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Research Papers Figure 7: Bust of Marius 37 Tau Sigma Journal of Historical Studies: Vol. XXIV Quintus Sertorius and the Rebellion in Spain: The Combination of Roman and Guerilla Tactics Sheldon Yeakley The Roman Republic slowly devolved into a succession of dictatorships beginning in the early first century B.C.E. and lasting until Octavian installed himself as the first emperor. Throughout this time of civil war and political upheaval, various strongly dictatorial men, backed by their military prowess or their current political favor, vied for power. In this environment two enemies arose to challenge one another, Marius and Sulla. Marius represented military reform and held the loyalty of a seasoned army, while Sulla argued for the reformation and restoration of the senate’s power. Sulla’s famous march on Rome, in 83 B.C.E., secured his power as dictator for the next year. Sulla immediately proscribed those who had opposed him under Marius, and Quintus Sertorius was one of these individuals. He had ascended the ranks of the Roman political system despite his Italian, not Roman, birth, and he owed this rise to Marius. Therefore, when Sertorius, governor of Hispania at the time, heard of his proscription, he continued to loyally support Marius by leading a rebellion in Hispania. Sertorius faced the Roman government at first with only the small garrison of troops in Hispania loyal to him, but later had success by utilizing the local tribesmen. Thus, Quintus Sertorius adapted from commanding the highly structured Roman legions to utilizing the traditional tribal warriors to defeat the legions of Metellus and Pompey, thereby leading to the successful continuation of the Marian rebellion as he sought to gain freedom from his own proscription. Sertorius’ early career allowed him to ascend to the higher echelons of Roman government and military, giving him the experience and the influence to succeed in his later rebellion. In 102 B.C.E. Sertorius served in Gaul fighting the Teutones, a fierce tribal enemy.1 The large success he saw under Marius gave him a key understanding of how to command Roman legions, and during this time he proved himself to be a courageous soldier, earning commendations from his generals. While they faced these enemies Marius demonstrated how to beat a tribal foe with the combination of disciplined 1. Phillip Spann, Quintus Sertorius and the Legacy of Sulla (Fayetteville: Arkansas University Press, 1987), 216. 38 Yeakley Quintus Sertorius training and experienced legionnaires, who could withstand the onslaught of greater numbered but more loosely organized tribal enemies. The knowledge he learned from Marius was underscored by the bitter defeat he experienced under Quintus Servilius Caepio at the Battle of Arausio, in which he lost his eye and witnessed the devastation a well-led tribal force could deal. For Sertorius, Gaul served as his classroom, and became the base experience for him to draw on in his unique combination of two types of warfare. Sertorius went on in 97 B.C.E. to serve with distinction under Titus Didius as Military Tribune in Hispania. Progressing upward during the Social War, Sertorius served as Quaestor in 91 B.C.E. Yet in the upheaval of politics between Sulla, Cinna, and Marius, Sertorius was forced to seek election under the Populares faction and by doing so won the Consulship in 86 B.C.E.2 As Governor of Hispania Sertorius treated his subjects civilly and gained the respect of the local tribesmen, who would benefit his political goals in the future. Thus after running with both the Populares and with Marius, Sertorius faced a grim political future when Sulla returned from the East and marched on Rome in 83 B.C.E. After his proscription in 82 B.C.E. Sertorius faced a hard decision, and due to his choice to rebel, fled, hoping to find a way to further his political goals. After hearing of the demise of Marius and his own proscription in 82 B.C.E., Sertorius began to make preparations for any attempt by Rome to seize Hispania from his control. Appian states, “Sertorius, who had been for some time previously chosen Praetor for Spain” was able to cause “a great deal of trouble for the Romans there.”3 Despite his ability to harass the existing Roman presence, he led only a small force, which had been divided by the political turmoil. Therefore Sertorius had little chance to defend himself against the now invading Annius. Forced to flee the Iberian Peninsula, Sertorius and his now even smaller force made a living as mercenaries for the next two years in the greater Mediterranean. One of the Spanish tribes, the Lusitanians, tired of the oppression of the Roman government, sent envoys that pleaded with him to come back to Spain 2. Phillip Matyszak, Sertorius and the Struggle for Spain (Barnsley: Pen, Sword Military, 2013), 72. 3. Appian of Alexandria, Appian’s Roman History: Vol. III, trans. Horace White (London: Heinemann, 1913), 157. 