Download constitutionalism and democracy: an islamic

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY:
AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE
Mohammad Hashim Kamali*
Abstract: The long history of Islamic scholarship on caliphate, sharīʿah-oriented
policy (siyāsah sharʿiyyah) and system of government (niz. ām al-h.ukm) has yielded
a rich legacy which is, nevertheless, beset with uncertainties in conjunction with
modern developments on government and constitutional law. Uncertainties
have persisted over the basic concept and definition of an Islamic polity and the
existence or otherwise of a valid precedent and model for an Islamic state. This is
partially caused by a tendency in modern writings to apply the nation-state ideas
of eighteenth-century Europe to the events of early Islam some twelve centuries
earlier and doubtful parallels that have been attempted to be drawn between them.
This article attempts first to identify the causes of the problem and then proceeds
with an overview of the evidence in the Qur’ān and Sunnah and contributions of a
cross-section of schools and scholars on the subject. This is followed by a general
characterisation of an Islamic system of rule under five sub-headings, the first of
which describing Islamic government whether Islamic state, and Iran in particular,
is a theocracy, whether Islam stands for a qualified democracy, and whether it
also upholds separation of powers. The last section discusses freedom of religion
and religious pluralism in an Islamic polity followed by a conclusion and recommendations.
Introduction
Islamic government is essentially civilian rather than theocratic, notwithstanding
the common misperceptions to the contrary. The theocratic image of Islamic state
and government was in many ways portrayed by the post-revolutionary Islamic
Republic of Iran, as I shall elaborate below. We shall also examine whether the
Islamic system of rule can be described as a ‘qualified democracy’, one which also
stands for freedom of religion and religious pluralism. Toward the end of this article
we shall have a look at the recognition or otherwise of separation of powers, and to
this effect examine two opposing theories on the subject. It is submitted that certain
* Professor Mohammad Hashim Kamali is the Chairman and CEO of IAIS Malaysia.
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functional lines of division between the various organs of state had always existed,
and had subsequently been adopted – although not from the Islamic sources – by
many of the twentieth-century constitutions of Muslim countries. My examination
of the evidence in the sources supports the existence in principle of a strong and
independent judiciary, and also of lines of separation between the executive and
legislative branches of an Islamic government. Accountability under the rule of
law and constitutional separation of powers thus bear essential harmony with the
Islamic system of rule.
Constitutionalism and Democracy Distinguished
The twin concepts of constitutionalism and democracy normally nurture and endorse
one another, yet they are not the same and can, under certain circumstances, stand
in a state of tension. Whereas democracy is focused on majority rule, constitutionalism demands commitment to the rule of law. One also notes a tendency, on
the part of the international community, to see the drafting of a constitution as a
way toward a negotiated peace – especially in post-conflict situations. This may,
theoretically, seem appealing, yet it could also run counter to its desired objectives
and cause greater instability by accentuating the wishes of the majority of citizens
over a suppressed minority. It may be relatively easy to impose elections on a given
country, but it is more difficult to establish legality, commitment to basic rights,
and a constitutional order of checks and balances within the organs of power. If
democracy can be defined as “popular political self-government”, a simple definition
of constitutionalism could be “the containment of popular decision-making by a
basic law”.1 At the heart of constitutionalism lies the deliberate choice of a representative government to constitute its political life in terms of commitment to a
binding agreement by the ruler and ruled, structured so as to be difficult to change.2
As American legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin (b. 1931) put it, “the constitution,
and particularly the Bill of Rights, is designed to protect individual citizens and
groups against certain decisions that a majority might want to make, even when
that majority acts in what it takes to be the general or common interest”.3 Apart
from its obvious relevance in all societies, this aspect is particularly relevant in
politically polarised and ethnically divided societies. Constitutions are drafted either
at the end of a conflict to seal its outcome or prior to the eruption of conflict in an
attempt to stave it off.
In Iraq, for example, the occupation powers attempted to forge a national and
political reconstruction through the medium of a constitutional drafting. Through an
inordinate amount of cajoling a document was drafted and ratified but the process of
arriving there severely exacerbated existing divisions and yielded a document feared
to ultimately lead to the disintegration of the state.4 Afghanistan could also be cited
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as a similar example, although different in some ways. However, the constitution
that was drafted and ratified in January 2004 under the auspices of UNAMA (United
Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan) has fallen short not only of its desired
objective of facilitating a negotiated peace between the rival factions; it may have
actually exacerbated factional rivalry and political instability in the country. In the
midst of an on-going conflict, and against the background especially of a humiliating
foreign occupation, it is questionable whether the process could live up to the
expectations made of it. The same holds true for external attempts at mediation
which sometimes pre-empt the emergence of a stable social consensus. This seems
to be the case with external constitutional support given to political and military
actors in the Sudanese and Somali civil wars.5
Commitment to justice, constitutionalism and judicial review can ultimately
provide the necessary protection against the ‘tyranny of the majority.’ There is strong
empirical evidence that constitutional legality will in time nurture democracy, but
that democracy on its own will not necessarily bring a constitutionally committed
government. Democracy and constitutionalism are not only different concepts but
can exist in a state of tension, as the former advocates majoritarian preferences,
whereas the latter imposes pre-existing restraints on the range of choices available
to governing majorities.6
The Western experience since 1945 has largely embodied both democracy and
constitutional government, making it thus difficult to imagine the two apart. Yet
evidence shows that only in the late 1940s did most western countries become
actually democratic, but that importantly, already a century earlier most of them
had put in place significant constitutional elements such as the rule of law, private
property rights, free speech and assembly and increasingly also constitutional
separation of powers, without being democratic. Government in North America
and Western Europe was not characterised by democracy but by constitutional
legality. “The western model is best symbolised not by the mass plebiscite but the
impartial judge.”7 Some agreement seems to have developed over time that the
best realisable form of government is a mixed – or constitutional – government
in which freedom is constrained by the rule of law and popular sovereignty is
tempered by state institutions that produce order and stability.8 Even if we do not
conclude that democracy is simply not viable in an environment of intense ethnic
preferences, it seems evident that merely holding elections is insufficient and that
additional institutional mechanisms and constitutional restraints are necessary to
make it work. The combined or mixed approach seems to show lines of convergence
with the Islamic conception of a constitutional government that derives legitimacy
from popular electoral mandate, commitment to justice and the rule of law – as
discussed in the following pages.
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Islamic Constitutional Law: An Overview of the Discipline
Constitutional law is one of the most under-developed areas of Islamic jurisprudence
and stands in this respect at the opposite pole of ʿibādāt (worship matters) on
which juristic literature is exceedingly elaborate. A great deal of what has been
written in the past concentrates on the early caliphate and pays but little attention
to subsequent developments. The literature that has come about as a result is still
wanting of critical evaluation and review. The prevailing uncertainties are also not
entirely new as problems began to set in at an early stage. The nascent caliphate of
the early decades of Islam had barely realised its potential when military conflict and
irregularities of dynastic rule exposed it to intolerable disruptions. The originally
republican features of the caliphate (khilāfah), especially consultation (shūrā)9 and
oath of allegiance (bayʿah),10 were only nominally kept but were subjugated to the
vagaries of a totalitarian system, which characterised the many centuries of rule
under the Umayyads, the Abbasids and others.
ʿAbd al-Razzāq Aḥmad al-Sanhūrī observed in 1926 that in the field of constitutional law and government, the fiqh (Islamic law) had remained in a state of
infancy. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Mutawallī quoted him 50 years later to say that “the
infant is still in the cradle. It can barely crawl and was never able to stand on its
feet.”11 Ḥassan al-Ṭurābī (b. c.1932), a Sudanese religious and political leader,
similarly noted that due to stagnation of constitutional law over the greater part of
the Islamic history, comprehensive research and ijtihād (independent reasoning)
in this area are wanting.12
A former Grand Mufti of Egypt, Shaykh Aḥmad Ḥuraydī, considered the political
order that prevailed in the Muslim lands over the greater stretch of history from
the Umayyads to the end of the Ottomans did not, on the whole, comply with
the principles of Islam, and those who wrote on Islamic government remained
focused on dynastic practices that did not reflect normative guidelines but expounded
the history of government in those times, and there is “a big difference between
the two”.13
The Iranian Shiʿite scholar Shaykh Jaʿfar Subḥānī (b. 1922) concurred to say that
al-Māwardī’s renowned treatise al-Ahkām al-sulṭāniyyah pays more attention to
the realities of the Abbasid state of his time rather than the foundational guidelines
of the Qur’ān and the sunnah. What needs to be done is to take a fresh recourse
to those guidelines and avoid tainting them with the precedent of dynastic rule.14
P.J. Vatikiotis (d. 1997), the late Emeritus Professor of Politics at the School of
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in the University of London, alluded to the
Islamic resurgence of recent decades by saying that Muslims were critical of the
prevailing “alien order which many consider unsuitable and inadequate for their
societies […]. One observes that neither in Iran so far nor among any of the militant
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Islamic movements elsewhere is there a clear idea of the nature of the Islamic state
or government they wish to establish.”15
The contemporary Egyptian scholar, Muḥammad Salīm al-ʿAwwā, SecretaryGeneral of the International Union for Muslim Scholars, noted that the Islamic
revolution of Iran stimulated scholarship and research on constitutional themes, yet
“many issues of interest to Islamic political thought and constitutional law remain
shrouded in ambiguity”. It is perhaps the present generation of researchers whose
contributions may “suit the requirements of our age and address issues of concern
to us at present”.16
Juristic works on the caliphate are on the whole concerned with the methods of
designation of the caliph, his rights and duties and a certain institutional blueprint
on the judiciary, vizierate, and departmental structures for the army, taxation, police
duties and so forth. This literature on the whole is scanty on modern developments,
including the nation-state itself, and constitutional themes on democracy, separation
of powers and so forth. The remainder of this article will highlight the characteristic
features of an Islamic polity.
