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CSID 2009 Conference: “Peacemaking between America and the Muslim World: Beginning a New Chapter in US-Islamic Relations?” By Nathan C. Funki Assistant Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies University of Waterloo [email protected] ABSTRACT: The advent of the Obama administration has created a window of opportunity for new beginnings in US relations with the Muslim world. Taking advantage of this opportunity, however, will require both political courage and a well-informed, well-developed strategy of active peacemaking that contrasts greatly with the approach of the last eight years (marked as it was by confrontation, ideological inflexibility, contradiction, and resistance to diplomatic engagement with adversaries), while also moving beyond the standard repertoire of practices associated with foreign policy realism. In the absence of a new strategy underpinned by principles of conflict resolution, democratic change, and restorative justice, the promise of the present moment is likely to go unfulfilled, giving way to an uncomfortable and unsteady new status quo. This paper presents a set of principles and prescriptions for breaking the present impasse in American-Islamic relations. These principles and prescriptions, derived from academic studies of peacemaking in protracted intergroup conflict as well as from critical evaluation of past US policies, are intended to build upon President Obama’s stated commitment to founding relations upon “mutual interest and mutual respect.” They underscore the vital importance of: 1) listening carefully to various Muslim accounts of the “backstory” behind present tensions; 2) embracing conflict de-escalation as an overarching strategy for marginalizing extremists by “draining the swamp” of enmity that is fed by various enduring rivalries (esp. US-Iranian, Israeli-Palestinian/ Arab, and US-Arab) in Islamic-Western relations; 3) consistently conveying respect for Islam, while simultaneously inviting dialogue about Islamic bases for peaceable relations; 4) articulating a “new deal” in US-Muslim relations based on internationally legitimate norms and standards rather than on traditional forms of geopolitical expediency; 5) drawing upon restorative justice principles to formulate diplomatic messages that signal commitment to genuine change in hitherto troubled historical relationships; and 6) developing a more genuinely “democratic” (as opposed to coercive or ethnocentric) set of guidelines for supporting democratic “change from within” in Muslim-majority societies. Introduction: A Window of Opportunity The advent of the Obama administration has created a window of opportunity for improving U.S.-Islamic relations. After years of deepening antagonism between America and the Muslim world and decades of drift and deterioration, there is a chance for something new. Although it would be difficult if not impossible to make a “clean break” from all that has gone before – cultures of policymaking, conceptions of national interest, and images of the other do not change overnight, either in Muslim lands or in America – an opening has emerged for new strategic approaches to the many vexing problems that beset the relationship. Years of destructive conflict cannot simply be wished away, but the meaning of past events is subject to change if we can find the political courage to enact a strategy of active and persistent peacemaking. Finding the political courage for such a strategy will not be easy. Particularly at a time of economic crisis and domestic reconstruction, there is a temptation to preserve political capital and adopt a cautious approach rooted in precedents and practices that are widely believed to have “worked” during the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War eras. Such approaches, although preferable to a confrontational and ideological preoccupation with regime change and selective invocation of human rights norms, cannot deliver “the change we need” in U.S.-Islamic relations. To write – or, better yet, coauthor – a new chapter in relations with the Muslim world, the U.S. will need to move beyond the standard repertoire of practices associated with foreign policy realism and with past Middle East policy. In the absence of a strategy underpinned by principles of conflict resolution, restorative justice, and democratic change, the promise of the present moment is likely to go unfulfilled, giving way to an uncomfortable and unsteady new status quo. If, however, American leaders can transcend the temptation to simply repackage traditional formulas for “stability” and can instead make a more serious effort to engage the backstory to U.S. tensions with the Muslim world, genuine opportunities for transforming political and identity conflict (not only interstate but intersocietal and intercultural) are likely to emerge – to the benefit of all parties, not least the United States. Symbolic Gestures That U.S.-Islamic relations are a priority for the Obama administration has been evident since Inauguration Day. In his January 20 address, President Obama sounded a welcome note when he stated, “To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.”ii Two days later, he indicated an intent to engage the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by appointing George Mitchell as his special envoy to the Middle East, and on January 26 he granted his first formal interview as president to the Arabic-language satellite channel, AlArabiya. These gestures were accompanied by executive orders to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility and ban the use of torture, and followed up by an Iranian Nowruz message on March 20 and an address on U.S.-Turkish as well as Muslim-American relations in Ankara on April 6. Taken together, such words and deeds communicate an aspiration to depart from the policies and the overall tone of the Bush administration, and reinforce the symbolism of change that Obama himself represents. While Middle Eastern commentators have detected many areas of continuity with Bush administration policies, particularly on Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, many Muslims are profoundly hopeful that America’s first black president – a president with Muslim relatives, life experience in Indonesia, and a presumed capacity to identify with people struggling for justice and equality in many parts of the world – will provide substantively different policies than those formulated by George Bush’s policy team. There is a hope that he will adopt a humbler policy that is more inclined to listen and negotiate than to dictate and polarize. Although not necessarily new, affirmation that the United States is not and will never be the enemy of Islam are welcome and salutary, particularly when repeated. Juan Cole characterizes the impact of such overtures in the following terms: The Obama administration has succeeded in changing the tone of US diplomacy with the Greater Middle East. Note that a better job could have been done. Aljazeera would have been a more effective place to do an interview than al-Arabiya, since it is much more widely watched. There were a few aggressive notes in the speech to Iran, which were gratuitous and helped to provoke the grumpy Iranian response. In polling, publics in the Middle East did see positive changes in US policy, with about 40% praising the changes. In Lebanon and the UAE it was over 50%, while in the outlier, Iran, it was only 29%. Still, the trend lines are the right ones.iii Overall, Obama’s personal approach has been positive and his words have been constructive. Given the extremely low popularity of the United States in the Middle East in the years since 9/11, even modest improvements would be welcome.iv But as Cole notes, the warming to America is still tentative and fragile, and will only prove to be an enduring phenomenon if policy challenges can be met. “[T]one is easy, where there is a will. Substance is hard.”v Official Iranian critiques of Obama’s initiatives, though less stark and mono-dimensional than North American media outlets have suggested (Cole characterizes the overall response as a hedged, “wait and see” positionvi), underscore this point. Though his initial reactions, including a call for an apology for 60 years of U.S. policies, were widely regarded as consistent with his penchant for diplomatically maladroit speech, Ahmadinejad spoke for many Middle Eastern Muslims when he stated, “change should be fundamental, not tactical.”vii A range of Iranian leaders, from Supreme Leader Sayyid ‘Ali Khamene’i to ‘Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, called for more explicit recognition of rights (Iranian as well as Palestinian), a suspension of threats and “carrot and stick” language, and broader attitude changes in the direction of respect, equality, and fairness.viii Arab commentators echoed many of these concerns, with many reiterating the substantive changes they would have to see before believing in new words from Washington. President-elect Obama's prolonged silence concerning Israel’s 22-day offensive (December 27, 2008 to January 17, 2009) against Hamas in Gaza created an opening for al-Qa‘ida, which sought to reinforce its longstanding characterization of America as the leader of a “Zionist-crusader coalition.”ix While such criticism could be expected of al-Qa’ida, more principled and even-handed Arab and Muslim commentators have made it clear that there is “a history of disappointment” in the Middle East, and that people are keenly watching to see what America will actually do to affect change in Israeli-Palestinian relations, to sustain progress toward genuine Iraqi selfdetermination, to prevent a quagmire in Afghanistan, to adopt a less instrumentalized and inconsistent approach to democratization issues, and to avoid a potentially devaastating militarized confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program.x Clearly, navigating such challenges in U.S.