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Public representations of scientific uncertainty about global climate change
Stephen C. Zehr
Public Understanding of Science 2000 9: 85
DOI: 10.1088/0963-6625/9/2/301
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Public Understand. Sci. 9 (2000) 85–103. Printed in the UK
PII: S0963-6625(00)11933-2
Public representations of scientific uncertainty about global
climate change
Stephen C. Zehr
This paper addresses the representation of scientific uncertainty about global warming and climate
change in the U.S. popular press. An examination of popular press articles about global warming
from 1986 to 1995 reveals that scientific uncertainty was a salient theme. The paper describes
several forms of uncertainty construction and means through which it was managed. I argue that
scientific uncertainty was used to help construct an exclusionary boundary between “the public”
and climate change scientists. This rhetorical boundary delegitimated lay knowledge by suggesting
that the public did not hold appropriate reverence for scientific uncertainty and the need for more
research.
1. Introduction
An article in a January 1994 issue of Current Health II opened with two, large-print quotations.
One quotation read: “New York and Miami will be flooded as sea levels rise from melting
polar ice. There will be famine. Health threats. Civil unrest. We have to take action now to
prevent a global catastrophe.” The other read: “The weather forecasters can’t tell us for sure
whether it will rain tomorrow, but they’re going to predict the temperature for the whole planet
50 years from now! In the 1970s they were telling us the next ice age was coming. Global
warming is just another false alarm.”1 After presenting these quotations, the author situated
reality somewhere in between, while conceding that much scientific uncertainty still remained.
This uncertainty was used to call readers’ attention to and show reverence for future scientific
research. “Can anything be learned from the global warming controversy? Perhaps the best
advice is to ‘chill.’ Don’t jump to conclusions that aren’t supported by the data.”2
This paper focuses on two central themes: (1) representations and salience of scientific
uncertainty in popular press articles about global climate change, and (2) uses of scientific
uncertainty to construct boundaries in the popular press between scientists’ knowledge-claims
about climate change and public reconstructions of this knowledge. I show that scientific
uncertainty was both a salient issue and was enrolled to maintain a rhetorical boundary between
scientists’ and lay knowledge about climate change. The above quote is a good illustration of
these two themes. Scientific uncertainty is represented as a central feature of knowledge about
global warming, and readers are told to “chill” and refrain from making claims until scientists
have spoken. Below, I explore some different forms through which scientific uncertainty was
constructed or represented in the press. I argue that scientific uncertainty was managed such
0963-6625/00/020085+19$30.00
© 2000 IOP Publishing Ltd and The Science Museum
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that the position of scientists as legitimate knowledge providers was maintained, in contrast to
a “public” that was constructed as misinformed.
The first part of the paper reviews relevant literature on representations of science in
the popular press, uncertainty discourse, and the concept of boundary-work. The paper then
addresses the construction of scientific uncertainty in the press dealing with its salience, forms
of construction, and management. The paper then considers how scientific uncertainty was
used to construct or reinforce boundaries between scientists and a public.
2. Literature review
Public representations of science in the popular press
Recent studies of science in the popular press have focused on four interrelated topics relevant
to my discussion below.3 One topic is the image of science and scientists portrayed in the press.
These images have been analyzed for their accuracy in depicting “real” science and scientists,
how positive images enable scientists to garner more societal resources, and their depictions
of women in science.4 This literature suggests that it is important to analyze these images as
more than mere representations of science and scientists, but also as builders of science and
society as well.
A second topic is the centrality of scientific controversy in the press.5 Controversies tend
to make dramatic reading and often are important to public concerns. On occasion, journalists
may develop controversy where none previously existed, or sustain it by soliciting opposing
arguments by expert scientists. This practice has been interpreted as a means to construct
journalistic objectivity and for creating drama in one’s account.6 As I argue below, it also helps
construct an appearance of scientific uncertainty.
A third topic is the connection between press representations of science and public
(mis)understandings. Since most members of the public have little contact with science outside
of the mass media, one would expect a strong relationship between the two. Though much
research suggests that the public is scientifically illiterate, Brian Wynne, among others, has
recently pointed to a lack of knowledge about the public (mis)understanding of science.7
Part of the problem is failure to differentiate among public knowledge of specific scientific
information, the scientific process (e.g., methodologies), and social dynamics of the scientific
community. Generally speaking, measurements of scientific literacy test specific scientific
information,8 even though it may be irrelevant to the everyday lives of individuals. Given
the measuring device, we should probably expect the results to show a limited literacy. In
focusing on scientific process, the public (and some scientists for that matter) may be unable
to describe the official scientific method, however, the public often holds and uses observation
and reasoning skills that are quite similar to those used by scientists. Likewise (using my
undergraduate sociology of science classes as an indicator), descriptions of social processes,
such as stratification and deviance, in the scientific community are less surprising to the public
than they once were.
Much emphasis in science literacy tests has been placed on whether the public understands
science in much the same way as scientists. However, one might question whether the public
even should (or could) understand science in this way. Responding to this critique, science
studies research increasingly focuses on how different publics use science, what lay knowledge
they intermix with science, and whether scientific or lay knowledge is more effective in people’s
day-to-day lives.9 Public understanding of science is mediated by lay interests, values, beliefs,
and knowledge. Thus, studies of public understanding of science must be qualified by “which
audience, in what context, looking for what information?”10 Also relevant is how public
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Public representations of scientific uncertainty about climate change
87
misunderstandings of science are a socially constructed phenomenon. These constructions
might be used to co-construct a gap between science and non-science, to legitimate resources
for science, or to privilege particular forms of science communication.11
A fourth topic is the press’s role in popularizing science. It was once assumed that
real science occurred in one setting and then was removed and popularized for public
dissemination in another. More recently, Stephen Hilgartner has shown the difficulties of
identifying a boundary between science and popularization.12 Hilgartner argues that claims
about popularization (and the simplification or abuse of “real” science that it allegedly involves)
serve as a rhetorical resource to help interpret and defend science against outsiders.13 Others
have suggested that in the U.S. the popularization process itself has been driven by the desire
to promote public appreciation of science and the benefits it provides for society.14
With these points in mind, it seems theoretically appropriate15 to consider popular press
representations of science as another arena for doing science. Scientific claims are constructed
in the pages of the popular press much as they are in other places, with particular rhetorical
features, and within complex and reciprocal relationships among scientists, journalists, and
readers. As science is communicated in this arena, scientific claims are being constructed,
but so are a social order and arrangement among these three sets of actors. This order and
arrangement merits further study.
Uncertainty discourse
Constructivist studies of scientific knowledge have emphasized how uncertainties in knowledge
production processes are eliminated or transformed, resulting in more certain claims about the
natural world.16 Recent research also has problematized scientific claims about uncertainty
and ignorance in science.17 Within uncertainty discourse, I include the individual or collective
claims that scientific knowledge is incomplete about some feature of nature.18 These claims
can be explicit, such as in the statement: “there is scientific uncertainty about the causal linkage
between twentieth-century greenhouse gas emissions and global temperature increases.” Or
uncertainty discourse might be an outcome of more certain claims. For example, opposing
scientific claims might be juxtaposed and lead to the inference that scientists, collectively, are
uncertain about some aspect of nature. Several different forms of uncertainty discourse will
be explored in more detail in the empirical section below.
Uncertainty discourse is not limited to the popular press. Through such means as
constructing gaps in the literature,19 scientists build uncertainties into their scientific papers.