Characteristic Features
Islam advocates a civilian polity which is neither theocratic nor totally secular but
has characteristics of its own. It is a limited and a constitutional form of government
whose powers are constrained by reference to the clear injunctions of the sharīʿah
on accountability and justice. It is also rooted in the notions of trust (amānah)
and vicegerency (khilāfah) committed to administer justice and secure people’s
welfare (maṣlaḥah). Thus according to an Islamic legal maxim, “the imām’s (head
of state) performance is judged by reference to people’s welfare”.17 This is the
single most important criterion, in other words, by which to evaluate success or
failure of a government in Islam. Is it also accidental, one might ask, to find that
governments in Islamic history have been labelled by such names as caliphate,
imāmate, sultanate, emirate etc., but not as ‘Islamic State’, a nomenclature which
most likely appeared first in the writing of Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935)? This
is because the Qur’ān and ḥadīth are silent on political nomenclature, and Muslim
scholars have also shown sensitivity not to amalgamate state and religion together.
The state represents the community to which it is accountable. It is a qualified
electoral democracy that conducts its affairs through consultation and consensus.
These are elaborated as follows.
Government as a trust (Amānat al-Ḥukm)
Government in Islam is a trust (amānah) and an extension as such of the general
qur’ānic concept expounded in a passage known as the āyat al-umarā’ (the ‘rulers’
verse’), where we read:
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God commands you to render the trusts (al-amānāt) to whom they are due, and when
you judge among people, you judge with justice. (4:58)
The immediately succeeding passage is on the subject of obedience where the
text urges the faithful to “obey God and obey the Messenger and those in charge
of the affairs among you” (4:59).
Muslims are thus enjoined to fulfil their trusts, to render impartial justice, and
obey their lawful rulers. The renowned Qur’ān exegete al-Ṭabarī (d. 923) wrote that
“the command over the fulfilment of trusts in this verse is addressed to community
leaders […] and those whom the community has entrusted with leadership, those
who administer justice and manage the community’s financial affairs”.18 Al-Qurṭubī
(d. 1273), however, maintains that it is “addressed to all strata of society – especially
the government leaders – regarding their duties in the distribution of assets as well
as the administration of justice”.19
Al-amānāt, in the above qur’ānic text, thus characterises the Islamic system of
rule as a trust borne by its leaders and officials, which renders them accountable
before God and the community. According to a ḥadīth:
Each of you is a custodian and responsible for that which is in his custody. The imām is a
custodian and he is responsible for his subjects; a man is a custodian and he is responsible
for his family, a woman is a custodian and she is responsible […]. All of you are custodians
of what is in their charge.20
It was on this basis that “the Righteous Caliphs understood their positions
analogous to guardians and executors […]. They saw it as their duty to personally
supervise community affairs, protect their interests and their rights.”21
Ibn Taymiyyah’s (d. 1328) renowned book, al-Siyāsah al-sharʿiyyah (sharīʿahoriented policy), which is a commentary on the ‘rulers’ verse’, highlights two themes
in his elaboration of ‘trusts’: selection and appointment of officials, which must
strictly be based on qualification and merit, and fair distribution of wealth. The
reference to justice occurs immediately after ‘al-amānāt’, indicating that impartial
justice is the most important of all amānāt.22
On distributive justice, Ibn Taymiyyah quoted the second Caliph, ʿUmar b.
al-Khaṭṭāb’s (r. 634–644) statement on the assets of public treasury (bayt al-māl):
“No one has a greater claim to these assets in preference to anyone else, and
everyone’s entitlement would be judged by his record (of service), his financial
condition, his burdens and his personal needs.”23
Government as a trust is also manifested in the concept of khilāfah, which has
two meanings, one being qur’ānic and refers to the vicegerency of man on earth (cf.
2:30; 24:55), and the other as a system of rule, which does not occur in the Qur’ān.24
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Amānah, or trust, in government is also manifested in the notion of representation. The head of state is a representative (wakīl) of the community by virtue
of wakālah which is a fiduciary contract and a wakīl is simultaneously a trustee
in charge of the trust he bears on behalf of his principal. The wakīl derives his
authority from the principal (muwakkil) and exercises it on the latter’s behalf. It is
a restricted form of wakālah, manifested in the requirements that the Imām enforces
the sharīʿah and consults the community in the conduct of government.25 Accountability (muḥāsabah) continues down the command chain in that all government
officials are accountable to the head of state by virtue of delegated authority (wilāyah
or tawliyah) entrusted in them. No one has immunity and everyone, including the
head of state, is accountable for their conduct. All are, in turn, subject to the authority
of the courts of justice.
Limited government
Islam advocates a limited government in which the individual enjoys considerable
autonomy. Restrictions are thus imposed on the state’s legislative capacities, which
may not introduce a law contrary to the injunctions of Islam. The state is also bound
by the requirements of consultation and consensus, and enforcement also of the
sharīʿah, which the state has no authority to overrule or abrogate. In the event
where the government issues a command contrary to the injunctions of Islam, the
individual is not bound to obey it. For according to a renowned ḥadīth, “There is
no obedience in transgression; obedience is due only in righteous conduct.”26 The
head of state represents the community that elects him in the first place and has
authority to depose him when he violates the law.27
Islam does not advocate a totalitarian system as many aspects of civilian life
remain outside the domain of law and government. Muslim jurists have thus
distinguished the religious (dīnī) from juridical (qaḍā’ī) obligations and maintained
that only the latter are enforceable before the courts. Most of the religious aspects
of the individual’s life are private and non-justiciable. Even some of the religious
duties such as prayer, fasting, the ḥajj, and almost all of what is classified as
recommendable, reprehensible and permissible (mandūb, makrūh, mubāḥ) are not
legally enforceable. The private and civil rights of individuals are immune – by the
express injunctions of the sharīʿah – against encroachment by others, including
the state. No government agency – not even the sharīʿah courts – has the power
to grant discretionary changes in the private rights and properties of individuals
without their consent.28
The head of state as well as the judge enjoy but limited powers to grant a pardon
to a convicted offender and may not order discretionary punishment for unstipulated
violations. The deterrent (taʿzīr) punishments are open to court discretion in respect
only of determining the quantitative aspect of the punishment for a conduct which
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is proscribed by the sharīʿah. Judges have no power to create offences without
valid evidence. There is, moreover, no recognition in the sharīʿah of any privileged
individual or group and no one, including the head of state, enjoys special immunity
or status before the courts.29 Thus it is noted that “the solutions provided by Islamic
law go decisively and consistently in favour of the rights of the individual, of the
sanctity of contracts, of private property, and they put severe limits to the action of
the state in these matters”.30
In response to a question whether constitution-making was acceptable to Islam,
Rashīd Riḍā issued the following fatwā which argued that since a constitution is
designed to delineate the limits of the state power and clarify the state’s commitment
to rights of the people, it is acceptable to Islam. If enacting a formal constitution
operates as a check on despotism, there is no question over its compatibility with
the sharīʿah. In the event where the constitution contains rules that are repugnant
to Islam, only the part that is so repugnant may be set aside but not the whole of it.
Riḍā elaborated that in the writings of Muslim jurists one finds instances where they
made errors in their ijtihād and in the books they have authored. One ought to isolate
and reject the errors but not the whole of their endeavour. Errors must be corrected
at an early opportunity so that the community is protected against deviation. The
contemporary Egyptian scholar Maḥmud Ḥilmī Muṣṭafā has concurred with this
fatwā and commented that there is nothing in the sharīʿah against enacting a written
constitution.31
Government powers in Islam are also limited in respect of taxation. The sharīʿah
thus lays down the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
taxation must be just and proportionate to the ability of the taxpayer;
it must apply equally to all without discrimination;
it must aim at the minimum of what is deemed necessary;
the well-being of the taxpayer must be observed in the determination of quantity
and methods of collection; and
5. taxation must observe the time-limit of one calendar year for the yield or profit
to materialise.32 Both the early Muslim jurist Abū Yūsuf (d. 798) and later on
al-Māwardī (d. 1058) have emphasised moderation in taxation by stating that
it must in no case deprive the taxpayer of the necessities of life.33
Theocracy or civilian rule?
