Download Islamic Republic of Iran Frederick W. Kagan

Survey
yes no Was this document useful for you?
   Thank you for your participation!

* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project

Document related concepts

Al-Nahda wikipedia , lookup

Islam and violence wikipedia , lookup

Dhimmi wikipedia , lookup

Fiqh wikipedia , lookup

Islamic Golden Age wikipedia , lookup

Islamofascism wikipedia , lookup

Muslim world wikipedia , lookup

Sources of sharia wikipedia , lookup

Islam and secularism wikipedia , lookup

The Satanic Verses controversy wikipedia , lookup

Criticism of Islamism wikipedia , lookup

Schools of Islamic theology wikipedia , lookup

Islamic democracy wikipedia , lookup

Islamic socialism wikipedia , lookup

Islam in Bangladesh wikipedia , lookup

Islam and other religions wikipedia , lookup

Censorship in Islamic societies wikipedia , lookup

Islam in Indonesia wikipedia , lookup

Political aspects of Islam wikipedia , lookup

Islamic schools and branches wikipedia , lookup

Islamic culture wikipedia , lookup

Islam and modernity wikipedia , lookup

Consolidation of the Iranian Revolution wikipedia , lookup

Transcript
Islamic Republic of Iran
Created 2009-02-19 15:55
By Frederick W. Kagan
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a revolutionary theocratic state formed in 1979
following the overthrow of the last Shah (monarch), Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. Grand
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was the leader of the revolution and then of the Islamic
Republic until his death in 1989. Khomeini had long opposed the increasingly secular
rule of the Shah, for which the Shah exiled him in 1964 first to Turkey and then to
Najaf in Iraq. In Najaf, Khomeini perfected the religious philosophy that is the basis
of the current Iranian regime. In particular, he established the principle that the only
legitimate ruler over a Muslim state is the jurisprudent best qualified to interpret the
Qu’ran, the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (hadith) and of the First Imam, Ali
ibn Abi Talib, and the traditional behavior of the early Muslim communities (see
Islam). This principle, known in Iran as the “guardianship of the jurisprudent”
(velayat-e faqih), is an extension of some elements of the Shi’i sect of Islam, but it is
not generally accepted outside of Iran. Even within Iran, the only other Grand
Ayatollah to accept the principle before the revolution was Hossein-Ali Montazeri,
who was to become Khomeini’s designated successor until 1988. The Shi’i clerical
establishment in Najaf in particular never accepted this principle, which remains
largely unpopular in Iraq. Very few Sunni Muslims
have ever accepted it.
The idea that the ruler of the state must be the
person best qualified to interpret Islam and enforce
Muslim law upon the people is enshrined in the
constitution of the Islamic Republic, which vests
full power in the jurisprudent (faqih) at its head in
the position commonly known as “Supreme Flag of Iran (Photo by “Pumbaa80”,
Leader” (currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, available at Wikimedia Commons)
Khomeini’s successor). The Supreme Leader is
selected (and could theoretically be removed for misbehavior) by a group of
jurisprudents known as the Assembly of Experts. Citing Qu’ranic verses enjoining the
consultation of the entire Muslim community (the ‘Umma) in governance, the
constitution also establishes a parliament known formally as the Islamic Consultative
Assembly. The parliament has the authority to pass “ordinary” laws, i.e. those relating
to the normal conduct of state business, but all laws and decisions of the parliament
must be approved by the Guardian Council (a separate group of twelve jurisprudents)
to ensure that they adhere not only to the constitution but also to Islamic law and
tradition as interpreted by the Supreme Leader. In 1989, a new body was formed to
mediate disagreements between the parliament and the Guardian Council, known as
the Expediency Council.
The constitution also provides for a directly-elected president (currently Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad), but the statutory powers of this position are relatively weak. The
president does not have the right to veto legislation approved by the parliament. He
nominates ministers and can dismiss them, but the parliament must approve all
1
nominations and can remove ministers by a vote of no-confidence as well. The
president is not by law the commander-in-chief of the military forces of the Islamic
Republic. That role is reserved for the Supreme Leader, although it has been delegated
on occasion to the president at the Supreme Leader’s discretion. The Supreme Leader
commands not only the regular armed forces of the state but also the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps, a body established by the constitution for the purpose of
“guarding the [1979] Revolution and its achievements.”
The Islamic Republic of Iran is, thus, a theocracy with consultative bodies. Absolute
power in all matters rests formally with the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council
(half of whose members the Supreme Leader selects; the others are selected by the
parliament from a list of qualified candidates prepared by the head of the judiciary,
himself appointed by the Supreme Leader). The influence of the president and
parliament on affairs depends by law largely on the willingness of the Supreme
Leader to permit it. In practice other considerations affect the relative power and
importance of various individuals within the Iranian government. Individuals with
strong power bases of their own, like former president Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani, former IRGC commander Major General Mohsen Reza’i, and the current
speaker of parliament, Ali Larijani, can distort the formal structures, drawing greater
influence into the offices they hold. In general terms, the Supreme Leader and his
subordinates in the military establishment have kept control of Iranian foreign policy
largely in their own hands, while the influence of the president, ministers, and
parliament has been much more significant in internal, especially economic, affairs.
Both Grand Ayatollah Khomeini and
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have normally
worked to maintain balance among the
various power groups within Iran and
avoided siding with one against the others,
although there have been exceptions. The
Supreme Leader almost never uses his
statutory powers to impose policies or
decisions upon the system, relying instead
on more discrete statements and actions to
Inside the Mosque of Sharif University, guide the decision-making process to the
Tehran (Phtoto by “Hessam”, available at desired endstate. The system is designed to
Wikimedia Commons)
give the Supreme Leader a sort of plausible
deniability with regard to any particular
policy and its outcome, shielding him and his position from the repercussions of
policy failures. Both Khomeini and Khamenei have shown a great degree of
willingness to accept the loss of arbitrary power and control required by such a system
in return for the protection it has afforded them.
The official religion of the Islamic Republic of Iran is “Twelver” Shi’ism. The
religious principles supporting the organization and structure of the theocracy are very
much Shi’i in origin. They are not only alien, but even heretical to most mainstream
Sunni Muslims. The Islamic Republic of Iran, nevertheless, explicitly aims to support
and lead the entire Muslim world including both Sunnis and Shi’is. Thus Article 11 of
the Constitution, citing Qu’ranic verse, declares: “all Muslims form a single nation,
and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of formulating its
2
general policies with a view to cultivating the friendship and unity of all Muslim
peoples, and it must constantly strive to bring about the political, economic, and
cultural unity of the Islamic world.” Article 12 enjoins the respecting of different
schools of Muslim religious thought (including the major Sunni schools) within Iran
(in the manner of the Ottoman Empire, which tolerated diversity within its Muslim
community in a similar fashion). The constitution also grants religious freedom to
Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians—but only to those groups, thus excluding other
religious minorities such as the Baha’i—again in the manner of the Ottoman Empire.
The implementation of this legal toleration is more than occasionally problematic in
actual practice. In both theory and law, however, the Shi’a Iranian theocracy not only
faces no obstacles to cooperating with Sunni states or groups, but is enjoined to do so
in its founding principles.
© Copyright 2009 American Enterprise Institute
Source URL: http://www.irantracker.org/basics/islamic-republic-iran-0
(Accessed on May 22, 2009)
3