39 Tau Sigma Journal of Historical Studies: Vol. XXIV to help them resist Rome.4 Seizing this opportunity to advance his own situation and political desires, he arrived in Hispania in 80 B.C.E. with a force of his legions and his allied Sicilian pirates. Sertorius quickly organized the tribes and his own forces to surprise and defeat the standing Roman presence of Lucius Fufidius and his hastily gathered force of one legion in the province of Baetica.5 After this rapid shift in power the Senate appointed Quintus Caecilius Metellus as governor of Hispania and gave him enough legions to crush Sertorius. As governor of Hispania, Sertorius had treated his subjects civilly, and by doing so he opened up political possibilities that made his goal of continuing the Marian movement possible. Sertorius acted atypically for a Roman governor at the time because he showed unusual amounts of respect, allowing the people certain liberties uncommon for this time.6 His good treatment of his subjects in the province of Hispania gave him a political tool to stage the uprising. Sertorius’ need for these tribesmen became obvious early in his rebellion, and the success of this conflict was only possible due to their aid. In Appian’s account Sertorius saw himself as “fighting against Sulla’s illegal government in Rome; not against Rome itself.”7 He strove to gain a political position with enough clout to be able to negotiate for his own arrangements in Rome. In addition to his ambitions, the Spanish tribes wished to gain a certain level of freedom within the Roman system, or if possible, even complete autonomy. Yet throughout the entirety of the rebellion Sertorius recognized the unlikelihood of total victory against the entire Roman state. Therefore in the words of historian Phillip Matyszak, “If military victory was out of the question, Sertorius could hope to hold off the legions until there was a chance of a political settlement.”8 Sertorius wished to make any defeat of Hispania so costly that negotiations would be preferable to continuing the war. This concept shaped the way that Sertorius fought in the Spanish rebellion, as he avoided open battles, and through guerilla tactics attempted to cause significant 4. H.H. Scullard, From Gracchi to Nero: A History of Rome From 133 B.C. to A.D. 68 (London: Menthuen, 1970), 90. 5. Appian, 203. 6. Ibid., 90. 7. Ibid., 90. 8. Matyszak, 73. 40 Yeakley Quintus Sertorius casualties to the Romans without risking his own smaller force. His motives for fighting in the first place, combined with the resources available in the tribes, uniquely altered his military strategy to utilize the strengths of both his legionaries and his clansmen. No other Roman general had done this before, and his success at doing so allowed for the initial accomplishment of his goals. However, Sertorius’ combination of legionaries and tribesmen in Hispania created several difficulties as it forced him to utilize two different sets of equipment and strategies. After the reforms of Marius, the legion constituted a versatile heavy infantry force. They fought equipped with chain mail, shields, and helmets, armed with pilum and gladius. Complementary troops of cavalry and archers or slingers did exist, but they were not the primary units on the battlefield. The Roman strategy of the time focused on the legions and their ability to fight pitched battles. The soldiers especially preferred close quarters combat as their armaments allowed them to defeat foes in sustained head to head fighting.9 However, this type of unit would be disadvantaged in the ambushes and hit and run attacks of the lighter equipped Lusitanni and CeltIberians. The tribesmen of the Iberian Peninsula equipped themselves with lighter and more rudimentary weapons and armor. They had only what they could carry easily, usually only a spear, sword, or club, combined with armor that ranged from nothing to very light cloth or leather. These troops became renowned for their mobility and their strategy of hitting the “line in concentrated groups and from all directions.”10 Impressively, Sertorius combined these two groups and these two strategies into a hybrid force strong enough to defeat the onslaught of Roman forces. Sertorius’ genius lay in his combination of two tactical approaches to warfare. He trained the tribal soldiers to utilize their tactics effectively against the Romans. Sertorius’ knowledge of the Roman strategies and his training of the tribes to understand and defeat these forces eliminated the advantage in organization and numbers that the Roman army initially had. Sertorius, in Matyszak’s opinion, sought to combine “the best of native and Roman military tradition.”11 Initially Sertorius found the tribesmen in disarray, unorganized and undisciplined, often scattering during and after combat. 9. Matyszak, 73. 10. Ibid., 75. 11. Ibid., 78. 