-Middle Eastern and American-Islamic relations will require attention to both style and substance. To cultivate new dynamics and enhance long-term U.S. security, American leaders would do well to listen closely to – and, indeed, to critically engage – sceptical voices, an effort to identify underlying roots of present conflict and formulate guiding principles for U.S. actions in the years ahead. Roots of Conflict While it is important to acknowledge that the Bush administration did not get everything wrong in its intellectual response to 9/11 – the new, albeit temporary, emphasis on democratization and acknowledgment of past support for narrowly based regimes was positive – failures at the level of policy owe much to reliance on a very narrow circle of advisors and pundits, with extremely selective solicitation of input from outside sources. The result was an incomplete, self-referential, and in no small part self-serving interpretation of U.S.-Islamic relations. Administration officials and spokespersons were far too quick subsume the new conflict within comfortably familiar parameters of American nationalistic and exceptionalist thinking, and to portray the struggle as yet another episode in an epic confrontation between grand principles of freedom and tyranny. Many familiar elements of the previous administration’s misdiagnosis of Muslim radicalism are evident in Norman Podhoretz’s tract, World War IV: The Long Struggle against Islamofascism. In this book, Podhoretz characterizes America’s “Islamofascist” enemy as “the latest mutation of the totalitarian threat to our civilization.”xi Relying on Bernard Lewis and on an apparent conviction that Islam is, at root, a religion of the sword, Podhortz ascribes contemporary manifestations of Muslim militancy to a fusion of premodern zeal with modern Nazi and Communist totalitarianism.xii The result, Islamofascism, is a “monster with two heads, one religious and the other secular... a truly malignant totalitarian enemy.”xiii Having thus dehumanized the foe and represented a range of movements – some quite destructive, others much less so – as an undifferentiated, monolithic force, Podhoretz goes on to state that the cause of present American insecurity is past weakness in the face of terrorist provocation. The possibility that America might have somehow contributed to the radicalization of Muslims is categorically rejected; rather, the problem is that the U.S. has not become sufficiently radicalized in the face of an implacable adversary. The absence of the will to treat acts of terrorism as acts of war has only emboldened an enemy who opposes American values and not just American policies. “American passivity and inaction,” he states, “opened the door to 9/11.”xiv Moreover, “we were hated by the terrorists who had attacked us and by their Muslim cheerleaders, not for our failings and sins, but precisely for our virtues as a free and prosperous country.”xv Acts of war must therefore be met with war, and the conflict is likely to be a protracted one. Although President Bush was generally more diplomatic in his labelling of the threat, Podhoretz’s conflict analysis overlaps to a very large extent with recent official narratives of the War on Terror. Like Podhoretz, Bush framed contemporary conflict in starkly moralistic terms, embraced a narrative that likened the struggle with terrorists to the struggles against fascism and Communism, identified transcendent principles with America’s sense of national mission, and rejected self-criticism as a form of weakness. No wonder, then, that Podhortez speaks of the Bush administration in highly affirmative terms, with his primary lines of critique addressed to Bush’s unwillingness to commit to the language of Islamofascism (being hampered, apparently, by diplomatic correctness) and his hesitation vis-a-vis Iran. Academically based critics, of course, have provided us with scathing and often perceptive critiques of such thinking. University of Manchester political scientist Richard Jackson, for example, argues that much discourse on terrorism works to deny and obscure its political origins and the possibility that it is a response to specific Western policies. That is, by assigning non-rational, cosmic aims to violent groups, the discourse depoliticizes, decontextualizes and dehistoricizes the grievances and political struggles of states and societies, thereby de-linking the motives of terrorists from the policies of Western states or their allies. xvi Through its repudiation of those who would critique Western policies and sweeping generalizations about the origins of modern Islamist movements, Podhoretz’s argument could be credited with fulfilling the functions Jackson describes. While it is undeniable that groups such as al-Qa’ida are indeed dangerous and capable of great destruction, Podhoretz’s broad statements concerning Islamofascism as a widespread and implacable ideological movement that fuses archaic religion with modern totalitarianism offers very little insight into the concrete political, economic, and cultural issues that contribute to radicalization and terrorist recruitment. By tarring a full spectrum of Islamists with the same brush, rhetoric such as that employed by Podhoretz lumps together those whom Muqtedar Khan refers to as “rogue Islamists” with democratic Islamists seeking electoral empowerment. As Jackson suggests, such discourse serves not only to bolster the cause of political repression, but also to “de-invest insurgent groups of any political authority or wider socio-cultural legitimacy they may have, in large part by appealing to the secular prejudice of Western societies.”xvii The need for re-evaluating policy choices is thereby evaded. Greater insight into the genuine grievances that motivate political violence in the Muslim world can be found in analyses such as those put forward by Robert Pape in Dying to Win.xviii While it would be unwise to ignore the religious dimension of contemporary Muslim politics, Pape rightly argues that the passions behind terrorism are profoundly political in character, and are by no means unique to Muslim contexts. Based on his comprehensive study of suicide terrorism between 1980 and 2003, Pape concludes that, though instrumentalized religious beliefs can play an enabling role, this form of political violence has an underlying secular logic: What nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is not religion, but a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel a democratic state to withdraw combat forces that terrorists either consider to be their homeland or prize greatly. From Lebanon to Israel to Sri Lanka to Kashmir to Chechnya, every suicide-terrorist campaign since 1980 has been waged by groups whose main goal has been to establish or maintain self-determination for territory the terrorists prize. Religion is rarely the root cause, although it is often used as a tool to mobilize for the cause and to support the broader strategic objective.xix In Pape’s view, events such as 9/11 demand political rather than ideological explanations, and are linked to Muslim indignation vis-a-vis the American military presence in the Arabian peninsula (especially but not exclusively Saudi Arabia) that became established after the first U.S.