Modalities may be added to knowledge-claims to draw attention to the context of the claims
and help reduce the certainty with which they are held.20 In scientific controversies, scientists
may use these and other devices to construct uncertainty about opponents’ claims as well.21
Uncertainty discourse serves numerous purposes in scientific communication. Among
scientists, it rhetorically creates a demand for scientific research and can be useful in scientific
controversies to draw attention to the inadequacy of opponents’ views. In political contexts,
uncertainty discourse may be used as authoritative statements that help legitimate a status quo
position (“the science is uncertain, so we better wait”),22 or it may be used as a “boundaryordering device” between advisory scientists and policy makers (i.e., as a commonly held
discourse that is both shared by and used to bring social order within and between these two
communities).23 Analyses of scientific uncertainty in the media have emphasized its role in
dramatizing accounts. On television shows, for example, a brief “window of uncertainty” may
be constructed to dramatize later, more certain accounts.24
However, less attention has been placed on the implications of scientific uncertainty for the
relationship between scientists and the public. Representations of uncertainty could potentially
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diminish the authority of science. Since science is generally perceived as an authoritative,
truth-producing profession, acknowledgment of uncertainty might reduce this authority and
open access to the production of knowledge to other groups and activities. On the other hand,
representations of uncertainty might be managed to augment scientific authority if they place
the problem in question more firmly in future scientific research. In the case study reported
here, I suggest that the latter was closer to the truth. Uncertainty discourse was used in the press
to situate science more centrally within the global warming/climate change problem domain.
To understand why, one must examine how uncertainty discourse not only depicts a lack of
scientific knowledge, but also how it is managed to co-produce particular identities and social
arrangements for science and the public.25 Toward this end, we must look at the linkage of
uncertainty discourse and boundary-work.
Boundary-work
Boundary-work refers to “the attribution of selected characteristics to the institution of science
for purposes of constructing a social boundary that distinguishes some intellectual activity
as non-science.”26 Boundary-work may perform such professional functions for science as
monopolization, expansion, expulsion, and protection.27 Boundary-work is also reciprocal.
As scientists or other spokespersons describe science, they also may depict non-science,
constructing a particular identity for practitioners of that activity.
In the global climate change case, boundary-work was significant for the way some claims
about scientific uncertainty rhetorically constructed a social hierarchy. In this hierarchy,
“the public” was given a very limited or non-existent role in the production of global
warming knowledge, while scientists’ role was privileged. Uncertainty discourse was used
to help protect the authoritative position of science against the possible emergence of more
authoritative lay knowledge.
Data
These issues were addressed through an empirical examination of articles on climate change
in the U.S. popular press from 1986–1995. Articles from four major newspapers (The New
York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Chicago Tribune, and The Los Angeles Times from
1989–1995) and magazines in the popular press (from 1986–1995) were content analyzed.28
Articles were identified through searches, using the key terms “global warming” and “global
climate change,” on the following computerized searching tools: Reader’s Guide to Periodical
Literature, Newspaper Abstracts, and Lexis-Nexis. Copies of articles were obtained and read
for content. As significant themes related to scientific uncertainty emerged, examples were
recorded. Articles were reread several times to identify further examples of emergent and
dominant themes. The excerpts below are presented as illustrative examples of these themes.
3. Global climate change in the press and the salience of uncertainty
The problem of global climate change has received considerable treatment in the U.S. popular
press. It was highly dramatized during the late 1980s, with its very hot summers, and with the
bold claims of James Hansen in a congressional hearing. According to Sheldon Ungar, the
heat and drought of the summer of 1988 created a “social scare” leading to increased media
attention and public concern, which attenuated as the scare passed.29 Even though the novelty
and drama surrounding climate change has since declined, the press has been persistent in its
coverage, especially in its attention to scientific uncertainty. Scientific uncertainty has served
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Public representations of scientific uncertainty about climate change
89
as an important “frame”30 through which the science of climate change was presented in the
press.
The salience of scientific uncertainty was reflected in several features of these articles.
In many articles, scientific uncertainty was the main topic. For example, a high profile 1991
New York Times Magazine article, entitled “Heating the Global Warming Debate,”31 focused
extensively on scientific uncertainty in the debate over rates of global warming. After an
initial large print statement that read: “In 1988 scientist Jim Hansen testified that the world
was getting hotter: But how hot? And how fast?”, the author situated the problem.
Environmentalists conjure images of disaster; industrialists appeal to scientific
uncertainty; the media seize on any hint of controversy with intemperate zeal. And
climate experts offer scant relief, insisting as they do that the day-to-day fluctuations
ordinary people notice aren’t nearly as significant as the long-term trends about which
they themselves seem to agree.”32
Then, at several successive points throughout the article, the author referred back to the theme
of scientific uncertainty. Several other articles also situated scientific uncertainty as the main
topic.33
In other articles, scientific uncertainty appeared in key places. These included titles
such as: “Cloud Data Cast Doubt About Atmosphere”; “Global Warming: Experts Ponder
Bewildering Feedback Effects”; “With Cloudy Crystal Balls, Scientists Race to Assess Global
Warming”; “Global Warming: Uncertainty and Action”; and “U.S. Water Resources Versus an
Announced But Uncertain Climate Change.”34 These articles included an opening or closing
paragraph (or both), that helped to frame uncertainty within the article. A 1991 New York Times
article on an international global warming meeting was typical. It began: “In a contest between
uncertain science and uncertain economics, negotiators from around the world convened in
Nairobi yesterday for what promises to be a contentious effort. . . .”35 Further references to
uncertainty were placed at several points throughout the article. In another example, a 1992
Chicago Tribune article addressed a theory put forth by a horticulturist that rising CO2 levels
may have beneficial effects in the form of increased plant productivity. However, the article
closed with an uncertainty caveat: “But he says that rather than propagating theories as facts,
‘the honest observer has to conclude he does not really know what will happen.’ ”36 In a third
example, scientific uncertainty was developed in a New York Times article in a section entitled,
“The Science.”37
Scientific uncertainty also was made salient through direct quotations from scientists
or scientific reports. Journalists have wide latitude over what they narrate and what they
quote directly from scientists, and the latter have control over how they frame information for
journalists. Direct quotations from scientists hold more force than narrative, and there were
many instances in which these quotations included uncertainty discourse. For example, in
a 1992 Chicago Tribune article, the author attempted to justify President Bush’s reluctance
to attend the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit the next month. The author explained that it was
difficult to make political decisions before research data were clear and that computer models
were flawed, as “many papers given at the last annual meeting of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science pointed out.” This was followed by the quote: “ ‘For the next
decade or so, all climate model predictions are expected to suffer from uncertainties,’ noted one
expert.”38 In another example, a Chicago Tribune article included the following main quote
from a 1991 National Academy of Sciences report: “Despite the great uncertainties, global
warming is a potential threat sufficient to justify action now.”39
In addition, both journalists and scientists often used attention-getting adjectives to further
stress scientific uncertainties. Some examples included: “hellacious” and “enormous;”40
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“substantial,” “large,” “contentious,” and “genuine;”41 and “gaping.”42
Thus, the reference to scientific uncertainty was a very common and salient theme in
articles on climate change during the 1986–1995 period. Scientific uncertainty has not
been a typical feature of science journalism.43 Rather, journalists and scientists have tended
to de-emphasize the uncertainties associated with specific fields of inquiry as accounts are
constructed in public domains. Whether the global climate change case is an exception to this
tendency or whether journalists’ and scientists’ practices have recently changed are unanswered
questions.
4. Forms of uncertainty construction
The above examples of scientific uncertainty were overt and easily detectable. Simply put,
journalists and scientists were claiming that scientific uncertainty existed. In this section,
I explore more subtle forms through which uncertainty was constructed in press accounts.
Three recurrent forms are explored, using the labels: scientific controversy, new research, and
expansion of the problem domain. These forms are probably not unique to the global climate
change phenomenon. The linkage between scientific controversy and uncertainty, in particular,
has been discussed in other cases.44
Scientific controversy
Uncertainty was constructed through the practice of interjecting and emphasizing controversy
or disagreement among scientists. From a science journalism standpoint, controversy and
disagreement often create drama in accounts and may provide journalists with a guise of
objectivity because it appears that they are presenting both sides.45 However, scientific
uncertainty is also constructed by the lack of scientists’ collective agreement about one specific
aspect of nature, even though each expert may be certain of his or her view. Occasionally,
journalists explicitly drew this connection between disagreement and scientific uncertainty.
