Download Religio-Political Rhetoric in Medieval Islamic Spain

“Gambling on the Past” -- Dr. H. Keaney – 10/4/05
Gambling on the Past, Gaining the Present:
Religio-Political rhetoric in Medieval Islamic Spain
By
Dr. Heather Keaney
Gambling is forbidden in Islam, and yet Islamic political rhetoric is crafted by
consummate gamblers. They shuffle the deck of past events in order to profit in the
present. Within medieval Islamic religio-political rhetoric there are usually four
points of appeal: authority, piety, unity, and jihad. Writers defend or criticize a
particular government based on these categories, playing them like four suits in a deck
of cards. Political apologists, by carefully selecting and arranging their evidence,
could stack the deck for or against a particular ideal and so for or against a particular
ruler or regime.
Ideally, governments should be characterized by all four virtues; however, this
has rarely – if ever – been the case. In response apologists usually limited themselves
to one suit, implying it would be the catalyst for achieving the other ideals. They did
this not through abstract rhetoric and principles, but by arguing that a particular
characteristic defined the early Islamic community of the Prophet Muhammad and his
close companions. Four companions ruled the community after Muhammad’s death
and are known collectively as the “Rightly-guided” Caliphs, or successors. Their
reigns came in Islamic collective memory to represent an idealized, golden age, in
which authority, piety, unity, and jihad were practiced correctly.
But this designation was more a product of memory than of history. Just over
a decade after Muhammad’s death, and upon the death of the second caliph, there was
debate over who should rule: a close companion, ‘Uthman b. ‘Affan, or Muhammad’s
cousin and son-in-law, ‘Ali b. Abi Talib. ‘Uthman was chosen, but was later accused
of corruption, oppression, nepotism, and treachery. A group of Muslims revolted
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“Gambling on the Past” -- Dr. H. Keaney – 10/4/05
against him, besieged him in his house and eventually broke in and brutally murdered
him while he was praying and reading the Quran. This was the first time Muslims
openly fought other Muslims and it is the first incident of Islamic regicide. Upon
‘Uthman’s death, ‘Ali became the fourth “Rightly-guided” Caliph. However, there
was resistance to his authority from the beginning for, allegedly, not pursuing and
punishing ‘Uthman’s killers. ‘Ali’s short reign was marred by civil war until he was
eventually assassinated. The events of ‘Uthman and ‘Ali’s reigns together make up
what is known in Islamic history as al-fitnah al-kobrah, or the great schism and civil
war. Subsequently, the community was permanently divided into Sunnis and Shiites
and government came to be based on pre-Islamic models of kingship.
‘Ali’s successor, Mu’awiyah b. Sufyan, was the governor of Syria, ‘Uthman’s
cousin and one of ‘Ali’s strongest opponents. Mu’awiyah moved the capital to
Damascus and established the Umayyad dynasty when he appointed his son, Yazid, to
succeed him. The Umayyads ruled for just under a century in which corruption and
abuse increased, until they were overthrown in a revolution that led to the
establishment of a new dynasty, the ‘Abbasids, who built for themselves a new capital
city, Baghdad. By the tenth century ‘Abbasid authority was weakening and a rival
Shii caliphate was established in North Africa by the Fatimids who built as their
capital city, Cairo. It was in response to the growing power of the Fatimids that a
descendent of a survivor of the Umayyad house who had made his way to Spain,
decided to declare a third rival caliphate in Cordoba.
The relatively quick succession of regimes in Islamic Spain (about one every
century) produced an often tenuous political legitimacy and the need for ongoing
debate and shifting points of appeal. This paper compares how four historians from
four successive regimes in Spain used the events of the fitnah al-kobra to defend the
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religio-political legitimacy of their rulers. They selected and shuffled their evidence
within the four criteria for religious and political legitimacy in order to produce
narratives that had contemporary rhetorical resonance.
The Umayyad Caliphate of Cordoba is considered one of the golden ages of
Islamic Civilization. Although most of Spain had been under Muslim control for over
two hundred years, it is only with the establishment of the second Umayyad Caliphate
in the tenth century and its claims to be the rightful successor to the Prophet that we
find Muslim Spanish historians interested in the events of early Islamic history.