If theocracy means government by religious leaders who exercise spiritual authority,
such as that of the pope in the Middle Ages, then the Islamic system of rule does
not qualify. In a theocracy the leaders claim to represent God and exercise powers
such as the pardoning of sins. Islamic government is simply not vested with such
authority,34 for “Islam does not recognise a religious authority of the kind which
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is known in Christianity.”35 Islam also encouraged the people to access the source
evidence directly, and vested no one with the exclusive authority to interpret the
Qur’ān nor to issue binding opinions in the name of religion.36 “The Islamic State”,
writes the contemporary Egyptian scholar Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (b. 1926), “is not a
theocracy: it is a civilian state (dawlah madaniyyah)”, simply because it comes into
being by election, pledge of allegiance (bayʿah) and consultation, and the head of
state is also accountable to the people. Citizens are entitled to advise the leader and
alert him to his error.37
“It should be clearly understood”, he writes, “that an Islamic state is not a
theocracy”; it is not the government of the ʿulamā’ nor is it a government by men
only to the exclusion of women. Women played a considerable role in public life
during the time of the Prophet, just as they also took part in the election of the third
Caliph ʿUthmān (r. 644–656).38 In Islam, the government is committed to administer
justice, protect the rights and liberties of the people and enable them to lead an
honourable life.39 The state may take any form or model, provided that it enforces
the sharīʿah. But that alone does not make the state a theocracy simply because the
sharīʿah itself does not approve of theocratic government.40
Normative precedent on this is found in what is usually known as the ‘Constitution
of Medina’ (c. 622) which laid the foundations of the new community under the
Prophet’s leadership. This document founded the bases of cooperation between the
Emigrants (al-Muhājirūn), the Helpers (al-Anṣār) and the Jews. Issues of leadership
and establishing the authority of the new state, equality and justice, freedom of
religion, right of ownership, freedom of movement, war and peace, and combating
crime were among the major preoccupations of this document. Thus we can see
that the ‘Constitution of Medina’ did have pronounced civilian characteristics.41
The sharīʿah is not all concerned with religious and worship matters; this is
admittedly one aspect of it, but it is also concerned with issues of justice, rights
and liberties, all with a degree of objectivity and inclusiveness that is not confined
to Muslims but extends to all citizens.42
Theocracy demands unquestioning obedience – unlike the sharīʿah which
recognises the individual’s right to disobey an unlawful command, just as it also
restrains the government from issuing one.43 Islamic government is thus described as
a people’s government (ḥukūmah shaʿbiyyah) wherein the ruler is under a mandate
to administer justice and uphold people’s basic rights in accordance with a set of
objective rules.44
Al-Qaraḍāwī is of the view that the Islamic system is neither a theocracy nor is
it totally secular (ʿulmāniyyah). It has a duty to protect the religion and enable the
people to observe it. The lawful and unlawful (ḥalāl, ḥarām), as are expounded
in the sharīʿah, are observed, and the state upholds religious values, yet it is not
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a theocratic state. All community members, men and women alike, are entitled to
give sincere advice to the ruler and criticise the government.45
Two historical statements have, however, been cited, side by side with Iran’s
revolutionary experience, in support of the claim that Islam does actually advocate
some sort of theocracy, one by the third caliph ʿUthman and the other by the Abbasid
caliph al-Manṣūr (754–775). These are as follows:
1. Prior to assassinating the caliph ʿUthmān (656), his assailants asked him to
relinquish his position as caliph, which he declined and said “I shall not remove
the garment God Almighty has adorned me with.” Some commentators saw
this as an affirmation, by the deceased caliph, of the religious character of the
caliphal office, and the view somehow reverberated that the caliph was the
chosen of God.46 The Muʿtazilah rationalist school maintained that the caliph
was an elected community representative who had no claim to holiness, a view
that is now generally accepted: the slain caliph had said nothing during his 13
years in office to change the basic position that the caliph was accountable to the
people, and his statement could simply be a pious acknowledgement of God’s
favour on him.47
2. The Abbasid caliph al-Manṣūr (r. 754–775) is quoted to have said in a sermon:
O people! I am God’s appointed authority in His earth (sulṭān Allāh fī arḍihi),
and I rule with His divine help and endorsement. I am guardian of His property
and I act in accordance with His will and what I give, I do so by His permission.
The Egyptian scholar ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Mutawallī has commented that most
people had taken this statement from the literary work of an Andalusian author
who was not a jurist and the quotation was also less than accurate.48 Al-Qaraḍāwī
concurred and added: even if al-Manṣūr’s statement were accurate, it is best
to treat it as an isolated incident. “We are not bound by al-Manṣūr’s precedent
on this.” Al-Qaraḍāwī then recounts an incident where al-Manṣūr had issued
an order to the then judge of Basra, Sawwār b. ʿAbd-Allāh, in a land dispute
between a merchant and an army commander – that the land should be given
to the latter. The judge wrote back to say “the evidence I have before me shows
that the land belongs to the merchant”. The caliph wrote again: “You shall give
it to the army commander.” And when the judge retorted repeating his earlier
message, al-Manṣūr conceded and even praised God for the firm stand the judge
had taken in the cause of justice. Al-Qaraḍāwī further recounted two other cases
to show that al-Mansur did not see himself as someone above the law and he
was in fact a learned man who knew the limits of his authority vis-à-vis the
sharīʿah. Is it credible then to hear the same caliph arrogating divine authority
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to himself? Claims of theocratic rule are thus unacceptable and Islamic thought
hardly leaves the matter open to doubt.49
Whether Iran is a theocracy
Commentators who characterised the Islamic Republic of Iran as a theocratic state
have also noted that Iran itself has made no claim to theocracy. Ayatollah Khomeini’s
theory of the guardianship of the jurist (Arab. wilāyat al-faqīh; Pers. velāyat-e faqīh)
and his own religious personality evidently lent support to the current theocratic
image of Iran. But Iran, under President Khatami, became a keen supporter of civil
society, civilian rule, and people’s rights.
Al-Qaraḍāwī who addressed this issue in his 1997 publication maintained that
the impression of a theocratic state was less than accurate. The leading offices of
state in Iran, including those of the President, the Supreme Leader, and the Iranian
Parliament (the Majlis) were all elective. Ministers and government officials did
not cease to be taken to task by the Majlis. On one occasion, in 1984, for instance,
the Majlis removed no less than seven ministers by a vote of no-confidence in
accordance with the constitution.50
Whereas the Sunnites maintain that caliphate and government are elective and
civilian, the Shiʿites consider the Imāmate as part of their theology wherein the Imām
receives his title through hereditary succession from the Prophet. The Imām is thus
a theocratic figure who is also held to be infallible and removed from the ability to
err and to commit sin (maʿṣūm).51 Notwithstanding this, however, Shiʿite clerics
and commentators have maintained that “government as a time and place-bound
phenomenon is human and has a worldly origin”. No one can thus claim to be
representing God or the Prophet in the exercise of political power […]. Government
and the exercise of political power thus fall into the realm of people’s voluntary
and chosen acts, and essentially cannot be otherwise.”52
Twelver Shiʿites believe their last Imām – Muhammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Mahdī,
who was born in 869, over a thousand years ago! – to be still alive, albeit in a state
of ‘occultation’ (ghaybah).53 As Marcinkowski54 writes:
[H]e is believed to have been hidden by God from his enemies by entering into subsequent
kinds of ‘occultation’ or ‘concealment’ (ghaybah).55 The first of them is referred to as
‘minor occultation’ during which he is said to have communicated with the faithful only
through his representatives who alone knew about his whereabouts.56 After several years,
he is believed to have entered into a ‘major occultation’ that is supposed to have taken
place in either 939 or 941 (depending on the sources). During this ‘major occultation’,
which is believed to continue until this very day, he is not accessible to anyone.57 The
main contention against this made by Sunnites is that it would be against the laws of
nature that he is still alive – after more than 1,000 years in concealment. Shiʿites used
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to counter by stating that some of the prophets mentioned in the Qur’ān, too – such as
Jesus Christ and Elijah –, are considered to be still alive by all Muslims.58
Twelver Shiʿites also believe that the mantle of Imāmate was ever since carried by
his general deputies (sing. nā’ib-i Imām) who led the Shiʿite community but who were
not infallible. In the absence of Prophet and Imām, the affairs of state are determined
in accordance with the will and consent of the community through consultation.
This comes close to the Sunnite doctrine of khilāfah, a position reflected in the
views of the late President of the Shiʿite Supreme Council of Lebanon, Muḥammad
Mahdī Shams al-Dīn (d. 2001) as discussed below.59 Furthermore, government in
both the Sunnite and Shiʿite doctrines is a contract which gives rise to mutual rights
and obligations. The fourth caliph ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (r. 656–661), has explicitly
referred to these rights and obligations in Sermon 207 of Nahj al-balāghah. Political
leaders are consequently bound, under both doctrines, to conduct government affairs
through consultation with the community.60 Some of the leading Iranian clerics,
including Muḥammad Kāẓim Khurasānī (d. 1911), issued fatwās during the period
of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905–11) to say that “It is a [Shiʿite]
religious requirement that during the Era of Absence [ghaybah] the government of
the Muslims rests with the majority of the people.”61
Ayatollah Khomeini’s (d. 1989) idea of ‘Guardianship of the Jurist’ (wilāyat
al-faqīh) entrusted the leading jurist to assume leadership and act as a Deputy (nā’ib)
of the Imām. Khomeini’s notion effectively adjusted the Shiʿite doctrine which had
postponed the establishment of an Islamic state until the return of the last Imām.