For instance, a 1990 Los Angeles Times article advised readers: “The way to separate values
from science is to. . . listen for agreement (scientific certainty, as far as it goes) and disagreement
(scientific uncertainty, all mixed up with values).”46
Scientific controversy and disagreement were developed in three ways. First, journalists
contrasted areas of research in which there was much scientific agreement with areas in which
there was little or no agreement. A Los Angeles Times article on the effects of ocean warming
in Monterey Bay was typical. The following paragraph identified points of controversy.
There is broad agreement among scientists that the Earth has gotten warmer by at
least a degree during the past 100 years. But there is considerable controversy over
the impact climate change is having on the Earth. There is also much disagreement
on whether human-generated greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide are fueling
the increase in temperature and whether they could lead to disastrous fluctuations in
weather patterns.47
This type of contrast (area of agreement versus disagreement) was a common feature. It
provided a quick review of the state of scientific knowledge and helped to organize articles.
The above quotation, for instance, produced a framework through which the specific study of
Monterey Bay was connected to a global problem. These contrasts also brought attention to
scientific controversy along with uncertainty.
Second, journalists focused on controversy and disagreement among scientists within a
specific area of research. These existed among scientists in general:
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Public representations of scientific uncertainty about climate change
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These gases—principally carbon dioxide and methane—are believed by some
scientists to trap [additional] heat in the atmosphere, leading to potentially catastrophic
climate changes. It is something to worry about, but there is deep scientific division
over the threat, or whether global warming even is under way.48
They existed among communities of researchers:
Those who disagree with what Hansen says—one climatologist calls them
“greenhouse agnostics”—fall into three sects. . . Those who don’t believe the
temperature record. . . is reliable enough to demonstrate a warming trend. Those
who agree that there has been a warming but aren’t sure blame can be assigned
solely to increases in the emissions of greenhouse gases. . . . Those who don’t think
anyone understands climate well enough to predict the meteorological effects of global
warming.49
They existed among individual scientists, who were singled out because of their dissenting
views. Scientists such as Richard Lindzen, Fred Singer, Patrick Michaels, and Robert Balling
Jr. were quoted numerous times in the popular press because they disagreed with much of
the climate change scientific community and because their public statements tended to invoke
controversy.50 These individuals were given a disproportionate amount of space in the press,
perhaps because climate change itself was a disputatious public issue51 or, quite possibly,
because of their connections to the energy industry.52
Third, scientific disagreement was presented almost as a journalistic reflex to help situate
the article in the global warming category. For example, a short Chicago Tribune article on
the high average earth temperature in 1991 contained this caveat at the end:
Many researchers have expressed concern about global warming in recent years. . . .
But others have questioned some of the dire predictions, and scientists continue
collecting information to try to determine any actual changes in climate.53
The author then added a quote from a scientist: “ ‘We need many more months before we
can say for sure.’ ”54 Taken literally, the statement would have called into question all the
information reported in the article. Its inclusion, however, speaks to a perceived need to add
the uncertainty caveat, so as to eliminate possible perceptions or claims of journalistic bias.
These three forms of representing controversy and disagreement helped construct scientific
uncertainty within numerous articles. Was this form of uncertainty used to imply limitations in
the perceived objectivity and utility of science, as some have suggested for other cases?55 As
scientific controversy was opened for public inspection, did journalists suggest that scientists
simply hold varying “opinions” rather than objective knowledge and that readers draw their
own conclusions? Though there were few instances of expansion on this question, those
journalists and scientists who did expand on it drew a different conclusion (with a couple of
exceptions). Their conclusion was to wait for further scientific research to sort things out. As
a Chicago Tribune article concluded: “There are, then, legitimate experts on all sides of the
greenhouse theory. And all the rest of us can do is wait for more facts to clear matters up so
we can decide whether—and how much—to change our lives.”56
New research
Scientific uncertainty was constructed by connecting new study topics and new research
methods and techniques to global climate change solutions. Articles that included this form
addressed an esoteric and interesting new research project, along with personal information
(and some quotes) about the scientist(s) conducting the study. From the sociology of social
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problems literature, we know that new topics and stories are appealing and important because
they help maintain novelty about the problem. Since social problems easily grow stale and
are in constant competition with other issues for public attention,57 novelty helps retain the
problem on the public agenda.
Novelty was created in articles on global warming through the representation of a research
project or method as a fresh and inventive means for resolving a key question. However, as this
research was described, more scientific uncertainty was constructed. That is, each new study
or technique was presented as important and novel precisely because it might answer hitherto
unanswered but significant questions. The extensive focus on new research implied that there
were many unanswered questions. Furthermore, scientists who were quoted in these articles
typically reconfirmed this state of scientific uncertainty.
Most accounts of new research involved novel means for measuring global warming
or climate change. A 1991 BioScience article entitled, “Does coral bleaching mean global
warming?”, was typical.58 The article began with the question: “Where is the proof that
one politician would need to convince others of the reality of global warming and the
potential seriousness of its consequences?”59 It then proceeded with a general discussion
of coral bleaching, which, the author noted, is affected by physiological stress, pollution,
eutrophication, and sedimentation, and has been increasing in the Caribbean. Then, it returned
to global warming: “Can coral reefs serve as biological indicators of global warming?”60 One
scientist (Ernest H. Williams of the University of Puerto Rico) answered affirmatively: “The
first proof of global warming may well come from the bleaching of the fragile and highly
sensitive coral reef system.”61 However, Williams quickly added: “Unfortunately, we do not
have sufficient data to fully evaluate this intriguing suggestion.”62 The article then continued,
noting the potential importance of coral bleaching for detecting global warming and the need
for more research funding to collect data. It concluded with yet another twist. According to
Walter C. Jaap of the State of Florida Department of Natural Resources, coral reef degradation
may not only indicate global warming but also “enhance the greenhouse effect.” However,
“other scientists are reluctant to reach so strong a conclusion from the limited data currently
available.”63
This format existed in many articles. A new research study or technique was introduced
and described in some detail. Then the author, or more typically a scientist, cautioned that
there were insufficient data or some uncertainties associated with the research. Each study
took on increased significance with its association with global warming, but at the same time
more scientific uncertainty about global warming was constructed.
The above example was coral bleaching. Other examples that fit this pattern included:
an underground laboratory in northern Michigan,64 studies of bore hole records,65 snow cover
monitors,66 ice core drilling in the Greenland, Laurentide, Antarctica, and Tibetan Plateau ice
sheets,67 glacier and ice sheet melting rates,68 changes in ocean acoustics,69 paleontological
studies of ancient swamps,70 Swedish tree rings,71 ranges of the woodland deer mouse,72 and
the possibility of launching a constellation of satellites that will warn against missile launches
and also, “with the left hand,” monitor global warming.73 In each case, the appeal of new and
often esoteric research was combined with its implications for a significant (and dramatic)
environmental problem. This practice made for fascinating reading, but also helped construct
scientific uncertainty.
Expansion of the problem domain
Uncertainty was constructed through the recurrent inclusion of more research problems within
the broader category of global climate change, leading to an expansion of the problem. This
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practice is a common feature of representations of environmental and other social problems
that incorporate scientific knowledge.74 For scientists, funding opportunities and visibility
are enhanced if their particular research project is linked to a larger public issue. Similarly,
journalists link scientific research projects to larger public concerns in their articles as a means
for increasing their salience. However, as different research problems are connected to an
environmental problem, the domain of the latter appears to expand. As it expands, both in
its entirety and in individual aspects, there seems to be more scientific uncertainty about the
problem. More research appears to be needed before one can claim a definitive understanding
of the problem.
