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In defence of Epicurus . . . . . . In criticism of Epicurus . . . . . . . . . The goodness of pleasure: Epicurean ethics Willie Costello August 1, 2013 In defence of Epicurus . . . . . . In criticism of Epicurus . . . . . . . On Moral Ends I Today’s lecture brought to you by the word… hēdonē (ἡδονή) = “pleasure” hedonism an ethical theory which claims that pleasure is the good In defence of Epicurus . . . . . . In criticism of Epicurus . . . . . . . On Moral Ends I Intuitive support for hedonism pleasure is… the ultimate end: everything else is a means to it, while it is not a means to anything else (I.29) the natural object of desire: every animal naturally seeks pleasure (I.30) self-explanatory: no need for further justification as to why pleasure should be sought (I.30) accurately perceived: the senses perceive what’s pleasant, and the senses perceive the truth (I.30) self-sufficient: a life of pleasure and without pain seems lacking in nothing (I.40) causally efficacious: pleasure/pain explains why we seek/avoid things (I.42) In defence of Epicurus . . . . . . In criticism of Epicurus . . . . . . . On Moral Ends I Rational hedonism pleasure must be sought rationally the Epicurean seeks the greatest net pleasure, not the greatest immediate pleasure “the greatest pleasure” = freedom from pain In defence of Epicurus . . . . . . In criticism of Epicurus . . . . . . . On Moral Ends I Pleasure and virtue wisdom the art of locating and obtaining pleasure temperance obtains the greatest pleasure by foregoing other pleasures courage frees us from terrors, fears, and pain justice makes one’s life more secure and thereby more pleasant In defence of Epicurus . . . . . . In criticism of Epicurus . . . . . . . On Moral Ends I Mental pleasures there are mental as well as bodily pleasures but mental pleasures originate in the body mental pleasures are greater than bodily pleasures: they comprise, not only the present, but also the past and future we are pleased by the memory of past goods and the prospect of future ones In defence of Epicurus . . . . . . In criticism of Epicurus . . . . . . . On Moral Ends I Pleasure and friendship a life without friends is fearful and painful ∴ a life with friends is more pleasant, and we should thereby acquire friends friendship is instrumental to a pleasant life In defence of Epicurus . . . . . . In criticism of Epicurus . . . . . . . On Moral Ends II The definition of pleasure “an agreeable stimulus that gladdens the senses” ̸= freedom from pain ↓ ↓ kinetic pleasure static pleasure In defence of Epicurus . . . . . . In criticism of Epicurus . . . . . . . On Moral Ends II Against “virtuous hedonism” To show that their hedonism does not result in vice, Epicureans say: “If those things in which the indulgent find pleasure freed them from fear of the gods, and from death and pain, and taught them the limits of desire, then we would have nothing to reproach them for. They would have their fill of pleasures in every way, with no element of pain or distress, that is, of evil.” (II.21) But this statement is absurd! In defence of Epicurus . . . . . . In criticism of Epicurus . . . . . . . On Moral Ends II Against pleasure as the natural object of desire if pleasure = static pleasure =⇒ our natural desire is for self-preservation if pleasure = kinetic pleasure =⇒ our natural desire is for (unrestricted) indulgence In defence of Epicurus . . . . . . In criticism of Epicurus . . . . . . . On Moral Ends II Against the Epicurean account of friendship many other things outweigh friendship in terms of utility ∴ if friendship is sought on the basis of utility, then no one would chose friendship (over money, power, etc.) In defence of Epicurus . . . . . . In criticism of Epicurus . . . . . . . On Moral Ends II Against mental pleasures claiming that all mental pleasures originate in the body seems implausible claiming that some mental pleasures do not originate in the body rejects the Epicurean conception of pleasure if mental pleasures are greater than bodily pleasures, then mental pains are greater than bodily pains and the wise person will experience both In defence of Epicurus . . . . . . In criticism of Epicurus . . . . . . . On Moral Ends II Against pleasure as the criterion of happiness happiness refers to a whole life (it is impossible to be happy at one time and unhappy at another) in contrast, pleasure is temporary and subject to chance a simple argument: . whoever is afflicted by the greatest evil cannot at that time be happy 2. the wise person is always happy 3. the wise person is sometimes afflicted by pain 1 ∴ pain ̸= the greatest evil In defence of Epicurus . . . . . . In criticism of Epicurus . . . . . . . For next class The goodness of virtue: Stoic & Peripatetic ethics On Moral Ends III.1–61: Stoics ethics – defence Stoics identify morality/virtue as the only good. How do they account for the other things in life that people typically value (e.g. wealth, health, honour)? Stoics believe that the goodness of morality has a natural basis. What is this basis? How do humans come to recognize morality as the good? What are some of controversial consequences of the Stoics’ position? What statements in Cato’s defence do you find particularly unintuitive, and why? On Moral Ends IV.1–43, 56–60, 69–72: Stoic ethics – criticisms Why does Cicero believe that the Stoics’ natural basis for their ethics is faulty? Why does Cicero believe that the Stoics have merely a verbal, and not a substantive, disagreement with their opponents? On Moral Ends V.9–12, 24–40, 59–60, 71–72, 77–86: Peripatetic ethics How does the Peripatetic’s appeal to nature differ from the Stoic’s? How does the Peripatetic’s appeal to nature relate to their account of what’s good? Why does Cicero believe the Peripatetic’s position to be self-contradictory?