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From Environmental to Ecological Sociology
Gary Bowden
Sociology, University of New Brunswick-Fredericton
[email protected]
Abstract: The rise and institutionalization of environmental sociology represents one of
the most significant changes to the discipline of the past quarter century. Underlying this
success, however, is a deeper question: Do these developments represent the first step
down a longer path toward more fundamental theoretical change or have the changes to
date delivered us to the promised land? Riley Dunlap, one of the sub-discipline’s
founders and most tireless advocates, recently argued the latter position. The three
sections of this paper combine to argue the former, that fundamental theoretical change is
still required. The first section distinguishes between environmental and ecological
sociology and advocates the latter. The second section examines current sociological
theorizing about the environment and concludes that the label ‘environmental sociology’
accurately describes the current state of affairs. The third section identifies three
theoretical disputes that have, in the past, prevented the development of ecological
sociology. Recent scholarship has resolved these debates, thus paving the way for the
development of ecological sociology, the characteristics of which are briefly described.
Distinguishing Environmental and Ecological Sociology
A quarter century ago, William Catton and Riley Dunlap wrote a series of articles
defining environmental sociology (Catton and Dunlap 1978a; 1978b; 1980; Dunlap and
Catton 1979; 1983; 1994). Frustrated with perceived deficiencies in then contemporary
sociological practice, they argued that sociology should examine the relationship between
society and the biophysical environment. This link was overlooked, they argued, because
the taken-for-granted assumptions of mainstream sociology led the discipline to ignore
the biophysical environment. To rectify the situation, they advocated a new paradigm
based on an alternative set of background assumptions.
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A close reading of Catton and Dunlap’s publications shows two distinct definitions of
environmental sociology: one methodological and the other paradigmatic. In contrast to
Dunlap and Catton, I do not see the two definitions as alternative ways of rendering the
same thing. Instead, I wish 1) to draw a distinction between environmental sociology
(defined methodologically) and ecological sociology (defined paradigmatically) and 2) to
argue that present thinking conflates the two.
Methodologically, Catton and Dunlap (1978a: 44) defined environmental sociology as
the “study of interaction between the environment and society.” Studies using social
variables as both cause and effect, for example the examination of social class
distinctions in public opinion toward the environment, merely transferred the gaze of
traditional sociological theory to a new substantive area – attitudes about the natural
environment. In contrast, Dunlap and Catton argued for the inclusion of both
environmental and social variables as cause and/or effect. Such studies, for example of
the impact of social class on environmental degradation or of energy shortages on
society, they viewed as ‘real’ environmental sociology.
Such studies were exceptionally rare in the 1970’s, they argued (Catton and Dunlap
1978a; 1978b; 1980), because Western society was premised upon a particular set of
background assumptions – the Dominant Western Worldview (see column 1 of Table 1).
Traditional sociology emerged out of this tradition and, hence, shared a set of related
background assumptions, the Human Exceptionalism Paradigm (see Column 2 of Table
1). In other words, they described a sociological paradigm based upon a shared
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anthropocentrism that – irrespective of particular theoretical orientation (Marxist,
functionalist, symbolic interactionist, or whatever) – led sociologists to treat modern
societies as ‘exempt’ from ecological constraints. In contrast to these existing paradigms,
they advocated an environmental sociology that embodied a new set of assumptions
(Column 3 of Table 1). Thus, the second definition defines a set of background
assumptions comprising the paradigmatic structure of environmental sociology.
Table 1 highlights three significant differences between the two conceptualizations of
“environmental sociology.” First, the paradigmatic definition is more elaborate and
precise. In addition to the methodological element of the first definition (the assumption
about social causation), the paradigmatic definition includes several other assumptions.
Second, the nature of those additional assumptions – particularly those about society –
significantly shift the focus from environment to ecology (i.e., from the biophysical realm
to a particular systemic conceptualization of the biophysical realm). Recognizing this,
Catton and Dunlap, who had originally labeled the NEP the “New Environmental
Paradigm” (Catton and Dunlap 1978a), renamed it the “New Ecological Paradigm”
(Dunlap and Catton 1979:250) to emphasize the ecological foundation of society. Third,
language of paradigms and paradigm change, invokes Kuhn’s famous work The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions (1962).
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Table 1: Major Assumptions of the Dominant Western Worldview, Sociology’s
Human Exemptionalism Paradigm, and the New Ecological Paradigm.
Dominant Western
Worldview (DWW)
Human
Exemptionalism
Paradigm (HEP)
New Ecological
Paradigm (NEP)
Assumptions about
the nature of human
beings
People are
fundamentally
different from all
other creatures on
Earth, over which
they have dominion.
Humans have a
cultural heritage in
addition to (and
distinct from) their
genetic inheritance,
and thus are quite
unlike all other
animal species.
Despite exceptional
characteristics,
humans remain one
among many
species that are
interdependently
involved in the
global ecosystem.
Assumptions about
social causation
People are masters
of their destiny; they
can choose their
goals and learn to
do whatever is
necessary to achieve
them.