An article in Reader’s Digest provides a good example. Entitled “What is the truth about
global warming?”, it began with James Hansen’s remarks at a Senate hearing in which he
concluded, with much certainty, that the greenhouse effect is changing our climate now. The
author then asked questions of and quoted scientists who claimed that the problem was less
extreme than the public believed it was or that there was still much uncertainty. Following
these quotes, the problem domain was expanded, leading to yet further uncertainty.
Oceans have a major effect upon climate, but scientists have only begun to understand
how. . . . How heat travels through the atmosphere and back into space is another big
question mark for the global-warming theory. So is the sunspot cycle, as well as the
effect of atmospheric pollution and volcanic particles that can reflect sunlight back
into space. Such factors throw predictions about global warming into doubt.75
The author then blamed the media for perpetuating hysteria in face of “the facts” and concluded
with a quote from global warming skeptic, Patrick Michaels.
We still know far too little to be stampeded into rash, expensive proposals. Before we
take such steps, says Patrick J. Michaels. . . “the science should be much less murky
than it is now.” Further research and climatic monitoring are certainly warranted.76
In this example, the author’s intentions were clear: to argue that global warming was
not severe and to raise questions that elicit further research. In other articles, journalists
addressed a specific climatic concern, linked it to global warming, then added a statement
about scientific uncertainties associated with the linkage. For example, a 1991 USA Today
article briefly discussed a scientist’s claim about severe hurricane activity and global warming.
“More severe and devastating hurricanes may be the result of a predicted global warming trend
from the greenhouse effect, claims Jay Hobgood. . . [of] Ohio State University.”77 However,
we quickly get to the caveat: “. . . but he cautions that it hasn’t been proved yet. ‘With what we
know now, it certainly seems logical that hurricanes will be stronger because of global warming.
But it’s a complicated problem. We’re just beginning to answer some of the questions.’ ”78
Other, similar cases of expanding the climate change problem included articles on the
impacts of: sulfur emissions,79 sunspot activity (possibly “weakening” the sun),80 the eruption
of Mount Pinatubo,81 and clouds.82 Each of these phenomena certainly could be linked, in
important ways, to climate change. However, when these additional concerns were reported
in the press, they had the effect, among other things, of increasing perceptions of scientific
uncertainty. Each article suggested that scientific uncertainty existed in that particular research
project. Because of its connection to global warming, these uncertainties were transferred to
the larger problem.
5. Management of uncertainty
As scientific uncertainty was constructed in the press, it also was represented as manageable.
In previous research, Shackley and Wynne have shown how, in political contexts, scientific
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uncertainty was rhetorically managed so that it helped maintain socially ordered scientific and
political worlds.83 Somewhat similar features of uncertainty management were found in the
popular press. Three modes of management were discernable.
Uncertainty as accountable
Scientific uncertainties were represented as accountable and explainable. Reasons were given
for uncertainty, including the complexity of the problem, the lack of refined computer models,
and insufficient data. As a 1989 Popular Science article explained:
The reason for large uncertainties. . . is that global models are not refined enough,
and the computers they run on are not powerful enough, to cope with the hideous
complexities of the problem. Nor have researchers been acquiring enough data. . . to
fine tune the models, which now can only give crude approximations of a monstrously
complex global system.84
Through these accounts, journalists and scientists made scientific uncertainty appear less a
consequence of ignorance than of current limitations in the state of research. The uncertainties
could be clearly articulated.
Uncertainty parameters
Explicit parameters were placed around some features of scientific uncertainty. One parameter
was a temperature range for future global warming, which also has been a salient feature of
several major scientific reports.85 In popular press articles, it was generally represented as
a more definitive range for global warming. For example, a 1991 Chicago Tribune article
reported: “The best forecasts available from general circulation models of the atmosphere
predict temperature increases of 3 to 9 degrees Fahrenheit if greenhouse gases double.”86
Occasionally, journalists took the mid-point in this range as the best prediction, making the
uncertainties appear even more manageable.87
Another parameter was a future time point when scientific uncertainties would be
completely or significantly reduced. Depending on the article, this future point extended
from a few years to a couple of decades, but in each case readers were left assured of a future
scientific resolution. For example, a Scientific American article suggested that decades were
needed. “Most of these questions can be answered definitively only by decades of additional
data gathering.”88 A Business Week article identified five to ten years as the time needed before
the detection of a global warming signal. “But even scientists who believe a warming is under
way concede it will be at least 5 to 10 years before they find the ‘smoking gun’ or ‘guns’ that
signal it—and enough evidence to indicate that CO2 is the cause.”89 Less time was needed
if less certainty was required. “It’s possible that the models could yield the accuracy needed
by policy-makers in 3 to 5 years—provided the government accelerates the pace of climate
research with a major infusion of funds.”90 In several instances, a crystal ball metaphor91 was
used to depict the current state of scientific uncertainty and a future, much clearer, state of
knowledge. A BioScience article ended: “The dilemma of deciding when to act on the climate
change problem, Schneider said, boils down to ‘our need to gaze into a very dirty crystal
ball. . . the tough judgment to be made is precisely how long to clean the glass before acting on
what we think we see inside.’ ”92 With both of these parameters, scientific uncertainty about
climate change appeared less as a representation of ignorance or failures in science, than a
controllable phenomenon open to rational prediction within science.
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Public representations of scientific uncertainty about climate change
95
Uncertain knowledge and policy
The implications of scientific uncertainty for policy were interpreted quite differently in the
articles. Two main interpretations were presented: that an emissions reduction policy was
premature or that it was necessary to provide effective insurance. Traditionally, the dominant
argument has been that policy should wait until scientific research is completed. This way of
managing uncertainty has been discussed by Brian Campbell93 and others, and need not be
further developed here. The basic idea is that scientific uncertainty about a problem means
that policy action cannot be rationally developed until these uncertainties are resolved. There
were many examples of this interpretation in the press.
However, many journalists and scientists objected to this policy implication. Also,
extensive criticism was levied on this wait-and-see approach in the U.S. acid rain case.94
Consequentially, scientific uncertainty was also interpreted to mean that mitigating legislation
could, and should, be supported. One means for translating scientific uncertainty in this
way was through the use of an insurance metaphor, made popular by a National Academy of
Sciences panel and a book by Stephen Schneider. Given the existence of scientific uncertainties,
the argument was that it would be wise to take some action as “insurance” against possibly very
negative consequences.95 These preliminary steps would allow further scientific research to
unfold without the extra pressure on scientists of an expedited research program. Policy could
be subsequently adjusted to meet this new knowledge. Scientific uncertainty about global
warming was managed in this sense by framing it within specified risks for which insurance
could be purchased.
With these and other forms of management, scientific uncertainty appeared less threatening
to established cultural and social patterns and as a phenomenon that could be adequately
addressed within current institutional arrangements. Global warming did not appear out of
control and potentially disruptive to traditional social patterns and sources of authority and
action. Rather, the management of scientific uncertainty made science and government appear
quite capable of handling the problem through preexisting channels. This mode of representing
scientific uncertainty was quite compatible, reciprocally, with public identities constructed in
these articles. This forms the next topic.
6. Boundary-work and the construction of public/science relations
These representations of scientific uncertainty occasionally were enlisted to construct a
“public” (as well as a “media” and a “politics,” which influence this public) and to identify
its relationship to “science.” Boundaries were so situated that “the public” was differentiated
from “science,” and was rhetorically excluded from holding legitimate knowledge, values,
and opinions about global warming. This public was construed as misinformed or rash in its
conclusions, in contrast to science and scientists who were skeptical, deliberate, and held an
appropriate respect for uncertainties in the knowledge.
