Download OIC Study Guide - Jadavpur University Model United Nations

STUDY GUIDE
ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC
COOPERATION
Representatives,
Greetings!
It gives me immense pleasure in welcoming you to the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation, at Jadavpur University Model United Nations 2017.
In this edition of JUMUN, OIC is going to discuss Countering Sectarian Violence
within Islam, a topic which certain countries have failed to address as a part of
their domestic policies especially in West Asia.
While preparing this study guide, I had a discussion with individuals reading
Islamic Studies and their opinion has been taken into account in the texts
mentioning the historical reasons behind which the conflict has escalated over the
last few decades.
Various scholars reading Islamic Studies believe that the interpretation of the
history is subjective and the same may vary amongst the member states based
on their understanding. Hence I request you all to read about their country/
communities perspective on how Sectarian Violence has emerged.
The study guide is a general understanding of Sectarian Violence and we have
penned down the common understanding of history which has been accepted
widely by the communities within Islam. Thus I expect the representatives to
respect the country and the understanding of the religion it represents during the
course of proceedings in the committee.
Do expect a crisis from the Executive Board anytime during the proceedings if the
need arises.
This study guide along with the history of OIC and its functions shall also give you
an overview of recent incidents on Sectarian Violence. We deliberately decided to
not address the violence that took place in few West Asian countries in the last
three decades as we expect the representatives to study those topics on their own.
Note, however, that the guide contains only background information and it should
only be the starting point of your research. It will take a lot more than this to
survive in this committee. Please note that representatives expecting to depend
only on this document for their survival shall fail utterly and I encourage you to do
as much of your own research before and during the MUN in order to keep up.
Feel free to approach the Executive Board with any queries that you may have
regarding council, once you have gone through the study guide. I wish you all the
very best of luck and I’m sure I speak for Sharat and Sourav as well when I say that
we look forward to seeing you all in Kolkata soon.
Regards,
Neel Duttaroy
Secretary General – OIC
(In confidence with Sharat Subramanian, Deputy Secretary General OIC & Sourav
Mishra, Director OIC)
.
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), formerly the Organization of the
Islamic Conference, is the second-largest intergovernmental organization after the
United Nations and has membership of 57 states spread over four continents. The
organization is considered to be the united voice of the Muslim fraternity and
guarantees to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world along with
promoting international peace and harmony amongst the people of the world.
The organization was established based on the decision of the historical summit
that took place in Rabat, Morocco on Rajab 12, 1389 Hijri (Sept. 25 1969) as a result
of criminal torching of Al-Aqsa Mosque in occupied Jerusalem.
In 1970 the first ever meeting of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Minister (ICFM)
was held in Jeddah, which decided to establish a permanent secretariat in Jeddah
headed by the organization's secretary general. The organization has seen 10
Secretary Generals till now with Dr. Yousef bin Ahmad Al-Othaimeen is the 11th
secretary general and assumed office in 2016.
The existing charter of OIC was adopted by the 11th Islamic Summit held in Dakar
on March 13-14, 2008, which placed the objectives and principles of the
organization and essential purposes to strengthen the harmony and cooperation
among the member states. Over the last 40 years, membership has grown from its
founding members of 25 to 57 states. The organization has the singular honor to
galvanize the ummah into a unified body and have actively represented Muslims
by espousing all causes close to the hearts of the over 1.5 billion Muslims of the
world. The organization has consultative and cooperative relations with the U.N.
and other intergovernmental organizations to protect the vital interests of
Muslims and to work for the settlement of conflicts and disputes involving
member states. In safeguarding the true values of Islam and Muslims, the
organization has taken various steps to remove misperceptions and has strongly
advocated the elimination of discrimination against Muslims in all forms and
manifestations.
The member states of the OIC face many challenges in the 21st century, and to
address these challenges, the third extraordinary session of the Islamic Summit,
held in Mecca in December 2005, laid down the blueprint called the Ten-Year
Program of Action, which envisages the joint action of member states; promotion
of tolerance and moderation, modernization, extensive reforms in all spheres of
activities including, science and technology, education and trade enhancement,
and emphasizes good governance and promotion of human rights in the Muslim
world, especially with regard to rights of children, women and elderly and the
family values enshrined by Islam.