Wilāyat al-faqīh thus enabled the jurist to establish an Islamic government during
the Imām’s absence, and Shams al-Dīn’s concept of people’s authority (wilāyat
al-ummah) transferred the authority from the jurist back to the wider community,
thus constructing a common doctrinal position on Islamic government among all
Muslims.62 But the question of the ‘Hidden Imām’ still remained problematic.
Muḥammad Mahdī Shams al-Dīn’s concept of wilāyat al-ummah restored to the
community itself the authority which Khomeini had entrusted in the leading jurist.
Shams al-Dīn explained that following the Prophet’s demise, the ummah became
the locus of political authority, according to the Ashʿarites and the Sunnites, but
only the Imām had title to leadership, according to the Shiʿite doctrine. ʿAlī b. Abī
Ṭālib was the first Imām to inherit that authority and the succeeding Imāms carried
the title after him. The Twelfth Imām has remained absent, in which case the umma
assumes his authority during his absence, and the ummah exercises it through
elective and consultative methods.63
Salīm al-ʿAwwā and Tawfīq al-Shāwī regarded Shams al-Dīn’s wilāyat al-ummah
as a logical extension of Khomeini’s doctrine of velāyat-e faqīh, which was basically
an elective office; the Sunnis only differed with it in that they did not stipulate that
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the candidate must be a faqīh. Shams al-Dīn effectively restored that choice back
to the community.64
Islam advocates, not a theocracy, but a people’s government. Note also that at no
time has the Iranian state arrogated divinity to itself due to the absence of a living
Imām. Iran has in fact a more consistent record of democratic governance compared
to many other Muslim countries. In sum, neither the Shiʿite doctrine nor the post
revolutionary experience of Iran provide an argument by which to characterise the
Islamic state as a theocracy, even among the Shiʿite community, let alone the wider
majority of Sunnites.
A ‘qualified democracy’?
Democracy is predicated in a set of principles most important among which are
a recognition of the inherent worth of every human being, a representative and
participatory government, acceptance of the rule of law, equality of all citizens
before the law, and a high level of tolerance of unconventional views and beliefs.
Islam contains a set of principles which “make it highly responsive towards many of
the moral and legal prerequisites of democracy”.65 If democracy means a system of
government that is the opposite of dictatorship, Islam is compatible with democracy
“because there is no place in it for arbitrary rule by one man or a group of men”.66
A whole generation of Muslim scholars have tried to redefine concepts such as
bayʿah, shūrā and ijmāʿ in ways that may deviate from their traditional usage, but
they are “no more removed from their original meanings than modern European
models of democracy are from the ancient Greek demes”.67
Among the differences commentators have noted in comparing democracy to
an Islamic system of rule, one is the attribution of sovereignty to God in Islam, but
to the people in a democratic state. In a democracy the people may bring any legal
order or system they wish for themselves whereas an Islamic government is bound
by implementing the sharīʿah. Furthermore, democratic aims are generally material
aims whereas Islam seeks both material and spiritual values. Democracy may not
regulate personal morality whereas this too is of concern to an Islamic order.68
Ṭaha Ḥusayn (d. 1973), one of the most influential twentieth-century Egyptian
writers and intellectuals and a figurehead for the modernist movement in Egypt,
observed that the political system in early Islam was neither democratic nor did it rest
on absolutism as understood by the Greeks and Romans; it was a purely Arab system
of government to which Islam added its own requirements. Muḥammad Ḥusayn
Haykal (d. 1956), the Egyptian writer, journalist, politician and former Minister of
Education, who penned also a biography of the Prophet, noted that the system of
shūrā in early Islam did not constitute a check on the powers of the caliph. Even
though the caliph had to consult the community, he was not answerable to it.69 The
contemporary scholar Ḍiyā al-Dīn al-Rīs has responded with some reservations. First,
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if by ‘purely Arab’ it is suggested that the Islamic state is ethnocentric, then it must be
said that Islam does not advocate ethnicity at all. Second, to say that the Islamic state
was not democratic also does not reflect the fact that the people’s consent, homage
and welfare lay at the foundation of the state of Medina. The commitment of that
state to justice, equality and people’s rights also went a long way toward democracy
as a government of the people, by the people, for the people. Al-Rīs adds, however,
that while the Islamic system subscribed to these principles, it was not identical
with democracy. The will of the people is sovereign in a democracy but in Islam
the sharīʿah, although generally supportive of it, also introduces limitations to it. In
a western democracy, the people’s sovereignty admits no limitation whereas in an
Islamic system the qur’ānic injunctions on equality and justice may not be violated
in the name of people’s sovereignty. Al-Rīs concludes that Islamic governance and
democracy have aspects in common just as they also differ in certain respects. It is
in this way sui generis as it has characteristics of its own.70
In Ḥassan al-Ṭurābī’s assessment, an Islamic government is not exactly a direct
government of the people by the people: it is rather a government of the sharīʿah.
But in “a substantial sense, it is a popular government since the sharīʿah approves
the convictions of the people and, therefore, their direct will”.71
Al-ʿAwwā is critical of the view some jurists have taken that consultation (shūrā)
was only recommended and not an obligatory requirement. This is indefensible
in view of the qur’ānic command (3:159) addressing the Prophet to consult the
community, and also the Prophet’s own practice of frequent recourse to shūrā,
followed by the precedent of the Pious Caliphs and the Companions after him.
Thus “I find it strange to see that some have considered shūrā only advisable but
not obligatory.”72 Al-ʿAwwā then cites al-Qurṭubī in support of the position that
shūrā is one of the cardinal principles of Islamic government and an obligation to
be implemented.73
Islamic government is a qualified democracy in that it holds the community as
the locus of authority that can take the government to account and may ultimately
depose it. The sharīʿah also vests the people’s representatives with the authority
to pass consensus-based legislation through ijmāʿ.74 This is the basic premise of
a minority view among Muslim scholars that sovereignty in the Islamic polity
belongs to the ummah. Others have qualified this to say that the ummah is vested
with “executive sovereignty (al-sultān al-tanfidhī)”.75 Still others maintain that the
state exercises a composite sovereignty (al-siyādah al-muzdāwijah) of the ummah
and the sharīʿah, which are intertwined and cannot be meaningfully separated.76
According to a legal maxim of the sharīʿah earlier quoted, it is the people’s
welfare on which the success and failure of an Islamic government is to be judged.
A government that makes decisions independently of people’s welfare thus deviates
from its basic terms of reference.77 This may explain why al-Qaraḍāwī characterises
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the state in Islam as “a state of rights and liberties (dawlat al-ḥuqūq wa ’l-ḥurriyyāt)
which is committed to protection of the rights of life, ownership, personal security
and honour, and right to basic necessities. These are the essential values (alḍarūriyyāt) which the sharīʿah seeks to protect.”78 Muhammad Asad observed that
a state may be described ‘Islamic’ if it incorporates in its constitution the clear and
unambiguous ordinances of Islam which have a direct bearing on the community’s
socio-political and economic life.79
Al-Qaraḍāwī has also spoken forcefully against the detractors of democracy in
the name of Islam, “for Islam advocates the people’s government […] and there is
essential harmony between Islam and democracy”. Islam has resolutely denounced
oppressive and arrogant rulers, the Pharaoh and the Kora, who sought to enslave
and humiliate their people. The Prophet expressed this vividly in a ḥadīth: “When
you see my community afraid of calling a tyrant ‘tyrant’ then take leave of it.” The
ruler in Islam is “agent and employee of the community” who is accountable to it.
This was amply shown in the statements of both the first and second caliphs, Abū
Bakr and ʿUmar (d. 634 and 644, respectively). Al-Qaraḍāwī adds that democracy
is the fruit of a long-standing struggle in which the people successfully subjugated
despotism. It is humanity’s shared achievement and “we are entitled […] to take from
others ideas and methods that benefit us and do not, in the meantime, clash with a
clear and unequivocal text”.80 Election according to al-Qaraḍāwī, and many others, is
a form of testimony (shahādah) by which the electorate testifies to the suitability of
the candidate. The electorate is under an obligation to give testimony and “discharge
his electoral duty” to ensure only the strong and trustworthy are elected.81
The Shiʿite doctrine concurs with its Sunni counterpart to say that Islam and
democracy are compatible. Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari (b. 1950) is even more
emphatic in saying that despotism, authoritarianism and, more specifically, ruling
people without their consent are in contradiction with the essence of religion, human
free will, and Islamic texts and guidelines.82 “In our view,” Eshkevari observed, “in
the present state of the world, the democratic method is the most religiously correct
way of social administration for Muslims.” If the ideal of religion is to uphold
truth and justice and the ideal of democracy is to do the same based on people’s
will and consent, then without doubt democracy is the most suitable method for
implementation of justice.83
Political parties are an important feature of modern democracy. On this too,
al-Qaraḍāwī dismisses the argument that Islam rejects political parties. The sharīʿah
principles of ḥisbah (promotion of good and prevention of evil), and naṣīḥah (sincere
advice) as well as the people’s right to criticise their government leaders can be
given a meaningful role within a multi-party system. Political parties are therefore
acceptable in an Islamic system. To curb oppressive rule is normally not within
the capacity of individuals acting in isolation. But when they join together in large
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numbers, they can influence government policy, in which case there should be no
need for acts of rebellion and uprising against oppressive rulers as often happened
in the past.84
In its broad outline, the sharīʿah also supports the people. It was due probably
to its strong advocacy of people’s rights that totalitarian regimes of the past had
difficulty in the implementation of sharīʿah. The ʿulamā’ have acted, more often
than not, as protectors of the people’s rights and resisted oppressive rule.