Three boundary dimensions were emphasized. First, the public was said to be alarmist and
sometimes hysterical about global warming (often due to environmentalists’ and the media’s
influence), in contrast to scientists’ more measured views and admissions of uncertainty.
For example, a Chicago Tribune article blamed environmentalists for apocalyptic views,
contrasting them with researchers’ understanding of what is known and not known about
climate change:
The debate about global warming has seemed to mix science fiction and science fact.
Many environmentalists conjure up apocalyptic visions of a world gone awry within
the lifetime of today’s children: Dust storms swirling across the no-longer-fertile corn
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S. C. Zehr
belt, parts of Florida and California submerged by rising sea levels due to melting
polar ice caps, violent storms, tropical diseases spreading into temperate zones. That
is unfortunate because it confuses (1) what specialists know with some certainty about
the basic physics of global warming with (2) some of the most uncertain science, which
has to do with exactly how and when climate changes would affect different parts of
the planet.96
An article in Reader’s Digest suggested that facts sometimes get lost in the hysteria and
panic surrounding an environmental problem. This was due, according to Stephen Schneider
(quoted in the article), to scientists’ need to make popular statements dramatic in order to
receive public attention. Though it was admitted that scientists were the source of the drama,
it was deemed justifiable to shake up a public inattentive to scientific facts.
The buildup of greenhouse gases is cause for scientific study, but not for panic. Yet
the facts sometimes get lost in the hysteria. Stephen Schneider confesses to an ethical
dilemma. He admits the many uncertainties about global warming. Nevertheless, to
gain public support through media coverage, he explains that sometimes scientists
“have to offer up scary scenarios, make simplified, dramatic statements, and make
little mention of any doubts we might have.”97
Ironically, even though scientific uncertainty was a salient theme in the press, this article
suggested that it had been de-emphasized by scientists due to the need to gain public support.
Why was the public so alarmist? This may have been due to their emotional approach to
the topic, in contrast to scientists’ more balanced perspectives. In a New York Times article,
for example, then Energy Secretary James D. Watkins was quoted as saying: “People with
scientific backgrounds realize there are still too many uncertainties to undertake expensive
control measures. . . . Non-scientists are simply becoming emotional on the topic.”98 In sum,
this boundary dimension depicted a public that over-reacted to the problem, in contrast with a
scientific community well aware of existing uncertainties, and more measured in their response.
Second, the public raced to conclusions about global warming, in contrast to the organized
skepticism and slow deliberations of scientists. The public lacked the ability to place day-today events in the context of long-term natural climatic variation. For example, in response to a
journalist’s question about whether the “man in the street” can recognize when global warming
has arrived, James Hansen responded:
You can’t stick your head out the window to look for the greenhouse effect unless
you’re clever enough to compare the climate to what it was a few decades ago. . . .
The problem that people have is not recognizing the magnitude of natural variability,
which is large in comparison to the warming.99
This inability, a 1989 Chicago Tribune article lamented, meant that a short period of cold
weather might change public and media perceptions about global warming.
There may be a blizzard tomorrow. It could rain every day in March. Summer ’89
could be memorably cold and wet. That wouldn’t change scientists’ forecasts about
the greenhouse effect or the mathematical models that predict it. But a change in the
weather could dampen public—and media—perceptions that the greenhouse effect is
an imminent danger. That, in itself, would increase the risks for all of us.100
The quickness to jump to conclusions also meant that the public had left science far behind.
Members of the public were making claims about climate change well before these claims
were properly evaluated by scientists.
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Public representations of scientific uncertainty about climate change
97
In their haste to confront this future calamity, the laymen have left science, and
scientists, far behind. There is nothing remotely like scientific consensus that global
warming is occurring or, if it is, that it will have disastrous consequences. A
respectable body of opinion in the international scientific community holds that any
climate warming is as likely to be beneficial as harmful, acting as a hedge against
global cooling.101
Third, the public was careless in its talk and opinions, paying insufficient attention to
scientific evidence and the process of science. For example, an interview with atmospheric
scientist Robert Charlson in Discover revealed the “fuzziness” of public talk, in contrast to the
need for long-term scientific research to unveil uncertainties.
The fuzzy carelessness of most public talk about world climate seems to offend him
personally. To his mind, the aerosol results are a perfect illustration of the extent
to which we don’t know what we’re doing. . . . “We need a decades-long intensive
scientific inquiry, because in reality these things are not going to submit to quick
answers. . . . There are substantial uncertainties.”102
In another example, the former governor of the state of Washington, Dixy Lee Ray (an
outspoken critic of U.S. environmentalism), began her article by asking whether the facts
agreed with what “everyone says.”
It appears that nearly everyone believes that “global warming” and “ozone depletion”
are serious problems from which the Earth must be saved! Why? Because everyone
says so. But what of the evidence? What data support these fears? Are there any
contrary facts?103
The article then continued with the revelation of these contrary scientific facts that “everyone”
is unaware of. These scientific facts were constructed, in essence, as lying in a realm distinct
from the public.
The main problem, according to a Scientific American article, was that public knowledge
was based on the overuse and loose usage of the term “global warming” by editors and
newscasters. This public knowledge failed to incorporate the ongoing debate among scientists.
The article began:
When editors and newscasters routinely bandy about the term “global warming”
without bothering to explain it, then the ideas could be said to have entered the
body of public knowledge, accepted by most as immutable fact. Yet the public’s
acceptance of global warming caused by the greenhouse effect belies the fluid nature
of the science. The conclusion that the buildup of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases might lead to catastrophic warming of the earth’s climate continues to generate
debate among scientists.104
In sum, apocalyptic thought, quickness to jump to conclusions, and carelessness were
descriptions used to represent public knowledge about global warming. In contrast, scientific
knowledge was beset with uncertainty and scientists recognized a need for more research.
Through this boundary-work two key features of public identity were constructed: a singular,
homogeneous public and a misinformed public. The singular, homogeneous public contrasts
with results of studies of the public understanding of science. These studies have noted the
diverse interests, concerns, goals, and values among different publics in their connections
to science.105 The simplification of “public” misrepresented this complexity. With the
misinformed public, journalists and climate change scientists described a public that lacked
legitimate knowledge because it did not understand and ignored scientists’ appreciation for the
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S. C. Zehr
uncertainties. Even though scientists themselves were uncertain, their knowledge was deemed
superior to public viewpoints, which allegedly did not exhibit this same uncertainty.
Though there were occasional calls for public action, the construction of a misinformed
public logically could have had the opposite result. The public was expected to be interested in
scientists’ research, but not hold an active role in the debate. This type of boundary performed
what Gieryn calls a “monopolization” function, whereby science maintains its authoritative
position over climate change knowledge to the exclusion of non-scientific knowledge.106
Occasionally, this monopolization was made explicit. As a New York Times article put it
after reviewing some of the uncertainties: “For the next few years, the public and policy
makers will have to rely on all these efforts [improvements in climate models] to tell them
what is happening.”107
The management of uncertainty in the press in this way can be contrasted to its management
in policy settings. There, according to Shackley and Wynne,108 scientific uncertainty served
as a boundary ordering device. This meant that it gave science advisers and policy makers
a common discourse when they were brought together, as well as one that could be flexibly
reshaped for particular purposes in their separate social worlds. In the popular press, however,
scientific uncertainty served a monopolistic function that rhetorically separated the scientific
and public worlds.
The “misinformed public” identity also can be contrasted with public knowledge, values,
and opinions about global warming and other environmental problems depicted in surveys and
personal interviews. Recent studies of environmental values and knowledge in American
society have shown that people use language and concepts and hold understandings that
are different from those of environmental scientists.109 However, rather than incomplete or
distorted versions of scientists’ models, people draw upon their own cultural models of
global warming and environmental problems that are internally consistent and make sense
to them. In particular, people view nature as a “highly interdependent system in a balanced
state, vulnerable to unpredictable chain reactions triggered by human disturbance.”110 Their
attitudes toward global warming and other environmental problems are well integrated with
such values as parental responsibility, obligation to descendants, traditional religious teachings,
and protecting nature for its own sake. These values, and the “cultural models” that emerge
with them, incorporate concern about future effects of global warming and associated climate
changes. As the authors of one study have noted, however, those attitudes are yet to be
translated into significant individual or collective action (beyond recycling).111 Quite possibly,
the limited role given to the public in the press and the delegitimation of their knowledge have
contributed to this inaction.
