Download “Peacemaking between America and the Muslim World: Beginning a

CSID 2009 Conference:
“Peacemaking between America and the Muslim World:
Beginning a New Chapter in US-Islamic Relations?”
By Nathan C. Funki
Assistant Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies
University of Waterloo
[email protected]
ABSTRACT:
The advent of the Obama administration has created a window of opportunity for new beginnings
in US relations with the Muslim world. Taking advantage of this opportunity, however, will
require both political courage and a well-informed, well-developed strategy of active
peacemaking that contrasts greatly with the approach of the last eight years (marked as it was by
confrontation, ideological inflexibility, contradiction, and resistance to diplomatic engagement
with adversaries), while also moving beyond the standard repertoire of practices associated with
foreign policy realism. In the absence of a new strategy underpinned by principles of conflict
resolution, democratic change, and restorative justice, the promise of the present moment is
likely to go unfulfilled, giving way to an uncomfortable and unsteady new status quo.
This paper presents a set of principles and prescriptions for breaking the present impasse in
American-Islamic relations. These principles and prescriptions, derived from academic studies
of peacemaking in protracted intergroup conflict as well as from critical evaluation of past US
policies, are intended to build upon President Obama’s stated commitment to founding relations
upon “mutual interest and mutual respect.” They underscore the vital importance of: 1) listening
carefully to various Muslim accounts of the “backstory” behind present tensions; 2) embracing
conflict de-escalation as an overarching strategy for marginalizing extremists by “draining the
swamp” of enmity that is fed by various enduring rivalries (esp. US-Iranian, Israeli-Palestinian/
Arab, and US-Arab) in Islamic-Western relations; 3) consistently conveying respect for Islam,
while simultaneously inviting dialogue about Islamic bases for peaceable relations; 4)
articulating a “new deal” in US-Muslim relations based on internationally legitimate norms and
standards rather than on traditional forms of geopolitical expediency; 5) drawing upon
restorative justice principles to formulate diplomatic messages that signal commitment to
genuine change in hitherto troubled historical relationships; and 6) developing a more genuinely
“democratic” (as opposed to coercive or ethnocentric) set of guidelines for supporting
democratic “change from within” in Muslim-majority societies.
Introduction: A Window of Opportunity
The advent of the Obama administration has created a window of opportunity for
improving U.S.-Islamic relations. After years of deepening antagonism between America and
the Muslim world and decades of drift and deterioration, there is a chance for something new.
Although it would be difficult if not impossible to make a “clean break” from all that has gone
before – cultures of policymaking, conceptions of national interest, and images of the other do
not change overnight, either in Muslim lands or in America – an opening has emerged for new
strategic approaches to the many vexing problems that beset the relationship. Years of
destructive conflict cannot simply be wished away, but the meaning of past events is subject to
change if we can find the political courage to enact a strategy of active and persistent
peacemaking.
Finding the political courage for such a strategy will not be easy. Particularly at a time of
economic crisis and domestic reconstruction, there is a temptation to preserve political capital
and adopt a cautious approach rooted in precedents and practices that are widely believed to have
“worked” during the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War eras. Such approaches, although
preferable to a confrontational and ideological preoccupation with regime change and selective
invocation of human rights norms, cannot deliver “the change we need” in U.S.-Islamic
relations. To write – or, better yet, coauthor – a new chapter in relations with the Muslim world,
the U.S. will need to move beyond the standard repertoire of practices associated with foreign
policy realism and with past Middle East policy. In the absence of a strategy underpinned by
principles of conflict resolution, restorative justice, and democratic change, the promise of the
present moment is likely to go unfulfilled, giving way to an uncomfortable and unsteady new
status quo. If, however, American leaders can transcend the temptation to simply repackage
traditional formulas for “stability” and can instead make a more serious effort to engage the
backstory to U.S. tensions with the Muslim world, genuine opportunities for transforming
political and identity conflict (not only interstate but intersocietal and intercultural) are likely to
emerge – to the benefit of all parties, not least the United States.
Symbolic Gestures
That U.S.-Islamic relations are a priority for the Obama administration has been evident
since Inauguration Day. In his January 20 address, President Obama sounded a welcome note
when he stated, “To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and
mutual respect.”ii Two days later, he indicated an intent to engage the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
by appointing George Mitchell as his special envoy to the Middle East, and on January 26 he
granted his first formal interview as president to the Arabic-language satellite channel, AlArabiya. These gestures were accompanied by executive orders to close the Guantanamo Bay
detention facility and ban the use of torture, and followed up by an Iranian Nowruz message on
March 20 and an address on U.S.-Turkish as well as Muslim-American relations in Ankara on
April 6.
Taken together, such words and deeds communicate an aspiration to depart from the
policies and the overall tone of the Bush administration, and reinforce the symbolism of change
that Obama himself represents. While Middle Eastern commentators have detected many areas
of continuity with Bush administration policies, particularly on Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, many Muslims are profoundly hopeful that America’s first black president – a president
with Muslim relatives, life experience in Indonesia, and a presumed capacity to identify with
people struggling for justice and equality in many parts of the world – will provide substantively
different policies than those formulated by George Bush’s policy team. There is a hope that he
will adopt a humbler policy that is more inclined to listen and negotiate than to dictate and
polarize. Although not necessarily new, affirmation that the United States is not and will never
be the enemy of Islam are welcome and salutary, particularly when repeated. Juan Cole
characterizes the impact of such overtures in the following terms:
The Obama administration has succeeded in changing the tone of US diplomacy with the
Greater Middle East. Note that a better job could have been done. Aljazeera would have
been a more effective place to do an interview than al-Arabiya, since it is much more
widely watched. There were a few aggressive notes in the speech to Iran, which were
gratuitous and helped to provoke the grumpy Iranian response.
In polling, publics in the Middle East did see positive changes in US policy, with about
40% praising the changes. In Lebanon and the UAE it was over 50%, while in the outlier,
Iran, it was only 29%. Still, the trend lines are the right ones.iii
Overall, Obama’s personal approach has been positive and his words have been constructive.
Given the extremely low popularity of the United States in the Middle East in the years since
9/11, even modest improvements would be welcome.iv But as Cole notes, the warming to
America is still tentative and fragile, and will only prove to be an enduring phenomenon if policy
challenges can be met. “[T]one is easy, where there is a will. Substance is hard.”v
Official Iranian critiques of Obama’s initiatives, though less stark and mono-dimensional
than North American media outlets have suggested (Cole characterizes the overall response as a
hedged, “wait and see” positionvi), underscore this point. Though his initial reactions, including
a call for an apology for 60 years of U.S. policies, were widely regarded as consistent with his
penchant for diplomatically maladroit speech, Ahmadinejad spoke for many Middle Eastern
Muslims when he stated, “change should be fundamental, not tactical.”vii A range of Iranian
leaders, from Supreme Leader Sayyid ‘Ali Khamene’i to ‘Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, called for more
explicit recognition of rights (Iranian as well as Palestinian), a suspension of threats and “carrot
and stick” language, and broader attitude changes in the direction of respect, equality, and
fairness.viii
Arab commentators echoed many of these concerns, with many reiterating the substantive
changes they would have to see before believing in new words from Washington. President-elect
Obama's prolonged silence concerning Israel’s 22-day offensive (December 27, 2008 to January
17, 2009) against Hamas in Gaza created an opening for al-Qa‘ida, which sought to reinforce its
longstanding characterization of America as the leader of a “Zionist-crusader coalition.”ix While
such criticism could be expected of al-Qa’ida, more principled and even-handed Arab and
Muslim commentators have made it clear that there is “a history of disappointment” in the
Middle East, and that people are keenly watching to see what America will actually do to affect
change in Israeli-Palestinian relations, to sustain progress toward genuine Iraqi selfdetermination, to prevent a quagmire in Afghanistan, to adopt a less instrumentalized and
inconsistent approach to democratization issues, and to avoid a potentially devaastating
militarized confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program.x
Clearly, navigating such challenges in U.S.-Middle Eastern and American-Islamic
relations will require attention to both style and substance. To cultivate new dynamics and
enhance long-term U.S. security, American leaders would do well to listen closely to – and,
indeed, to critically engage – sceptical voices, an effort to identify underlying roots of present
conflict and formulate guiding principles for U.S. actions in the years ahead.