Social and cultural
factors (including
technology) are the
major determinants
of human affairs.
Human affairs are
influenced not only
by social and
cultural factors, but
also by intricate
linkages of cause,
effect, and feedback
in the web of nature
Assumptions about
the context of
human society
The world is vast,
and thus provides
unlimited
opportunities for
humans.
Social and cultural
environments are
the crucial context
for human affairs,
and the biophysical
environment is
largely irrelevant.
Humans live in and
dependent on a
finite biophysical
environment that
imposes potent
physical and
biological restraints
on human affairs.
Assumptions about
constraints on
human society
The history of
humanity is one of
progress; for every
problem there is a
solution, and thus
progress need never
cease.
Culture is
cumulative; thus
technological and
social progress can
continue
indefinitely, making
all problems
ultimately soluble.
Although human
inventiveness may
appear to
temporarily extend
carrying capacity
limits, ecological
laws cannot be
repealed.
(adapted from Dunlap 2002:333)
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Thus, Catton and Dunlap’s work suggests three distinct visions of sociological practice:
traditional sociology, environmental sociology (the methodological definition) and
ecological sociology (the paradigmatic definition). The conceptual differences among
them can be clarified by a simple visual representation. Think of two colored circles, one
yellow and one blue, separated by an empty space. The yellow circle represents the social
sphere; the blue circle represents the natural sphere. Traditional sociology (the HEP)
operates like a set of colored glasses that obscures the blue circle and, hence, sociological
theorizing ignores the biophysical environment. Environmental sociology, the
methodological definition imploring sociology to take the biophysical environment (and
its interactions with society) into account, removes those glasses. We now see both
circles and, in addition, the arrows of causation (representing interactions between the
two spheres) flowing between them. Note, however, that expanding the perspective to
include the natural sphere does not necessitate a fundamental overhaul of the way the
social is theorized (it continues to exist as an autonomous, identifiable yellow circle).
In contrast, the paradigmatic definition (ecological sociology) argues that each sphere is,
in part, embedded within the other. This can be visualized as two overlapping circles, one
yellow and one blue. Embedding the spheres within each other has two significant
implications. First, the shapes of the yellow and blue circles are altered (they each have a
bite taken out of them by the overlap). Second, a new region (the green area created by
the blending of the yellow and blue in the overlapped area) is created. Stated in
theoretical terms, paradigm change involves a significant modification of a disciplines
conceptual apparatus (the change in shape of the yellow area). In addition, seeing the two
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spheres as embedded (rather than interacting) focuses attention on the possibility of a
new type of emergent phenomenon (e.g., phenomenon such as global warming that
emerge from the blending of the two spheres) represented by the green area.
The Current State of Environmental Sociology
Which of the three representations best describes current practice? Looking over the
developments of the past 25 years, several things are evident. First, sociological studies
of the nature-society connection have been institutionalized as part of a recognized subdiscipline, complete with journals and scholarly associations. Second, as a series of
recent theoretical reviews have noted (Dunlap et al 2002: 3-32; Redclift and Woodgate
1997; Buttel 1996; Dunlap 1997), theoretical diversity among self-identified
environmental sociologists has increased over time. Indeed, the variety of theories in
environmental sociology closely approximates the various theoretical traditions present in
the discipline as a whole: Marxist, Durkheimian, Weberian, world-systems, social
constructionist (for examples of each of these, and others, see Dunlap et al 2002). Third,
there exists a general consensus that theory development in the field has occurred;
through a process of “greening” previously existing theories (Dunlap et al 2002: 3-32;
Redclift and Woodgate 1997; Buttel 1996; Dunlap 1997). In other words, the core of each
of the previously existing theories has remained fundamentally intact. The modifications
have occurred through a process of extension – i.e., integrating previously ignored
concerns into the fabric of the existing theories. This is the equivalent of the second
alternative (environmental sociology) described above. The basic outline of sociology’s
theories – be it social constructivist approaches, Marxist perspectives, cultural studies, or
whatever – as represented by the yellow circle remain unchanged.
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Without denying the significance of these developments, it is erroneous to claim, as
Dunlap (2002) does, that the greening of sociological theory constitutes a Kuhnian
paradigm shift (see Bowden 2004 for an elaboration of this point). On the other hand,
self-identified environmental sociologists tend to embrace the assumptions of the NEP
and, as a result, see themselves as working within a paradigm that differs from that of
traditional sociology.
How can we explain this apparent contradiction: the objective fact that the emergence of
environmental sociology has not caused a paradigm revolution within sociological theory
juxtaposed against the belief of environmental sociologists that they employ a different
paradigm? A close examination of Column 3 of Table 1 provides the answer. The
defining characteristic of the NEP is a concept borrowed from biology – the notion of
carrying capacity – or the existence of biophysical limits on human society. By removing
sociology’s colored glasses, environmental sociologists have become aware of, and
adopted, ideas from outside the traditional discipline, specifically the biologist’s concept
of carrying capacity. Thus, environmental sociologists have embraced biology’s
orientation toward scarcity (in contrast to the economic conception traditionally held by
the discipline) while “greening” sociological theory rather than radically revising it.