Under the charter, the organization aims, inter alia, to:
Enhance and consolidate the bonds of fraternity and solidarity among the
member states;
Safeguard and protect the common interests and support the legitimate causes
of the member states and coordinate and unify the efforts of the member states
in view of the challenges faced by the Islamic world in particular and the
international community in general;
Respect the right of self-determination and non-interference in domestic affairs
and to respect sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each member
state;
Ensure active participation of the member states in the global political, economic
and social decision-making processes to secure their common interests;
Reaffirm its support for the rights of peoples as stipulated in the U.N. Charter and
international law;
Strengthen intra-Islamic economic and trade cooperation in order to achieve
economic integration leading to the establishment of an Islamic common market;
Exert efforts to achieve sustainable and comprehensive human development and
economic well-being in member states
In order to realize these objectives, Member States shall act, inter alia, in
accordance with the following principles:
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All Member States commit themselves to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations Charter;
Member States are sovereign, independent and equal in rights and obligations;
All Member States shall settle their disputes through peaceful means and
refrain from use or threat of use of force in their relations;
All Member States undertake to respect national sovereignty, independence
and territorial integrity of other Member States and shall refrain from
interfering in the internal affairs of others;
Member States shall uphold and promote, at the national and international
levels, good governance, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms,
and the rule of law.
The Organization is composed of the following main bodies:
The Islamic Summit, composed of Kings and Heads of State and Government of
Member States, is the supreme authority of the Organization. It convenes once
every three years to deliberate, take policy decisions and provide guidance on all
issues pertaining to the realization of the objectives and consider other issues of
concern to the Member States and the Ummah.
The Council of Foreign Ministers, which meets once a year, considers the means
for the implementation of the general policy of the Organization by, inter alia:
a. Adopting decisions and resolutions on matters of common interest in the
implementation of the objectives and the general policy of the Organization;
b. Reviewing progress of the implementation of the decisions and resolutions
adopted at the previous Summits and Councils of Foreign Ministers;
The General Secretariat, which is the executive organ of the Organization,
entrusted with the implementation of the decisions of the two preceding bodies.
In order to coordinate and boost its action, align its view points and stands, and be
credited with concrete results in various fields of cooperation -political, economic,
cultural, social, spiritual and scientific- among Member States, the Organization
has created different committees, nearly all, at ministerial level, a number of which
are chaired by Heads of State. The Al-Quds Committee, the Standing Committee
for Information and Cultural Affairs (COMIAC), the Standing Committee for
Economic and Trade Cooperation (COMCEC), and the Standing Committee for
Scientific and Technological Cooperation (COMSTECH) are the ones Chaired by
Heads of State.
The number and types of secondary organs and institutions, working toward the
achievement of the OIC objectives, have been steadily increasing, and cover
various areas of cultural, scientific, economic, legal, financial, sports, technological,
educational, media, as well as vocational, social and humanitarian. Depending on
their degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the parent organization, they are classified as
subsidiary organs and specialized or affiliated institutions.
http://www.oicun.org/2/23/
Islam and it’s Origin
Mohammed unveiled a new faith to the people of Mecca in 610. Known as Islam, or
submission to God, the monotheistic religion incorporated some Jewish and
Christian traditions and expanded with a set of laws that governed most aspects
of life, including political authority. The word Islam also means peace and Muslim
comes from Musallam Imaan which means strong in faith.
By the time of his death in 632, Mohammed had consolidated power in Arabia. His
followers subsequently built an empire that would stretch from Central Asia to
Spain less than a century after his death. But a debate over succession split the
community, with some arguing that leadership should be awarded to qualified
individuals and others insisting that the only legitimate ruler must come through
Mohammed’s bloodline.