Ameer Ali (d. 1929) commented that the sharīʿah gave the people a code which
consecrated the principle of self-rule, made men equal in the eyes of the law, and
made the government subordinate to the law. An examination of the precedent of
the early caliphs depicts a popular government administered by an elective chief
with limited powers. At a time of history when everywhere “the masses were in
hopeless subjugation, Islam elaborated a political system fundamentally republican
in character, stressing the duties of the sovereign towards their subjects, and the
freedom and equality of people”.85
Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938) spoke affirmatively of the democratic impulse of
Islam but said that the Muslims did not effectively develop the elective principle.
This was due partly to the Persians and the Mongols, the two great races which
embraced Islam and formed governments; they were not only strangers to the
elective principle, but actively opposed to it. The Persians worshipped their
monarchs as manifestations of divine power, whereas the Mongols were given to
tribalist methods.86 Iqbal added: “The republican form of government is not only
thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam, but has also become a necessity in
view of the new forces that are set free in the world of Islam.” The position of the
ruler in the eyes of the sharīʿah is the same as that of an ordinary Muslim. The
basis of legislation, after the clear injunctions of the sharīʿah, is the agreement of
the Muslim community.87 Iqbal’s commentator, Khalifa Abdul Hakim, characterised
“Iqbal’s conception of Islamic democracy” as closely aligned with what Islam
experienced during its early period. In this “there was no ruling class, freedom
reigned everywhere. The state was a welfare state.” The rulers were elected on the
merit of their moral and intellectual excellence.88
Muhammad Asad (d. 1992) described the Islamic government as democratic and
noted that democracy, as conceived by the West, was infinitely nearer to the Islamic
system than to its Greek parallel. For Islam maintains that all human beings are
equal and must be given the same opportunities for development and self-expression.
Islam essentially envisaged an elective government. A government that comes to
power by “non-elective means becomes automatically illegal”.89
The evidence I have examined suggests obviously that there are some differences
between the Islamic system of rule and a modern democratic state. Yet there is enough
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in common between them to justify the characterisation of Islamic government as
a qualified democracy.
Separation of Powers
If the historical caliphate is taken as a basis of assessment, then it would appear that
separation of powers does not find a place in an Islamic polity. Many commentators
have thus held that separation of powers is alien to Islamic political thought. There
is a basis for this opinion as I shall explain, although I believe that this conclusion
is less than accurate and calls for a review.
The historical caliphate subscribed to administrative centralism and concentration
of powers under the combined effect of wilāyah (public authority) and wakālah (representation). The caliph in his capacity as wakīl and representative of the community
was accordingly vested with political authority by the community. He delegated in
turn his powers to other government office holders, ministers, governors, judges,
etc., who are entrusted with delegated authority which they exercise on the caliph’s
behalf. With the exception of the judges whose position in respect of enforcing the
sharīʿah is parallel to that of the caliph himself, all other officials act, in effect, as
delegates and assistants to the head of state.90
A unitarian approach to governance is also the conclusion often drawn from the
Islamic doctrine of Divine Oneness (tawḥīd) which has deeply impacted Islamic
religious and political thought. Thus it is understood that Islam takes a holistic
and unitarian approach to governance and it is averse therefore to the notion of
separation of powers. Such was deemed to bear greater harmony with the integrationist outlook of tawḥīd and territorial unity of the caliphate. This was also
seen to be in line with the precedent of the Prophet-cum-head of state and the
Rightly-Guided caliphs after him who acted as the repositories of political power.
This unitarian approach also seems to be manifested in the postulate that Islam
does not admit of separation between religion and state. This is evidently very
different from the western nation-state model that bore the philosophical vestiges
of Enlightenment, which separates religion from politics and regards religion as a
concern only of personal conscience of the individual. Under the Islamic caliphate
model, the state is deemed as the patron and protector of religion, and under mandate
also to implement the sharīʿah. Hence an organic unity, not separation, between
religion and state is suggested.
The theoretical blueprint of caliphate visualised two categories of government
officials, those who exercised political authority, or ḥukm, and those who only acted
in the capacity of assistants (muʿāwinūn) to the head of state. The leading officers
were in turn assisted by deputies and assistants who acted as administrative officers
but did not partake in the exercise of ḥukm. In his capacity as the centre of political
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and executive authority that originated in the community’s pledge of allegiance
(bayʿah) and representation, the head of state acted on behalf of the community but
remained accountable to it. Hence the caliphate model did not recognise autonomous
individuals and organs in the government hierarchy; everyone exercised delegated
authority that emanated from the office of the head of state.91
Muslim commentators are reluctant, however, to extend the implications of this
administrative centralism to anything more than an organisational approach that
need not interfere with the essence of accountability, nor of a functional separation
of powers in the various organs of state. The head of state – although the supreme
political figure – could not be an absolute ruler, for he is subjected to the overarching
authority of the ummah and that of the sharīʿah.92
It would appear upon scrutiny that the centralised pattern of administration
originated in a derivative logic and a persuasive precedent, which were taken up
and subsequently reflected, somewhat unquestioningly perhaps, in the juristic works
of the ʿulamā’. The unity (waḥdah) of government in the territorial domain of
the historical caliphate was reflected, as al-Sanhūrī observed, in a unified central
authority (sulṭah markaziyyah islāmiyyah) which was personified by the caliph.93
Al-Sanhūrī added, however, that a centralised state was not an inflexible rule and
the historical pattern may be changed in the light of prevailing conditions. There
is nothing in the sources of the sharīʿah to impose a mandate in regards to the
administrative structure of government.94 Speaking of the legislative function of
the Islamic system and its independence from the executive, Wahbah al-Zuhaylī
similarly went on record to compare the Islamic system with its western counterpart
and say that both
[v]alidate the principle of separation of powers. For legislation in Islam emanates from
the Qur’ān and sunnah, consensus (ijmāʿ) of the ummah, and ijtihād. All of these are
independent of the Imām, nay but he is bound by them and by the conclusions drawn
from them. The principle of ijmāʿ in Islam manifests the will of the people […]. Both
[democracies] reject despotism and consider the people as the locus of authority in
political and government affairs.95
The head of state has thus little control over legislation in an Islamic polity. The
whole structure of law-making in the Islamic jurisprudential theory is controlled
by lay jurists and mujtahids who act independently of the head of state.
As for the judiciary, here too the ʿulamā’ dominated the judicial branch as judges
were traditionally selected from among those learned in the sharīʿah. Since the
sharīʿah was not enacted by the state, and the state had in effect only an administrative role with regard to it, the ʿulamā’ and judges regarded themselves as custodians
of the sharīʿah almost independently of the state hierarchy.
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Zaydān thus wrote categorically: “No one whatsoever is permitted to interfere in
the work of the Muslim judge or qāḍī with a view to influence him away from the
course of justice. Anyone who violates this guideline is violating the sharīʿah.”96
This is because the duty to administer justice, although primarily borne by the head
of state, with the judge acting as his deputy, the latter shares that function with him
by virtue of a direct sharīʿah mandate. Furthermore, in his task to administer the
sharīʿah, the judge basically plays a declaratory role. He ascertains the ruling of the
sharīʿah and declares its application to a dispute before him. The judge does not, in
other words, create a ruling (ḥukm) in the absence of evidence in the sharīʿah. Then
for a judge to fulfil that role, he must act independently of extraneous influences;
for he alone is accountable for any error or miscarriage of justice. He is within his
rights also to reject all interference, even from the head of state, in the conduct of
his duty.97
In the present writer’s opinion, the implications of tawḥīd need not be extended
to the organisational structure of power in the state. One can believe in One God
without necessarily extending this to the structure of state hierarchy. The centralist
model would appear to have taken hold in the early years of the advent of Islam
when the nascent state of Medina found itself in continuous warfare with the pagans
of Mecca. A rapid pace of territorial expansion in the succeeding decades also
extended the geographical domain of Islam far beyond the Arabia peninsula and
brought it in close contact with other cultural traditions. Administrative centralism
was thus most likely seen to be in keeping with the objective of political unity of the
state, a position that may have in turn influenced Muslim jurists and commentators
to advocate a centralist model. Furthermore, if a centralist model is deemed to be
congenial to the territorial unity of the state, that logic would still fail to sustain the
view that internal separation of powers would necessarily jeopardise political unity.
The matter thus remains open to considerations of public interest and consultation
(maṣlaḥah and shūrā). It is through these methods that necessary adaptation
and adjustment in the administrative structure of the state could be devised and
implemented.