7. Conclusion
The argument can be summarized in four successive points: (1) Scientific uncertainty was
a highly salient theme in climate change articles; (2) Scientific uncertainty was constructed
through various, sometimes unintentional, processes, including representations of controversy,
new research topics, and an expanding problem domain; (3) Scientific uncertainty was managed
in the press such that science remained an authoritative knowledge provider for climate change.
An important part of this management involved the use of uncertainty in the construction
of boundaries between science and the public; (4) These boundaries, in turn, constructed a
“misinformed public” identity. This identity may itself be misinformed but, more importantly,
it may contribute to inaction among publics who are so represented.
These results suggest a need for further research into how the press communicates scientific
uncertainty and ignorance and their reception by various publics. A couple of recent works
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Public representations of scientific uncertainty about climate change
99
help develop this analysis.112 In particular, this research must differentiate between the practice
of identifying scientific uncertainties in science where they exist, and making them dominant
and salient features of articles, perhaps to the exclusion of other scientific news. We also
must examine the use of scientific uncertainty as a basis for constructing a misinformed public
that allegedly does not hold appropriate reverence for scientific process. To what extent does
this construction persist beyond the climate change case and to what extent does it serve to
delegitimate lay knowledge?
This analysis also opens questions, certainly not for the first time, about the appropriate
mix (and processes for obtaining that mix) of scientific and lay knowledge in environmental
and other problem domains. An important beginning point is the elimination of the type of
boundary-work in the press described above. The construction of a misinformed public will
only hinder the expression of lay ideas, concerns, and actions. In a case like global climate
change, with all its potential consequences, this point is only too obvious. In contrast, more
diverse public identities might be constructed that minimally allow for expression of different
ideas. One avenue for creating this diversity is through linkages between global or national
problems and local concerns.113 Tying global climate change to local climate change seems
an easy and logical step in this direction.
Acknowledgments
The research was supported by a grant from the University of Southern Indiana Foundation.
I thank Marci Pilant for her careful work on this project and Ronda Priest for editorial help.
I also thank three anonymous reviewers and the editor for thoughtful comments and criticisms.
References
1 G. Scott, “The controversy heats up,” Current Health 2 (January 1994): 6.
2 Ibid., 11.
3 See B. V. Lewenstein, “Science and the media,” in Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, ed. S. Jasanoff,
G. E. Markle, J. C. Petersen, and T. Pinch (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995) for an extensive review of this
research.
4 For example, see M. C. LaFollette, Making Science Our Own: Public Images of Science 1910–1955 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990); D. Nelkin, Selling Science: How the Press Covers Science and Technology
(New York: W. H. Freeman, 1995).
5 Nelkin, Selling Science.
6 S. H. Stocking and L. W. Holstein, “Constructing and reconstructing scientific ignorance: ignorance claims in
science and journalism,” Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 15 (1993): 186–210.
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G. E. Markle, J. C. Petersen, T. Pinch (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995).
8 For example, see National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991).
9 Wynne, “Public understanding of science.”
10 Lewenstein, “Science and the media.”
11 Wynne, “Public understanding of science.”
12 S. Hilgartner, “The dominant view of popularization: conceptual problems, political uses,” Social Studies of
Science 20 (1990): 519–539.
13 Ibid.
14 B. V. Lewenstein, “The meaning of ‘public understanding of science’ in the United States after World War II,”
Public Understanding of Science 1 (1992): 45–68; Nelkin, Selling Science.
15 R. Whitley, “Knowledge producers and knowledge acquirers: popularisation as a relation between scientific fields
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16 For example, see H. M. Collins, “Certainty and the public understanding of science: science on television,” Social
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17
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Studies of Science 17 (1987): 689–713; B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction
of Scientific Facts (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979); and T. Pinch, “The sun-set: the presentation of certainty in
scientific life,” Social Studies of Science 11 (1981): 131–158.
Key examples include: B. L. Campbell, “Uncertainty as symbolic action in disputes among experts,” Social
Studies of Science 15 (1985): 429–453; S. M. Friedman, S. Dunwoody, and C. L. Rogers, eds. Communicating
Uncertainty: Media Coverage of New and Controversial Science (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum Press, 1999);
S. Shackley and B. Wynne, “Representing uncertainty in global climate change science and policy: boundaryordering devices and authority,” Science, Technology and Human Values 21 (1996): 275–302; M. Smithson,
Ignorance and Uncertainty: Emerging Paradigms (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1989); and Stocking and
Holstein, “Constructing and reconstructing scientific ignorance.”
My concern is not to identify some baseline state of uncertainty in science and compare it to popular press
accounts, nor to distinguish among different sources of scientific uncertainty. Rather, it is with how scientific
uncertainty is constructed and the implications of those constructions. This approach draws upon Stocking and
Holstein, “Constructing and reconstructing scientific ignorance,” which clearly articulates the constructivist
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Ibid.
B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage,
1979); G. N. Gilbert and M. Mulkay, Opening Pandora’s Box: A Sociological Analysis of Scientists’ Discourse
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
A. Mazur, The Dynamics of Technical Controversy (Washington, D.C.: Communications Press, 1981); G. Myers,
Writing Biology: Texts in the Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1990).
B. L. Campbell, “Uncertainty as symbolic action.”
S. Shackley and B. Wynne, “Representing uncertainty in global climate change science and policy.” Also, see
S. Jasanoff, “Contested boundaries in policy-relevant science,” Social Studies of Science 17 (1987): 195–230.
H. M. Collins, “Certainty and the public understanding of science: science on television,” Social Studies of
Science 17 (1987): 689–713.
The idea of co-production is drawn from the work of Sheila Jasanoff and Brian Wynne. See S. Jasanoff, “Beyond
epistemology: relativism and engagement in the politics of science,” Social Studies of Science 26 (1996):
393–418 and B. Wynne, “SSK’s identity parade: signing-up, off-and-on,” Social Studies of Science 26 (1996):
357–391.
T. F. Gieryn, “Boundary work and the demarcation of science from non-science: strains and interests in
professional ideologies of scientists,” American Sociological Review 48 (1983): 782.
T. F. Gieryn, “Boundaries of science,” in Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, ed. S. Jasanoff,
G. E. Markle, J. C. Petersen, and T. Pinch (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995).
A slightly longer period of time was included for the popular press than the newspapers because of limitations
in my searching tools for the latter.
S. Ungar, “The rise and (relative) decline of global warming as a social problem,” The Sociological Quarterly
33 (1992): 483–501.
See E. Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York: Harper and Row,
1974) for a general discussion of frames. W. A. Gamson and A. Modigliani, “Media discourse and public opinion
on nuclear power: a constructionist approach,” American Journal of Sociology 95 (1989): 1–37; S. Dunwoody,
“The media and public perceptions of risk,” in The Social Response to Environmental Risk, ed. D. W. Bromley
and K. Segerson (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1992); and C. Trumbo, “Constructing climate change: claims and
frames in U.S. news coverage of an environmental issue,” Public Understanding of Science 5 (1996): 269–283,
expand upon and apply framing to the construction of environmental social problems.
K. Wright, “Heating the global warming debate,” The New York Times Magazine (3 February 1991): 24–31.
Ibid., 24.