A group of prominent early followers of Islam elected Abu Bakr, a companion of
Mohammed, to be the first caliph, or leader of the Islamic community, over the
objections of those who favored Ali ibn Abi Talib, Mohammed’s cousin and son-inlaw. The opposing camps in the succession debate eventually evolved into Islam’s
two main sects. Shias, a term that stems from shi’atu Ali, Arabic for “partisans of
Ali,” believe that Ali and his descendants are part of a divine order. Sunnis,
meaning followers of the sunna, or “way” in Arabic, of Mohammed, are opposed to
political succession based on Mohammed’s bloodline.
Ali became caliph in 656 and ruled only five years before he was assassinated. The
caliphate, which was based in the Arabian Peninsula, passed to the Umayyad
dynasty in Damascus and later the Abbasids in Baghdad. Shias rejected the
authority of these rulers. In 680, soldiers of the second Umayyad caliph killed Ali’s
son, Husayn, and many of his companions in Karbala, located in modern-day Iraq.
Karbala became a defining moral story for Shias, and Sunni caliphs worried that
the Shia Imams—the descendants of Husayn who were seen as the legitimate
leaders of Muslims (Sunnis use the term “imam” for the men who lead prayers in
mosques)—would use this massacre to capture public imagination and topple
monarchs. This fear resulted in the further persecution and marginalization of
Shias.
Even as Sunnis triumphed politically in the Muslim world, Shias continued to look
to the Imams—the blood descendants of Ali and Husayn—as their legitimate
political and religious leaders. Even within the Shia community, however, there
arose differences over the proper line of succession. Mainstream Shias believe
there were twelve Imams. Zaydi Shias, found mostly in Yemen, broke off from the
majority Shia community at the fifth Imam, and sustained imamate rule in parts
of Yemen up to the 1960s. Ismaili Shias, centered in South Asia but with important
diaspora communities throughout the world, broke off at the seventh Imam. Most
Ismailis revere the Aga Khan as the living representative of their Imam. The
majority of Shias, particularly those in Iran and the eastern Arab world, believe
that the twelfth Imam entered a state of occultation, or hiddenness, in 939 and
that he will return at the end of time. Since then, “Twelvers,” or Ithna Ashari Shias,
have vested religious authority in their senior clerical leaders, called ayatollahs
(Arabic for “sign of God”).
Many Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian converts to Islam chose to become Shia
rather than Sunni in the early centuries of the religion as a protest against the
ethnic Arab empires that treated non-Arabs as second-class citizens.
Their religions influenced the evolution of Shia Islam as distinct from Sunni Islam
in rituals and beliefs.
Sunnis dominated the first nine centuries of Islamic rule (excluding the Shia
Fatimid dynasty) until the Safavid dynasty was established in Persia in 1501. The
Safavids made Shia Islam the state religion, and over the following two centuries
they fought with the Ottomans, the seat of the Sunni caliphate. As these empires
faded, their battles roughly settled the political borders of modern Iran and Turkey
by the seventeenth century, and their legacies resulted in the current demographic
distribution of Islam’s sects. Shias comprise a majority in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and
Bahrain, and a plurality in Lebanon, while Sunnis make up the majority of more
than forty countries from Morocco to Indonesia.
Prophet’s Farewell and the historical incident of Ghadir-e-Khumm
In March 632, in the final year of Prophets life, he made a final pilgrimage to
Mecca; it is known as Hajj al-wida, the farewell Pilgrimage. On this occasion, he
addressed his fellow muslims and went on to warn them against unethical
practices in trade, cautioned them to respect the sacred months, and urged them
to treat their wives and all women with respect.
Some early sources including a judge from the tenth century recorded that on
Prophet’s return to Medina from his farewell pilgrimage, a verse of Quran (5:67)
was revealed upon him that said it was very important for prophet to accomplish
something and not doing so would mean not delivering God’s message.
At Gadir Khumm, the prophet gathered his followers and ordered the building of a
temporary platform. Standing on the platform, the Prophet took Ali’s arm, lifted it
up, and said “He whose Maula I am, Ali is his Maula”.