Roots of Conflict
While it is important to acknowledge that the Bush administration did not get everything
wrong in its intellectual response to 9/11 – the new, albeit temporary, emphasis on
democratization and acknowledgment of past support for narrowly based regimes was positive –
failures at the level of policy owe much to reliance on a very narrow circle of advisors and
pundits, with extremely selective solicitation of input from outside sources. The result was an
incomplete, self-referential, and in no small part self-serving interpretation of U.S.-Islamic
relations. Administration officials and spokespersons were far too quick subsume the new
conflict within comfortably familiar parameters of American nationalistic and exceptionalist
thinking, and to portray the struggle as yet another episode in an epic confrontation between
grand principles of freedom and tyranny.
Many familiar elements of the previous administration’s misdiagnosis of Muslim
radicalism are evident in Norman Podhoretz’s tract, World War IV: The Long Struggle against
Islamofascism. In this book, Podhoretz characterizes America’s “Islamofascist” enemy as “the
latest mutation of the totalitarian threat to our civilization.”xi Relying on Bernard Lewis and on
an apparent conviction that Islam is, at root, a religion of the sword, Podhortz ascribes
contemporary manifestations of Muslim militancy to a fusion of premodern zeal with modern
Nazi and Communist totalitarianism.xii The result, Islamofascism, is a “monster with two heads,
one religious and the other secular... a truly malignant totalitarian enemy.”xiii
Having thus dehumanized the foe and represented a range of movements – some quite
destructive, others much less so – as an undifferentiated, monolithic force, Podhoretz goes on to
state that the cause of present American insecurity is past weakness in the face of terrorist
provocation. The possibility that America might have somehow contributed to the radicalization
of Muslims is categorically rejected; rather, the problem is that the U.S. has not become
sufficiently radicalized in the face of an implacable adversary. The absence of the will to treat
acts of terrorism as acts of war has only emboldened an enemy who opposes American values
and not just American policies. “American passivity and inaction,” he states, “opened the door
to 9/11.”xiv Moreover, “we were hated by the terrorists who had attacked us and by their Muslim
cheerleaders, not for our failings and sins, but precisely for our virtues as a free and prosperous
country.”xv Acts of war must therefore be met with war, and the conflict is likely to be a
protracted one.
Although President Bush was generally more diplomatic in his labelling of the threat,
Podhoretz’s conflict analysis overlaps to a very large extent with recent official narratives of the
War on Terror. Like Podhoretz, Bush framed contemporary conflict in starkly moralistic terms,
embraced a narrative that likened the struggle with terrorists to the struggles against fascism and
Communism, identified transcendent principles with America’s sense of national mission, and
rejected self-criticism as a form of weakness. No wonder, then, that Podhortez speaks of the
Bush administration in highly affirmative terms, with his primary lines of critique addressed to
Bush’s unwillingness to commit to the language of Islamofascism (being hampered, apparently,
by diplomatic correctness) and his hesitation vis-a-vis Iran.
Academically based critics, of course, have provided us with scathing and often perceptive
critiques of such thinking. University of Manchester political scientist Richard Jackson, for
example, argues that much discourse on terrorism
works to deny and obscure its political origins and the possibility that it is a response to
specific Western policies. That is, by assigning non-rational, cosmic aims to violent
groups, the discourse depoliticizes, decontextualizes and dehistoricizes the grievances and
political struggles of states and societies, thereby de-linking the motives of terrorists from
the policies of Western states or their allies. xvi
Through its repudiation of those who would critique Western policies and sweeping
generalizations about the origins of modern Islamist movements, Podhoretz’s argument could be
credited with fulfilling the functions Jackson describes. While it is undeniable that groups such
as al-Qa’ida are indeed dangerous and capable of great destruction, Podhoretz’s broad statements
concerning Islamofascism as a widespread and implacable ideological movement that fuses
archaic religion with modern totalitarianism offers very little insight into the concrete political,
economic, and cultural issues that contribute to radicalization and terrorist recruitment. By
tarring a full spectrum of Islamists with the same brush, rhetoric such as that employed by
Podhoretz lumps together those whom Muqtedar Khan refers to as “rogue Islamists” with
democratic Islamists seeking electoral empowerment. As Jackson suggests, such discourse
serves not only to bolster the cause of political repression, but also to “de-invest insurgent groups
of any political authority or wider socio-cultural legitimacy they may have, in large part by
appealing to the secular prejudice of Western societies.”xvii The need for re-evaluating policy
choices is thereby evaded.
Greater insight into the genuine grievances that motivate political violence in the Muslim
world can be found in analyses such as those put forward by Robert Pape in Dying to Win.xviii
While it would be unwise to ignore the religious dimension of contemporary Muslim politics,
Pape rightly argues that the passions behind terrorism are profoundly political in character, and
are by no means unique to Muslim contexts. Based on his comprehensive study of suicide
terrorism between 1980 and 2003, Pape concludes that, though instrumentalized religious beliefs
can play an enabling role, this form of political violence has an underlying secular logic:
What nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is not religion, but a specific
secular and strategic goal: to compel a democratic state to withdraw combat forces that
terrorists either consider to be their homeland or prize greatly. From Lebanon to Israel to
Sri Lanka to Kashmir to Chechnya, every suicide-terrorist campaign since 1980 has been
waged by groups whose main goal has been to establish or maintain self-determination for
territory the terrorists prize. Religion is rarely the root cause, although it is often used as a
tool to mobilize for the cause and to support the broader strategic objective.xix
In Pape’s view, events such as 9/11 demand political rather than ideological explanations, and are
linked to Muslim indignation vis-a-vis the American military presence in the Arabian peninsula
(especially but not exclusively Saudi Arabia) that became established after the first U.S.-Iraq
War.
As important as Pape’s comparative empirical analysis may be for comprehending
circumstances that have motivated suicide terrorism in multiple contexts, questions nonetheless
remain. For example, the United States has combat forces in many parts of the world, and not
everywhere are these forces perceived as occupation forces that must be resisted at all costs.
There is a need, therefore, to examine the various political and cultural factors that have made
the U.S. military presence particularly unwelcome.