-Iraq War. As important as Pape’s comparative empirical analysis may be for comprehending circumstances that have motivated suicide terrorism in multiple contexts, questions nonetheless remain. For example, the United States has combat forces in many parts of the world, and not everywhere are these forces perceived as occupation forces that must be resisted at all costs. There is a need, therefore, to examine the various political and cultural factors that have made the U.S. military presence particularly unwelcome. Anthony Cordesman, an American security analyst who is not known for sentimentality, argues that it is precisely these factors that policymakers need to take into account. The U.S. national interest is not served by arguments that substitute ideological generalizations for analysis of specific grievances that give rise to militancy. The U.S., he suggests, has an image problem in Muslim lands, and this image problem is linked to specific foreign policy choices. The American image in the Islamic and Arab worlds is a key factor in building popular support and tolerance for extremist and terrorist movements. This anger against the United States is not directed at its values or “democracy,” but rather at tangible issues like the U.S. role in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Iraq War, and other U.S. policies in the Middle East. It is shaped by the perception that the U.S. reaction to 9/11 has gone beyond counterterrorism to a broad hostility to Islam and Arabs.xx Insofar as U.S. public diplomacy is failing, Cordesman states, the cause is not salesmanship but rather the product that must be sold. Broad surveys of Muslim public opinion, such as those discussed in Esposito and Mogahed’s Who Speaks for Islam?, suggest a similar conclusion.xxi According to Gallup polls, both politically moderate and radicalized Muslims admire many aspects of American and Western culture, including political freedoms, technological innovation, and a work ethic that has led to prosperity. Their dislikes with respect to America and the West concern not just the diffusion of a culture they regard as permissive, but also to the impact of external political influences on their own self-determination. A key difference between radicals and moderates, Esposito and Mogahed argue, is not the degree of religious commitment, but rather the greater pessimism of radicals with respect to prospects for real change to a situation they regard as humiliating and an “unacceptable”: For the politically radicalized, their fear of Western control and domination, as well as lack of self-determination, reinforces their sense of powerlessness. xxii A primary catalyst for radicalism, often seen as inseparable from the threat to Muslim religious and cultural identity, is the threat of political domination and occupation.xxiii Within this context, politically engaged individuals are inclined to turn to Islam as a language of solidarity and mobilization, and as a basis for critiquing unjust authority. Campaigns for instituting shari‘a become a framework for cultural as well as political self-determination and legitimacy, based on indigenous rather than externally imposed values and standards. As US intelligence agencies have acknowledged, excessive militarization of the “war on terrorism” (and particularly the choice to invade Iraq) feeds the very perceptions that inspire recruitment into radical Islamist groups.xxiv Overconfidence in the utility of military force in resolving contemporary problems of non-state political violence has brought increasing turbulence not only to the Middle East, but also to increasingly diverse Western societies. Contrary to the arguments of Podhoretz and other neoconservative thinkers, war appears highly ineffective for destroying the “taproot” of terrorism, particularly insofar as it reinforces the “us vs. them” dynamic of identity conflict and gives an undeserved advantage to rhetoric stressing the “ancient origins” of present strife. Because the resort to military force feeds perceptions of confrontation and injustice and legitimizes popular resistance, war is an ultimately self-defeating mechanism for defeating Middle Eastern radicalism. Jackson frames the issue in the following terms: [T]here seems little doubt that Western counter-terrorism policies, based in large part on the productive categories of “Islamic terrorism” discourse, are at least partly responsible for intensifying cycles of violence and instability. That is, the Iraq invasion, the destruction of Fallluja, the Abu Ghraib abuses, the Guantanamo prison camp, the practice of extraordinary rendition and public support for Israel’s war against Lebanon – among others – are helping to construct further political grievances that could provide the justification for further acts of terrorism. xxv It is simply not possible to impose upon the Islamic world a set of political, cultural, and economic solutions that are viewed as inauthentic and humiliating. Attempts to do so have negative consequences not only for nonviolent democratization projects in the Middle East, but also for interreligious and intercultural relations in North America and Europe. The transnational character of Islamic identity ensures that at least some members of diaspora communities will view distant conflicts through Middle Eastern lenses, an outcome is nurtured in no small part by the climate of fear and suspicion that war engenders. Fortunately, the Obama administration appears to have recognized the inefficacy of the “War on Terror” framework, despite the continuing vitality of this framework among Obama’s critics. Nonetheless, current U.S. leaders would be wise to attend carefully to analyses of Muslim grievances such as those reviewed above, particularly in light of strong temptations to return to a traditional realist framework for managing state-to-state relations and for taming, coopting, or repressing Islamic movements. Political Realism and Beyond: Seeking Principles of Engagement After the profound setbacks experienced by U.S. military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the pendulum of elite American opinion has begun to swing back from neoconservatism to political realism, a school of thought in international relations that eschews excessive preoccupation with ideology and argues that statecraft must be conducted in accordance with principles of national interest and prudence. Though welcome in many respects as a corrective to arguments for open-ended war and political confrontation to transform Muslim societies, the “realist” philosophy also has a dark side that is increasingly forgotten in high-level political conversations. Both the strengths and limitations of realism are evident in Ethical Realism: A Vision for America’s Role in the World, by Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman.xxvi This impressively bipartisan book is the product of collaboration between a senior fellow at the New America Foundation and a former senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, both of whom became profoundly concerned at the direction of post-9/11 foreign policy. Together, they seek to restate and reconstruct what they consider to be the most compelling insights of the realist foreign policy tradition, using the painful experience of the Iraq war as salutary call to sobriety and humility. The book begins with a rather bold assertion: What has failed... has been not just the strategy of the administration of George W. Bush, but a whole way of looking at the world. This consists of the beliefs that America is both so powerful and so obviously good that it has the ability to spread democracy throughout the world; that if necessary, this can be achieved through war; that this mission can also be made to advance particular U.S. national interests; and that this combination will naturally be supported by good people all over the world, irrespective of their own political traditions, national allegiances, and national interests.xxvii In the post-9/11 era as in the Vietnam era, Lieven and Hulsman propose, U.S. strategic thinkers and policymakers have lost their way, and have allowed nationalistically inflated ideological certainties interfere with hard-headed analysis of the political world. By adopting a “for us or against us” drive for security through hegemony and excessive interference in the politics of other nations, leaders have forgotten one of the chief lessons of the Vietnam, that others may perceive a contradiction between U.S. strategies and their own “national pride and national aspirations.”xxviii In contrast to neoconservatism, Lieven and Hulsman call for an international strategy based on prudence; a concentration on possible results rather than good intentions; a close study of the nature, views, and interests of other states, and a willingness to accommodate them when possible; and a mixture of profound American patriotism with an equally profound awareness of the limits on American power and on American goodness.xxix Rather than posit the United States as an exceptional nation that is uniquely responsible for a establishing a moral world order, Lieven and Hulsman state that effective foreign policy requires “a capacity to see ourselves as a nation as others see us.”xxx Like other states, the U.S. is potentially fallible. Rather than guaranteeing security, an “obsession with showing will” could easily lead to destructive foreign policy misadventures.xxxi A wiser course involves careful study of the world’s moral and political complexity, and an ability to differentiate between essential objectives that must be advanced forcefully and conditions that must be accepted – and worked with – as they are. When contrasted with the rhetoric and practice of recent years, this approach has many virtues. For example, Lieven and Hulsman wisely