Maula, in Arabic has two meanings; 1. Leader and 2. Friend. The set of people who
took Prophet’s message as appointing Ali as the leader after him are now known
as Shias (since they thought Prophet would not gather everyone to declare the
friendship) and for others who took Ali as a friend of theirs in the time and hour of
need are now Sunnis.
Caliphate
There are several accounts of what happened soon after the prophet’s death.
They are the subject of debate among the historians. According to an account in
Tabari, immediately after the death of the Prophet, Ali Ibn Abi Talib attended to
his family responsibility of preparing the prophet’s body for burial.
Meanwhile, a group of helpers met at an assembly hall to choose a leader from
among them. Some of them wanted to nominate a leader among themselves i.e.;
Mahajirun. After a lot of appositions, people agreed that Hazrat Abu Bakr, who
was a companion of Prophet, was the eldest and the most experienced out of all
and he should be the leader. Henceforth, they all gave their pledge of allegiance to
Hazrat Abu Bakr who then went on to become the first Caliph of the Muslim
Community. After Abu Bakr, Hazrat Umar, Hazrat Uthman and Hazrat Ali (Ali Ibn
Abi Talib) became the successors in the caliphate.
Sources of the Islamic Law:
Islamic law is based upon four main sources:
Primary Sources
THE QURAN
Muslims believe the Quran to be the direct words of Allah, as revealed to and
transmitted by the Prophet Muhammad. All sources of Islamic law must be in
essential agreement with the Quran, the most fundamental source of Islamic
knowledge. When the Quran itself does not speak directly or in detail about a
certain subject, Muslims only then turn to alternative sources of Islamic law.
THE SUNNAH
Sunnah is the traditions or known practices of the Prophet Muhammad, many of
which have been recorded in the volumes of Hadith literature. The resources
include many things that he said, did, or agreed to -- and he lived his life according
to the Quran, putting the Quran into practice in his own life. During his lifetime,
the Prophet's family and companions observed him and shared with others
exactly what they had seen in his words and behaviors -- i.e. how he performed
ablutions, how he prayed, and how he performed many other acts of worship.
People also asked the Prophet directly for rulings on various matters, and he would
pronounce his judgment. All of these details were passed on and recorded, to be
referred to in future legal rulings. Many issues concerning personal conduct,
community and family relations, political matters, etc. were addressed during the
time of the Prophet, decided by him, and recorded.
The Sunnah can thus clarify details of what is stated generally in the Quran.
Secondary Sources
IJMA' (CONSENSUS)
In situations when Muslims have not been able to find a specific legal ruling in the
Quran or Sunnah, the consensus of the community is sought (or at least the
consensus of the legal scholars within the community).
The Prophet Muhammad once said that his community (i.e. the Muslim
community) would never agree on an error.
QIYAS (ANALOGY)
In cases when something needs a legal ruling but has not been clearly addressed
in the other sources, judges may use the analogy, reasoning, and legal precedent
to decide new case law. This is often the case when a general principle can be
applied to new situations.
Modern Tensions
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Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 provided Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
the prospect to implement his vision for an Islamic government ruled by the
“guardianship of the jurist” (velayat-e faqih), a contentious concept among Shia
scholars that is opposed by Sunnis, who have historically differentiated between
political leadership and religious scholarship. Shia ayatollahs have always been
the guardians of the faith. Khomeini argued that clerics had to rule to properly
perform their function: implementing Islam as God intended, through the mandate
of the Shia Imams.
Under Khomeini, Iran began the experiment in Islamic rule. Khomeini tried to
encourage further Islamic revival, preaching Muslim unity, but supported groups in
Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Pakistan that had specific Shia agendas.
Sunni Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, admired Khomeini’s
success, but did not accept his leadership, underscoring the depth of sectarian
suspicions.