Anthony Cordesman, an American security analyst who is not known for sentimentality,
argues that it is precisely these factors that policymakers need to take into account. The U.S.
national interest is not served by arguments that substitute ideological generalizations for
analysis of specific grievances that give rise to militancy. The U.S., he suggests, has an image
problem in Muslim lands, and this image problem is linked to specific foreign policy choices.
The American image in the Islamic and Arab worlds is a key factor in building popular
support and tolerance for extremist and terrorist movements. This anger against the United
States is not directed at its values or “democracy,” but rather at tangible issues like the U.S.
role in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Iraq War, and other U.S. policies in the Middle
East. It is shaped by the perception that the U.S. reaction to 9/11 has gone beyond
counterterrorism to a broad hostility to Islam and Arabs.xx
Insofar as U.S. public diplomacy is failing, Cordesman states, the cause is not salesmanship but
rather the product that must be sold.
Broad surveys of Muslim public opinion, such as those discussed in Esposito and
Mogahed’s Who Speaks for Islam?, suggest a similar conclusion.xxi According to Gallup polls,
both politically moderate and radicalized Muslims admire many aspects of American and
Western culture, including political freedoms, technological innovation, and a work ethic that has
led to prosperity. Their dislikes with respect to America and the West concern not just the
diffusion of a culture they regard as permissive, but also to the impact of external political
influences on their own self-determination. A key difference between radicals and moderates,
Esposito and Mogahed argue, is not the degree of religious commitment, but rather the greater
pessimism of radicals with respect to prospects for real change to a situation they regard as
humiliating and an “unacceptable”:
For the politically radicalized, their fear of Western control and domination, as well as lack
of self-determination, reinforces their sense of powerlessness. xxii
A primary catalyst for radicalism, often seen as inseparable from the threat to Muslim
religious and cultural identity, is the threat of political domination and occupation.xxiii
Within this context, politically engaged individuals are inclined to turn to Islam as a language of
solidarity and mobilization, and as a basis for critiquing unjust authority. Campaigns for
instituting shari‘a become a framework for cultural as well as political self-determination and
legitimacy, based on indigenous rather than externally imposed values and standards.
As US intelligence agencies have acknowledged, excessive militarization of the “war on
terrorism” (and particularly the choice to invade Iraq) feeds the very perceptions that inspire
recruitment into radical Islamist groups.xxiv Overconfidence in the utility of military force in
resolving contemporary problems of non-state political violence has brought increasing
turbulence not only to the Middle East, but also to increasingly diverse Western societies.
Contrary to the arguments of Podhoretz and other neoconservative thinkers, war appears highly
ineffective for destroying the “taproot” of terrorism, particularly insofar as it reinforces the “us
vs. them” dynamic of identity conflict and gives an undeserved advantage to rhetoric stressing
the “ancient origins” of present strife.
Because the resort to military force feeds perceptions of confrontation and injustice and
legitimizes popular resistance, war is an ultimately self-defeating mechanism for defeating
Middle Eastern radicalism. Jackson frames the issue in the following terms:
[T]here seems little doubt that Western counter-terrorism policies, based in large part on
the productive categories of “Islamic terrorism” discourse, are at least partly responsible
for intensifying cycles of violence and instability. That is, the Iraq invasion, the
destruction of Fallluja, the Abu Ghraib abuses, the Guantanamo prison camp, the practice
of extraordinary rendition and public support for Israel’s war against Lebanon – among
others – are helping to construct further political grievances that could provide the
justification for further acts of terrorism. xxv
It is simply not possible to impose upon the Islamic world a set of political, cultural, and
economic solutions that are viewed as inauthentic and humiliating. Attempts to do so have
negative consequences not only for nonviolent democratization projects in the Middle East, but
also for interreligious and intercultural relations in North America and Europe. The transnational
character of Islamic identity ensures that at least some members of diaspora communities will
view distant conflicts through Middle Eastern lenses, an outcome is nurtured in no small part by
the climate of fear and suspicion that war engenders.
Fortunately, the Obama administration appears to have recognized the inefficacy of the
“War on Terror” framework, despite the continuing vitality of this framework among Obama’s
critics. Nonetheless, current U.S. leaders would be wise to attend carefully to analyses of
Muslim grievances such as those reviewed above, particularly in light of strong temptations to
return to a traditional realist framework for managing state-to-state relations and for taming, coopting, or repressing Islamic movements.
Political Realism and Beyond: Seeking Principles of Engagement
After the profound setbacks experienced by U.S. military campaigns in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the pendulum of elite American opinion has begun to swing back from
neoconservatism to political realism, a school of thought in international relations that eschews
excessive preoccupation with ideology and argues that statecraft must be conducted in
accordance with principles of national interest and prudence. Though welcome in many respects
as a corrective to arguments for open-ended war and political confrontation to transform Muslim
societies, the “realist” philosophy also has a dark side that is increasingly forgotten in high-level
political conversations.
Both the strengths and limitations of realism are evident in Ethical Realism: A Vision for
America’s Role in the World, by Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman.xxvi This impressively
bipartisan book is the product of collaboration between a senior fellow at the New America
Foundation and a former senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, both of whom
became profoundly concerned at the direction of post-9/11 foreign policy. Together, they seek to
restate and reconstruct what they consider to be the most compelling insights of the realist
foreign policy tradition, using the painful experience of the Iraq war as salutary call to sobriety
and humility. The book begins with a rather bold assertion:
What has failed... has been not just the strategy of the administration of George W. Bush,
but a whole way of looking at the world. This consists of the beliefs that America is both
so powerful and so obviously good that it has the ability to spread democracy throughout
the world; that if necessary, this can be achieved through war; that this mission can also be
made to advance particular U.S. national interests; and that this combination will naturally
be supported by good people all over the world, irrespective of their own political
traditions, national allegiances, and national interests.xxvii
In the post-9/11 era as in the Vietnam era, Lieven and Hulsman propose, U.S. strategic thinkers
and policymakers have lost their way, and have allowed nationalistically inflated ideological
certainties interfere with hard-headed analysis of the political world. By adopting a “for us or
against us” drive for security through hegemony and excessive interference in the politics of
other nations, leaders have forgotten one of the chief lessons of the Vietnam, that others may
perceive a contradiction between U.S. strategies and their own “national pride and national
aspirations.”xxviii In contrast to neoconservatism, Lieven and Hulsman call for
an international strategy based on prudence; a concentration on possible results rather than
good intentions; a close study of the nature, views, and interests of other states, and a
willingness to accommodate them when possible; and a mixture of profound American
patriotism with an equally profound awareness of the limits on American power and on
American goodness.xxix
Rather than posit the United States as an exceptional nation that is uniquely responsible for a
establishing a moral world order, Lieven and Hulsman state that effective foreign policy requires
“a capacity to see ourselves as a nation as others see us.”xxx Like other states, the U.S. is
potentially fallible. Rather than guaranteeing security, an “obsession with showing will” could
easily lead to destructive foreign policy misadventures.xxxi A wiser course involves careful study
of the world’s moral and political complexity, and an ability to differentiate between essential
objectives that must be advanced forcefully and conditions that must be accepted – and worked
with – as they are.