counsel against lumping all ideological Islamic movements together, or tarring them all with a “totalitarian” brush so as to more parsimoniously divide the world into “pro-terrorist” and “pro-American” camps.xxxii Quite rightly, they observe that neoconservatives and liberal hawks alike have failed to appreciate the significance of multiple ideological cleavages in Muslim politics between Arab nationalism and Islamism, or between Sunni and Shi‘a radicalism. The tendency to regard all such movements as equally totalitarian, fixed in essence, and inherently opposed to the United States has produced arrogant and ignorant foreign policy conversations. These conversations are only tenuously linked to realities on the ground: As the analysis of the “Islamic totalitarianism” line reveals, too much of the liberal hawk and neoconservative view of the Middle East – and, alas, of American perceptions in general – is overwhelmingly self-referential. Although ostensibly about backing Muslim liberals and defeating extremists, it is not really linked at all to real debates in the Muslim world.xxxiii In other words, the policies say as much about us and our own self-image as they do about the reality to which they are putatively addressed. No wonder, then, that Muslims in the Middle East and other regions have experience a profound disconnect between U.S. proclamations of support for democracy, and policies that appear to instrumentalize this concern and ignore input from local sources. Lieven and Hulsman put forward a persuasive argument for reclaiming essential insights from the realist foreign policy tradition while also retaining a moral compass. Their treatment of Middle Eastern and Muslim politics is far more sophisticated attuned to complex realities than more sensationalist writers, and they wisely counsel both “respect [for] the expression of Islam in political movements,”xxxiv a more even-handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and a more focused and realistic Iran policy that recognizes limits to American power. Despite these selling points, there are silences in Lieven and Hulsman’s characterization of realism and narration of its place in the U.S. foreign policy tradition – silences which indicate that realism alone is unlikely to provide adequate grounds for transforming American-Islamic relations. Despite the authors’ best efforts to differentiate “ethical realism” from the more amoral tradition of “classical realism,” their treatment of Truman and Eisenhower as exemplars of a tough yet pragmatic and ultimately principled foreign policy is unlikely to satisfy readers in world regions such as the Middle East and Latin America. Insofar as their effort to reconstruct the best of the realist tradition requires clarity about moral parameters that may ultimately constrain or guide the pursuit of national interest, Lieven and Hulsman would have been well advised to account for the bitter fruit of Eisenhower-era interventions in Guatemala and Iran at the expense of the democratically elected leaders Jacobo Arbenz Guzman and Mohammed Mossadegh, respectively. In light of the past implication of political realism in these and other suppressions of democracy and self-determination in developing nations, the silence should be disconcerting for Muslims who hope for a “New Deal” from policy intellectuals as astute and well-informed as Lieven and Hulsman. At present, U.S. and Western leaders need policy input from thinkers who are less concerned with reconstructing Cold War frameworks than with crafting operative principles appropriate to the current era. These principles should be directed not so much toward the “containment” of adversaries as toward the de-escalation and ultimate transformation of conflicts in the Middle East and other Muslim-majority regions. Recent US proposals to revive or recalibrate a Cold War “containment” frameworkxxxv presuppose a distanced relationship between the United States and the conflicts that motivate extreme Muslim political groups and movements. Though superior to more militarized prescriptions, such proposals fail to offer effective means for engaging Muslim populations and addressing the problems that fuel extremism – among the more important of which is the widespread impression the U.S. is actively colluding with narrowly based, allied governments to thwart legitimate Muslim aspirations for self-determination, political autonomy, popular participation, and social justice. Enduring Western-Islamic peace can only be achieved by taking these realities into account. In addition to prudence, an ethically informed conception of the national interest, and respect for the complex realities of other nations, principles for engagement with Muslim-majority nations should also include 1) an orientation toward conflict resolution, 2) a genuine commitment to nurture democratic change, and 3) an awareness of the desirability of restorative justice as a bridge to new relationships. Enriching the practice of statecraft with such priorities can help generate new relational dynamics and, in many cases, strategic visions that can be embraced by individuals on both sides of the Islamic-Western divide. For many, the relevance of conflict resolution has been amply demonstrated by the results of neglecting standard conflict resolution practice during the Bush administration. It can hardly be argued, for example, that U.S. disengagement from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict benefited Israelis and Palestinians, or that an increasingly partisan alignment with one party brought lasting security to the other. The application of military force in a range of theatres – directly or by proxy – has generated highly mixed results. Many would argue that it has led to a more fractured and ultimately insecure world order. Strategizing to transform conflicts in the Middle East and other regions of the Islamic world will ultimately require greater American and Western involvements in regional conflict resolution efforts than has been the case in recent years, together with willingness to engage with Islamic movements seeking a stake in the political process. Working to integrate revisionist movements into negotiation frameworks does not preclude the expression of strong criticism with respect to past actions taken by these groups. Critics who argue that this amounts to “compromise with extremists” could be answered by recalling that, however distant the Reformation era may seem, now-mainstream Protestant religious movements began with passionate involvement in political controversy. xxxvi What were once “radical” movements willing to fight for their convictions have evolved into powerful, “mainline” vehicles for expressing humane religious sentiments. Humility and historical perspective – but not worldweary resignation – are vital qualities as Western leaders seek collaborative responses to internationally salient conflicts. Over the long term, one of the most crucial tasks for peacebuilding is depriving violent extremism of legitimacy. Diverse parties can support the realization of this objective through religiously and culturally informed approaches to diplomatic engagement and to conflict resolution within and between societies. Middle Eastern Muslims today find themselves engaged in a profound struggle at a crucial juncture in their history. They feel cut off from the past, and faced with a present characterized by authoritarianism, poverty and humiliation, with no viable or desirable prospects for creating their own future. These are realities that the U.S. must address when proposing new terms of engagement and conveying an image of a more positive future constructed through democratic change. Assurances of American and Western commitment to a stable, democratic, and prosperous region are invaluable, particularly if supplemented with gestures demonstrating respect for Middle Eastern perspectives on the democratization process. As Lieven and Hulsman note, it is crucial that democracy promotion efforts be accompanied by “policies that visibly serve the interests of the peoples concerned, and are tailored to their wishes.”xxxvii In this regard, it is critical to recognize that democracy remains a word with positive association for a majority of the world’s Muslims – particularly when the word is not narrowly associated with a specific set of American policies or prescriptions. American leaders should not make the mistake of regarding democracy promotion as something that has been tried and that has failed, nor should their conceptions of its viability be shaped exclusively by consultations with elite members of Muslim societies. At the grassroots level, there is strong demand for more accountable and participatory government institutions, and for safeguards guaranteeing rights to political dissent. What is needed is not an aggressive approach to democratization or the selective invocation of democracy as a tool for undermining specific adversaries. When conjoined with other policies, such as a proactive