P. Shabecoff, “Global warming: experts ponder bewildering feedback effects,” The New York Times (17 January
1989): C, 1; W. Stevens, “With cloudy crystal balls, scientists race to assess global warming,” The New York
Times (7 February 1989): C, 1; P. Shabecoff, “Bush denies putting off action on averting global climate shift,”
The New York Times (19 April 1990): B, 4; E. B. Skolnikoff, “The policy gridlock on global warming,” Foreign
Policy (Summer 1990): 77–93; J. Beck, “Activists heat up the debate over global warming,” Chicago Tribune
(17 February 1992): 11; The New York Times, “Cloud data cast doubt about atmosphere,” (30 January 1995):
A, 16; L. Dye, “Cutbacks imperil foundation on which breakthroughs rely,” Los Angeles Times (11 October
1995): D, 5.
NY Times, “Cloud data cast doubt about atmosphere”; P. Shabecoff, “Global warming: experts ponder bewildering
feedback effects”; W. Stevens, “With cloudy crystal balls, scientists race to assess global warming”; G. F. White,
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35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
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45
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48
49
50
51
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53
54
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56
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60
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62
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101
“Global warming: uncertainty and action,” Environment 30 (July/August 1988): inside cover; P. E. Waggoner,
“U.S. water resources versus an announced but uncertain climate change,” Science 251 (1 March 1991): 1002.
W. K. Stevens, “At meeting on global warming, U.S. stands alone,” The New York Times (10 September 1991):
C, 1.
R. Orr, “One scientist suggests silver lining in greenhouse effect on plants,” Chicago Tribune (5 October 1992):
3.
W. K. Stevens, “Governments start preparing for global warming disasters,” The New York Times (14 November
1989): C, 1. For other good examples, see R. A. Kerr, “The global warming is real,” Science (3 February 1989):
603; and W. K. Stevens, “Climate talks enter harder phase of cutting back emissions,” The New York Times
(11 April 1995): C, 4.
J. Beck, “Alarmists lie in wait for Bush at Earth Summit,” Chicago Tribune (14 May 1992): 27.
Chicago Tribune, “U.S. panel urges planting more trees,” (11 April 1991): 20. For other examples, see T. Atlas,
“Experts warn about global warming costs,” Chicago Tribune (26 May 1990): 2; W. K. Stevens, “Quick steps
urged on warming threat,” The New York Times (11 April 1991): B, 12; D. J. Frederick, “Digging for ancient ice,
they extract cold facts: researchers getting to the core of historic climatic questions,” Chicago Tribune (26 May
1993): 8; M. Hertsgaard, “Global warning,” The New York Times (8 April 1995): A, 23; R. A. Kerr, “Its official:
first glimmer of greenhouse warming seen,” Science 270 (8 December 1995): 1565–1567.
Science, “Letters to Editor” 247 (5 January 1990): 14–15.
E. B. Skolnikoff, “The policy gridlock on global warming.”
P. Shabecoff, “Bush denies putting off action on averting global climate shift,” The New York Times (19 April
1990): B, 4. See also The New York Times, “Why so chilly?” (24 May 1992): 10; W. K. Stevens, “Warming of
globe could build on itself, some scientists say,” The New York Times (19 February 1991): C, 4.
For a discussion of this point see S. H. Stocking, “How journalists deal with scientific uncertainty,” in
Communicating Uncertainty: Media Coverage of New and Controversial Science ed S. M. Friedman,
S. Dunwoody, and C. L. Rogers (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum Press, 1999).
For example, see S. H. Stocking and L. W. Holstein, “Constructing and reconstructing scientific ignorance.”
Nelkin, Selling Science; Stocking and Holstein, “Constructing and reconstructing scientific ignorance;”
J. W. Dearing, “Newspaper coverage of maverick science: creating controversy through balancing,” Public
Understanding of Science 4 (1995): 341–361.
D. H. Meadows, “In global warming debate, skeptics corral Bush with a policy of inaction,” Los Angeles Times
(11 February 1990): M, 3.
F. Clifford, “Ocean study shows effects of global warming,” Los Angeles Times (3 February 1995): A, 1.
Chicago Tribune, “A new direction on global warming,” (21 August 1994): C, 2.
K. Wright, “Heating the global warming debate,” The New York Times Magazine (3 February 1991): 26.
For examples, see M. L. Wald, “Pro-coal ad campaign disputes warming idea,” The New York Times (8 July
1991): D, 2; D. Warsh, “Economics—as in costs—enters already heated debate on global warming,” Chicago
Tribune (21 April 1991): 80; W. K. Stevens, “Scientists confront renewed backlash on global warming,” The New
York Times (14 September 1993): C, 1; J. Weiner, “Winter forecast: frigid. But don’t be fooled,” The New York
Times Magazine (23 October 1994): 57. J. W. Dearing, “Newspaper coverage of maverick science” discusses
the broader point of journalists’ use of maverick scientists to construct controversy in their accounts of public
issues.
S. H. Stocking, “How journalists deal with scientific uncertainty,” reviews this point.
See L. Wilkins, “Between facts and values: print media coverage of the greenhouse effect, 1987–1990,” Public
Understanding of Science 2 (1993): 71–84.
Chicago Tribune, “Earth heats up, volcano cools it off,” (9 January 1992): 12.
Ibid., 12.
D. Nelkin, “The political impact of technical expertise,” Social Studies of Science 5 (1975): 35–54.
P. Gorner, “Greenhouse effect worries may be blooming too soon,” Chicago Tribune (15 January 1989): C, 1.
S. Hilgartner and C. Bosk, “The rise and fall of social problems: a public arenas model,” American Journal of
Sociology 94 (1998): 53–78; J. A. Hannigan, Environmental Sociology: A Social Constructionist Perspective
(New York: Routledge, 1995).
Also see R. Abramson, “Changes in coral reefs may be sign of global warming,” Los Angeles Times (12 October
1990): A, 4, for a similar article on coral bleaching.
J. A. Miller, “Does coral bleaching mean global warming?” BioScience (February 1991): 77.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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64 F. James, “Cellar science: underground lab lets biologists get down and dirty with their subjects,” Chicago
Tribune (29 October 1991): 1.
65 J. Detjan, “Looking for an out-of-the-world clue to Earth’s past,” Chicago Tribune (30 May 1991): 3;
R. Monastersky, “Global warming underfoot,” Science News 139 (9 February 1991): 90–91.
66 J. Aschenbach, “Snow yields a few of its mysteries,” Chicago Tribune (31 December 1993): 8.
67 W. K. Stevens, “Mobile ice mountains may have touched off ancient climate shifts,” The New York Times
(4 September 1990): C, 4; D. J. Frederick, “Digging for ancient ice”; Chicago Tribune, “Glacier dig reveals
rapid climate changes,” (15 July 1993): 2; W. Sullivan, “Study of Greenland ice finds rapid change in past
climate,” The New York Times (15 July 1993): A, 1;
68 L. Oliwenstein, “Cold comfort,” Discover 13 (August 1992): 18; R. Monastersky, “Signs of global warming
found in ice,” Science News 141 (1992): 148.
69 M. W. Browne, “Ocean loudspeakers to sound off for data on global warming,” The New York Times (6 November
1990): C, 4; W. J. Broad, “2 Environmental camps feud over noisy ocean experiment,” The New York Times
(5 April 1994): C, 4; W. K. Stevens, “Warming of deep sea is surprising,” The New York Times (10 May 1994):
C, 10; M. Crenson, “Scientific experiment generates a lot of noise,” Chicago Tribune (10 January 1995): 3.
