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Katie Pace Iran’s Struggle for Democracy In 1979, a religiously inspired revolution replaced the Iranian monarchy with a theocracy. Motivated by hatred for governments imported from the West, the desire to reaffirm their Muslim identities, and the conviction that Islam and democracy could be unified into a coherent and liberal political ideology, the diverse Iranian population unified behind religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini’s efforts to incorporate the religious establishment into the government. Today, the Iranian attempt to unite religion and politics in a democratic manner has failed, and, as reformists call for a greater separation of religion and state, “the government of God is ceding to secular statecraft”(Wright 4). Iran’s failure has buttressed the claims of those who believe in the incompatibility of Islam and democracy. Islam, they argue, is an unequal and intolerant religion. It leaves no room for the autonomy necessary for the development of a vibrant civil society. It adheres to an outdated and unchangeable set of laws that restrict freedoms of expression and choice. In short, any government which is influenced by Islam will be undemocratic. Those who assume this stance ignore the dialogue occurring today within the Iranian government and society. Discontent with the existing system is widespread, but few reformers are demanding the total separation of religion and state. Instead, they are arguing that Islam and democracy are inherently compatible if only the role of interpretation is not limited to a small group of conservative clerics. These reformers, who draw support for their arguments from the basic tenants and history of Islam, claim that if Islam is treated as the vibrant and dynamic religion it should be, their will be room for the freedom and tolerance necessary for civil society and democracy. From the time of its conception, Islamic law has encompassed the religious, social and political aspects of life. The prophet Muhammad was both a religious and a political leader. His creation of a community in Medina whose membership was defined by belief in Allah cemented the connection between religion and politics. As Islam spread throughout the Middle East, a group of religious scholars, the ulama, acquired the role of teachers and interpreters of religious law. The ulama’s sphere of influence was the mosques, schools and universities. Because they alone possessed the knowledge to interpret Islamic law, they made judgements pertaining to family and social life, commerce, property and other areas that fall under the jurisdiction of Islamic law, the shari’ah. In doing so, the ulama legitimized the state, which was obligated to enact policy in accordance with these judgments. The state’s other duties included protecting the community from foreign aggressors, maintaining order, collecting taxes and administering essential services. The ulama could not function without the order enforced by the political rulers, and the political rulers could not maintain power without the legitimacy granted to them by the ulama.(7) A system arose in which “religious and political institutions play complementary roles in the pursuit of human welfare”(Kelsay 288). Both sets of institutions remained independent of each other in that they each had different duties, but one could not function smoothly without the other. Numerous practices outlined in the Quran reinforced the cooperation between the ulama and state. The ruler was obligated to engage in shura, consultation with the community, to adhere to the consensus of the community and to uphold the shari’ah.(8) At the point at which the ruler failed to meet his duties, he could and should be overthrown. No branch of Islam supports the elimination of unjust rulers more than that of the Shi’as. The emergence of Shi’ism dates back to the seventh century schism within Islam. Muhammad named no successor before his death, nor did he leave a method by which to choose a successor. A minority of Muslims, the Shi’as, believed only those related to the prophet by blood could succeed Muhammad. The majority Sunnis felt this to be an unnecessary requirement. The Muslim community was able to agree on the first three successors; however, in 656, the third leader, or caliph, was murdered by rebellious Syrian tribesman, and the question of succession reemerged. Ali, Muhammad’s cousin, was chosen, but his rule was contested by the Syrian tribesman. In the ensuing civil war, Ali was murdered and Mu’awiyah, a Syrian tribesman, assumed the caliph and established the Umayyad dynasty. Ali’s son, Hussein, responded by leading a rebellion against the dynasty. The rebellion failed and, in 680, Hussein was killed.