When contrasted with the rhetoric and practice of recent years, this approach has many
virtues. For example, Lieven and Hulsman wisely counsel against lumping all ideological
Islamic movements together, or tarring them all with a “totalitarian” brush so as to more
parsimoniously divide the world into “pro-terrorist” and “pro-American” camps.xxxii Quite
rightly, they observe that neoconservatives and liberal hawks alike have failed to appreciate the
significance of multiple ideological cleavages in Muslim politics between Arab nationalism and
Islamism, or between Sunni and Shi‘a radicalism. The tendency to regard all such movements as
equally totalitarian, fixed in essence, and inherently opposed to the United States has produced
arrogant and ignorant foreign policy conversations. These conversations are only tenuously
linked to realities on the ground:
As the analysis of the “Islamic totalitarianism” line reveals, too much of the liberal hawk
and neoconservative view of the Middle East – and, alas, of American perceptions in
general – is overwhelmingly self-referential. Although ostensibly about backing Muslim
liberals and defeating extremists, it is not really linked at all to real debates in the Muslim
world.xxxiii
In other words, the policies say as much about us and our own self-image as they do about the
reality to which they are putatively addressed. No wonder, then, that Muslims in the Middle East
and other regions have experience a profound disconnect between U.S. proclamations of support
for democracy, and policies that appear to instrumentalize this concern and ignore input from
local sources.
Lieven and Hulsman put forward a persuasive argument for reclaiming essential insights
from the realist foreign policy tradition while also retaining a moral compass. Their treatment of
Middle Eastern and Muslim politics is far more sophisticated attuned to complex realities than
more sensationalist writers, and they wisely counsel both “respect [for] the expression of Islam
in political movements,”xxxiv a more even-handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and
a more focused and realistic Iran policy that recognizes limits to American power.
Despite these selling points, there are silences in Lieven and Hulsman’s characterization
of realism and narration of its place in the U.S. foreign policy tradition – silences which indicate
that realism alone is unlikely to provide adequate grounds for transforming American-Islamic
relations. Despite the authors’ best efforts to differentiate “ethical realism” from the more
amoral tradition of “classical realism,” their treatment of Truman and Eisenhower as exemplars
of a tough yet pragmatic and ultimately principled foreign policy is unlikely to satisfy readers in
world regions such as the Middle East and Latin America. Insofar as their effort to reconstruct
the best of the realist tradition requires clarity about moral parameters that may ultimately
constrain or guide the pursuit of national interest, Lieven and Hulsman would have been well
advised to account for the bitter fruit of Eisenhower-era interventions in Guatemala and Iran at
the expense of the democratically elected leaders Jacobo Arbenz Guzman and Mohammed
Mossadegh, respectively. In light of the past implication of political realism in these and other
suppressions of democracy and self-determination in developing nations, the silence should be
disconcerting for Muslims who hope for a “New Deal” from policy intellectuals as astute and
well-informed as Lieven and Hulsman.
At present, U.S. and Western leaders need policy input from thinkers who are less
concerned with reconstructing Cold War frameworks than with crafting operative principles
appropriate to the current era. These principles should be directed not so much toward the
“containment” of adversaries as toward the de-escalation and ultimate transformation of conflicts
in the Middle East and other Muslim-majority regions. Recent US proposals to revive or
recalibrate a Cold War “containment” frameworkxxxv presuppose a distanced relationship
between the United States and the conflicts that motivate extreme Muslim political groups and
movements. Though superior to more militarized prescriptions, such proposals fail to offer
effective means for engaging Muslim populations and addressing the problems that fuel
extremism – among the more important of which is the widespread impression the U.S. is
actively colluding with narrowly based, allied governments to thwart legitimate Muslim
aspirations for self-determination, political autonomy, popular participation, and social justice.
Enduring Western-Islamic peace can only be achieved by taking these realities into account. In
addition to prudence, an ethically informed conception of the national interest, and respect for
the complex realities of other nations, principles for engagement with Muslim-majority nations
should also include 1) an orientation toward conflict resolution, 2) a genuine commitment to
nurture democratic change, and 3) an awareness of the desirability of restorative justice as a
bridge to new relationships. Enriching the practice of statecraft with such priorities can help
generate new relational dynamics and, in many cases, strategic visions that can be embraced by
individuals on both sides of the Islamic-Western divide.
For many, the relevance of conflict resolution has been amply demonstrated by the
results of neglecting standard conflict resolution practice during the Bush administration. It can
hardly be argued, for example, that U.S. disengagement from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
benefited Israelis and Palestinians, or that an increasingly partisan alignment with one party
brought lasting security to the other. The application of military force in a range of theatres –
directly or by proxy – has generated highly mixed results. Many would argue that it has led to a
more fractured and ultimately insecure world order.
Strategizing to transform conflicts in the Middle East and other regions of the Islamic
world will ultimately require greater American and Western involvements in regional conflict
resolution efforts than has been the case in recent years, together with willingness to engage with
Islamic movements seeking a stake in the political process. Working to integrate revisionist
movements into negotiation frameworks does not preclude the expression of strong criticism
with respect to past actions taken by these groups. Critics who argue that this amounts to
“compromise with extremists” could be answered by recalling that, however distant the
Reformation era may seem, now-mainstream Protestant religious movements began with
passionate involvement in political controversy. xxxvi What were once “radical” movements
willing to fight for their convictions have evolved into powerful, “mainline” vehicles for
expressing humane religious sentiments. Humility and historical perspective – but not worldweary resignation – are vital qualities as Western leaders seek collaborative responses to
internationally salient conflicts. Over the long term, one of the most crucial tasks for
peacebuilding is depriving violent extremism of legitimacy. Diverse parties can support the
realization of this objective through religiously and culturally informed approaches to diplomatic
engagement and to conflict resolution within and between societies.
Middle Eastern Muslims today find themselves engaged in a profound struggle at a
crucial juncture in their history. They feel cut off from the past, and faced with a present
characterized by authoritarianism, poverty and humiliation, with no viable or desirable prospects
for creating their own future. These are realities that the U.S. must address when proposing new
terms of engagement and conveying an image of a more positive future constructed through
democratic change. Assurances of American and Western commitment to a stable, democratic,
and prosperous region are invaluable, particularly if supplemented with gestures demonstrating
respect for Middle Eastern perspectives on the democratization process. As Lieven and Hulsman
note, it is crucial that democracy promotion efforts be accompanied by “policies that visibly
serve the interests of the peoples concerned, and are tailored to their wishes.”xxxvii
In this regard, it is critical to recognize that democracy remains a word with positive
association for a majority of the world’s Muslims – particularly when the word is not narrowly
associated with a specific set of American policies or prescriptions. American leaders should not
make the mistake of regarding democracy promotion as something that has been tried and that
has failed, nor should their conceptions of its viability be shaped exclusively by consultations
with elite members of Muslim societies. At the grassroots level, there is strong demand for more
accountable and participatory government institutions, and for safeguards guaranteeing rights to
political dissent. What is needed is not an aggressive approach to democratization or the
selective invocation of democracy as a tool for undermining specific adversaries. When
conjoined with other policies, such as a proactive approach to conflict resolution, an evenhanded and long-term commitment to democratic principles and the opening of political space
could produce further gains in American-Islamic relations.