Perhaps it is not surprising then that this period produced an anonymous treatise on
early Islamic political history entitled Al-Imamah wa’l-siyasah (The Imamate and
Government).1 The author of the Imamah is not interested in defending the piety or
unity of ‘Uthman, ‘Ali, or the Companions. Rather both sides in the conflict are
presented in such a way as to undermine ‘Abbasid and Fatimid legitimacy, while
strengthening that of Mu’awiyah and his descendents, the Umayyads. Mu’awiyah is
clearly the hero of the narrative, occupying one fifth of a history that covers two
centuries. Moreover, the Umayyads of Damascus are remembered for their conquest
of North Africa and Spain, suggesting the Umayyads of Cordoba are the rightful
Muslim rulers of these regions.
In terms of the fitnah, ‘Uthman’s abilities as caliph and ‘Ali’s efforts to
become caliph are criticized from the very beginning. When ‘Uthman was elected
one of the Companions admitted to ‘Ali that many people were not happy with
‘Uthman as their caliph. But he also urged ‘Ali not to use this for his own advantage,
warning that if he did so swords would be loosened in the community. But ‘Uthman
abused his authority and several key companions, including ‘Ali, united in opposition
1
Al-Imamah wa’l-siyasah, ed. Taha Muhammad al-Zayni, n.d.
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against him. Only Mu’awiyah appears as a faithful supporter, not so much of
‘Uthman, but of the authority of the caliph and the loyalty due him.
In contrast to ‘Uthman’s weak leadership and the divisions within the
community, the Imamah holds up Mu’awiyah’s decisive leadership and the support he
commanded in Syria as crucial for the survival of the caliphate and the unity of the
community. It was Mu’awiyah who called for a meeting of the Companions to
discuss the grievances against ‘Uthman. In this meeting Mu’awiyah summarized their
history since Muhammad’s death and emphasized that they had all sworn allegiance
to ‘Uthman. He urged them to avoid folly and to be patient with what they did not
like. It is the authority rather than the character or conduct of the caliph that is most
important. He warned that if they did not take heed of his own supporters in Syria,
then fitnah would break out in the community and there would be mass violence that
would end with the murder of ‘Uthman and ‘Ali. His prediction was correct.
According to the author, if more people had taken Mu’awiyah’s authority into
consideration, violence and disunity could have been avoided.
The Imamah undermines the piety and unity of the Companions while
emphasizing the authority of Mu’awyiah. Mu’awiyah urged ‘Uthman to confront the
Companions who were challenging him, but ‘Uthman refused claiming he could do
nothing to harm the Prophet’s Companions or to bring bloodshed into the community.
This proved to be a naïve position since the Companions were already behaving
treacherously and bloodshed ensued regardless. However, it is significant that when
Mu’awiah asked for the right to avenge ‘Uthman -- if he was killed – ‘Uthman
granted him this right. This legitimizes Mu’awiyah’s opposition to ‘Ali, suggesting
that Mu’awiyah was ‘Uthman’s legitimate successor. This is further supported by the
story of ‘Uthman’s wife sending a letter to Mu’waiyah describing ‘Uthman’s murder
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with which she also sent ‘Uthman’s bloody shirt and Quran. This describes a
symbolic transfer of political and religious authority to Mu’awiyah.
Despite the author of the Imamah’s assertions of the political and ideological
strength of the Cordoban Caliphate, it lasted less than a century
The eleventh century was one of internal divisions and Sunni-Shiite tensions
throughout the Islamic world, including Spain. The caliphate in the West dissolved
into a number of small statelets, ruled by amirs known as the ta’ifah rulers or “party
kings,” deriving from the Arabic word ta’ifah, meaning “party” or “faction.” The
Party-Kings were known appropriately for their loose living and also f or their
collusion with various Christian rulers in order to strengthen their own position
against rival Muslim leaders within Spain. In response to these internal divisions and
weaknesses, writing on the early Islamic period shifted away from political history
and towards religious biography. The eleventh century is awash with hagiographies,
of which Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr of Cordoba’s (d. 1070) Al-Isti’ab fi ma’rifat al-ashab
(Study of the Knowledge of the Companions of the Prophet)2 is a representative
Spanish example.