(6) Following Hussein’s death, the Muslim community divided into the Shi’as and the Sunnis. The Shi’as viewed Ali and Hussein as martyrs who died fighting injustice and tyranny. A true Muslim, according to Shi’ism, should emulate Ali and Hussein in resisting injustice. Because of their different beliefs, the Shi’as granted their religious leaders more authority than did the Sunni’s. According to the Shi’as, Muhammad passed his divine inspiration to Ali after choosing him as successor. Since that time, each of the Shi’a leaders, or Imam, designated his successor before death. The Shi’a community believed the prophet’s divine inspiration passed from Imam to Imam. Consequently, the Imam assumed the right to pass infallible judgements on Islamic law. According to Twelver Shi’ism, Iran’s official religion, the twelfth Imam disappeared in 874 but did not die. Instead, he remains concealed by God and will return to bring justice to the earth. The twelfth Imam, or Hidden Imam, continues to make judgements about human affairs. The problem of knowing his judgements was eliminated in Iran when first the Safavid shahs and then the ulama assumed the role of the Hidden Imam. Upon claiming divine inspiration, the Iranian ulama established themselves as a powerful check on the state. The state remained obligated to uphold Islamic law, and only the religious establishment could determine the means by which to do this. Furthermore, the Iranian population firmly believed the ulama possessed divine knowledge; thus, they were willing to disobey any ruler who failed to act in accordance with ulama judgements. This power over society and the state transformed the ulama into Iran’s first civil society. Civil society consists of those organizations or associations that are independent of the state but act as a check on state power. It is the means through which individuals may express themselves without fear of suppression. Finally, it creates an atmosphere in which people of different views interact with each other in a civil and tolerant manner. The population’s reverence of the ulama granted the ulama the power to resist the encroachment of state power into the society and religion. The jurisdiction of Islamic law extended into all areas of life. Though called a religious establishment, the ulama were less organized and centralized than their western counterparts. There was no established hierarchy nor were there exclusionary practices that limited involvement within the establishment; thus, anyone possessing adequate knowledge of the sacred texts and the life of the prophet could enter into the ulama. Finally, the practice of itjihad created the pluralistic and tolerant dialogue necessary for civil society. Itjihad is the independent analysis and interpretation of Islamic law by individuals, that “human space where man can exercise his freedom and use his reason, becoming thereby a responsible trust-bearing creature”(Tamimi). Twelver Shi’ism was not widely accepted in Iran until the establishment of the Safavid dynasty. At the end of the fifteenth century, the Safavid tribes acquired areas of control within Anatolia and Syria. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Isma’il, who assumed leadership of the Safavids in 1494, proclaimed himself shah, or king, of the order. Following numerous successful campaigns, Isma’il established the Safavid dynasty in Iran. After proclaiming Twelver Shi’ism the official state religion, Isma’il proceeded to import Shi’a ulama and legal experts from the Middle East to replace the existing Sunni religious leaders. Isma’il himself claimed to be descended from the seventh Imam; thus, his divine inspiration qualified him to render religious, social and legal judgements. His descendants were assumed to possess the same divine authority. Following Isma’il’s religious reforms, Shi’ism was adopted by the vast majority of the population, and Shi’ism became a major source of national identity.(14) The Safavid Empire lasted until 1722, when the deterioration of its army allowed a rebellious tribal leader to seize control of the capital. Following a period of decentralization, a Turkish tribe established the Qajar Dynasty in 1794. The Qajar shah’s made no claims to divinity; thus, the Shi’a ulama acquired sole authority to interpret laws and religious practices. The shahs were temporal rulers whose legitimacy depended on their willingness to obey the ulama’s opinions. As their role and status increased, the religious established grew. The resulting hierarchy functioned independently of and as a check on the state.(6) Though now more organized than previously, the ulama remained the major component of Iran’s civil society. Its role as a check on the government and an institution expressive of society’s desires became apparent after the arrival of western imperialists in Iran. Beginning in the nineteenth century, Russia and Great Britain engaged in imperial struggles over economic influence in Iran. In 1828, a defeat by the Russian army forced Iran to grant Russian merchants extraterritorial rights and favorable tariff rates. In 1857, British merchants were granted the same privileges. Iran’s traditional craft industries declined as European industrialized goods flooded the market, and Iran soon saw itself transformed into a country dependent on the exports to raw materials and the import of manufactured goods. By the second half the on nineteenth century, the Iranian shah, Muzzafir al-Din, was desperate for funds due to his inability to collect taxes from rebellious tribes and internal corruption. Consequently, in 1890, he granted an English company exclusive rights over the production, sales and exports of Iran’s tobacco crop. The ulama, claiming the concession was a violation of Islamic principles. responded by organizing the Tobacco Protest of 1891, a statewide boycott of tobacco products. Their ability to rally mass support, which resulted in the repeal of the concession, revealed that the Iranian population could be politically mobilized around