70 R. Monastersky, “Swamped by climate change?” Science News 138 (22 September 1990): 184–186.
71 W. K. Stevens, “Climate roller coaster in Swedish tree rings,” The New York Times (7 August 1990): C, 4.
72 K. Schneider, “Ranges of animals and plants head north,” The New York Times (13 August 1991): C, 1.
73 D. Evans, “Global warming and Dr. Teller’s ‘bit of doubt,’ ” Chicago Tribune (18 September 1992): C, 19. This
idea was presented in an article on Edward Teller’s doubts about the reality of global warming. According to the
author of the article, Teller proposed the satellites as a joint venture between the U.S. and Russia. They could
warn against incoming missile attacks while performing a double mission as an environmental monitor.
74 In the acid rain case, for example, some U.S. scientists attempted to link their particular research to acid rain
so that it would become eligible for funding under the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program. See
S. C. Zehr, “The centrality of scientists and the translation of interests in the U.S. acid rain controversy,” Canadian
Review of Sociology and Anthropology 31 (1994): 325–353. This led to difficulties in bringing closure to the
controversy because the problem kept expanding to new issues for which research was not yet completed. This
practice is hardly new, as implied in Aronson’s studies of nineteenth century American nutrition scientists who
defined the “labor problem” as a matter of proper nutrition and economy of workers. N. Aronson, “Nutrition as
a social problem: a case study of entrepreneurial strategy in science,” Social Problems 29 (1982): 474–487.
75 R. J. Bidinotto, “What is the truth about global warming?” Reader’s Digest 136 (February 1990): 96.
76 Ibid., 98.
77 USA Today, “Global warming spurs hurricanes,” 119 (June 1991): 14–15.
78 Ibid. For a similar example, see W. K. Stevens, “Violent weather battering globe in last 2 years baffles experts,”
The New York Times (24 May 1994): C, 1.
79 R. Monastersky, “Haze clouds the greenhouse,” Science News 141 (11 April 1992): 232–233.
80 R. Monastersky, “A star in the greenhouse,” Science News 142 (24 October 1992): 282–285.
81 R. A. Kerr, “Did Pinatubo send climate-warming gases into a dither?” Science 263 (18 March 1994) 1562.
82 W. K. Stevens, “Clouds are yielding clues to changes in climate,” The New York Times (24 April 1990): C, 1.
83 S. Shackley and B. Wynne, “Representing uncertainty in global climate change science and policy.”
84 A. Fisher, “Global warming: playing dice with Earth’s climate,” Popular Science 235 (August 1989): 58.
85 National Academy of Sciences, Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press, 1991). See S. Schackley and B. Wynne, “Representing uncertainty in global climate change
science and policy” and J. Sluijs, J. Eijndhoven, S. Shackley, and B. Wynne, “Anchoring devices in science for
policy: the case of consensus around climate sensitivity,” Social Studies of Science 28 (1998): 291–323 for a
discussion of the use of this temperature range in political settings.
86 D. Warsh, “Economics—as in costs—enters already heated debate on global warming,” D, 8. Also, see
P. H. Abelson, “Uncertainties about global warming,” Science 247 (30 March 1990): 1529; P. Shabecoff,
“Team of scientists sees substantial warming of Earth,” W. K. Stevens, “Washington may change its position on
climate,” The New York Times (18 February 1992): C, 1; and E. T. Smith, “Global warming: the debate heats up,”
Business Week (27 February 1995): 119–120. Smith, writing for Business Week, highlighted a lowered estimate
range for future global warming.
87 A New York Times article described a poll of climate scientists in which most believed that there is a “better than
even chance that the climate will warm by at least 3.5 degrees over the next century.” W. K. Stevens, “Scientists
confront renewed backlash on global warming.”
88 P. D. Jones and T. M. L. Wigley, “Global warming trends,” Scientific American 263 (August 1990): 89.
89 E. T. Smith, “Global warming: the debate heats up,” 120.
90 R. Jastrow, “Letter to the Editor,” Science 247 (5 January 1990): 15.
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Public representations of scientific uncertainty about climate change
103
91 Usually in quotes from Stephen Schneider.
92 L. Tangley, “Preparing for climate change,” BioScience 38 (January 1988): 14–18. See also D. Bjerkile, “The
heat is on,” Time 130 (19 October 1987): 58–64; A. Fisher, “Global warming: playing dice with Earth’s climate;”
and J. A. Ahladas, “Global warming: fact or science fiction?” Vital Speeches of the Day 55 (1 April 1989):
381–384, for very similar examples.
93 B. L. Campbell, “Uncertainty as symbolic action in disputes among experts.”
94 A spokesperson for the electric power industry proposed that it take a different strategy in the global warming case
precisely because of its uncaring appearance in the acid rain case. See R. M. Perhac, “Usable science: lessons
from acid rain legislation, NAPAP,” Power Engineering 95 (10, 1991): 26–29 and R. M. Perhac, “Making
credible science usable: lessons from CAA, NAPAP,” Power Engineering 95 (9, 1991): 38–40.
95 R. A. Kerr, “U.S. bites greenhouse bullet and gags,” Science 251 (22 February 1991): 868; R. Lacayo, “Global
warming: a new warning,” Time 137 (22 April 1991): 32.
96 T. Atlas, “Lacking direction from Washington, Missouri plots global warming course,” Chicago Tribune (4 June
1992): C, 18.
97 R. J. Bidinotto, “What is the truth about global warming?” See also E. B. Skolnikoff, “The policy gridlock on
global warming;” E. Rubenstein, “Global warming or hot air?” National Review 43 (29 April 1991): 14; J. Beck,
“Alarmists lie in wait for Bush at Earth Summit;” The Economist, “As the world burns. . . feuding over global
warming,” reproduced in World Press Review (July 1995): 6–9; and C. L. Harper Jr., “Time to phase out fossil
fuels,” Wall Street Journal (26 December 1995), for other good examples.
98 M. T. Wald, “Watkins defends policy on warming,” The New York Times (9 February 1990): A, 16.
99 K. Wright, “Heating the global warming debate,” The New York Times Magazine (3 February 1991): 31.
100 J. Beck, “It’s not time to sing ‘greenhouse blues’ yet—but just wait,” Chicago Tribune (30 January 1989): C, 11.
101 S. F. Singer, “Science is cool to global warming,” Chicago Tribune (23 March 1991): C, 15.
102 D. Berreby, “The parasol effect,” Discover 14 (July 1993): 50.
103 D. L. Ray, “Global warming: fact or fiction?” Chicago Tribune (13 April 1992): C, 19.
104 T. Beardsley, “Not so hot: new studies question estimates of global warming,” Scientific American 261 (November
1989): 17.
105 B. V. Lewenstein, “Public understanding of science.”
106 T. F. Gieryn, “Boundaries of science.”
107 W. K. Stevens, “Global warming: search for the signs,” The New York Times (29 January 1991): C, 1.
108 S. Shackley and B. Wynne, “Representing uncertainty in global climate change science and policy.”
109 For example, see R. J. Bord, A. Fisher, and R. E. O’Connor, “Is accurate understanding of global warming
necessary to promote willingness to sacrifice?” Risk: Health, Safety and Environment 8 (1997): 339–354;
W. Kempton, J. S. Boster, and J. A. Hartley, Environmental Values in American Culture (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1995); J. K. Lazo, J. Kinnell, T. Bussa, A. Fisher, and N. Collamer, “Expert and lay mental models of
ecosystems: inferences for risk communication,” Risk: Health, Safety and Environment 10 (1999): 45–64.
110 Ibid., 214.
111 Ibid.
112 Friedman, Dunwoody, and Rogers, eds., Communicating Uncertainty; S. H. Stocking, “On drawing attention to
ignorance,” Science Communication 20 (1998): 165–178.
113 See R. D. Lipschutz, Global Civil Society and Global Environmental Governance: The Politics of Nature from
Place to Planet (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996) for more extensive discussion of this
issue.
Author
Stephen Zehr is Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Sociology, University of
Southern Indiana, Evansville, IN 47712 (tel.: 812-465-1203; e-mail: [email protected]). His
research addresses public and political representations of scientific expertise on environmental
problems.
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