In contrast to the author of the Imamah, Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr is concerned with
piety rather than authority, with religious virtue rather than political acumen. His
entries rely on hadith, or the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, in praise of various
Companions. The focus is not on causation or accountability, but isolated character
traits and virtues. His brief laudatory biography of ‘Uthman is a virtual rebuttal of the
accusations against ‘Uthman. Rather than misappropriating public treasury resources
for his own private purposes, ‘Uthman is praised for sharing his wealth with the
people. Not only did ‘Uthman not show favoritism to certain members of his family,
Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr al-Numayri, Al-Isti’ab fi ma’rifat al-ashab, ed. ‘Ali Muhammad al-Bukhari (Cairo:
Maktabat nahdah Marr wa-matba’atiha, n.d.).
2
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he: “loved, defended, and dealt cordially with all believers on earth without
exception.”3 Similarly, ‘Ali is praised for his early conversion and support for
Muhammad, his prowess in battle and wisdom and asceticism as caliph. Ibn ‘Abd alBarr does not debate the claims of ‘Ali and Mu’awiyah to exercise authority. Indeed,
in direct contrast to the Imamah, there is little religious obligation upon Ibn ‘Abd alBarr to defend Mu’awiyah. His brief entry on Mu’awiyah includes some of the
“firsts” of his reign, including: introducing hereditary succession, body guards, and
eunuchs – in other words, the accoutrements of royal authority. In fact he notes that
Mu’awiyah claimed to be the first [Islamic] king; a development generally regarded
as decidedly un-Islamic.
The tendency to prioritize an a-historical piety was not unique to Spain during
the divisions and weaknesses that plagued the Islamic world in the eleventh century.
However, Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr also reflects the specific situation in Spain. He concludes
an account of one of ‘Uthman’s sermon’s with the following observation:
If the Muslims… had resisted selfishness, they would have been sufficiently
sustained... But they became impatient and unsheathed their swords with
those who unsheathed theirs. As a result their swords became sheathed with
unbelievers and unsheathed and raised in the face of Muslims until the Day of
Judgment.4
Blame is placed not only on greedy members of the community, but the eternal
consequences of this. The community became divided as Muslims fought each other
instead of unbelievers. The analysis fits exactly the situation in Spain during the reign
of the Party-Kings when Christians made significant advances into Muslim territory.
The disunity of the Party-Kings was brought to an end and the Christian
Reconquista halted for a time, when Spain was invaded in the late eleventh century by
3
4
Ibid., 1041.
Ibid.
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a revivalist Berber dynasty from North Africa, the Almoravids.5 The Almoravids
were welcomed by the Muslim religious leaders of Spain, but resisted by many others.
Compared to the cultural and intellectual sophistication of Islamic Spain, the Berbers
were backward barbarians. But faced with the suzerainty of the Christians or the
Almoravids, as one ta’ifah ruler concluded, it was better to herd camels than pigs.6
Recognizing this deficit, the Almoravids sought to legitimize their seizure of power
on the basis of reestablishing the unity of the Muslim community. As a part of this
program they sent Abu Bakr ibn al-‘Arabi (d. 1148),7 a scholar from Seville, to seek a
title of investiture from the ‘Abbasid caliph in Baghdad for the Almoravid amir.
Among Ibn al-‘Arabi’s works is the book Al-‘Awasim min al-qawasim, or
Preservation from Destruction,8 in which he presents a series of historical and
theological disasters (qawasim) that befell the Islamic community and then presents
how the community was preserved (‘awasim) from them. He does this through
refuting a particular heresy or giving different historical interpretations of an event.