Islamic-based calls for action. The shah had been able to eliminate all opposition to his regime except that which emanated from the religious establishment. Consequently, the ulama was the only set of politically independent associations within Iran able to act as a viable check on state power. Despite the success of the Tobacco Protest, the shah again resorted to concession granting to acquire funds. A 1901 concession gave a British company control over Iranian oil. Low tariff rates on imported manufactured goods continued to ravage local craft industries, thereby mobilizing merchants against the regime. At the same time, intellectual reformers, inspired by European examples, argued that only the introduction of a constitution would democratize and strengthen Iran. The ulama joined the merchants and reformers in the fight for a constitution to protect its independence from the state. In 1905, the discontent within these three groups resulted in the beginning of the Constitutional Revolution, which culminated in the shah’s convening of a constituent assembly. The resulting constitution reduced the powers of the monarch, granted additional powers to the legislature and defined citizens’ rights. The ulama ensured that the constitution was not a secular one. Instead, the constitution made Twelver Shi’ism the official state religion and created a committee of ulama leaders to guarantee that legislation conformed to Islamic law. Once again, the ulama led the attack on state power. A counterrevolution that reestablished the Qajar dynasty was followed by eleven months of civil war that returned the constitutional government to power. However, the government was paralyzed by internal feuding. To protect their sphere of influence, British sent troops to occupy southern Iran in 1911. Russia followed suit with an occupation of the North. The economic devastation caused by first World War and continued occupation by foreign powers weakened the government’s authority. In 1921, Colonel Reza Khan led his brigade into Tehran and forced the shah to appoint a reformer as prime minister. By 1923, however, Khan has assumed enough power to claim the office of prime minister for himself, force the shah into exile and convince the Majlis, or national assembly, to crown Khan as king. In 1926, Khan became Reza Shah and the Pahlavi dynasty began.(6) The shah’s goal was to strengthen Iran while maintaining sole military and political control. He manipulated elections, ignored the constitution, banned political parties and trade unions, imposed censorship laws and arrested and murdered his political opponents. Like many Middle Eastern reformer of the time, the shah believed secularization was essential to modernizing Iran. In 1928, the Iran adopted a new secular code that created a hierarchy of state courts in which secular officials replaced the ulama as judges. The shari’ah judicial system was not eliminated, but state courts assumed the right to regulate their jurisdiction. The state attacked the ulama’s financial independence by seizing their waqf lands, lands owned by the ulama whose revenues were not taxed by the state. Other secularization measures included forcing men to dress in European clothes, banning women from wearing the veil and ending segregation of the sexes in public places.(6) During World War II, British and Soviet forces invaded Iran due to suspicions of the shah’s pro-German attitude. Following Reza Shah’s abdication in 1941, the two forces divided Iran into zones of influence, where they remained until 1946. Reza Shah was succeeded by his son Muhammad Reza Shah. When Muhammad assumed power, Iran was in the middle of a battle between those who wanted reform and those, such as the officer corps, who benefited from the shah’s rule. In the 1940’s a reformer named Mosaddiq began an antiroyalist movement whose aim was to end foreign interference in Iran and replace the country’s dictatorship with a democracy. In 1949, Mosaddiq formed the National Front along with other reformist groups. The National Front mobilized around demands for an end to British control of Iranian oil. Dissatisfied with the writing of new concessions in 1950, National Front organized nationwide demonstrations. It was joined by the ulama who lent as Islamic component to the struggle. In 1951, the Majlis [parliament] responded by nationalizing the oil industry and asking Mosaddiq to become prime minister. Great Britain and the United States responded by boycotting Iranian oil(6). By 1953, economic problems caused by the boycott and disunity within the National Front weakened Mossadiq’s power. A group of military officers planned a coup to remove him from power. They were aided by the United States, which sent CIA agents to organize the coup due to its fear of the Tudeh’s reemergence as a political power. The 1953 coup returned the shah to power who in turn solidified his dictatorship. He destroyed both the national Front and the Tudeh party, created the SAVAK, an internal security organization, to suppress opposition, and controlled elections. However, due to pressure from the United States to liberalize his regime and discontent created by economic problems, the shah allowed the National Front to participate in elections. This small step towards greater political freedom began a protest movement which spiraled out of the shah’s control. In 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini, a prominent member of the religious establishment began preaching against the regime. He accused the shah of having lost his legitimacy by failing to abide by and protect Islamic law. As in 1901, 1905 and 1953, the ulama was able to rally the public behind Islamic calls to action. The ulama was threatened by secular reforms within the country and state encroachment on their power. Furthermore, they, like much of the population, disliked the corruption within the monarchy, the shah’s emulation of western practices and his disregard for Islamic concepts of social justice.