Saudi Arabia has a sizable Shia minority of roughly 10 percent, and millions of
adherents of a puritanical brand of Sunni Islam known as Wahhabism (an offshoot
of the Sunni Hanbali school) that is antagonistic to Shia Islam. The transformation
of Iran into an overtly Shia power after the Islamic revolution induced Saudi Arabia
to accelerate the propagation of Wahhabism, as both countries revived a
centuries-old sectarian rivalry over the true interpretation of Islam. Many of the
groups responsible for sectarian violence that has occurred in the region and
across the Muslim world since 1979 can be traced to Saudi and Iranian sources.
Saudi Arabia backed Iraq in the 1980–1988 war with Iran and sponsored militants
in Pakistan and Afghanistan who were primarily fighting against the Soviet Union,
which had invaded Afghanistan in 1979, but were also suppressing Shia
movements inspired or backed by Iran.
The transformation of Iran into an agitator for Shia movements in Muslim
countries seemed to confirm centuries of Sunni suspicions that Shia Arabs answer
to Persia. Many experts, however, point out that Shias aren’t monolithic—for many
of them, identities and interests are based on more than their confession. Iraqi
Shias, for example, made up the bulk of the Iraqi army that fought Iran during the
Iran-Iraq War, and Shia militant groups Amal and Hezbollah clashed at times
during the Lebanese civil war. The Houthis, a Zaydi Shia militant group in Yemen,
battled the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh, a Zaydi, several times between 2004
and 2010. Then, in 2014, the Houthis captured the capital Sana'a with ousted
president Saleh's support.
Sunnis and Shias agree on the basic tenets of Islam: declaring faith in a
monotheistic God and Mohammed as his messenger, conducting daily prayers,
giving money to the poor, fasting during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, and
performing the pilgrimage to Mecca.
There are divisions even over the precepts of Islam, but the main difference relates
to authority, which sparked the political split in the seventh century and evolved
into divergent interpretations of sharia, or Islamic law, and distinct sectarian
identities.
Shias believe that God always provides a guide, first the Imams and then
ayatollahs, or experienced Shia scholars who have wide interpretative authority
and are sought as a source of emulation. The term “ayatollah” is associated with
the clerical rulers in Tehran, but it’s primarily a title for a distinguished religious
leader known as a marja, or source of emulation. Iran’s supreme leader, Ali
Khamenei, was appointed by an elected body of Iranian clerics, while maraji (plural
of marja) are elevated through the religious schools in Qom, Najaf, and Karbala.
Shias can choose from dozens of maraji, most of whom are based in holy cities in
Iraq and Iran. Many Shias emulate a marja for religious affairs and defer to
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Iran for political guidance. For Sunnis, authority is
based on the Quran and the traditions of Mohammed. Sunni religious scholars,
who are constrained by legal precedents, exert far less authority over their
followers than their Shia counterparts.
Both sects have subdivisions. The divisions among Shias were discussed above.
Four schools comprise Sunni jurisprudence: Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki, and Hanbali, the
latter spawning the Wahhabi and Salafi movements in Saudi Arabia. Sunnism, a
broad umbrella term for non-Shia Islam, is united on the importance of the Quran
and practice of Mohammed but allows for differences in legal opinion.
Violence between Islam’s sects has been rare historically, with most of the deadly
sectarian attacks directed by clerics or political leaders rather than erupting
spontaneously. Extremist groups, many of which are fostered by states, are the
chief actors in sectarian killings today.
Two of the most prominent terrorist groups, Sunni al-Qaeda and Shia Hezbollah,
have not defined their movements in sectarian terms, and have favored using
anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist, and anti-American frameworks to define their jihad,
or struggle. They share few similarities beyond the use of violence. Hezbollah has
developed a political wing that competes in elections and is part of the Lebanese
government, a path not chosen by al-Qaeda, which operates a diffuse network
largely in the shadows. Both groups have deployed suicide bombers, and their
attacks shifted from a focus on the West and Israel to other Muslims, such as alQaeda’s killing of Shia civilians in Iraq and Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian
civil war.
Conflict and chaos have played a role in the reversion to basic sectarian identity.