approach to conflict resolution, an evenhanded and long-term commitment to democratic principles and the opening of political space could produce further gains in American-Islamic relations. To help clear the way for such developments, America and its Muslim counterparts would do well to explore an emerging consensus on the vital importance of “restorative” conceptions of justice during peace processes and periods of political transition. Often framed as an alternative to politically unrealistic and morally problematic notions of retributive justice (justice as revenge or punishment of offenders) and blanket amnesties (forgiveness without a sense of accountability or a guarantee of reform), restorative justice endeavours integrate frequently opposed values of forgiveness and accountability. Often but not always understood in religious terms, restorative justice challenges former enemies – government and opposition, or societies in conflict – to rehumanize the adversary, acknowledge responsibility for misdeeds and excesses, and (whenever possible) utilize symbolic gestures as well as various forms of reparation to signal desire for a new relationship. Restorative justice is predicated on the notion that profound shifts in human relations are possible, and that former enemies can become allies or friends. In the context of Western- Islamic relations, it provides a potential basis for simultaneously addressing deeply felt needs for justice and hope for new beginnings, in a way that might potentially set a virtuous cycle in motion. Prescriptions: A Strategy of Active Peacemaking Without a comprehensive vision of how Western-Islamic coexistence might be achieved, the power of existing strategic assumptions and cultural mythologies is likely to overwhelm piecemeal cooperative efforts. By working with a regionally grounded awareness of conflict dynamics and sensitivity to the need for locally rooted solutions to challenges facing Muslimmajority societies, however, peaceful coexistence may yet be achieved through a sustained process involving geopolitical restraint, commitment to consensus building, and intercultural rapprochement. It is in this spirit that the following list of recommendations has been formulated. This list is intended to prompt fresh thinking about how American policies and initiatives might help overcome a troubled historical legacy and begin to foster international and regional dynamics that favor peaceful conflict resolution. These policies and initiatives would be designed with the intention of amending strategies that have heightened conflict and polarization, while creating conditions conducive to incremental “change from within” in Middle Eastern states and societies. 1) Listen carefully to various Muslim accounts of the “backstory” behind present tensions. In the United States after 9/11, one of the more immediate concerns – beyond the tightening of security measures and the formulation of a military strategy – was to ensure that public diplomacy efforts were adequate to “sell” the US and its policies overseas. This concern for marketing, however, was not accompanied by a comparable interest in the salability of the foreign policy product, or in the utility of public diplomacy for taking the measure of foreign publics and discovering their messages for Americans. Some public diplomacy programs were even premised on the notion that Middle Eastern Muslims know very little about the United States – an assumption that even a very short visit to the region would belie. While Middle Eastern publics are not without their biases and blind spots vis-à-vis the U.S., they tend to be much better informed about developments in American pop culture, sports, politics, technology, education, and lifestyles than many suspect. As Esposito and Mogahed’s data suggests, starkly negative opinions of the U.S. often have less to do with judgments about the reputed licentiousness of American culture than with genuine political disagreements. In Juan Cole’s words, “Radicalism in the Muslim world is very much wrought up with antiimperialism, with a desire to push back against what local people see as an overbearing and arrogant American dictation to them of how to live their lives.”xxxviii There is no easy substitute for addressing these issues head on, in a manner that reflects openness to dialogue. Vigorous public relations packaging cannot by itself solve the problem. At its best, public diplomacy is a valuable instrument which the US and other Western nations can use to open channels of two-way communication with Middle Eastern societies. An effective public diplomacy strategy starts with actively listening to voices in the regionxxxix – not only to their words and ideas, but also to the emotions and experiences behind the words and ideas. Active listening, an invaluable skill for conflict resolution and the cultivation of sustained dialogue, can also be an indispensable tool of analysis. In listening, the US and other Western countries may begin to appreciate why their intentions have often been doubted or misunderstood by Muslims. The belief that US leaders will not listen to or acknowledge Muslim criticisms deepens attitudes of indignation and alienation, and increases resistance to American perspectives on problems in the Middle East. Without dialogue, Muslims will be unable to hear even the most powerful, accurate, and valid American insights and concerns about the governance problems of many Middle Eastern countries. For America to reach the hearts and minds of Arabs and Muslims, expressing agreement with differing points of view is far less important than demonstrating respect and interest through practices of dialogue and engagement. If used for such purposes, public diplomacy can also provide a channel for building relationships of trust while signaling a commitment to reconciliation, and the development of visions in which Americans and Muslims cooperate to bring about a better future. Establishing an atmosphere of trust and mutual concern cannot be achieved by plowing over historical inconsistencies and mixed signals, dispensing with dialogue, and expecting Middle Eastern audiences to embrace a new message. America and other Western powers cannot afford to exclude Muslim publics and civic leaders from the process of formulating messages intended to enlist support in shared efforts to construct a viable future. Granted, the trust of Middle Eastern Muslims cannot be won overnight. Yet a carefully designed approach that responds directly and consistently to high priorities of citizens in the region is likely to turn significant dividends. Because it is crucial for officials to have a well-informed, street-level perspective on the complex mix of political frustration and intercultural alienation that feeds radicalization within the region, additional steps could also be taken to enhance embassy relations with civic and religious leaders in Middle Eastern countries, and to maintain open channels of communication between appropriately knowledgeable diplomatic personnel and decision makers in executive and legislative branches of government. Ensuring that Middle Eastern diaspora communities are appropriately heard within government policymaking processes and recruited to public service is another important way to enhance governmental expertise and outreach capability. 2) Embrace conflict de-escalation as an overarching strategy for marginalizing extremists by “draining the swamp” of enmity that is fed by various enduring rivalries (esp. USIranian, Israeli-Palestinian/Arab, and US-Arab) in Islamic-Western relations. Because radicalism feeds on unresolved conflict, patient efforts to bridge divides are a necessity if more moderate political dynamics are to have a chance of succeeding in the Middle East. In seeking to reduce the overall amount of political stress in the region, there is a wide range of regional conflicts that American and Western diplomacy can address, whether in a public manner or through quiet efforts to foster dialogue. These conflicts include the ArabIsraeli conflict, the ongoing violence in Iraq, U.S.