Freedom of Religion and Religious Pluralism
Historical accounts indicate that Muslims have maintained a track record of peaceful
coexistence with other religious communities in their midst. Starting with accounts
of the Prophet Muḥammad’s engagement with the Jews and Christians of Medina
and recognition of their freedom of religion, as documented in the renowned
‘Constitution of Medina’, peaceful coexistence is also endorsed by many of his
sayings and ḥadīths. This pattern continued during the dynastic periods of the
Umayyad, Abbasid, Ottoman, and Mogul empires where people of different
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religions, race and language lived as neighbours and compatriots. The overall picture
is one of recognition and mutual respect, notwithstanding isolated incidents and
episodes to the contrary. Islam recognises religious pluralism in its postures with
other religions, as I shall presently elaborate. It is also internally pluralistic in its
recognition of diversity of thought and doctrine among its various schools and sects
from the Shiʿite and Sunnite to the Ḥanafī, Shāfiʿī, Mālikī and Hanbalī schools that
are prevalent throughout the Muslim world to this day.
Numerous passages in the Qur’ān advocate freedom of religion:
Let there be no compulsion in religion. (2:256)
Whoever wishes to believe, let him believe, and whoever wishes to disbelieve, let him
disbelieve. (18:29)
The Qur’ān also provides in an address to the Prophet Muḥammad:
If God had willed everyone on the face of the earth would have been believers. Are you
then compelling the people to become believers? (10:99; see also 11:18)
The question in this last verse begs the reply that God the Most High has Himself
willed that people should be free to decide for themselves; and that no one should try
to change that. Religious pluralism has no uniform definition and is seen differently
by different commentators. But if one takes the more simplified characterisation of
religious pluralism, then religious pluralism would mean that “different religions
co-exist within the same society”.98 In that sense, Islam too is certainly pluralist,
because, as some might argue, “no civilisation in history has demonstrated a more
resolute commitment to pluralism than Islam”. For not only the Qur’ān itself but
also the ‘Constitution of Medina’ and the acts and deeds of the Prophet himself
attest to Islam’s affirmative stance on pluralism.99 Space does not permit a detailed
enquiry, which I have attempted elsewhere. Here it will suffice to outline the basic
qur’ānic evidence:100
He it is Who created you; some from among you are disbelievers and some of you are
believers. (64:2)
This is a clear affirmation that people are bound to differ in respect of the religion
they wish to follow. To quote the Qur’ān on religious pluralism:
Say: We have faith in God, and in that which has been sent down to Abraham, Ishmael,
Isaac and Jacob and the tribes, and in that which was given to Moses and Jesus, and in
that which was given to all the prophets from the Lord. We do not make any distinction
between any of them and to Him do we submit. (2:136)
For each of you We have appointed a right way and an open road. (5:48)
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Pluralism in the qur’ānic language is more than a mere superficial acknowledgement of the religious:
Verily, those who believe and those who are Jews, and the Sabeans and the Christians,
all those who believe in God and the last day and do righteous deeds, they shall have
their recompense with God. They shall not fear nor shall they sorrow. (2:62; also 5:69)
While speaking of freedom of religion as a qur’ānic mandate, al-Qaraḍāwī observes
that anyone who violates this freedom and compels people into embracing any
religion commits an act of fitnah (sedition) that must be avoided.101 Islam’s
commitment to freedom of religion and religious pluralism was put to the test at a
time when the Prophet was still in Mecca. A group of the Meccan pagans proposed
to the Prophet that they would be prepared to worship Allah for a year if he would
also reciprocate by worshiping their deities; in this way both sides would gain
insight into each other’s religions. A short qur’ānic sūrah was then revealed ordering
the Prophet to tell the unbelievers: “I do not worship those that you worship, nor
do you worship He Whom I worship […]. To you is your religion, and to me, my
religion” (Q, sura 109). This is a clear acceptance of religious pluralism in Islam.
The universality of the qur’ānic message is often suppressed, however, by some
of the orthodox exegetes who diluted the essence of religious freedom in the Qur’ān
through doubtful interpretations, especially of these two verses: “Verily the religion
with God is Islam – inna al-dīn ʿind Allāh al-Islām” (3:19); and “Who seeks other
than Islam as a religion, it will not be accepted from him – wa man yabtaghī ghayr
al-Islām dīnan fa-lan yuqbal minhu” (3:85). These are often cited as incontrovertible evidence that only those who follow Islam shall be saved.
Here we note that Islām has two meanings, one which names the religion revealed
to the Prophet Muḥammad. But Islām (lit. ‘submission’) is also the primal religion
of submission preached by Adam to all his posterity, who accepted God as their
Lord, as in the divine invocation: alastu bi-rabbikum? Qālū balā shahidnā (Am I
not your Lord? They said: Yes, we do testify; 7:172). All humankind then, before
time began, professed Islām in its widest sense of submission. Understood in this
way the two verses (3:19 and 385) recognise the validity of every religion that
entails submission to the divine will.
The essence of submission as a common denominator of all religions is featured
frequently in the Qur’ān: “And We have sent to every people a messenger that they
may worship God” (16:32); and (10:47): “And for every people there is a messenger.
When their messenger comes, they are judged with equity and are not wronged.” But
instead of taking these verses as affirmation of the validity of all religions prior to
Islam, they are presented as declarations in support of Islam’s finality that override
and abrogate other religions. The universalist verses of the Qur’ān are thus rarely
allowed to stand alone as the unencumbered words of God.102
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The spirit of openness and religious pluralism in Islam has also been constrained
by the demands of nationalism and the Muslim world’s post-colonial experience
in constitution making. Constitutions after constitutions were introduced by the
countries of Middle East and Asia, which singled out Islam as the state religion,
while some also declared Islamic law as the basic source of legislation. This
experience is still with us and is not likely to change in the foreseeable future.
Notwithstanding the guarantee of freedom of religion to non-Muslims under these
constitutions, their clauses on state religion could be said to be ahistorical, and a
response to colonialist aggression that impinged on the self-identity of Muslims.
Prior to the era of constitutionalism, which is of western origin, scholastic
teachings and praxis in Muslim lands aimed at upholding religious symbols and
observances (al-shaʿā’ir), such as the call to prayers (adhān) in public mosques,
Friday congregational prayers, and also closure of restaurants in Muslim residential
areas during Ramadan. The imām would also recite, toward the end of his Friday
sermon, the name of the head of state and invoke God’s protection for him and the
Muslim community. One can perhaps envisage the possibility of taking these rather
than formal constitutional declarations on state religion as the index of Islamic
identity of states in highly pluralistic Muslim societies – if this would indeed serve
the desired purpose of genuine religious pluralism within the given conditions of
each country.
Conclusion and Recommendations
To conclude, Islamic government may be said to be profoundly committed to justice,
people’s welfare and the rule of law. It is a government that aspires to people’s trust
and exhibits a high level of receptivity to their legitimate wishes.
Contemporary writings on the nature and composition of an Islamic polity are
generally cognisant of the absence of a particular model or prototype for an Islamic
state and lay emphasis instead on conformity to a set of principles. Therefore:
• A state may consequently take a variety of forms, and be internally organised in
different ways, yet qualify as Islamic if it complies with those principles. Salient
among these are consultation, freedom, equality and justice, commitment to
the rule of law and to people’s welfare. Government power in an Islamic
polity is also limited by virtue of its commitment to the implementation of
the sharīʿah. An Islamic government bears essential harmony with democracy
and its concomitant principles of accountability, commitment to basic rights
and liberties, and a system of checks and balances that curb arbitrariness
and abuse. Islam advocates a participatory and civilian system of rule and
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its powers are limited by reference to the sharīʿah and accountability to the
people.
• A formal constitution is acceptable in an Islamic polity if it serves to articulate
these principles and the modalities of their implementation. Any government
that is committed to these principles, defends the country against aggression
and inspires people’s trust qualifies as Islamic. It may be similar to the
historical caliphate or may be different and combine new features in response
to its own particular requirements.103
Emerging democracies and Muslim jurisdictions in Southeast Asia do perhaps fare
better on accountability and the rule of law compared with many of their counterparts
elsewhere in Asia and Africa. On a broader note, however, Muslim countries have
not been all that successful in making constitutionalism and democracy a reality in
their governments. The general picture one has is rather a poor record of achievement
on commitment to democratic principles. Many present-day Muslim countries have
impressive constitutions but tend to be falling short on implementation. Therefore:
• Accountability and good governance are not simply a question of having a
constitution but more importantly of an unwavering commitment to good
practice.
• A similar picture obtains unfortunately with regard to a gap which exists
between the theory and practice of freedom of religion and pluralism – and
what it takes to translate these into reality. In this regard, it may be said that
the normative teachings of Qur’ān and Sunnah are more supportive of freedom
of religion and pluralism than scholastic interpretations of the schools and
scholars of the sharīʿah.
• The evidence reviewed in this essay shows Islam’s substantive harmony with
the principles of democracy, yet it is felt that Muslim scholars and ʿulamā’
have not been sufficiently expressive of this. This aspect of harmony between
the Islamic and modern laws merits, in the present writer’s opinion, greater
exposure and recognition simply because of the common misperceptions that
prevail purporting Islam to be opposed to democracy. A case can therefore
be made that Muslim scholars and experts in the field should address the gap
that currently exists between the negative yet commonly held perceptions of
Islam on religious freedom. Islam is affirmative on religious and intellectual
pluralism as our review of the source evidence has shown.