In Iraq, for instance, remnants of Hussein's Ba’athist regime, as well as militants
whose organization would eventually become the self-proclaimed Islamic State,
employed Sunni rhetoric to mount a resistance to the rise of Shia power. Sunni
fundamentalists, many inspired by al-Qaeda’s call to fight Americans, flocked to
Iraq from Muslim-majority countries, attacking coalition forces and many Shia
civilians. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who founded al-Qaeda’s franchise in Iraq, evoked
ancient anti-Shia fatwas, or religious rulings, to spark a civil war in hopes that the
Shia majority would eventually capitulate in the face of Sunni extremist violence.
Iraq's foremost Shia religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has been a
voice for sectarian restraint in Iraq, and the country's Shia community absorbed
thousands of deaths before fighting back with their own militias. But, during the
U.S. occupation of Iraq and, more recently, offensives against the Islamic State,
Shia paramilitaries have been accused of possible war crimes.
Syria’s civil war, in which a quarter million people have been killed and eleven
million—more than half the country's prewar population—displaced, has amplified
sectarian tensions to unprecedented levels. The war began with peaceful protests
in 2011 calling for an end to the Assad regime. Decades of the Assad family's
repression of Syria's majority Sunni population and elevation of minority Alawis in
government and the private sector has sown sectarian strife. The 2011 protests
and brutal government crackdown uncovered sectarian tensions, which have
rippled across the region.
Tens of thousands of Syrian Sunnis joined rebel groups such as Ahrar al-Sham, the
Islamic Front, and al-Qaeda’s Nusra Front, which all employ anti-Shia rhetoric;
similar numbers of Syrian Shias and Alawis enlisted with an Iran-backed militia
known as the National Defense Force to fight for the Assad regime. Sunni fighters
from Arab and Western countries initially joined the Syrian rebels before turning
their guns on them in an effort to establish their envisaged caliphate. Meanwhile
Hezbollah and some Shia militias from Iraq, such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib
Hezbollah, backed the Syrian government. Syria’s civil war has attracted more
militants from more countries than were involved in the conflicts in Afghanistan,
Chechnya, and Bosnia combined.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq had been decimated by Sunni Iraqis who joined the fight against
extremists, the U.S.-led military surge, and the death of Zarqawi, its leader, in a
2006 U.S. airstrike, but found new purpose exploiting the vacuum left by the
receding Syrian state. It established its own transnational movement known as
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The group expanded its grip on Sunni provinces
in Iraq and eastern regions in Syria, seizing Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul, in
June 2014. It defied orders from al-Qaeda’s top commanders to curtail its
transnational ambitions and wanton violence against civilians, which led to the
militant group’s expulsion from al-Qaeda in February 2014. ISIS rebranded as the
Islamic State in July 2014 and declared its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as
caliph. The group's highly publicized killing of Western hostages triggered a
campaign of air strikes by the United States and its regional allies Jordan, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Extremist groups have come to rely on satellite television and high-speed Internet
over the past two decades to spread propaganda and attract recruits.
Fundamentalist Sunni clerics, many sponsored by wealthy Sunnis from Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf states, have popularized anti-Shia slurs. Shia religious
scholars have also taken to the airwaves, mocking and cursing the first three
caliphs and Aisha, one of Mohammed’s wives.
Sectarian rhetoric dehumanizing the “other” is centuries old. But the volume is
increasing. Dismissing Arab Shias as Safawis, a term that paints them as Iranian
agents (from the Safavid empire) and hence traitors to the Arab cause, is
increasingly common in Sunni rhetoric. Hard-line Sunni Islamists have used
harsher historic terms, such as rafidha, rejecters of the faith, and majus,
Zoroastrian or crypto Persian, to describe Shias as heretical. Iranian officials, Iraqi
politicians, and Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, routinely describe their
Sunni opponents as takfiris (referring to the doctrine embraced by al-Qaeda of
declaring fellow Muslims apostate) and Wahhabis (referring to the puritanical
Saudi sect). This cycle of demonization has been amplified throughout the Muslim
world.