The fact that environmental sociology did not bring about a paradigm change does not
mitigate the need for change. Several recent empirical studies concluded that systems
combining people and nature are not the same thing as the interaction of autonomous
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social and natural systems (Gunderson and Holling 2002: 121-146, 195-240). More
specifically, they argue that social and natural systems are involved in a process of coevolution (Holling 1994). This concept implies the need for an integrative framework that
encompasses both the natural and the social, i.e., for ecological sociology. But such
theoretical development has yet to occur. Why?
Three Theoretical Disputes and The Developments That Resolved Them
Three theoretical disputes have acted as barriers to the paradigm change necessary for the
emergence of ecological sociology: the division between economic optimists and neoMalthusians, the division between realists and social constructivists, and the inadequate
and discredited conception of system characterizing most sociology. In each case, recent
developments have removed resolved these debates and paved the way for paradigm
change.
As noted above, the distinction between the HEP and the NEP reflects a division between
economic and biological conceptions of scarcity. The economic optimists argue that
social arrangements – typically free markets, science and liberal democracy – provide the
institutional arrangements that allow humans to solve any problem they confront.
Economic markets raise capital and provide incentives for entrepreneurs to solve
problems; science provides knowledge about the functioning of the natural world,
knowledge that can be applied to the problem; and democracy allows participation by
wider segments of the public, thus enhancing the probability that a solution will be found.
In contrast, the neo-Malthusian tainted NEP holds that the demand for resources,
stemming from population growth and the increasing standard of living, grows
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exponentially while the ability to provide them grows arithmetically. As a result, there
exist strict biophysical limits on resource supply – the carrying capacity of an ecosystem
or the biosphere.
This argument was recently resolved by Homer-Dixon (1999). Where the economic
optimists and neo-Malthusians argued past one another, holding that the key claims of the
other side were false, Homer-Dixon recognized that both groups offered partial truths and
developed a theory integrating the insights from both. He accomplished this by shifting
the discussion from a focus on scarcity to an analysis of whether or not we can supply the
requisite ingenuity and identifying the factors relevant to determining society’s supply of
and requirement for ingenuity.
A second conundrum involved sociology’s debate between realist and constructionist
ontology. Chronologically paralleling the rise of environmental sociology was another
development – the sociology of scientific knowledge – which treated scientific
conclusions as just another socially constructed knowledge claim (Latour and Woolgar
1979). Many environmental sociologists, however, took a strong realist view; science
legitimized the existence of environmental problems and the need for remedial action.
These debates culminated in the science wars (Parsons and Long 2003). Since that time,
researchers on both sides have moved toward a common middle ground. See, for
example, the ‘critical realism’ of Collier (1994) or the ‘realist constructivism’ of Murphy
(2002). Even Bruno Latour now claims that “things strike back” and, in recognition of
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this, has added “a realist social philosophy of science” to the “old tired theme of social
construction” (Latour 2000: 115, 114).
The third limiting factor involves sociology’s traditional attitude toward system thinking.
In the late 1970’s, when Dunlap and Catton were advancing their ideas, sociological
theorists were engaged in an Oedipal rejection of functionalism, the dominant tradition of
an earlier generation of theorists. In the process of throwing out the functionalist bath
water, the discipline also threw out the baby – any discussion of system. Functionalism
treated social systems as a self-regulating equilibrium in which, when confronted with
pressure to change, a mechanism acts to restore the system to a state of balance. This
approach, exemplified in the highly influential work of Parsons (1951), was beset with a
number of problems; an excessively rigid relationship between parts and the whole and
an inability to deal with either a) sudden change or b) diversity. Unable to overcome the
objections, sociology largely abandon systems theorizing (Walby 2004: 1-9).
That was not the case in other disciplines. Updated versions of systems theory, notably
the idea of complex adaptive systems (Byrne 1998; Holland 2000; Kauffman 1995),
overcome the objections leveled against traditional systems thought in sociology and are
now being applied to social systems (Walby 2004). The most promising such theory,
Holling’s (2001) notion of a panarchy, outlines a common framework for the explanation
of social, economic and ecological systems while recognizing the distinctive nature of
social systems (Gunderson and Holling 2002: 103-120).
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With the disputes resolved, the guiding principals of an ecological sociology become
apparent: 1) a model of human nature – human’s as problem-solvers – predicated upon
what is ecologically unique about our species (we are adaptive generalists rather than
adapted to the specifics of a particular ecological niche) (see Homer-Dixon 2001: 191220) and 2) a model of co-evolving natural and social systems premised upon that model
of human nature. Such a conceptualization would integrate the social and ecological
demands for energy flows (social organization requires energy inputs to overcome the
tendency toward disorganization implicit in the second law of thermodynamics) with the
differential cycling present in natural systems (water, carbon, etc.) and social systems
(the information necessary for problem-solving). While not totally foreign to current
theory (Meyerowitz 1985), an information processing model of society differs
substantially from more traditional models (e.g., Marxist class conflict) and, hence, will
involve a true paradigm shift within sociology.
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