To help clear the way for such developments, America and its Muslim counterparts would do
well to explore an emerging consensus on the vital importance of “restorative” conceptions of
justice during peace processes and periods of political transition. Often framed as an alternative
to politically unrealistic and morally problematic notions of retributive justice (justice as revenge
or punishment of offenders) and blanket amnesties (forgiveness without a sense of accountability
or a guarantee of reform), restorative justice endeavours integrate frequently opposed values of
forgiveness and accountability. Often but not always understood in religious terms, restorative
justice challenges former enemies – government and opposition, or societies in conflict – to
rehumanize the adversary, acknowledge responsibility for misdeeds and excesses, and (whenever
possible) utilize symbolic gestures as well as various forms of reparation to signal desire for a
new relationship.
Restorative justice is predicated on the notion that profound shifts in human relations are
possible, and that former enemies can become allies or friends. In the context of Western-
Islamic relations, it provides a potential basis for simultaneously addressing deeply felt needs for
justice and hope for new beginnings, in a way that might potentially set a virtuous cycle in
motion.
Prescriptions: A Strategy of Active Peacemaking
Without a comprehensive vision of how Western-Islamic coexistence might be achieved, the
power of existing strategic assumptions and cultural mythologies is likely to overwhelm
piecemeal cooperative efforts. By working with a regionally grounded awareness of conflict
dynamics and sensitivity to the need for locally rooted solutions to challenges facing Muslimmajority societies, however, peaceful coexistence may yet be achieved through a sustained
process involving geopolitical restraint, commitment to consensus building, and intercultural
rapprochement.
It is in this spirit that the following list of recommendations has been formulated. This list is
intended to prompt fresh thinking about how American policies and initiatives might help
overcome a troubled historical legacy and begin to foster international and regional dynamics
that favor peaceful conflict resolution. These policies and initiatives would be designed with the
intention of amending strategies that have heightened conflict and polarization, while creating
conditions conducive to incremental “change from within” in Middle Eastern states and
societies.
1) Listen carefully to various Muslim accounts of the “backstory” behind present tensions.
In the United States after 9/11, one of the more immediate concerns – beyond the
tightening of security measures and the formulation of a military strategy – was to ensure that
public diplomacy efforts were adequate to “sell” the US and its policies overseas. This concern
for marketing, however, was not accompanied by a comparable interest in the salability of the
foreign policy product, or in the utility of public diplomacy for taking the measure of foreign
publics and discovering their messages for Americans. Some public diplomacy programs were
even premised on the notion that Middle Eastern Muslims know very little about the United
States – an assumption that even a very short visit to the region would belie.
While Middle Eastern publics are not without their biases and blind spots vis-à-vis the
U.S., they tend to be much better informed about developments in American pop culture, sports,
politics, technology, education, and lifestyles than many suspect. As Esposito and Mogahed’s
data suggests, starkly negative opinions of the U.S. often have less to do with judgments about
the reputed licentiousness of American culture than with genuine political disagreements. In
Juan Cole’s words, “Radicalism in the Muslim world is very much wrought up with antiimperialism, with a desire to push back against what local people see as an overbearing and
arrogant American dictation to them of how to live their lives.”xxxviii There is no easy substitute
for addressing these issues head on, in a manner that reflects openness to dialogue. Vigorous
public relations packaging cannot by itself solve the problem.
At its best, public diplomacy is a valuable instrument which the US and other Western
nations can use to open channels of two-way communication with Middle Eastern societies. An
effective public diplomacy strategy starts with actively listening to voices in the regionxxxix – not
only to their words and ideas, but also to the emotions and experiences behind the words and
ideas. Active listening, an invaluable skill for conflict resolution and the cultivation of sustained
dialogue, can also be an indispensable tool of analysis. In listening, the US and other Western
countries may begin to appreciate why their intentions have often been doubted or
misunderstood by Muslims. The belief that US leaders will not listen to or acknowledge Muslim
criticisms deepens attitudes of indignation and alienation, and increases resistance to American
perspectives on problems in the Middle East. Without dialogue, Muslims will be unable to hear
even the most powerful, accurate, and valid American insights and concerns about the
governance problems of many Middle Eastern countries.
For America to reach the hearts and minds of Arabs and Muslims, expressing agreement
with differing points of view is far less important than demonstrating respect and interest through
practices of dialogue and engagement. If used for such purposes, public diplomacy can also
provide a channel for building relationships of trust while signaling a commitment to
reconciliation, and the development of visions in which Americans and Muslims cooperate to
bring about a better future.
Establishing an atmosphere of trust and mutual concern cannot be achieved by plowing
over historical inconsistencies and mixed signals, dispensing with dialogue, and expecting
Middle Eastern audiences to embrace a new message. America and other Western powers cannot
afford to exclude Muslim publics and civic leaders from the process of formulating messages
intended to enlist support in shared efforts to construct a viable future. Granted, the trust of
Middle Eastern Muslims cannot be won overnight. Yet a carefully designed approach that
responds directly and consistently to high priorities of citizens in the region is likely to turn
significant dividends.
Because it is crucial for officials to have a well-informed, street-level perspective on the
complex mix of political frustration and intercultural alienation that feeds radicalization within
the region, additional steps could also be taken to enhance embassy relations with civic and
religious leaders in Middle Eastern countries, and to maintain open channels of communication
between appropriately knowledgeable diplomatic personnel and decision makers in executive
and legislative branches of government. Ensuring that Middle Eastern diaspora communities are
appropriately heard within government policymaking processes and recruited to public service is
another important way to enhance governmental expertise and outreach capability.
2) Embrace conflict de-escalation as an overarching strategy for marginalizing extremists
by “draining the swamp” of enmity that is fed by various enduring rivalries (esp. USIranian, Israeli-Palestinian/Arab, and US-Arab) in Islamic-Western relations.
Because radicalism feeds on unresolved conflict, patient efforts to bridge divides are a
necessity if more moderate political dynamics are to have a chance of succeeding in the Middle
East. In seeking to reduce the overall amount of political stress in the region, there is a wide
range of regional conflicts that American and Western diplomacy can address, whether in a
public manner or through quiet efforts to foster dialogue. These conflicts include the ArabIsraeli conflict, the ongoing violence in Iraq, U.S.-Iranian relations, hostilities between
Palestinian refugees and the Lebanese government, tensions between Kurdish minorities and the
states within which they live, conflicts between states and Islamic movements, racialized ethnic
conflict in Sudan, ethnoreligious tensions in Lebanon and Egypt, and a longstanding dispute over
the status of the Western Sahara. Obvious linkages between Middle Eastern conflicts and
ongoing events in Afghanistan and Pakistan are also worthy of attention.
By actively practicing dialogue and negotiation, the U.S. will be in a much better position
to advise Middle Eastern governments on the need to seek accommodation and reduce reliance
on repressive measures. Creative Western policies might also include efforts to enhance regional
conflict resolution capacity, by encouraging the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference to devote institutional resources to mediation training and to the development of
improved mechanisms for dispute resolution and conciliation. Constructive proposals emanating
from the region, such as the 2002 Saudi and Arab League peace initiative for the Israeli-Palestine
conflict, merit diplomatic encouragement. By working together on such proposals and nurturing
an interreligious “second track” for dialogue and negotiation, Western and Islamic leaders might
make significant contributions to peace by reframing the conflict over Israel-Palestine as a feud
within the Abrahamic family rather than as an interreligious collision, “crusade” (as seen by
Muslims), or “defense of democracy” (as seen by Washington).