• Our analysis also shows substantive support in the theory and praxis of Islam
for the democratic principle of separation of powers. If this is deemed to offer
a better prospect for accountability and healthy checks and balances in the
exercise of power, then separation of powers merits recognition and support
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from the Islamic viewpoint. An acknowledgement of this aspect of the Islamic
teachings may also help to improve the prospects of a more refined approach
to separation of powers in Muslim countries and their respective constitutions.
Notes
1. Cf., Frank I. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999),
5–6.
2. Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (New York: Foundation Press, 2000, 3rd ed.),
20.
3. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 133.
4. Zeid al-Ali, “Iraq: A Constitution or an Epitaph?”, OpenDemocracy, 15 August 2005, available
online at http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-iraq/constitution_2757.jsp (accessed on
15 February 2010).
5. Cf. L.B. Deng, “The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Will It Be Sustained?”, Civil Wars
7, no. 3 (2005), 244.
6. Cf., Samuel Issacharoff, “Constitutionalising Democracy in Fractures Societies”, Texas Law
Review 82 (2004), 1861.
7. Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs 76 (November 1997), 35;
Edward J. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Prone to Violence: The Paradox of the Democratic Peace”,
National Interest 82 (Winter 2005–06), 39–45.
8. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press), 199.
9. The ruler’s duty to consult the community – clearly stated in Qur’ān 3:156 and 42:36 and also
manifested in the precedent and Sunnah of the Prophet Muḥammad – was ignored and subjected
to the vagaries of power politics under the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, Mu’āwiyah b. Abī
Sufyān (r. 661–680) and his son and successor, the notorious Yazīd (r. 680–683).
10.Bayʿah is an act by which individual A informs individual B that A supports B’s assumption of
the leadership position in question and gives B his or her allegiance.
11. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī, Fiqh al-khilāfah wa tatawwuruhā, Arab. trans. and comm. Nadia
al-Sanhūrī and Tawfīq al-Shāwī (Cairo: al-Hay’ah al-Miṣriyyah al-ʿĀmmah li ’l-Kitāb, 1989),
62–4; ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Mutawallī, al-Sharīʿah al-islāmiyyah ka-maṣdar asasī li ’l-dustūr
(Alexandria: Mu’assasah Shabāb al-Jāmiʿah, 1990, 3rd ed.), 214.
12. Ḥasan al-Turābī, Tajdīd uṣūl al-fiqh al-islāmī (Jeddah: Dār al-Saʿūdiyyah li ’l-Nashr, 1404AH/1984),
20.
13. Lecture series by Shaykh Aḥmad Ḥuraydī held at the University of Cairo – as quoted by Fu’ād
A. Aḥmad, Uṣūl niẓām al-ḥukm fī ’l-islām, 15–16.
14. Jaʿfar al-Subḥānī, Maʿālim al-ḥukūmah al-islāmiyyah, lecture series compiled by Jaʿfar al-Hādī
(Beirut: Dār al-Adwā’, 1405AH/1984), 76–7.
15. P.J. Vatikiotis, “Islamic Resurgence: A Critical Review”, in: Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal
Dessouki (eds), Islam and Power (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1981),
193 and 196.
16. Muḥammad Salīm al-ʿAwwā, al-Fiqh al-islāmī fī ṭarīq al-tajdīd (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī,
1419 AH/1998, 2nd ed.), 44.
17. Tawfīq al-Shāwī, al-Mawṣūʿah al-ʿaṣriyyah fī ’l-fiqh al-jinā’ī al-islāmī (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq,
1421AH/2001), 1:106.
18. Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1374AH/1995), 5:87;
also quoted in Muḥammad Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn al-Rīs, al-Naẓariyyāt al-siyāsiyyah al-islāmiyyah (Cairo:
Dār al-Maʿārif, 1967), 326 n. 20.
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19. AbūʿAbd-Allāh Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qur’ān (Cairo: Dār
al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyyah, 1387AH/1967, 3rd ed.), 5:255.
20. Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Eng. tr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan (Lahore:
Kazi Publications, 1979), vol. 9, ḥadīth no. 252.
21. Ismāʿīl a-Badawī, Tawliyah ra’īs al-dawlah fī ’l-sharīʿah (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1986),
220.
22. Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Siyāsah al-sharʿiyya fī iṣlāḥ al-ra’y wa ’l-ra’iyyah (Cairo: Dār
al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1951, 2nd ed.), 18.
23. Ibid., 43.
24. Cf. Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Characteristics of the Islamic State”, Islamic Studies 32 (1993),
24; Anwar Ahmad Qadri, Islamic Jurisprudence in the Modern World (Lahore: Ashraf Press, 1981,
2nd ed.), 270.
25. Fatḥī ʿUthmān, al-Fikr al-qānūnī al-islāmī (Cairo: Maṭbaʿah Mukhaymar, n.d.), 119; Bāqir Sharīf
al-Qurshī, Niẓām al-ḥukm wa ’l-idārah fī ’l-Islām (Najaf: Maṭbaʿah al-Ādāb, 1386AH/1966), 27.
26. ʿAbd-Allāh Khaṭīb al-Tabrīzī, Mishkāt al-maṣābīḥ, ed. Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī (Beirut:
al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1399AH/1979, 2nd ed.).
27. Cf. Kamali, “Characteristics”, 32 n. 29; al-Shāwī, al-Mawṣūʿah, 2:286; Muṣṭafā Kamāl Waṣfī,
al-Niẓām al-dustūrī fī ’l-Islām muqarinan bi ’l-nuẓūm al-ʿaṣriyyah (Cairo: Maktabah Wahbah,
1414AH/1994, 2nd ed,), 14–15; Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, Min fiqh al-dawlah fī ’l-Islām (Cairo: Dār
al-Shurūq, 1417AH/1997), 58; Manzuruddin Ahmed, “The Classical Muslim State”, Islamic
Studies 1 (1962), 90.
28. Cf. Kamali, “Characteristics”, 32.
29. Ibid., 33; ʿAwwā, al-Fiqh, 6:170–1.
30. Joseph Schacht, “Islamic Law in Contemporary States”, The American Journal of Comparative
Law 8 (1959), 19.
31. Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, Fatāwa Imām Muḥammad Rashīd Ridā, comp. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Munjid
and Yūsuf Khurī (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Jadīd, 1390AH/1970), 805–8; Maḥmūd Ḥilmī Muṣṭafā,
Niẓām al-ḥukm al-islāmī (Cairo: n. publ., 1401AH/1981, 6th ed.), 122.
32. Cf. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Khallāf, al-Siyāsah al-sharʿiyyah (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿah al-Salafiyyah,
1350AH/1970), 59; Umar Chapra, The Economic System of Islam (Karachi: University of Karachi
Press, 1971), 63; Kamali, “Characteristics”, 33.
33. Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb b. Ibrāhīm, Kitāb al-kharāj (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿah al-Salafiyyah, 1352AH/1933,
2nd ed.), 152; Abū ’l-Ḥasan al-Māwardī, Kitāb al-aḥkām al-sulṭāniyyah (Cairo: al-Babi al-Halabi,
1386AH/1966, 2nd ed.), 194.
34. Cf. Kamali, “Characteristics”, 37; al-Rīs, al-Naẓariyyāt, 377.
35. Muḥammad ʿAbduh, al-Islām wa ’l-naṣrāniyyah (Cairo: Dār al-Manār, n.d., 8th ed.), 57–58; see
also Mutawallī, al-Sharīʿah, 208–10.
36. Maḥmūd Shalṭūṭ, al-Islām: ʿAqīdah wa sharīʿah (Kuwait: Dār al-Qalam, 1965), 476.
37. al-Qaraḍāwī, Min fiqh al-dawlah, 57–8; See also Qadri, Islamic Jurisprudence, 270 n. 29.
38. Hasan Turabi, “The Islamic State”, in: John Esposito (ed.), Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1983), 243.
39. Salem Azzam (ed.), Islam in Contemporary Society (London: Longman, 1982), 258.
40. Sayyid Quṭb, al-ʿAdālah al-ijtimāʿiyyah fī ’l-Islām (Cairo: ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1373AH/1954,
2nd ed.), 98.
41. See for the text (in 47 articles) and analysis of the main features of the ‘Constitution of Medina’,
Fu’ād ʿAbd al-Munʿim Aḥmad, Uṣūl niẓām al-ḥukm fī ’l-Islām (Alexandria: Mu’assasah Shabāb
al-Jāmiʿah, 1411AH/1991), 92–7; Munīr Ḥāmid al-Bayāṭī, al-Niẓām al-siyāsī al-islāmī muqārinan
bi-’l-dawlat al-qānūniyyah (Baghdad: Dār al-Bashīr li’l-Nashr wa-’l-Tawzīʿ, n.d.), 46.
42. Cf. ʿAbd al-Karīm Zaydān, al-Fard wa ’l-dawlah fī ’l-sharīʿah al-islāmiyyah (Gray IN:
International Islamic Federation of Student Organisations, 1390AH/1970, 2nd ed.), 7.
