arguments for Normative Subjectivism.
Argument from Democracy:
1. If everyone has an equal right to have and voice moral opinions,
then everyone’s moral opinions are equally plausible.
2. Everyone does have an equal right to have and voice moral
opinions.

3. Everyone’s moral opinions are equally plausible.
Objection: Premise 1 is false.
Argument from analogy:
1. Opinions about ethical truths are like opinions about other
matters of fact, e.g. science or accounting.
2. Though everyone has a right to hold opinions about science and
accounting, and to express them, not everyone’s opinions about
these matters are equally plausible. The experts generally have
more plausible opinions than the novice.

3. It is not the case that everyone’s opinions about ethical facts
truths are equally plausible.
The Argument from Disagreement.
1. If there is persistent disagreement among informed, reasonable
people about a subject matter, then that subject matter does not
admit of objective truth.
2. There is persistent disagreement about ethical issues among
informed, reasonable people.

3. There are no objective ethical truths.
Objections:
A. There is more agreement about ethical truths than is generally
acknowledged.
B. Such disagreement as does exist is often not informed, because
a great deal of ‘common knowledge’ to which people appeal in
defending their moral claims is often in fact mistaken.
C. Premise 1 is false.
Argument:
1. There is persistent disagreement among physicists.
2. Such disagreement is disagreement about the objective truth,
and such truths exist to be discovered.

3. There can be objectives truths about a subject matter (e.g.
physics) about which informed reasonable people persistently
disagree.
The Argument from Tolerance
1. If normative subjectivism is true, then everyone’s opinions
about ethical matters are equally plausible.
2. If everyone’s opinions are equally plausible, then we have to
respect and tolerate the opinions of others.

3. If normative subjectivism is true, we must respect and tolerate
the opinions of others.
Objections:
A. Ethical Objectivism does not require that one fail to respect and
tolerate the opinions of others (a little humility about whether one
knows the ethical truth is always appropriate, even on the
assumption that there is such a truth to describe).
B. Premise 2 must be false if ethical subjectivism is true.
Argument:
1. Suppose normative subjectivism is true.
2. Then tolerant behavior is right just in case someone thinks it is.
3. But similarly, intolerant behavior is right just in case someone
thinks it is.

4. Sincerely intolerant persons need not respect and tolerate the
opinions of others.
The Argument from Atheism
1. If ethics is objective, then God must exist.
2. God does not exist.

3. Ethics is not objective.
Defense of Premise 1
1. Suppose God exists and issues commands.
2. Suppose the commands constitute the moral rules governing our
behavior.
3. Then ethics is objective because the rules come from God rather
than us (if they came from us, then subjectivism would be true).

4. If the rules didn’t come from God, then ethics wouldn’t be
objective.
(contrapositive of premise 1 in first argument)
Objections:
A. There need be no law-giver for objective moral rules to hold.
Argument from analogy:
1. Moral rules are like rules of logic or mathematics.
2. Rules of logic and mathematics hold independently of their
being ordained by anyone or anything.

3. Moral rules can hold independently of their being ordained.
B. If ethics is objective, this cannot be because God legislates the
rules.
Argument:
1. Suppose God legislates the moral rules.
2. Either He does so because these are the right rules, or not.
3. Suppose not.
4. Then God’s commands are arbitrary, and supply no
authoritative moral reasons for actions (at most the reasons are
prudential—one serve’s one’s best interests by obeying them; but
there is no reason to think disobedience is immoral, just stupid).
5. Thus, in this case, ethics is not in fact objective.
6. Suppose God legislates the rules because these are the right
rules.
7. Then there must be reasons these are the right rules which are
independent of God’s legislating them.
8. Hence, the rules would obtain whether or not God commands
that we obey them.
9. In this case, ethics is objective, but not because God legislates
the ethical rules.

10. It is not the case that if ethics is objective this is because the
rules come from God.
Reasons for Rejecting Normative Subjectivism
1. If normative subjectivism is right, then moral criticism is not
possible. (Moral Equivalence)
2. If normative subjectivism is right, it is (nearly) impossible to be
wrong about what one should do—one (almost) cannot act in an
immoral fashion. (Moral Infallibility)
3. Moral Equivalence and Moral Infallibility jointly imply
contradictions: it is (according to Hobbes) right for Igor to off
Ivan, and (according to Rachels) wrong for Igor to off Ivan. Hence
it is both right and wrong for Igor to off Ivan.
4. Contradictions can be remedied only by relativizing ethical
claims to particular persons: It would be right for Hobbes, were he
in Igor’s place, to off Ivan, but wrong for Rachels.
5. Price of the remedy: normative subjectivism cannot explain
why moral disagreement exists.
6. Normative Subjectivism implies that moral views are arbitrary.