(14) When the shah responded with repression, he only solidified opposition to his regime. In 1977, United Nation human rights reports resulted in pressure from the United States to liberalize the country. The shah’s relaxation of police controls, introduction of court reforms, and release of political prisoners encouraged opposition groups to voice their complaints. The Freedom Movement of Iran emerged as one of the opposition’s leaders. The movement called for a secular government, but one which would be distinctly Iranian and not totally abandon Islamic principles. Th movement appealed to the Islamic tendencies within Iran by reminding the public of the Shi’a duty to emulate Hussein by resisting oppression. The ulama emerged as another opposition leader. While many moderate ulama agreed with the Freedom Movement, a more militant wing called for the creation of an Islamic state controlled by the ulama. Its leader was Ayatollah Khomeini. Though the opposition was divided, Khomeini proved a strong leader. His personal appeal and his religiously based political activism united diverse segments of the population against the shah. The shah, in response to mass demonstrations and violence by the police and Islamic vigilantes, declared martial law in 1978. The declaration was ignored as protests continued. In 1979, a nationwide wave of strikes halted the economy. During the day of mourning for Hussein’s death, protestors downed shrouds of martyrdom to signify their willingness to die for their cause. Instead of suppressing the demonstration, army troops joined the demonstrators. Soon after, the shah was forced into exile, where he died a year later. As shah left, Khomeini returned from his fifteen-year exile. The anti-royalist movements within Iran differed greatly in their vision of the new Iranian state. Though they had unified under Khomeini, once the shah was deposed they proceeded to struggle about the role of religion in government. Khomeini led the militant Islam faction, whose goal was both a political and cultural transformation overseen by a government ruled by the ulama. Beyond his desire for a theocracy, Khomeini had no political or economic plan. Furthermore, he, nor his followers, had any political experience. More liberal factions believed Islam was compatible with modernity and sought to establish a secular government through non-violent means. After his return to Iran, Khomeini named Mehdi Bazargan to be prime minister. Bazargan, a liberal, sought the creation of a secular government. However, his powers were limited by the Council of the Islamic Republic. This council, composed of mainly ulama, was the supreme administrative and legislative body in Iran and possessed veto power over Bazargan’s legislation. Frustrated with his inability to act, Bazargan resigned less than a year after his appointment.(6) Before his resignation, Bazargan’s government drafted a constitution that recognized the Islamic nature of the Iranian state but granted no special powers to the ulama. The drafts were submitted to the popularly elected Assembly of Experts, also dominated by ulama. In an effort to ensure their political power, the assembly wrote a new draft requiring all laws and regulations to comply with shari’ah. The constitution was ratified in 1979, granting the ulama supreme power within the country. The constitution provided for a directly elected president who would appoint a prime minister, and a popularly elected single-chamber national assembly, called the Majlis. Both males and females above the age of fifteen could vote. The Majlis’ decisions were subject to supervision by the twelve-member Council of Guardians, which could veto any legislation that did not comply with Islamic law. The Council also determined who could run for parliamentary election. Furthermore, the constitution adopted the principle of vilayat-I faqih, governance of an Islamic jurist on behalf of the Hidden Imam. This supreme jurist, the Faqih, had the power to appoint members of the Council of Guardians, appoint and dismiss the chief of the armed forced and the Revolutionary Guards (created in 1979 to suppress opposition to the revolution), decide who was qualified to run for presidential office, and confirm presidential elections. The constitution was the result of a search for a complementary relationship between religion and state that would reflect their historically complementary relationship before the rule of the modern shahs. Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers believed, due to the policies of the shahs, that “the record of modern Iranian governments was so dominated by attempts to usurp the proper authority of the ulama that [they] would have to take a place within government on order to protect the independence of Islam”(Kelsay 294) Consequently, the constitution was written so as to safe guard the ulama. Article 4 of the constitution stated: “All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria…and the religious scholars of the Guardian Council are judges in this manner”(Kelsay 297). Article 8 reads: “In the Islamic republic of Iran, the commanding of the good and the forbidding of the evil is a universal and reciprocal duty that must be fulfilled by the people with respect to one another, by the government with respect to the people, and by the people with respect to the government”(Kelsay 297). Article 175 gave the supreme jurist the right to appoint and dismiss the heads of state and radio television network so as to fulfill the governments duty to use “all its resources [to raise] the level of public awareness”(Kelsay 298). The result of granting the ulama such power was the elimination of independent political and religious spheres and the development of a tyrannous religious establishment. Once a member of government, the ulama could not longer serve as a member of civil society. Following their rise to power, the ulama set about crushing all opposition to their rule and Islamicizing Iranian society, thereby preventing the development of a new civil society to replace the one just lost. Khomeini formed revolutionary tribunals with religious judges, which tried, convicted and executed opponents. He formed the Islamic Republic Party, the only political party sanctioned by the government, to mobilize popular support. To ensure social justice and equality, the state expanded its influence into the private economic and social spheres. Though lacking a coherent economic policy, government nationalized banks and industries. It created new judicial rules that required judges to be proficient in Islamic law and to base their decisions on shari’ah, not on the existing secular legal codes. The government restricted freedom of choice and expression by enforcing a dress code that required women to wear the hijah, a lose veil, banned music and dancing in public places and censored newspapers, journals, books and films.(7) The factionalism within the government and society about the nature of the relationship between religion and politics was apparent in the turmoil following the revolution. The ruling clergy eliminated their former allies who in turn responded with violent counterattacks. (14) In 1981, the country’s first president, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, was forced to flee after clashes with the clerics. That same year, the second president was killed in a bombing. (14) By the election of the third president, Ali Khamenei, the ulama dominated every branch of government. Despite the ulama’s encroachment on civil liberties, the revolution did not falter immediately. Khomeini remained a respected leader capable of unifying the various factions within the government and society. Furthermore, the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980 garnered nationalistic support for the revolution. It wasn’t until after the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 that widespread discontent became apparent within Iran. Declining oil prices, the destruction caused by the war, and inefficient state economic policies resulted in economic stagnation. The lack of oil revenues and an enormous debt prevented a quick recovery from the war. To worsen the problem, Iran’s population nearly doubled in less than twenty years after the revolution. By the mid 1990’s, average per capita income was only a quarter of what it was in 1979. Due to corruption in the public sector, domestic and foreign investors refrained from investing in the economy. Unemployment and inflation soared while living conditions deteriorated.(13) At the same time, the regime continued to restrict civil liberties by implementing strict censorship laws, weakening labor unions and banning political parties. Voluntary associations were closely watched. Political dissidents were arrested and murdered. In 1995, the United Nations condemned Iran’s human rights’ compliance, estimating the number of political prisoners to be 19,000.(13) Because of its control of political, economic and social institutions, the ulama became the target of discontent. Following the revolution, "the clergy's direct involvement in state affairs has made it the main target of blame for the ills of society and the state. The cleric's mismanagement of the economy, totalitarian control over the country's cultural life, and above all, abuse of power, have severely undermined their once untarnished moral authority."(Abootalebi 34) Khomeini’s death in 1989 and his replacement by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, appointed by the popularly elected 83-member Assembly of Experts, further weakened the ulama’s legitimacy, for Khamenei was less respected as a religious leader.(3) In the early 1990’s, a more moderate faction within government emerged, the pragmatists, who, aware of the shortcomings of government, were less doctrinaire and more willing to compromise with moderates.(3) President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, who held office form 1989 until 1997, allied with Khamenei to moderate government policies. Together, they eliminated the position of prime minister and increased presidential authority. They reigned in the action of revolutionary committees, which had been created to monitor public compliance with government regulations. The president created an agenda to reconstruct the economy through privatization of businesses and opening the country to foreign investment.