43. Cf. ʿAbd al-Ḥamid Mutawallī, Mabādī niẓām al-ḥukm fī ’l-Islām (Alexandria: Munsha’āt
al-Maʿārif, 1974), 92f.
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ʿUthmān, al-Fikr, 30, 119.
al-Qaraḍāwī, Min fiqh al-dawlah, 31, 34.
Cf. Ibn al-Athīr, al-Bidāyah wa ’l-nihāyah (Beirut: Maktabat al-Maʿārif, n.d.), 17:180.
al-Qaraḍāwī, Min fiqh al-dawlah, 60, 66; Fahmī Huwaydī, “Akdhūbat al-ḥukm al-ilāhī”, Al-Ahrām
[Cairo], 14 October 1986, as quoted by al-Qaraḍāwī, Min fiqh al-dawlah.
48. Mutawallī, Mabādī, 190.
49. al-Qaraḍāwī, Min fiqh al-dawlah, 68–70 (therein also referring to Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Ta’rīkh
al-khulafā’ (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), 241).
50. Ibid., 72.
51. Cf. Ẓāfir al-Qāsimī, Niẓām al-ḥukm fī ’l-sharīʿah wa ’l-ta’rīkh (Beirut: Dār al-Nafā’s, 1977, 2nd
ed.), 297; Ann K.S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1981), 298.
52. Ziba Mir-Hosseini and Richard Tapper, Islam and Democracy in Iran: Eshkevari and the Quest
for Reform (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 89.
53. For a recent survey of Twelver Shiʿite beliefs and practices see Christoph Marcinkowski, Shiʿite
Identities: Community and Culture in Changing Social Contexts (Freiburg Studies in Social
Anthropology 27 (Zurich: LIT Verlag, 2010), 19–48. See also Christoph Marcinkowski, “Twelver
Shiʿite Islam: Conceptual and Practical Aspects”, IDSS Working Paper 113 [Institute of Defence
and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore], July 2006,
available online at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP114.pdf (accessed on
2 April 2010).
54.Marcinkowski, Shiʿite Identities, 26.
55. See Said Amir Arjomand, “Crisis of the Imamate and the Institution of Occultation in Twelver
Shi’ism: A Sociohistorical Perspective”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 28, no. 4
(1996), 491–515, idem, “The Consolation of Theology. The Shiʿite Doctrine of Occultation and
the Transition from Chiliasm to Law”, Journal of Religion 76, no. 4 (1996), 548–71, and idem,
“Imam Absconditus and the Beginnings of a Theology of Occultation: Imami Shi’ism around 900
CE/280–290 AH”, Journal of the American Oriental Society 117, no. 1 (1997), 1–13.
56. V. Klemm, “Die vier sufarā’ des Zwölften Imam. Zur formativen Periode der Zwölferšī‘a”, Die
Welt des Orients 15 (1984), 126–43.
57. For an early Twelver Shiʿite source see Abdulaziz Sachedina, “A Treatise on the Occultation of
the Twelfth Imamite Imam”, Studia Islamica 48 (1978), 108–24.
58. Already in 944, only three years after the beginning of the ‘major occultation’, a tomb with a
mosque (later known as al-ʿAskariyyah) was erected on the burial site of the eleventh Imām. In
the further course of history, a magnificent golden dome was constructed above the tomb which
was destroyed by Sunnite extremists in February 2006. This event has subsequently led to the
outbreak of widespread sectarian violence throughout Iraq.
59. al-Shāwī, al-Mawṣūʿah, 2:105, n. 31.
60. Cf., Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, Islam, 89.
61. As quoted in ibid., 91.
62. al-ʿAwwā, al-Fiqh, 71–2.
63. Muḥammad Mahdī Shams al-Dīn’s views are conveyed in his two works Niẓām al-ḥukm wa
’l-idārah fī ’l-Islām (Beirut: al-Mu’assasah al-Dawliyyah, 1995) and Fī ’l-Ijtimāʿ al-siyāsī al-islāmī
(Beirut: al-Mu’assasah al-Jāmiʿiyyah li’-Dirāsāt wa’l-Tawzīʿ, 1992) – cited by both al-ʿAwwā
and al-Shāwī, as in the following notes.
64. al-Shāwī, al-Mawṣūʿah, 1:106.
65. Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (London: Macmillan, 1982), 126.
66. Ibid., 128.
67. Ibid., 135.
68. al-Qurshī, Niẓām al-ḥukm, 104f.
44.
45.
46.
47.
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69. Both Taha Ḥusayn and Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal’s views are quoted in Mazheruddin Siddiqi,
Modern Reformist Thought in the Muslim World (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1982),
132–3.
70. al-Rīs, al-Naẓariyyāt, 372–85.
71. Ṭurābī, “The Islamic State”, 244.
72. al-ʿAwwā, al-Fiqh, 60.
73. Ibid., 61; al-Qurṭubī, Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1997), 4:249.
74. For details on ijmāʿ see Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence
(Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 2003), 228f.
75. Zaydān, al-Fard, 25. For further detail on sovereignty see Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “The
Limits of Power in an Islamic State”, Islamic Studies 28 (1989), 324; Waṣfī, al-Niẓām, 17.
76. al-Rīs, al-Naẓariyyāt, 385.
77. Cf. Waṣfī, al-Niẓām, 97–8; al-Shāwī, al-Mawṣūʿah, 1:106 and 2:452.
78. al-Qaraḍāwī, Min fiqh al-dawlah, 48–9.
79. Muhammad Asad, The Principles of State and Government in Islam (Berkeley CA: University
of California Press, 1961), 17.
80. al-Qaraḍāwī, Min fiqh al-dawlah, 130–47.
81. Ibid., 138. See also Mahmud Ahmad Ghazi, State and Legislation in Islam (Islamabad: Shariah
Academy, 2006), 53.
82. Eshkevari, as quoted in Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, Islam, 86.
83. Ibid., 85.
84. Ibid., 147–61.
85. Syed Ameer Ali, quoted in Siddiqi, Modern Reformist Thought, 119.
86. Quoted by Siddiqi, Modern Reformist Thought, 127.
87. Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: Ashraf Press, 1982,
repr.), 157; see also Siddiqi, Modern Reformist Thought, 127.
88.Siddiqi, Modern Reformist Thought, 128 (quoting Khalīfah ʿAbd al-Ḥakīm, Fikr-i Iqbāl, 266).
89.Asad, Principles, 36.
90. Cf., Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Characteristics of the Islamic State”, Islamic Studies 32 (1993),
31.
91. Cf., Saʿdī Abū Ḥabīb, Dirasah fī manhaj al-Islām al-siyāsī (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risālah,
1406AH/1985), 72; Taqī al-Dīn al-Nabhānī, Muqaddimāt al-dustūr (Kuwait: Dār al-Qalam, 1964),
89–90.
92. Cf., Ghazi, State, 107f.
93. al-Sanhūrī, Fiqh al-khilāfah, 174–5.
94. Ibid., 179.
95. Wahbah al-Zuhaylī, Qaḍāyā al-fiqh wa ’l-fikr al-islāmī (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2006), 466ff.
96. ʿAbd al-Karīm Zaydān, Niẓām al-qaḍā fī ’l-sharīʿah al-islāmiyyah (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risālah,
2002, 3rd rev. ed.), 59.
97. Ibid., 59–60.
98. Chandra Muzaffar, “What Pluralism Means to Islam”, Sunday Star [Kuala Lumpur], 18 June
2006, 28.
99. Ibid.
100. Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society,
1997), contains a chapter each on ‘freedom of religion’ (87–106) and ‘blasphemy and apostasy’
(212–50), respectively. See also my “Diversity and Pluralism: A Qur’ānic Perspective”, Islam
and Civilisational Renewal l, no.1 (2009), 27–55.
101. Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, “al-Taʿaddudiyyah fī naẓar al-Islām”, in the conference proceedings volume
Niẓām al-ḥukm al-islāmī wa ’l-dīmūqrātiyyah: al-furūq wa imkāniyyāt al-taʿāyush (Amman:
Mu’assasat Āl al-Bayt li’ l-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1424 AH/2004), 8.
102. Cf., Joseph Lumbard, “Qur’anic Inclusivism in an Age of Globalisation”, in: Muhammad Suheyl
Umar (ed.), The Religious Other: Towards a Muslim Theology of Other Religions in a Post-
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Prophetic Age (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 2008), 154. Lumbard also quotes Jane Dammen
McAuliffe, Qur’anic Christians: An Analysis of Classical and Modern Exegesis (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), and Yohanan Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam:
Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
See also Anthony H. Johns and Abdullah Saeed, “Nurcholish Madjid and the Interpretation of
the Qur’an: Religious Pluralism and Tolerance”, in: Suha Taji-Farouki (ed.), Modern Muslim
Intellectuals and the Qur’an (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 86–7.
103. Cf., ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Khallāf, as quoted in Mutawallī, al-Sharīʿah, 224 n. 1. See also al-Rīs,
al-Naẓariyyāt, 210; for further details on some of these principles see Mohammad Hashim Kamali,
Freedom, Equality and Justice in Islam (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 2002).
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28/09/2010 11:06