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Transcript
Trending stocks are responsible for virtually all of the market’s gains
Actual historical record and how academic theory unknowingly agrees
Actual Historical Record
With respect to individual U.S. stocks, lifetime returns have not been symmetrical or balanced. Between the
years 1983 and 2006 (24 years) a small minority of very strong stocks were responsible for the vast majority of
the overall market’s gains.
Lifetime total returns of individual U.S. stocks, 1983 to 2006
1493
1491
156
133
121
114
96
300% & better
190
275% to 300%
212
250% to 275%
262
225% to 250%
321
200% to 225%
50% to 75%
25% to 50%
0% to 25%
-25% to 0%
-50% to -25%
-75% & worse
-75% to -50%
401
175% to 200%
632
604
150% to 175%
510
125% to 150%
524
More than 90% of the
market's collective return
came from these stocks
61% of all stocks had a
positive lifetime return
100% to 125%
794
75% to 100%
39% of all stocks
had a negative
lifetime return
Stock's lifetime total return
Attribution of collective return of U.S. stocks, 1983 to 2006
Percent of collective gain
100%
80%
The collective return was
zero if you missed the 25%
most profitable stocks
60%
40%
20%
0%
-20%
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Percent of stocks
The database covers common stocks that traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ since 1983, including delisted stocks. Point-in-time liquidity filters used
to limit universe to the approximately 8,000 (due to index reconstitution, delisting, mergers, spin-offs, IPOs’, etc.) stocks that would have qualified for
membership in the Russell 3000 at some point in their lifetime. Stock and index returns were calculated on a total return basis (dividends reinvested).
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Analysis* of stocks from the United Kingdom and Canada shows similar results. All of the collective gains came
from a small minority of outperforming stocks.
Attribution of collective return, Canadian stocks
100%
80%
Percent of collective gain
Percent of collective gain
Attribution of collective return, U.K. stocks
The collective return was
zero if you missed the 11%
most profitable stocks
60%
40%
20%
0%
-20%
-40%
-60%
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
80%
The collective return was
zero if you missed the 15%
most profitable stocks
60%
40%
20%
0%
-20%
-40%
-60%
0%
100%
25%
Percent of stocks
50%
75%
100%
Percent of stocks
*Analysis of U.K. and Canada covered 1996 – 2006, including delisted stocks, incomplete dividend data for U.K. stocks
A Relative View of the Historical Record
Between the years 1983 and 2006 nearly two thirds of liquid U.S. common stocks underperformed the Russell
3000 index over the course of their lifetime. The following charts illustrate this phenomenon on a lifetime total
return and compounded annual return basis.
Lifetime total returns of individual U.S. stocks vs. Russell 3000 index, 1983 to 2006
1263
83
73
60
46
300% to 350%
350% to 400%
400% to 450%
450% to 500%
500% & better
108
250% to 300%
157
200% to 250%
203
150% to 200%
100% to 150%
50% to 100%
0% to 50%
-50% to 0%
-100% to -50%
-150% to -100%
-200% to -150%
-400% to -350%
272
-250% to -200%
-450% to -400%
494
451
446
270
-300% to -250%
129
-350% to -300%
91
-500% to -450%
-500% & worse
85
188
962
892
394
316
36% of stocks had
a higher total return
than the index
1071
64% of stocks had
a lower total return
than index
Stock's lifetime total return minus the corresponding index total return
The Russell 3000 Index measures the performance of the largest 3000 U.S. companies representing approximately 98% of the investable U.S. equity market.
The database covers common stocks that traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ since 1983, including delisted stocks. Point-in-time liquidity filters were
used to limit universe to the approximately 8,000 (due to index reconstitution, delisting, mergers, spin-offs, IPOs’, etc.) stocks that would have qualified for
membership in the Russell 3000 at some point in their lifetime. Stock and index returns were calculated on a total return basis (dividends reinvested). Start
and stop dates for the corresponding index return were matched to those of each individual stock.
2
Lifetime annualized returns of individual U.S. stocks vs. Russell 3000, 1983 to 2006
1,498
1,211
64% of stocks had a
lower annualized
return than the index
36% of stocks had a
higher annualized
return than the index
1,077
857
681
570
395
15% to 20%
10% to 15%
5% to 10%
0% to 5%
-5% to 0%
-10% to -5%
-15% to -10%
-20% to -15%
124
122
25% to 30%
321
189
30% & better
404
20% to 25%
334
-25% to -20%
-30% to -25%
-30% & worse
271
Stock's annualized return minus the corresponding index annualized return
Relative return analysis of stocks from the United Kingdom and Canada showed essentially the same results;
approximately two thirds of stocks underperformed their respective country index and the resulting
distributions displayed fat tails.
Simulating Academic Theory
Most financial academics and many market participants believe that stock price movements are essentially
random and adhere to a somewhat normal distribution. The following chart illustrates such a distribution,
which has been calibrated to have a positive mathematical expectancy of 8% annualized, which is approximately
the long term average annual return of the Russell 3000.
Assumed distribution of 10,000 monthly individual stock returns
800
700
600
500
400
Very rare that an
individual stock would
lose 50% in one month
Very common that
an individual stock
would gain 2% in
one month
300
200
100
-50%
-48%
-46%
-44%
-42%
-40%
-38%
-36%
-34%
-32%
-30%
-28%
-26%
-24%
-22%
-20%
-18%
-16%
-14%
-12%
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
22%
24%
26%
28%
30%
32%
34%
36%
38%
40%
42%
44%
46%
48%
50%
0
Randomly sampling the above distribution on a probability weighted basis (sample and replace) to construct
8,000 simulated stocks shows the following results.
3
Simulated periodic total returns of individual stocks
3000
3 years
5 years
10 years
20 years
2500
2000
1500
The majority of the
collective return came
from these stocks
1000
500
300% & better
275% to 300%
250% to 275%
225% to 250%
200% to 225%
175% to 200%
150% to 175%
125% to 150%
100% to 125%
75% to 100%
50% to 75%
25% to 50%
0% to 25%
-25% to 0%
-50% to -25%
-75% to -50%
-75% & worse
0
Stock's periodic total return
Despite normally distributed random monthly returns, most stocks deliver below average results while a small
minority produces virtually all of the market’s collective gain. The reason for this has to do with the asymmetric
payoff structure of common stocks. Losses cannot exceed -100% while gains can be far greater than +100%.
(Normal distributions + randomness + time + limited liability) = a minority of large winners
100%
Attribution of collective simulated return
Percent of collective gain
80%
3 years
5 years
10 years
20 years
60%
40%
20%
The collective return was zero
if you missed the minority of
above average stocks
0%
-20%
-40%
-60%
-80%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Percent of stocks
Simulation of conventional academic theory and actual historical record both show that a minority of especially
strong stocks account for the vast majority of the overall market’s gains. Every member of this minority shared
one common characteristic. Each showed the propensity to appreciate to new all time highs, either more
frequently, over longer periods of time, or with more acceleration than the majority of below average stocks.
Each of these phenomenons meets the mathematical definition of a trend.
A stock cannot start at $10 and finish at $200 without making new highs along the way. Regardless of the path
taken, above average positive lifetime returns (adjusted for dividends) cannot result without a series of new all
time highs. Buying that first all time high and staying invested in stocks that continue to appreciate is trend
following…..on stocks.
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