(14) However, conservatives blocked economic reforms. More importantly, the alliance did not reduce the power of the jurist or of the council of Guardians, nor did it eliminate the many restrictions on civil liberties. Rafsanji’s attempts at reforms only increased the divisions within government. From 1992 to 1996, parliament, paralyzed by factionalism, passed no major legislation, and disillusionment with the revolution increased.(14) As discontent mounted, new voices for reform emerged. Among the loudest and most convincing was that of philosopher Abdol Karim Soroush. Soroush is one of many intellectuals arguing that Islam and democracy are perfectly compatible, but only if Islam as treated as a dynamic religion capable of adjusting to changing human conditions. According to Soroush, “Islam and democracy are not only compatible. Their association is inevitable. In Muslim society, one without the other is not perfect”(Wright 40). Soroush argues that freedom is essential to Islam, for “in order to be a true believer, one must be free. To become a believer under pressure or coercion won’t be true belief…you should be free as well to leave your faith or belief”(Wright 41). This freedom is only possible if Islam is adaptable to changing human needs. Soroush believes that religion can be dynamic without abandoning its fundamental beliefs and laws, without losing its “essence”. “There is nothing heretical about new interpretations of Islam that differ from interpretations of the past. An ideal religious society cannot have anything but a democratic government. As interpretations of Islam evolves, Islamic law can even be the basis of modern legislation.”(Takeyh) The scripture, according to Soroush, demands freedom and equality and requires a process of consultation between rulers and the rules. Furthermore, Islam has a rich history of intellectual inquiry and interpretation due to itjihad. The gates of itjihad were closed generations ago. If opened again, they could pave the way for a true Islamic democracy. Unfortunately, the existing religious establishment is unwilling to open itself to change. The ulama’s entrance into politics and their ties to the interests of a particular group has turned religion into a stagnant force and the ulama into a religious dictatorship.(5) The supreme jurist, a position which is antithetical to Islam because it can easily ignore popular will, is the most conspicuous proof of the ulama’s dictatorial behavior.(8) Even members of the religious establishment “decry the fact that religion has become the handmaiden of politics”(Bertone). The problem with Iranian government, Soroush argues, is that the ruling clerics assume only they have the right to interpret Islamic law and that their judgements should remain unchanged. This strict adherence to the interpretation of a few is “smothering” religion. “Nothing is sacred in human society. All of us are fallible human beings. Though religion itself is sacred, its interpretation is not scared, and therefor it can be criticized, modified, refined and redefined. The interpretation of religious texts is thus always in flux. There’s no single, inflexible, infallible or absolute interpretation of Islam. Interpretations are also influenced by the age you live in, the conditions and mores of the time, and by other branches of knowledge…In other words, interpretations evolve with time. Any fixed version would effectively smother religion. It would block the rich exploration of the meanings in the sacred texts.”(Wright 42) Consequently, the clergy should not resist criticism of their opinions regarding Islamic law nor impose their beliefs on the community. To claim a monopoly on understanding is heretical, for it places the clergy on the same footing as God.(14) It ignores the Quran’s command to consult with the community. And it risks forming the basis for a totalitarian state. To prevent this threat, clerics should be accountable to the public, and lines should be drawn to separate the roles of religion and politics without excluding one from the other. Soroush is only one of many demanding government accountability, democracy, human rights, liberty, equality, social justice and tolerance. After years of harassment, he was forced into silence and then exile, but other voices in the film, literary, art and intellectual communities remained behind to spread his message. The improved education system created a generation of educated and demanding youth whose views shifted from those of the conservative Hizballah to those of reformers. They, along with the newly politicized female population, are joining voices to demand greater political and civil liberties. In 1997, popular discontent culminated in the election of reformer Muhammad Khatami to president. In a landslide victory, Khatami garnered two-thirds of the vote. His victory was the more impressive because he overcame the manipulation of elections by the conservative right and defeated former president Hashemi Rafsanjani.