For Sunni extremists, social media has revolutionized recruitment opportunities.
Fundamentalists no longer have to infiltrate mainstream mosques to attract
recruits surreptitiously, but can now disseminate their call to jihad and wait for
potential recruits to contact them. Shia groups can count on state support from
the Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian governments to recruit militants for sectarian jihad.
Differences
How do Sunnis and Shi'as differ theologically?
Hadith and Sunnah
Initially the difference between Sunni and Shi'a was merely a question of who
should lead the Muslim community. As time went on, however, the Shi'a began to
show a preference for particular Hadith and Sunnah literature.
Interpretation of the Hadith and Sunnah is an Islamic academic science. The Shi'a
gave preference to those credited to the Prophet's family and close associates.
The Sunnis consider all Hadith and Sunnah narrated by any of twelve thousand
companions to be equally valid. Shi'as recognise these as useful texts relating to
Islamic jurisprudence, but subject them to close scrutiny. Ultimately this difference
of emphasis led to different understandings of the laws and practices of Islam.
The Mahdi
The concept of the Mahdi is a central tenet of Shi'a theology, but many Sunni
Muslims also believe in the coming of a Mahdi, or rightly guided one, at the end of
time to spread justice and peace. He will also be called Muhammad and be a
descendant of the Prophet in the line of his daughter Fatima (Ali's wife). The idea
has been popular with grassroots Muslims due to the preaching of several Sufi or
mystical trends in Islam.
Over the centuries a number of individuals have declared themselves the Mahdi
come to regenerate the Muslim world, but none has been accepted by the majority
of the Sunni community. However, some more Orthodox Sunni Muslims dispute the
concept of the Mahdi because there is no mention of it in the Qur'an or Sunnah.
Shrines
The Wahabi movement within Sunni Islam views the Shi'a practice of visiting and
venerating shrines to the Imams of the Prophet's Family and other saints and
scholars as heretical. Most mainstream Sunni Muslims have no objections. Some
Sufi movements, which often provide a bridge between Shi'a and Sunni theologies,
help to unite Muslims of both traditions and encourage visiting and venerating
these shrines.
Practical differences
Prayer
All Muslims are required to pray five times a day. However, Shi'a practice permits
combining some prayers into three daily prayer times. A Shi'a at prayer can often
be identified by a small tablet of clay from a holy place (often Karbala), on which
they place their forehead whilst prostrating.
Leadership
Today there are significant differences in the structures and organisation of
religious leadership in the Sunni and the Shi'a communities. There is a hierarchy to
the Shi'a clergy and political and religious authority is vested in the most learned
who emerge as spiritual leaders. These leaders are transnational and religious
institutions are funded by religious taxes called Khums (20% of annual excess
income) and Zakat (2.5%). Shi'a institutions abroad are also funded this way.
There is no such hierarchy of the clergy in Sunni Islam. Most religious and social
institutions in Sunni Muslim states are funded by the state. Only Zakat is
applicable. In the West most Sunni Muslim institutions are funded by charitable
donations from the community at home and abroad.
Status of Women
Status of Women is considerably different in Shias and Sunnis. For instance, the
Shia (In a lot of the sects) Women are allowed to visit the religious place, Mosque
for reciting prayers. However, the Sunni women aren’t allowed to go to the
mosques for reciting their everyday prayers.
Historical Reasons behind Sectarian Violence (How this might have started?)
1. Leadership Crisis
Assassination of Ali Ibn Abi Talib:
After Utthman, Ali was chosen as the fourth and the last Caliph for the Muslim
Community, Political Tensions began developing. Muawiyah bin abi sufyan, who
happened to have found the Umayyad Dynasty, which led the Muslim empire from
Damascus until 750, claimed Caliphate after Utthman, in place of Ali but Since Ali
Ibn Abi Talib was the most experienced and knowledgable individual then, he was
made the successor of Utthman. Amid Ali's Caliphate, the Muslim world got to be
distinctly divided and war broke out amongst Ali and Muawiyah.