According to Ibn al-‘Arabi, historians “concoct [stories] to poison weak hearts which
they push into people’s heads to make them despise their forefathers and disregard
religion.”9 Ibn al-‘Arabi argues, however, “[Religion] is greater than that and they
[the forefathers] are better than we.”10 In other words, he determines the reliability of
historical sources based on the a priori assumption that the Companions could not
The name is derived from the Arabic, “al-Murabitun.” “This word was once assumed to be derived
from a type of ‘warrior-monk’ who inhabited a ribat, a fortified convent on the frontiers of Islam, and
this sense is no doubt the correct one in several instances. However, the Saharan Murabitun may well
have regarded their name as metaphorical, a spiritual discipline rather than a literal toponymic or
geographical nomenclature attached to a convent or retreat.” H.T. Norris, “Al-Murabitun,”
Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed.
6
Angus Mackay and Muhammad Benaboud, “Alfonso VI of León and Castille, ‘al-Imbratur dhu-lMillatayn’,” Bulletin of Hispanic Studies 56 (1979): 96.
7
He is not to be confused with Muhyi’l-Din Muhammad Ibn al-‘Arabi (d. 1240), the great sufi master.
Muhyi’l-Din is often referred to, incorrectly, as Ibn ‘Arabi in order to distinguish him from Abu Bakr
b. al-‘Arabi.
8
Abu Bakr ibn al-‘Arabi, Al-‘Awasim min al-qawasim, ed. ‘Ammar Halbi (Cairo: Maktabat Dar alTurath, 1997).
9
Ibid., 350.
10
Ibid., 349.
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have done anything blameworthy. The unity of the community is the compass by
which he navigates the treacherous waters of the first fitnah. He then asserts a similar
unity is necessary to strengthen the cause of Islam in the present.
In his narrative of the revolt and the siege of ‘Uthman, Ibn al-‘Arabi defends
the Companions’ unity and ‘Uthman’s character. It was men from the provinces who
were stirring up fitnah. Mu’awiyah confronted them and accused them of “tearing
apart the sanctity of the community” and behaving like those living in ignorance
before Islam.11 In contrast to the dissidents’ desire for fitnah, ‘Uthman refused to
remove the shirt of authority placed upon him by God which would abandon the
Prophet’s community to division and discord. Indeed it was ‘Uthman’s unwillingness
to introduce bloodshed into the community that ultimately led to his own death.
According to Ibn al-‘Arabi, 20,000 men offered to defend ‘Uthman. However, he
refused, preferring instead to surrender himself to God’s will, forcing the Companions
to do likewise.
After discussing ‘Uthman’s death, Ibn al-‘Arabi’s first priority continues to be
defending the Companions and the unity of the community. He regards the oath of
allegiance given to ‘Ali as binding and questions the reliability of accounts that claim
some Companions opposed ‘Ali’s caliphate. As for Mu’awiyah’s opposition, he
describes this as a war between the people of Iraq and Syria, between those who gave
the oath of allegiance to ‘Ali and those demanding retribution for ‘Uthman’s murder.
Ibn al-‘Arabi admits that both sides had their perspective and their rights, but ‘Ali’s
were greater. Thus he does not explicitly condemn Mu’awiyah’s refusal to support
‘Ali’s caliphate in the name of vengeance for ‘Uthman, but he does point out
Mu’awiyah’s position was weaker because he threatened the unity of the community.
11
Ibid., 292.
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In direct contrast to the Imamah, Ibn al-‘Arabi holds up the ideals of a unified
community -- past and present -- over any special claims for Mu’awiyah or his
descendents.
In Ibn al-‘Arabi’s treatment of subsequent conflicts he consistently sides with
those who represent a continuation and preservation of the unity of the community.
For example, he defends Mu’awiayh’s appointment of his son, Yazid, to succeed him
even though this is regarded as an evil innovation by most Muslims. Consequently,
Ibn al-‘Arabi is unsympathetic towards the failed revolt against Yazid led by ‘Ali’s
son, Husayn. The brutal massacre of Husayn, Muhammad’s grandson, and his family
at Karbala in Iraq is a horrible tragedy for all Muslims, and was especially significant
in the formation of Shii identity. But according to Ibn al-‘Arabi, Husayn was in the
wrong for threatening the unity of the community. Ibn al-‘Arabi’s concern with unity
leads him to regard as one of the “crises” in the community the Shii view that the
caliphate should have gone to ‘Ali from the very beginning.
