Download The goodness of pleasure: Epicurean ethics

In defence of Epicurus
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In criticism of Epicurus
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The goodness of pleasure:
Epicurean ethics
Willie Costello
August 1, 2013
In defence of Epicurus
. . . . . .
In criticism of Epicurus
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On Moral Ends I
Today’s lecture brought to you by the word…
hēdonē (ἡδονή) = “pleasure”
hedonism
an ethical theory which claims that pleasure is the good
In defence of Epicurus
. . . . . .
In criticism of Epicurus
. . . . . . .
On Moral Ends I
Intuitive support for hedonism
pleasure is…
the ultimate end: everything else is a means to it, while it is not a means to
anything else (I.29)
the natural object of desire: every animal naturally seeks pleasure (I.30)
self-explanatory: no need for further justification as to why pleasure should
be sought (I.30)
accurately perceived: the senses perceive what’s pleasant, and the senses
perceive the truth (I.30)
self-sufficient: a life of pleasure and without pain seems lacking in nothing
(I.40)
causally efficacious: pleasure/pain explains why we seek/avoid things (I.42)
In defence of Epicurus
. . . . . .
In criticism of Epicurus
. . . . . . .
On Moral Ends I
Rational hedonism
pleasure must be sought rationally
the Epicurean seeks the greatest net pleasure,
not the greatest immediate pleasure
“the greatest pleasure” = freedom from pain
In defence of Epicurus
. . . . . .
In criticism of Epicurus
. . . . . . .
On Moral Ends I
Pleasure and virtue
wisdom
the art of locating and obtaining pleasure
temperance
obtains the greatest pleasure by foregoing other pleasures
courage
frees us from terrors, fears, and pain
justice
makes one’s life more secure and thereby more pleasant
In defence of Epicurus
. . . . . .
In criticism of Epicurus
. . . . . . .
On Moral Ends I
Mental pleasures
there are mental as well as bodily pleasures
but mental pleasures originate in the body
mental pleasures are greater than bodily pleasures:
they comprise, not only the present, but also the past and future
we are pleased by the memory of past goods
and the prospect of future ones
In defence of Epicurus
. . . . . .
In criticism of Epicurus
. . . . . . .
On Moral Ends I
Pleasure and friendship
a life without friends is fearful and painful
∴
a life with friends is more pleasant,
and we should thereby acquire friends
friendship is instrumental to a pleasant life
In defence of Epicurus
. . . . . .
In criticism of Epicurus
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On Moral Ends II
The definition of pleasure
“an agreeable stimulus that gladdens the senses”
̸=
freedom from pain
↓
↓
kinetic pleasure
static pleasure
In defence of Epicurus
. . . . . .
In criticism of Epicurus
. . . . . . .
On Moral Ends II
Against “virtuous hedonism”
To show that their hedonism does not result in vice, Epicureans say:
“If those things in which the indulgent find pleasure freed
them from fear of the gods, and from death and pain, and
taught them the limits of desire, then we would have
nothing to reproach them for. They would have their fill of
pleasures in every way, with no element of pain or distress,
that is, of evil.” (II.21)
But this statement is absurd!
In defence of Epicurus
. . . . . .
In criticism of Epicurus
. . . . . . .
On Moral Ends II
Against pleasure as the natural object of desire
if pleasure = static pleasure =⇒
our natural desire is for self-preservation
if pleasure = kinetic pleasure =⇒
our natural desire is for (unrestricted) indulgence
In defence of Epicurus
. . . . . .
In criticism of Epicurus
. . . . . . .
On Moral Ends II
Against the Epicurean account of friendship
many other things outweigh friendship in terms of utility
∴
if friendship is sought on the basis of utility,
then no one would chose friendship (over money, power, etc.)
In defence of Epicurus
. . . . . .
In criticism of Epicurus
. . . . . . .
On Moral Ends II
Against mental pleasures
claiming that all mental pleasures originate in the body
seems implausible
claiming that some mental pleasures do not originate in the body
rejects the Epicurean conception of pleasure
if mental pleasures are greater than bodily pleasures,
then mental pains are greater than bodily pains
and the wise person will experience both
In defence of Epicurus
. . . . . .
In criticism of Epicurus
. . . . . . .
On Moral Ends II
Against pleasure as the criterion of happiness
happiness refers to a whole life
(it is impossible to be happy at one time and unhappy at another)
in contrast, pleasure is temporary and subject to chance
a simple argument:
. whoever is afflicted by the greatest evil cannot at that time be happy
2. the wise person is always happy
3. the wise person is sometimes afflicted by pain
1
∴ pain ̸= the greatest evil
In defence of Epicurus
. . . . . .
In criticism of Epicurus
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For next class
The goodness of virtue: Stoic & Peripatetic ethics
On Moral Ends III.1–61: Stoics ethics – defence
Stoics identify morality/virtue as the only good. How do they account for the
other things in life that people typically value (e.g. wealth, health, honour)?
Stoics believe that the goodness of morality has a natural basis. What is this
basis? How do humans come to recognize morality as the good?
What are some of controversial consequences of the Stoics’ position? What
statements in Cato’s defence do you find particularly unintuitive, and why?
On Moral Ends IV.1–43, 56–60, 69–72: Stoic ethics – criticisms
Why does Cicero believe that the Stoics’ natural basis for their ethics is faulty?
Why does Cicero believe that the Stoics have merely a verbal, and not a
substantive, disagreement with their opponents?
On Moral Ends V.9–12, 24–40, 59–60, 71–72, 77–86: Peripatetic ethics
How does the Peripatetic’s appeal to nature differ from the Stoic’s?
How does the Peripatetic’s appeal to nature relate to their account of what’s
good?
Why does Cicero believe the Peripatetic’s position to be self-contradictory?