Given that Americans still possess significantly more existential security than most
inhabitants of majority-Muslim countries, it is vitally important for the U.S. to take the initiative
in efforts to convey peaceful intentions and a desire to partner with local actors to foster the
emergence of a more prosperous and satisfactory future. Willingness to engage with Islamic
movements can give enhanced credibility to Western demonstrations of respect for Islamic
symbolism, and can help to ease Muslim perceptions of security threat. Calls to address the root
causes of conflict without being distracted by manipulated imagery are also essential. Through
their choices, Westerners have the power to respond to Middle Eastern conflicts in ways that
either mobilize anti-Western sentiment or bolster the cause of moderation and mutual adjustment.
At the present moment, U.S. efforts to negotiate a solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis
could open new opportunities for broader regional peacemaking initiatives, while also sending a
significant symbolic message. In addition, it is worth pointing out that while some grievances of
Islamic movements are widely shared, others are highly localized. We should not repeat the
errors of the Cold War by painting all movements with the same brush or adopting a totalizing
agenda of ideological confrontation. Instead, the goal should be to disaggregate and address
multiple contributing factors in a number of regional conflicts, and thereby reduce the appeal of
transnational extremism.
Though the U.S. governments may not wish to trumpet a willingness to engage with nonstate armed groups (be they active adversaries, as in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, or
irregulars engaged with the governments of Middle Eastern states), negotiation with insurgent
forces is often the only way to put an end to civil and regional wars. Denying “radical” groups a
chance to develop a stake in the political process can make things worse, not better.
U.S. and Western policy toward the Middle East should not target Islamic revivalism
(which, like Reformation-era movements in the West, is experienced as a process of internal
renewal) or Islamic fundamentalist reactions to perceived external threats. Rather than seek to
manipulate intraregional rivalries such as the Arab-Persian and Sunni-Shi‘a divides, Western
policy might generate more lasting contributions to security by calling for collaborative efforts to
redress grievances used to justify terrorism – for example, the suffering of Palestinians and
Iraqis, the maldistribution of resources, and the absence of legitimate and genuinely participatory
political authority.
3) Consistently convey respect for Islam, while simultaneously inviting dialogue about
Islamic bases for peaceable relations.
Far too often, trust between Westerners and Middle Eastern Muslims has been corroded
by needlessly provocative or misinformed pronouncements by opinion leaders on both sides. In
the current tense atmosphere, words articulated by leaders matter a great deal and have a
profound impact on domestic as well as foreign publics. At home, they impact the capacity of
citizens to imagine new relationships predicated on commonality instead of fear and resentment.
Overseas, these words are interpreted and reinterpreted by media analysts and political figures
seeking signals of underlying national intentions and purposes.
Through their choices, American leaders have the power to respond to Islam in ways that
either mobilize anti-Western sentiment or bolster the cause of moderation and mutual adjustment.
Western demonstrations of respect for and genuine interest in Islam – which, for so many Middle
Easterners, is the very core of their identity and sense of self – can help to ease Muslim
perceptions of security threat. Calls to address the root causes of conflict are also essential if
pathology and anti-Western extremism are not to be mistaken for the essence of the secondlargest world religion. Affirming Islamic identity while also working for consensus to address
outstanding political disputes can help Muslims shift away from a defensive stance and toward a
more creative response to modern problems of development, participation, and social justice.
Contact between Middle Eastern Muslims and Westerners can and should be
institutionalized to support regular interaction and mutual learning. In addition to public
diplomacy and greater effort on the part of diplomats in the field to make contact with social
leaders, governments and non-governmental groups can promote youth exchanges,
intercontinentally linked classrooms, and even sister city programs. The establishment of
Western and Middle Eastern endowments to fund cultural events that use visual and performing
arts to celebrate coexistence would also be welcome. Existing initiatives such as the Alliance of
Civilizations at the United Nations can play an important role by mapping out the issues that
divide Islamic and Western societies as a prelude to rapprochement based on reciprocity as well
as “pre-emptive” conciliatory measures.
Islam plays many roles in Muslim politics, providing languages of justification not only
for destructive conflict but also for justice-seeking and nonviolent behaviors. Although Islam
has often been understood in ways that conceive of peace narrowly as an “absence of war”
secured by a powerful and assertive governing authority, a strong foundation exists in Muslim
thought for conceptions of peace that are linked to social justice, communal solidarity, and
coexistence with non-Muslim communities. Efforts to engage Muslim peoples that take Islamic
frameworks for peacemaking into account are likely to be far more productive than approaches
that seek only to combat radicalism and shore up political authority structures.xl
Taking Muslim aspirations toward social justice and a more equitable international
system seriously can generate new energy in Middle Eastern and Islamic-Western peacemaking.
By affirming Islamic identity and deeply held ideals in a wide range of forums, from political
speech and diplomacy to civil society dialogues, Westerners have the potential to reduce
anxieties surrounding the perceived need to defend Islam. They can also help build sufficient
trust for more wide-ranging discussions of how Islamic values can play a role in conflict
resolution, nonviolent social change strategies, and development of a climate of relations among
the world’s religions in which mutuality and appreciation prevail rather than fear and
recrimination.
Like the West and its constituent religious traditions, the Islamic tradition is internally
rich with interpretations, practices, and meanings. Humbly and respectfully engaging Muslims
and expressing curiosity about these internal resources can help to activate them. However,
Muslim leaders should not hesitate to begin their own dialogue and confidence-building
initiatives, while proactively applying Islamic peacebuilding resources to the problems of Middle
Eastern societies. The events of recent years provide ample evidence that radicalism grows when
insulting an adversary’s values and “fighting fire with fire” become default responses to conflict;
a time has come for new experiments in intercultural, interreligious, and international relations
premised on mutual invitations to come to the table and seek common terms of understanding.
Given the importance of domestic example for relations with predominantly Muslim
societies, new steps should be taken to ensure inclusion of Muslims in Western societies. Special
efforts could be made to utilize the resources of university systems, and to encourage multifaith
projects that express shared religious values in the public sphere. The status of the United States
and Canada as immigrant societies gives these countries unique assets in the effort to engage
Muslim societies; there is a need, however, to ensure that the commitment to pluralism
continues, particularly in the face of widespread “Islam anxiety”xli and a widespread ignorance
about Islam. xlii
To prevent moves toward retrenchment and anti-Muslim prejudice, advocates of cultural
pluralism need to be articulate about the values underlying their efforts. Cultural pluralism
entails a principled openness to others and an engaged commitment to coexistence through
mutual recognition and respectful dialogue. Respect for the “other” permits a more truly
democratic approach to differences, and facilitates the pursuit of common standards.
4) Articulate a “new deal” in US-Muslim relations based on internationally legitimate
norms and standards rather than on traditional forms of geopolitical expediency.