41 Tau Sigma Journal of Historical Studies: Vol. XXIV He trained them in combined assaults and group movements. The success of the war depended upon the elaborate plans that Sertorius implemented, and these relied on the coordination of the tribesmen. The legions that had remained loyal to Sertorius fought alongside him throughout this war and adapted their training to fit Sertorius’ new hybrid tactical approach. Instead of steady formation approaches, open field battles, and structured movements, they adapted to the lightning strikes of his guerilla warfare. Sertorius succeeded in reforming the rabble and implementing his training of Roman strategy alongside his use of their guerilla tactics. In the late 78 B.C.E. Metellus invaded the province of Hispania in order to capture and seize the territory from Sertorius, but he met such stiff resistance from Sertorius that Rome was forced to send aid. Sertorius’ rebellion had already swept across Hispania, drawing support from the tribes and some of the Romans. At this time Plutarch stated that he “was in possession of Hispania, and was threatening the Romans like a formidable cloud. As if a final disease of the state, that civil wars had poured all their venom in this man.”12 Sertorius made a name for himself by defeating Metellus for approximately two years. Metellus continually attempted to invade the interior from the coastline that he controlled with the Roman navy, but Sertorius always thwarted these movements. Plutarch also stated that Metellus was “outdistanced when events swept along at high speed.”13 Metellus’ men became fearful of crossing rivers and wooded areas, as Sertorius was prone to ambush while they moved through these areas.14 He cut off Metellus’ supply lines and then commenced to lay siege to his army through these ambushes. The Roman force made no significant progress into the territory controlled by Sertorius, and they wasted substantial amounts of manpower, provisions, and money. The strategy employed by Sertorius successfully navigated the first years of the war against Metellus without fighting a pitched battle. Due to Metellus’ failure in the beginning of the conflict the Senate turned to a rising young general named Pompey. Hungry for power and glory, he would charge headfirst into Hispania to meet Sertorius. 12. Plutarch, Plutarch’s Lives, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 155. 13. Ibid, 157. 14. Christopher F. Konrad, Plutarch’s Sertorius: A Historical Commentary (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 1994), 137. 42 Yeakley Quintus Sertorius Pompey arrived in 76 B.C.E. to begin the next phase of the Sertorian war, ushering in a time of mass movements and conflicts. Once Pompey arrived, the campaign altered in multiple ways. First, Pompey recognized the great skill of Sertorius, and his respect for Sertorius influenced his military movements. Second, the number of Romans at least doubled upon the arrival of Pompey, with fresh troops eager for battle, unlike the now wearied rebel troops. Yet Sertorius persevered under these odds. Appian stated, “Directly Pompey arrived in Spain Sertorius cut in pieces a whole legion of his army.”15 The altered situation led to various pitched battles, which Pompey realized would sway in his favor. Sertorius also knew this fact and attempted to steer his army away from such conflicts. In 75 B.C.E. Pompey and Metellus sought to gain the areas along the coast in order to maintain supply lines while they sought to entrap Sertorius in open battle. H.H. Scullard stated, “Pompey’s first objective was to win the control of the eastern coastal roads, especially around Valentia.”16 With his back to the sea and the Roman navy controlling the eastern coast of Hispania, supply lines ceased to be a problem. By positioning himself in this way Pompey eliminated one of Sertorius’ guerilla tactics of cutting off the supply lines. However, early in the year Sertorius still outmaneuvered his opponents by using his speed and night attacks. Plutarch states, “For the most part they encamped apart, for their versatile enemy (Sertorius) used to cut off their communications and separate them, and showed great skill in appearing in many places within a short time, and in drawing them from one contest into another.”17 Sertorius’ tactics successfully disrupted the movements of Pompey and Metellus, despite the rebels’ being at a disadvantage due to the Roman navy’s control of the sea. Sertorius’ ability to do this allowed him to gain an upper hand at Sucro. In 75 B.C.E. Sertorius came close to defeating the entirety of Pompey’s army a few miles inland at Sucro. Pompey held greater numbers and the overall advantage for open battles, yet Sertorius chose to fight at this time because he saw his opportunity to deal a devastating blow to Pompey while Metellus was too far away to aid his fellow general. Sertorius attacked the flank of Pompey’s force, in the midst of whom Pompey 15. Appian, 203. 16. Scullard, 91. 17. Plutarch, 163. 43 Tau Sigma Journal of Historical Studies: Vol. XXIV himself saw direct combat and received a wound. Appian stated, “Sertorius defeated Pompey, who received a dangerous wound.”18 The numbers of Pompey’s force won out in the end and drove the attackers into retreat, but the damage the rebels dealt was greater. Sertorius’ inability to defeat the whole army in one assault led to an eventual draw, but the honor of the battle went to his side in the eyes of Plutarch.19 Sertorius negotiated with Pompey after this conflict, which had even further impressed the young general of the rebel’s talents, and these talks drew Sertorius even closer to achieving his political goals. The draw at Sucro forced Pompey to negotiate with Sertorius and even led him to send threats to the Senate. The Roman army was drained at this point in the war. Sustaining a wound to the hand at Sucro, Pompey felt the sting of the war physically. In addition, he felt the tightening of his monetary reserves, forcing him to pay the troops, the