-Iranian relations, hostilities between Palestinian refugees and the Lebanese government, tensions between Kurdish minorities and the states within which they live, conflicts between states and Islamic movements, racialized ethnic conflict in Sudan, ethnoreligious tensions in Lebanon and Egypt, and a longstanding dispute over the status of the Western Sahara. Obvious linkages between Middle Eastern conflicts and ongoing events in Afghanistan and Pakistan are also worthy of attention. By actively practicing dialogue and negotiation, the U.S. will be in a much better position to advise Middle Eastern governments on the need to seek accommodation and reduce reliance on repressive measures. Creative Western policies might also include efforts to enhance regional conflict resolution capacity, by encouraging the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to devote institutional resources to mediation training and to the development of improved mechanisms for dispute resolution and conciliation. Constructive proposals emanating from the region, such as the 2002 Saudi and Arab League peace initiative for the Israeli-Palestine conflict, merit diplomatic encouragement. By working together on such proposals and nurturing an interreligious “second track” for dialogue and negotiation, Western and Islamic leaders might make significant contributions to peace by reframing the conflict over Israel-Palestine as a feud within the Abrahamic family rather than as an interreligious collision, “crusade” (as seen by Muslims), or “defense of democracy” (as seen by Washington). Given that Americans still possess significantly more existential security than most inhabitants of majority-Muslim countries, it is vitally important for the U.S. to take the initiative in efforts to convey peaceful intentions and a desire to partner with local actors to foster the emergence of a more prosperous and satisfactory future. Willingness to engage with Islamic movements can give enhanced credibility to Western demonstrations of respect for Islamic symbolism, and can help to ease Muslim perceptions of security threat. Calls to address the root causes of conflict without being distracted by manipulated imagery are also essential. Through their choices, Westerners have the power to respond to Middle Eastern conflicts in ways that either mobilize anti-Western sentiment or bolster the cause of moderation and mutual adjustment. At the present moment, U.S. efforts to negotiate a solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis could open new opportunities for broader regional peacemaking initiatives, while also sending a significant symbolic message. In addition, it is worth pointing out that while some grievances of Islamic movements are widely shared, others are highly localized. We should not repeat the errors of the Cold War by painting all movements with the same brush or adopting a totalizing agenda of ideological confrontation. Instead, the goal should be to disaggregate and address multiple contributing factors in a number of regional conflicts, and thereby reduce the appeal of transnational extremism. Though the U.S. governments may not wish to trumpet a willingness to engage with nonstate armed groups (be they active adversaries, as in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, or irregulars engaged with the governments of Middle Eastern states), negotiation with insurgent forces is often the only way to put an end to civil and regional wars. Denying “radical” groups a chance to develop a stake in the political process can make things worse, not better. U.S. and Western policy toward the Middle East should not target Islamic revivalism (which, like Reformation-era movements in the West, is experienced as a process of internal renewal) or Islamic fundamentalist reactions to perceived external threats. Rather than seek to manipulate intraregional rivalries such as the Arab-Persian and Sunni-Shi‘a divides, Western policy might generate more lasting contributions to security by calling for collaborative efforts to redress grievances used to justify terrorism – for example, the suffering of Palestinians and Iraqis, the maldistribution of resources, and the absence of legitimate and genuinely participatory political authority. 3) Consistently convey respect for Islam, while simultaneously inviting dialogue about Islamic bases for peaceable relations. Far too often, trust between Westerners and Middle Eastern Muslims has been corroded by needlessly provocative or misinformed pronouncements by opinion leaders on both sides. In the current tense atmosphere, words articulated by leaders matter a great deal and have a profound impact on domestic as well as foreign publics. At home, they impact the capacity of citizens to imagine new relationships predicated on commonality instead of fear and resentment. Overseas, these words are interpreted and reinterpreted by media analysts and political figures seeking signals of underlying national intentions and purposes. Through their choices, American leaders have the power to respond to Islam in ways that either mobilize anti-Western sentiment or bolster the cause of moderation and mutual adjustment. Western demonstrations of respect for and genuine interest in Islam – which, for so many Middle Easterners, is the very core of their identity and sense of self – can help to ease Muslim perceptions of security threat. Calls to address the root causes of conflict are also essential if pathology and anti-Western extremism are not to be mistaken for the essence of the secondlargest world religion. Affirming Islamic identity while also working for consensus to address outstanding political disputes can help Muslims shift away from a defensive stance and toward a more creative response to modern problems of development, participation, and social justice. Contact between Middle Eastern Muslims and Westerners can and should be institutionalized to support regular interaction and mutual learning. In addition to public diplomacy and greater effort on the part of diplomats in the field to make contact with social leaders, governments and non-governmental groups can promote youth exchanges, intercontinentally linked classrooms, and even sister city programs. The establishment of Western and Middle Eastern endowments to fund cultural events that use visual and performing arts to celebrate coexistence would also be welcome. Existing initiatives such as the Alliance of Civilizations at the United Nations can play an important role by mapping out the issues that divide Islamic and Western societies as a prelude to rapprochement based on reciprocity as well as “pre-emptive” conciliatory measures. Islam plays many roles in Muslim politics, providing languages of justification not only for destructive conflict but also for justice-seeking and nonviolent behaviors. Although Islam has often been understood in ways that conceive of peace narrowly as an “absence of war” secured by a powerful and assertive governing authority, a strong foundation exists in Muslim thought for conceptions of peace that are linked to social justice, communal solidarity, and coexistence with non-Muslim communities. Efforts to engage Muslim peoples that take Islamic frameworks for peacemaking into account are likely to be far more productive than approaches that seek only to combat radicalism and shore up political authority structures.xl Taking Muslim aspirations toward social justice and a more equitable international system seriously can generate new energy in Middle Eastern and Islamic-Western peacemaking. By affirming Islamic identity and deeply held ideals in a wide range of forums, from political speech and diplomacy to civil society dialogues, Westerners have the potential to reduce anxieties surrounding the perceived need to defend Islam. They can also help build sufficient trust for more wide-ranging discussions of how Islamic values can play a role in conflict resolution, nonviolent social change strategies, and development of a climate of relations among the world’s religions in which mutuality and appreciation prevail rather than fear and recrimination. Like the West and its constituent religious traditions, the Islamic tradition is internally rich with interpretations, practices, and meanings. Humbly and respectfully engaging Muslims and expressing curiosity about these internal resources can help to activate them. However, Muslim leaders should not hesitate to begin their own dialogue and confidence-building initiatives, while proactively applying Islamic peacebuilding resources to the problems of Middle Eastern societies. The events of recent years provide ample evidence that radicalism grows when insulting an adversary’s values and “fighting fire with fire” become default responses to conflict; a time has come for new experiments in intercultural, interreligious, and international relations premised on mutual invitations to come to the table and seek common terms of understanding. Given the importance of domestic example for relations with predominantly Muslim societies, new steps should be taken to ensure inclusion of Muslims in Western societies. Special efforts could be made to utilize the resources of university systems, and to encourage multifaith projects that express shared religious values in the public sphere. The status of the United States and Canada as immigrant societies gives these countries unique assets in the effort to engage Muslim societies; there is a need, however, to ensure that the commitment to pluralism continues, particularly in the face of widespread “Islam anxiety”xli and a widespread ignorance about Islam. xlii To prevent moves toward retrenchment and anti-Muslim prejudice, advocates of cultural pluralism need to be articulate about the values underlying their efforts. Cultural pluralism entails a principled openness to others and an engaged commitment to coexistence through mutual recognition and respectful dialogue. Respect for the “other” permits a more truly democratic approach to differences, and facilitates the pursuit of common standards. 