The events of recent years demonstrate that the United States and other Western countries
have an interest in working in harmony with United Nations institutions whenever possible to
address security concerns. Abstention from both involvement in and rhetorical support for
military activities that have not received UN approval would be a wise and prudential policy for
combating the sense of international lawlessness that feeds radicalization and supports terrorist
recruitment.
A multilateral approach to international security based on respect for international
institutions can be greatly enriched by applying an integrative “human security” approach to the
problems of terrorism and political violence. This framework has a number of virtues: it
recognizes that radicalization festers in situations of repression and protracted conflict; it places a
strong emphasis on law enforcement, development, and protection of civilian populations rather
than on large-scale (and deeply polarizing) military campaigns; and it affirms the importance of
efforts to work towards a uniform standard of human rights, understood to include not only civil
and political but also economic, social, and cultural rights. It redirects policy from a narrow
focus on empowering state security and military apparatus toward a broader concern with
protecting individual human beings from harm and deprivation.
In the search for common ground on issues of international security, Western politicians
should take pains to resist polarizing discourse (e.g., “war for civilization,” “axis of evil,”
combat against “enemies of democracy,” demonization of Islamic movements and parties). The
stance taken by US, Canadian, and some other governments on the tragically counterproductive
Israel-Hizbullah war of 2006, like their perceived hypocrisy with respect to Hamas’s victory in
Palestinian elections the West had pressed for, have resulted in further loss of political capital for
the West (not to mention credibility for democracy) in the Arab Middle East. Western influence
and ability to mediate effectively in regional conflicts depend on acting in ways that thoughtful
members on both sides in the region’s painful conflicts can recognize as principled or at least
fair-minded. Care needs to be taken to develop credibility through consistent appeals to
international criteria for legitimacy (such as international human rights law and United Nations
resolutions) as well as through constructive diplomacy. One-sided stands make little sense in
complex Middle Eastern conflicts where no party is blameless.
U.S. and Western governments would benefit by attending carefully to the messages sent
by both words and deeds. Although it is not possible to control how one’s actions will be
construed, becoming keenly aware of regional perceptions can help to reduce cultural and
political miscommunication. Policies that demonstrate steady commitment to the principles of
human rights, human security, and international law (including jus in bello) are likely to be
viewed with far greater favor than policies toward regional conflicts that appear opportunistic or
inconsistent. Organizations that monitor human rights – intergovernmental as well as nongovernmental – may be able to provide helpful guidance in this regard. Whether the problem is
Arab-Israeli conflict, treatment of detainees in counterterrorism operations, or repression and
counter-violence between Arab governments and opposition movements, working to cultivate
international consensus on “fair” standards is far more desirable than staking out positions that
may appear arbitrary or hostile to regional stakeholders.
5) Draw upon restorative justice principles to formulate diplomatic messages that signal
commitment to genuine change in hitherto troubled historical relationships.
Much rhetoric about American-Islamic relations is preoccupied with affixing blame for
real as well as perceived injustices and offences. Given that publics have grown accustomed to
confrontation, efforts to achieve significant changes in relations can be politically risky, and will
need to be preceded by forms of discourse that enlarge the moral imagination of citizens in ways
that make coexistence appear more realistic and desirable. Often, this will require a delicate
balancing act, in which respect is paid to existing, selective national memories of relations with
adversaries, while also introducing new information and perspectives that prepare the ground for
change. There is a need here for oratorical skill of the quality displayed in the past by Barack
Obama in his multi-perspectival “honest talk” on race – discourse that simultaneously honors
and challenges multiple perspectives and experiences. Particularly risky but potentially high
payoff options, including political apology, could also be used at strategic moments to break an
impasse, if possible after preparatory track-two consultations and scenario-building for
reciprocal measures.
As the more powerful party in relations with Muslim-majority states and Islamic
movements, it might behoove American spokespersons to acknowledge the impact of unequal
power relations on cultural contact between Muslims and Westerners, in a manner that highlights
the importance of extenuating circumstances in shaping actions on both sides. Unequal power
has led to a situation in which genuine cultural differences are experienced simultaneously with
serious political and economic disputes. The results have often been quite painful. Imagine, for
example, how Iranian-American relations might have developed if not for Cold War geopolitics,
and Western fears of Soviet control over Iranian oil resources in the event of a feared (but
unlikely) communist takeover. In the absence of such concerns, Anglo-American support for a
pro-monarchy coup might never have manifested in 1953, putting the West on a collision course
with Iranian secular and religious nationalists. We cannot reverse history, yet there is cause for
remorse at the unfortunate and unanticipated outcomes of past decisions and events.
If there is to be a new beginning, humility will be required of all parties. Within the
West, there is a need to acknowledge that great powers such as England, France, and now the
United States have often used their influence in ways that have dramatically reduced the capacity
of Middle Eastern Muslims to control their own cultural and political destiny. At the time of
their own breakthroughs in modern economic and political development, these Western powers
competed with one another but faced no comparable obstacles to self-determination and selfrespect. Becoming more cognizant of such issues through Western cultural empathy has become
vital for international peace. However, placing all responsibility for change on the shoulders of
the U.S. or other Western powers would be undesirable because it denies the role contemporary
Muslims can play by trusting in the enduring strength of authentic Islamic values, which are no
doubt quite capable of absorbing the shocks of Western intrusions while providing a principled
basis for integrating and adapting those Western ideas and practices that can complement an
ongoing revitalization of Islamic culture. Sobriety and humility are vital watchwords for
Westerners and Muslims as they seek to avoid the perils of hubris and fanaticism, and develop
intercultural confidence-building measures.
6) Develop a more genuinely “democratic” (as opposed to coercive or ethnocentric) set of
guidelines for supporting democratic “change from within” in Muslim-majority societies.
By contributing to the radicalization of young Muslim men, over-militarization of the
“War on Terror” has done more to destabilize the Muslim Middle East than to cultivate a basis
for sustainable peace. The result has been a troubled policy that enjoins democracy on the one
hand, while collaborating with (and indeed participating in) practices of state-sponsored torture
on the other.xliii Though some democratic reformers in the Middle East initially took heart at US
President George W. Bush’s acknowledgement of past complicity with oppressive states,
disruption created by the Iraq war has made genuine transformation a more distant goal.
Despite these trends, fostering incremental “change from within” in the Middle East is
among the most vital tasks facing Western nations as they seek to adjust and redefine relations
with the region. The United States and other Western countries can best support positive internal
developments by promoting political participation within structures appropriate to the needs and
culture of the people, and not by unreflectively promoting the transplantation of Western models
or supporting authoritarian regimes.
By shaping conditions within which internal debates proceed, American and Western
policies have exerted a significant – but often unrecognized – impact on prospects for democracy
in the Middle East. Insofar as past policies have turned a blind eye to repressive practices and to
the suffering associated with major regional conflicts, Western powers have inadvertently helped
to create conditions favorable to anti-liberal, reactive action. Some policies, such as the decision
to arm and actively assist anti-Soviet insurgents in Afghanistan during the Cold War, have
unintentionally contributed to the present strength of radical networks. More recent policies
linking democratization to the Iraq war have been at least as problematic, fostering the
impression that “democracy” is a Trojan horse for Western conquest and political manipulation.