At the point when Muawiyah passed on in 680, Husayn did not offer succession to
his child, Yazid, who had been appointed as Umayyad caliph by Muawiyah. As a
demonstration of revenge, Yazid and Husayn, got in the war of Karbala as we call
it, which obviously executed Husayn and that is the place the sectarian violence
had its spot ever.
Note: Husayn did not bring any armed force with him to Karbala since they were
called to Kufa (A place) where he was called to offer answers for issues that a vast
lump of individuals confronted.
2. Difference in Ideologies
Caliphate and Imamat:
At the point when Abu Bakr was chosen as the first Caliph for the Sunni Muslims,
the Shias acknowledged Ali as their first imam after Prophet's affirmation. This
brought about the distinction of belief systems amongst Shias and Sunnis. Both
the gatherings despised the other since they believed the other set of people do
not have the right ideology.
This episode did not create any violence between the groups in those days, yet
even now when we attempt to comprehend; we'll discover a difference in
ideologies as a main driver behind the violences.
Conclusions
The conflicts in the region are driven by several factors, some related to weak
state formation and the persistence of sub-national identities that supersede
national loyalties; some that are the product of authoritarian (or totalitarian) state
structures that provide no rights or voice to their citizens; some that are the result
of Muslim revolutionary ambitions exemplified by the Islamic Revolution in Iran,
the accession to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the campaigns of al
Qaeda and ISIL/Da’esh; and some that derive from sub-regional power politics
founded on perceived national interests and security concerns, notably between
the KSA and Iran, also influenced by Turkey and Egypt.
The impact of external interventions has also been significant, both on local
realities and regional perceptions: the schism between Washington and Tehran
after the Islamic Revolution and the occupation of the U.S. Embassy in 1979;
Soviet, Chinese, French, and U.S. support for Iraq in its war against Iran from 1980
to 1988; the close alliance between the KSA and the U.S. in Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990; the displacement
of the Taliban in Afghanistan, followed by the invasion of Iraq, without UNSC
authorization, by a U.S.-led coalition in 2003, the disbandment of the Ba’athist
government and Iraqi military forces, the execution of Saddam Hussein, and
revelations about interrogation of prisoners in Abu Ghraib; U.S. and other Western
states’ relations with the governments of Egypt and Syria, notably to bolster
peace agreements with Israel; Western ambivalence and Russian strategic
purpose in the Syrian civil war; and the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action on July 14, 2015 between the P5+1 and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Behind all this, the unresolved, though perhaps frozen, Israel-Palestine conflict still
festers, and serves as tinder for radicals competing for support on the street. These
factors have played out in different ways in the four major sectarian conflicts of
the past Decade – Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain.
Questions that the council must answer
1. Are the terms “sect” and “sectarianism” correct or beneficial in discussing
diverse religious manifestations of Islam, past and present? Is it more
accurate or useful to speak of groups, denominations, or perspectives?
2.
How do Sunnis, Shias, or other religious groups in the Islamic world
conceptualize and religiously make sense of other groups or perspectives
within Islam?
3.
What are some of the ways in which sectarian identities are materially,
practically, or socially expressed? How do such expressions change over
time, or in different geographical contexts?
4.
Deep differences between Sunnis and Shias, in particular, are generated by
profound differences in their reading of Islamic history, particularly early
Islamic history. Are there more inclusive and less divisive ways of reading
this history?
5. What factors contribute to situations of either conflict or peaceful
coexistence between different sectarian groups, or between the dominant
religious majority and minority communities? How do political, social, and
economic issues create or amplify sectarian divisions and intolerance?
6.
How do sectarian differences affect social relations and marriage practices
in different Muslim communities? How do substantial rates of intermarriage
between Sunnis and Shias affect relations between the two communities in
particular contexts?
7. In what ways might sectarian differences have been beneficial to the
religious and intellectual development of the Islamic tradition as a whole?
How have the intellectual traditions of different groups influenced and
benefited from one another?
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