locals, and others involved in the constant re-supplying of the army. Due to these factors Pompey made a very serious threat to the Senate and implied that if he did not receive more money he would either join Sertorius or march on Rome himself. Plutarch stated, “He asked for money from the senate, threatening to come back to Italy with his army if they did not send it.”20 Sertorius had been so effective in fighting his guerilla war that Pompey felt pressure to switch sides, even if the chances of success were slim. The genuine nature of the threat is evidence of the success that Sertorius was having at the time in accomplishing his goals for his political future. After the Senate yielded to the demands of Pompey, the newly supplied army of Metellus and Pompey set out in late 75 B.C.E. to finally end the Sertorian rebellion at Saguntum. Sertorius’ defeat would not completely destroy him, but would force him to be on the defensive until his death. Also located along the coast, not far from Sucro, Saguntum became the first and only instance in which Sertorius faced both Roman generals in pitched battle. The combined forces had all major advantages in the conflict. They had the numerical, positional, and tactical advantages as they managed to force Sertorius into open battle against both of them. They did this by separating and focusing Metellus’ contingent on Sertorius’ lieutenant Perperna’s troops, delaying 18. Appian, 205. 19. Plutarch, 160. 20. Ibid., 160. 44 Yeakley Quintus Sertorius Sertorius enough that they could entrap him at Saguntum. The battle occurred on a relatively flat field, which favored the legionaries. Sertorius thus suffered his greatest defeat since his expulsion from Hispania in the 80s. He found the continuation of any open field conflict impossible and would never again face the Roman army in open battle, but used only defensive guerilla tactics.21 However, Sertorius was far from being defeated. From this time at the end of 75 B.C.E. up to his death in 72 B.C.E., he maintained a good level of control over the territory and kept up the continual harassment of the Roman forces. Appian states that the Senate sent “another army of two legions into Spain.”22 With these forces Pompey and Metellus repeatedly invaded the areas Sertorius controlled in the years following 75 B.C.E. However, Sertorius continued to repel these attacks with the same intensity that he had previously. The need for the Senate to send more aid and the presence of so many other conflicts at the time (including the wars with Mithradates, in Crete, and against pirates) cemented the lack of total success for Pompey and his forces during this period. In 72 B.C.E. one of Sertorius’ own men defeated him and ended the rebellion by succumbing to his own greed and political desires. Sertorius’ forces experienced low morale, especially in their time away from families, yet his army seemed intact except for one disgruntled lieutenant and a few Roman legionaries. Marcus Perperna Vento assassinated Sertorius, after getting him and his bodyguard drunk at a feast, in order to try and gain position with Pompey.23 This act effectively killed the rebellion, and Pompey easily dealt with the remaining forces. Perperna claimed that Sertorius had gone mad and carried out the deed himself, yet afterwards he pleaded the virtues of Sertorius and claimed command of the rebellion himself. The result of his short command was a pitched battle only ten days after the assassination. Pompey did not respect Perperna and even in the words of Appian “despised the generalship of Perperna,” and Perperna himself did not believe that his army “would long remain faithful to him.”24 The battle lasted only a short time and Pompey won on all fronts; 21. Phillip Spann, “Saguntum vs. Segontia: A Note on the Topography of the Sertorian War,” Zeitschrift Fur Alte Geschichite 33, no. 1 (January-March 1984): 116-119. 22. Appian, 207. 23. Ibid., 211. 24. Ibid., 215. 45 Tau Sigma Journal of Historical Studies: Vol. XXIV seizing Perperna in a thicket he promptly executed him, and the Sertorian war ended. Had Perperna not acted out of political greed, the war would have lasted even longer, perhaps long enough for Sertorius to gain his own political goals. Sertorius displayed significant military genius, as he was pitted against two of the foremost Roman generals at that time. In the words of Konrad, he “proved their equal; he faced the military resources of Rome as a stranger leading barbarians and almost prevailed.”25 He attempted to accomplish his goals by utilizing the resources he had on hand: groups of tribal guerilla warriors. Coming from a strictly Roman background, his adeptness at commanding these troops proved his military genius. However, despite withstanding the full might of the Roman military machine commanded by the great Pompey and Metellus, he succumbed to a common fate of the period: assassination. Therefore, despite his valiant effort, he failed in his quest for freedom from proscription and consequently contributed to the rise of one of the military and political giants of the age, Pompey. Desperate to quell Sertorius’ rebellion, the Senate ignored the law and gave Pompey the power and influence that would make him a threat to the Republic. 25. Konrad, 33. 46