Ibn al-’Arabi’s critique of the Shii broadens to include a refutation of special
status claimed for any individual or group. In this his position is consistent with his
patrons, the Almoravids, who had no claim to legitimacy beyond their religious zeal.
According to Ibn al-‘Arabi, to claim special status for any individual is contrary to
Islam and verging on idolatry. He quotes the Quranic verse: “God has promised to
make those of you who believe and do the right, leaders in the land . . . and will
establish their faith which He has chosen for them and change their fear into
security.”12 The right to lead the community belongs to those who can now
accomplish the promises of God, defend the territory of Islam, and carry out Islamic
12
Q 24:55.
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government. According to Ibn al-‘Arabi, this is the Almoravids with the support and
guidance of the religious establishment in Spain.
As long as the Almoravids were able to do this they were supported by the
religious leaders in Spain. Eventually, however, the Almoravids suffered under the
same demands of government that compromised the Party-Kings. The pressure of
continual fighting against the Christians forced them to institute extra-Quranic taxes.
Internal divisions and weaknesses encouraged individual Almoravid generals to make
treaties with Christian rulers in order to ensure their own survival. As the Almoravid
government came to resemble that of its predecessors, it too fell victim to a new
Islamic reformist movement rising out of North Africa, known as the Almohads.
The Almohads came with renewed emphasis on jihad and accused the
Almoravids of a variety of corruptions and heresies.13 It is not surprising therefore,
that histories from this period approach early Islamic events almost exclusively from
the perspective of the conquests. In the first miraculous, rapid expansion of Islam,
was to be found the inspiration for the current crisis. But even this was short lived
and by the middle of the 13th century the Almohads too were divided and defeated;
Muslim authority in Spain reduced to a small enclave around Granada.
Having traced the relationship between historical circumstances and religiopolitical rhetoric, we must ask what are the ethical implications of this relationship.
These rhetorical patterns have endured down to the present day. Appeals to authority,
or stability, are used by existing leaders who want to defend the status quo and assert
their rights over their rivals. According to the religious scholars, stability and unity
were seen as complimentary. Both were necessary for the smooth functioning of the
13
Among these, was the charge of anthropomorphism. The Almohads emphasized the oneness of God
(tawhid) from which they derive their name in Arabic, al-Muwahhidun. M. Shatzmiller, “AlMuwahhidun,” Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed.
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religious life of the community, from the appointment of reliable judges and preachers
to safe roads for religious and intellectual pilgrimage. But if the political authorities
ensured stability, it was the religious leaders who defined and defended unity. When
political power and unity was lacking, they were able to do this through focusing on
the piety of the Companions and the religious identity of the community. The
hagiographies they produced have had the strongest impact on popular perceptions of
early Islamic history until today. However, in recent years, these memories have
shifted from being not only the inspiration for personal piety and spiritual identity, but
also the desired basis for government policy and national identity. Similarly, jihad, or
the defense of the Muslim community, has always been an Islamic religio-political
ideal. However, it took on added rhetorical significance during a period of internal
divisions and external threats in the 11th and 12th centuries. The rhetoric was
developed and utilized in support of those lacking other claims to legitimacy as a
critique of the weakened political establishment -- and appears to be serving the same
purpose today.
A noteworthy omission from this analysis has been appeals to justice –
certainly one of the foundational principles of early Islamic government. While one
noteworthy medieval Islamic political theorist has asserted: “a kingdom may last
while there is irreligion, but it will not endure when there is oppression,”14 the more
common position has been that justice will be the inevitable consequence of authority,
piety, unity, and security. To the extent that this legacy too has endured, current
approaches to interpreting the past – that is gambling on the past to gain the present -may prove to be a losing hand.
14
Nizam al-Mulk, The Book of Government or Rules for Kings, trans. Hubert Drake (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), 12.
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