4) Articulate a “new deal” in US-Muslim relations based on internationally legitimate norms and standards rather than on traditional forms of geopolitical expediency. The events of recent years demonstrate that the United States and other Western countries have an interest in working in harmony with United Nations institutions whenever possible to address security concerns. Abstention from both involvement in and rhetorical support for military activities that have not received UN approval would be a wise and prudential policy for combating the sense of international lawlessness that feeds radicalization and supports terrorist recruitment. A multilateral approach to international security based on respect for international institutions can be greatly enriched by applying an integrative “human security” approach to the problems of terrorism and political violence. This framework has a number of virtues: it recognizes that radicalization festers in situations of repression and protracted conflict; it places a strong emphasis on law enforcement, development, and protection of civilian populations rather than on large-scale (and deeply polarizing) military campaigns; and it affirms the importance of efforts to work towards a uniform standard of human rights, understood to include not only civil and political but also economic, social, and cultural rights. It redirects policy from a narrow focus on empowering state security and military apparatus toward a broader concern with protecting individual human beings from harm and deprivation. In the search for common ground on issues of international security, Western politicians should take pains to resist polarizing discourse (e.g., “war for civilization,” “axis of evil,” combat against “enemies of democracy,” demonization of Islamic movements and parties). The stance taken by US, Canadian, and some other governments on the tragically counterproductive Israel-Hizbullah war of 2006, like their perceived hypocrisy with respect to Hamas’s victory in Palestinian elections the West had pressed for, have resulted in further loss of political capital for the West (not to mention credibility for democracy) in the Arab Middle East. Western influence and ability to mediate effectively in regional conflicts depend on acting in ways that thoughtful members on both sides in the region’s painful conflicts can recognize as principled or at least fair-minded. Care needs to be taken to develop credibility through consistent appeals to international criteria for legitimacy (such as international human rights law and United Nations resolutions) as well as through constructive diplomacy. One-sided stands make little sense in complex Middle Eastern conflicts where no party is blameless. U.S. and Western governments would benefit by attending carefully to the messages sent by both words and deeds. Although it is not possible to control how one’s actions will be construed, becoming keenly aware of regional perceptions can help to reduce cultural and political miscommunication. Policies that demonstrate steady commitment to the principles of human rights, human security, and international law (including jus in bello) are likely to be viewed with far greater favor than policies toward regional conflicts that appear opportunistic or inconsistent. Organizations that monitor human rights – intergovernmental as well as nongovernmental – may be able to provide helpful guidance in this regard. Whether the problem is Arab-Israeli conflict, treatment of detainees in counterterrorism operations, or repression and counter-violence between Arab governments and opposition movements, working to cultivate international consensus on “fair” standards is far more desirable than staking out positions that may appear arbitrary or hostile to regional stakeholders. 5) Draw upon restorative justice principles to formulate diplomatic messages that signal commitment to genuine change in hitherto troubled historical relationships. Much rhetoric about American-Islamic relations is preoccupied with affixing blame for real as well as perceived injustices and offences. Given that publics have grown accustomed to confrontation, efforts to achieve significant changes in relations can be politically risky, and will need to be preceded by forms of discourse that enlarge the moral imagination of citizens in ways that make coexistence appear more realistic and desirable. Often, this will require a delicate balancing act, in which respect is paid to existing, selective national memories of relations with adversaries, while also introducing new information and perspectives that prepare the ground for change. There is a need here for oratorical skill of the quality displayed in the past by Barack Obama in his multi-perspectival “honest talk” on race – discourse that simultaneously honors and challenges multiple perspectives and experiences. Particularly risky but potentially high payoff options, including political apology, could also be used at strategic moments to break an impasse, if possible after preparatory track-two consultations and scenario-building for reciprocal measures. As the more powerful party in relations with Muslim-majority states and Islamic movements, it might behoove American spokespersons to acknowledge the impact of unequal power relations on cultural contact between Muslims and Westerners, in a manner that highlights the importance of extenuating circumstances in shaping actions on both sides. Unequal power has led to a situation in which genuine cultural differences are experienced simultaneously with serious political and economic disputes. The results have often been quite painful. Imagine, for example, how Iranian-American relations might have developed if not for Cold War geopolitics, and Western fears of Soviet control over Iranian oil resources in the event of a feared (but unlikely) communist takeover. In the absence of such concerns, Anglo-American support for a pro-monarchy coup might never have manifested in 1953, putting the West on a collision course with Iranian secular and religious nationalists. We cannot reverse history, yet there is cause for remorse at the unfortunate and unanticipated outcomes of past decisions and events. If there is to be a new beginning, humility will be required of all parties. Within the West, there is a need to acknowledge that great powers such as England, France, and now the United States have often used their influence in ways that have dramatically reduced the capacity of Middle Eastern Muslims to control their own cultural and political destiny. At the time of their own breakthroughs in modern economic and political development, these Western powers competed with one another but faced no comparable obstacles to self-determination and selfrespect. Becoming more cognizant of such issues through Western cultural empathy has become vital for international peace. However, placing all responsibility for change on the shoulders of the U.S. or other Western powers would be undesirable because it denies the role contemporary Muslims can play by trusting in the enduring strength of authentic Islamic values, which are no doubt quite capable of absorbing the shocks of Western intrusions while providing a principled basis for integrating and adapting those Western ideas and practices that can complement an ongoing revitalization of Islamic culture. Sobriety and humility are vital watchwords for Westerners and Muslims as they seek to avoid the perils of hubris and fanaticism, and develop intercultural confidence-building measures. 6) Develop a more genuinely “democratic” (as opposed to coercive or ethnocentric) set of guidelines for supporting democratic “change from within” in Muslim-majority societies. By contributing to the radicalization of young Muslim men, over-militarization of the “War on Terror” has done more to destabilize the Muslim Middle East than to cultivate a basis for sustainable peace. The result has been a troubled policy that enjoins democracy on the one hand, while collaborating with (and indeed participating in) practices of state-sponsored torture on the other.xliii Though some democratic reformers in the Middle East initially took heart at US President George W. Bush’s acknowledgement of past complicity with oppressive states, disruption created by the Iraq war has made genuine transformation a more distant goal. Despite these trends, fostering incremental “change from within” in the Middle East is among the most vital tasks facing Western nations as they seek to adjust and redefine relations with the region. The United States and other Western countries can best support positive internal developments by promoting political participation within structures appropriate to the needs and culture of the people, and not by unreflectively promoting the transplantation of Western models or supporting authoritarian regimes. By shaping conditions within which