This impression is quite damaging, as the only viable democratic projects in Muslim
countries are those that take root in local soil and are nourished by the aspirations of citizens for
a more hopeful future. Though regional democratic projects may derive important ideas and
insights from Western practices of democracy, their language and forms of expression will reflect
regional culture and Islamic values, shorn of traditional as well as modern baggage that is no
longer experienced as life-giving. As Jeremy Jones has argued, democratic change will stand the
best chance of success in the Middle East if it is conceived as a genuinely indigenous enterprise:
Democracy in the Middle East may not only be possible, it may already be under
construction. In the diverse institutions and conversations, the traditions and experiments
with which the people of the region conduct their daily lives, manage their social relations
and organize their politics there might be all kinds of practices that ought to be recognized
as democratic in nature. It may be these practices, rather than those that have developed in
the West… that will form the foundations for the further development of democratic
political institutions….xliv
By becoming sensitized to ongoing experiments with democratic change in Middle Eastern
countries, Western policymakers stand a much better chance of finding means to strategically
nourish positive dynamics, providing the hope necessary to sustain long-term, peaceful change
and address many of the underlying conflicts that have created the current atmosphere of
repression, violence, and anger.
Conclusion
This paper has been written with the conviction that the ultimate significance of the
present turbulent period has yet to be determined. Will Americans and Muslims seek to
transcend their immediate, emotional reactions to violent and painful events, or will they
withdraw into more deeply ethnocentric and aggrieved frames of reference? Will they aspire to
gain more authentic knowledge about their counterparts’ fears and aspirations, or will they allow
their mutual perceptions to become more polarized, partisan, and self-serving? Will they move
toward broader and more humane understandings of their respective cultural and political
traditions, or will they amplify belief systems that deny the virtues of tolerance and cultural
pluralism? The arrival fresh American leadership provides grounds for optimism, yet the road
ahead will not be easy.
What is clear, however, is that Americans and Muslims now have the opportunity to
create a new story together by moving beyond the scripted tropes that have been recited too often
in relations between Islam and the West. We may lack perfect freedom to choose our future, but
it is our fundamental responsibility to present as well as to future generations to capitalize on the
degrees of freedom that are available to us as we make conscious choices between war and
peace, isolation and engagement, pessimism and hope.
i Several passages in this paper have been adapted from Islam and Peacemaking in the Middle East (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), a coauthored book written in collaboration with Abdul Aziz Said, whose
contribution to the substance and forms of expression is gratefully acknowledged.
ii “Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address,” New York Times, January 20, 2009, accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all on May 3, 2009.
iii Juan Cole, “Obama's First Hundred Days in the Greater Middle East,” Informed Comment blog, April 28, 2009,
accessed at http://www.juancole.com/ on May 2, 2009.
iv Throughout the Middle East, views of the United States went from bad to worse in the years after 9/11 and the
Iraq War. In April 2002, 76% of Egyptians claimed to hold the US in low regard, whereas by July 2004, 98%
expressed a negative opinion. In Morocco the trend was much the same, moving from 61% negative in 2002 to 88%
negative in 2004. Linzer, “Poll Shows Growing Arab Rancor,” Washington Post, 2004.
v Juan Cole, “Obama's First Hundred Days in the Greater Middle East,” Informed Comment blog, April 28, 2009,
accessed at http://www.juancole.com/ on May 2, 2009.
vi Juan Cole, “Obama's First Hundred Days in the Greater Middle East.”
vii Nazila Fathi and David E. Sanger, “Iran Offers ‘Dialogue with Respect’ with U.S.,” New York Times, February
11, 2009.
viii For comments by Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, see “Iran Cleric to Obama: Don’t Repeat Bush’s Warnings,” Reuters,
January 30, 2009.
ix “Qaeda’s Zawahri dismisses Obama, U.S. still enemy,” Reuters, February 3, 2009.
x Salah ad-Din Al-Jourchi, “Candid Words for a Candid President,” Web Commentary, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, December 8, 2008, accessed at http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?
fa=print&id=22509 on February 12, 2009.
xi Norman Podhoretz, World War IV: The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism (New York: Random House, 2008),
p. 15.
xii Podhoretz, World War IV, pp. 6-7.
xiii Podhoretz, p. 13.
xiv Podhoretz, p. 25.
xv Podhoretz, p. 102.
xvi Richard Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: “Islamic Terrorism” in Political and Academic Discourse,”
Government and Opposition, Vol. 42, No 3, p. 421.
xvii Richard Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: “Islamic Terrorism” in Political and Academic Discourse,”
Government and Opposition, Vol. 42, No 3, p. 421.
xviii Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005).
xix Robert Pape, in Douglas Macgregor, Marvin Weinbaum, Abdullah Ansary, and Rogert Pape, “The ‘Global War
on Terror’: What Has Been Learned,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Winter 2008), p. 12.
xx Anthony H. Cordesman, “Winning the ‘War on Terrorism’: A Fundamentally Different Strategy,” Middle East
Policy, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Fall 2006), p. 102).
xxi John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think (New York:
Gallup Press, 2007).
xxii John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, “Battle for Muslim Hearts and Minds: The Road Not (Yet) Taken,”
Middle East Policy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 2007), p. 37.
xxiii Esposito and Mogahed, “Battle for Muslim Hearts and Minds,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring
2007), p. 39.
xxiv Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2006.
xxv Richard Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: “Islamic Terrorism” in Political and Academic Discourse,”
Government and Opposition, Vol. 42, No 3, p. 424.
xxvi Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, Ethical Realism: A Vision for America’s Role in the World (New York:
Random House, 2006).
xxvii Lieven and Hulsman, p. xi.
xxviii Lieven and Hulsman, p. xiii.
xxix Lieven and Hulsman, p. xvii.
xxx Lieven and Hulsman, p. xvii.
xxxi Lieven and Hulsman, p. 38.
xxxii Lieven and Hulsman, p. 39.
xxxiii Lieven and Hulsman, p. 50.
xxxiv Lieven and Hulsman, p. 123.
xxxv Thompson, “A War Best Served Cold, New York Times, 2007; Shapiro, Containment, 2007.
xxxvi The revolutionary religious and political projects pursued by Oliver Cromwell and the English Puritans are
exemplary. See Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints, 1969.
xxxvii Lieven and Hulsman, p. 54.
xxxviii Juan Cole, “Obama's First Hundred Days in the Greater Middle East,” Informed Comment blog, April 28,
2009, accessed at http://www.juancole.com/ on May 2, 2009.
xxxix Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mixed Blessings, p. 17.
xl Nathan Funk and Abdul Aziz Said, Islam and Peacemaking in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2009).
xli Juan Cole, Engaging the Muslim World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
xlii “Majorities of Muslims – both politically radicalized and moderates – say they know and admire the West’s
technology, freedom of speech, and value system of hard work. Meanwhile, Americans asked what they know about
Muslims predominantly offer two responses: ‘Nothing’ and ‘I don’t know.’” Esposito and Mogahed, “Battle for
Muslim Hearts and Minds,” p. 41.
xliii Mertus, Bait and Switch, 2004.
xliv Jones, Negotiating Change, 2007, pp. 5-6.