internal debates proceed, American and Western policies have exerted a significant – but often unrecognized – impact on prospects for democracy in the Middle East. Insofar as past policies have turned a blind eye to repressive practices and to the suffering associated with major regional conflicts, Western powers have inadvertently helped to create conditions favorable to anti-liberal, reactive action. Some policies, such as the decision to arm and actively assist anti-Soviet insurgents in Afghanistan during the Cold War, have unintentionally contributed to the present strength of radical networks. More recent policies linking democratization to the Iraq war have been at least as problematic, fostering the impression that “democracy” is a Trojan horse for Western conquest and political manipulation. This impression is quite damaging, as the only viable democratic projects in Muslim countries are those that take root in local soil and are nourished by the aspirations of citizens for a more hopeful future. Though regional democratic projects may derive important ideas and insights from Western practices of democracy, their language and forms of expression will reflect regional culture and Islamic values, shorn of traditional as well as modern baggage that is no longer experienced as life-giving. As Jeremy Jones has argued, democratic change will stand the best chance of success in the Middle East if it is conceived as a genuinely indigenous enterprise: Democracy in the Middle East may not only be possible, it may already be under construction. In the diverse institutions and conversations, the traditions and experiments with which the people of the region conduct their daily lives, manage their social relations and organize their politics there might be all kinds of practices that ought to be recognized as democratic in nature. It may be these practices, rather than those that have developed in the West… that will form the foundations for the further development of democratic political institutions….xliv By becoming sensitized to ongoing experiments with democratic change in Middle Eastern countries, Western policymakers stand a much better chance of finding means to strategically nourish positive dynamics, providing the hope necessary to sustain long-term, peaceful change and address many of the underlying conflicts that have created the current atmosphere of repression, violence, and anger. Conclusion This paper has been written with the conviction that the ultimate significance of the present turbulent period has yet to be determined. Will Americans and Muslims seek to transcend their immediate, emotional reactions to violent and painful events, or will they withdraw into more deeply ethnocentric and aggrieved frames of reference? Will they aspire to gain more authentic knowledge about their counterparts’ fears and aspirations, or will they allow their mutual perceptions to become more polarized, partisan, and self-serving? Will they move toward broader and more humane understandings of their respective cultural and political traditions, or will they amplify belief systems that deny the virtues of tolerance and cultural pluralism? The arrival fresh American leadership provides grounds for optimism, yet the road ahead will not be easy. What is clear, however, is that Americans and Muslims now have the opportunity to create a new story together by moving beyond the scripted tropes that have been recited too often in relations between Islam and the West. We may lack perfect freedom to choose our future, but it is our fundamental responsibility to present as well as to future generations to capitalize on the degrees of freedom that are available to us as we make conscious choices between war and peace, isolation and engagement, pessimism and hope. i Several passages in this paper have been adapted from Islam and Peacemaking in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), a coauthored book written in collaboration with Abdul Aziz Said, whose contribution to the substance and forms of expression is gratefully acknowledged. ii “Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address,” New York Times, January 20, 2009, accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/ 2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all on May 3, 2009. iii Juan Cole, “Obama's First Hundred Days in the Greater Middle East,” Informed Comment blog, April 28, 2009, accessed at http://www.juancole.com/ on May 2, 2009. iv Throughout the Middle East, views of the United States went from bad to worse in the years after 9/11 and the Iraq War. In April 2002, 76% of Egyptians claimed to hold the US in low regard, whereas by July 2004, 98% expressed a negative opinion. In Morocco the trend was much the same, moving from 61% negative in 2002 to 88% negative in 2004. Linzer, “Poll Shows Growing Arab Rancor,” Washington Post, 2004. v Juan Cole, “Obama's First Hundred Days in the Greater Middle East,” Informed Comment blog, April 28, 2009, accessed at http://www.juancole.com/ on May 2, 2009. vi Juan Cole, “Obama's First Hundred Days in the Greater Middle East.” vii Nazila Fathi and David E. Sanger, “Iran Offers ‘Dialogue with Respect’ with U.S.,” New York Times, February 11, 2009. viii For comments by Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, see “Iran Cleric to Obama: Don’t Repeat Bush’s Warnings,” Reuters, January 30, 2009. ix “Qaeda’s Zawahri dismisses Obama, U.S. still enemy,” Reuters, February 3, 2009. x Salah ad-Din Al-Jourchi, “Candid Words for a Candid President,” Web Commentary, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 8, 2008, accessed at http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm? fa=print&id=22509 on February 12, 2009. xi Norman Podhoretz, World War IV: The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism (New York: Random House, 2008), p. 15. xii Podhoretz, World War IV, pp. 6-7. xiii Podhoretz, p. 13. xiv Podhoretz, p. 25. xv Podhoretz, p. 102. xvi Richard Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: “Islamic Terrorism” in Political and Academic Discourse,” Government and Opposition, Vol. 42, No 3, p. 421. xvii Richard Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: “Islamic Terrorism” in Political and Academic Discourse,” Government and Opposition, Vol. 42, No 3, p. 421. xviii Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005). xix Robert Pape, in Douglas Macgregor, Marvin Weinbaum, Abdullah Ansary, and Rogert Pape, “The ‘Global War on Terror’: What Has Been Learned,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Winter 2008), p. 12. xx Anthony H. Cordesman, “Winning the ‘War on Terrorism’: A Fundamentally Different Strategy,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Fall 2006), p. 102). xxi John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think (New York: Gallup Press, 2007). xxii John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, “Battle for Muslim Hearts and Minds: The Road Not (Yet) Taken,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 2007), p. 37. xxiii Esposito and Mogahed, “Battle for Muslim Hearts and Minds,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 2007), p. 39. xxiv Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2006. xxv Richard Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: “Islamic Terrorism” in Political and Academic Discourse,” Government and Opposition, Vol. 42, No 3, p. 424. xxvi Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, Ethical Realism: A Vision for America’s Role in the World (New York: Random House, 2006). xxvii Lieven and Hulsman, p. xi. xxviii Lieven and Hulsman, p. xiii. xxix Lieven and Hulsman, p. xvii. xxx Lieven and Hulsman, p. xvii. xxxi Lieven and Hulsman, p. 38. xxxii Lieven and Hulsman, p. 39. xxxiii Lieven and Hulsman, p. 50. xxxiv Lieven and Hulsman, p. 123. xxxv Thompson, “A War Best Served Cold, New York Times, 2007; Shapiro, Containment, 2007. xxxvi The revolutionary religious and political projects pursued by Oliver Cromwell and the English Puritans are exemplary. See Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints, 1969. xxxvii Lieven and Hulsman, p. 54. xxxviii Juan Cole, “Obama's First Hundred Days in the Greater Middle East,” Informed Comment blog, April 28, 2009, accessed at http://www.juancole.com/ on May 2, 2009. xxxix Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mixed Blessings, p. 17. xl Nathan Funk and Abdul Aziz Said, Islam and Peacemaking in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009). xli Juan Cole, Engaging the Muslim World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). xlii “Majorities of Muslims – both politically radicalized and moderates – say they know and admire the West’s technology, freedom of speech, and value system of hard work. Meanwhile, Americans asked what they know about Muslims predominantly offer two responses: ‘Nothing’ and ‘I don’t know.’” Esposito and Mogahed, “Battle for Muslim Hearts and Minds,” p. 41. xliii Mertus, Bait and Switch, 2004. xliv Jones, Negotiating Change, 2007, pp. 5-6.