(2) His platform was a synthesis of religion and liberty, one which called for increased political and civil liberties and a greater sphere of individual autonomy. His stated goal was the creation new “Islamic political society”(8) based on the rule of law and existing alongside a vibrant civil society. “An Islamic government is one that considers itself to be the servant of the people, not their master. A government’s authority is not realized by coercion or arbitrariness, but by legal acts, by respect for rights and by encouraging people’s participation in decision making.”(Wright 64) Khatami acted first to create civil society within Iran, believing it to be essential to broadening political participation, restricting state encroachment on civil liberties and creating an atmosphere of pluralistic and tolerant debate, whether it be in a secular democracy or an Islamic democracy.(3) Because civil society is a western term, there exists debate about application of the concept of civil society to non-Western countries.(8) Though Khatami supports reform of the Iranian government, he has expressed no desire to secularize the system; thus, he raises the question of whether civil society can exist within an Islamic society. Khatami has remarked that Islamic attitudes towards civil society differ from the West, because “the emphasis of Muslims seems to be on the creation of a sphere of citizen liberty…[while the West seems] focused on citizen participation in specific organizations”(Kelsay 285). Despite differences, Khatami has stressed the importance of allowing certain institutions, such as the media and business sector, degrees of autonomy from state control. Consequently, Khatami, upon entering office, attempted to purge the security forces, which stifled the growth of civil society, and he supported the proliferation of newspapers, journal and professional associations.(8) In 1999, Khatami held Iran’s fist local elections in an effort to decentralize power. Local elections were required in the constitution but had never been implemented. The elections, the largest ever in Iran, involved about 330,000 candidates for 200,000 council positions.(2) Despite the conservatives’ manipulation of the elections through a Central Oversight Committee that supervised the selection of candidates, Khatami supporters were clearly victorious. The elections were held to make the state more responsive to the people’s needs but also to further the development of civil society by giving more people a role in government and increasing the number of avenues through which to influence government. The state of civil society in Iran today remains precarious as Khatami struggles to increase freedom of choice and expression but is countered by restrictive measures by the conservatives as they continue to shut down publishers and arrest journalists and outspoken reformers. (2) Because of the lack of coherent associations, “the pressure for change toward civil society and democracy in Iran emanates not so much from agents of civil society--which remains relatively few in numbers, organizationally weak and mostly ineffective in influencing public policy--but from the overall mobilized population across all sectors of society”(Abootalebi). Frustrated youth, dissatisfied women and disillusioned middle and lower classes, all more educated and literate in the past because of an improved education system and modern communications, are calling for a greater sphere of autonomy from the government. These calls have only grown louder since Khatami’s election. The Ministry of Culture has, despite conservative attempts at suppression, become been more tolerant of public debate about civil society, religion and politics. In response, media organizations are growing, organizing and playing an increasingly political role.(13) Consequently, though many opponents of government have been silenced, essential dialogue is occurring within society. The student riots in Tehran in the summer of 1999 were the most conspicuous example of this dialogue. That summer, after inflaming the students with arrests of prominent reformers and media members, the parliament approved a new law to further restrict the media. The next day, student at the University of Tehran mobilized a protest. When the protesters were attacked by conservative supporters, the police failed to intervene. Later, the police raided the university dorms, killing one students, injuring dozens and arresting hundreds.(14) Despite the violence, the students continued to protest. As police responded by firing tear gas into the crowds, and vigilantes attacked the students with chains and rods, protest spread throughout the nation. On the sixth day of protests, students and police broke out into street battles. Though the police regained control, the summer demonstrations marked a turning point in Iran’s political development, for they were the biggest challenge to the government since the revolution.(14) Though defeated, the students forced the nation and its government to acknowledge the discontent growing in society and the repressive actions of the state. Dialogue is also occurring within the government itself as it is split by ideological differences between the conservative Hizballah and the reformers.(3) The debate centers around “how to modernize without risking moral bankruptcy”(Wright 63). Though the conservatives retain primary control over the government, an important power struggle is taking place within the government. This power struggle is the only means by which “a polyarchy, a system based on multiple power centers, can eventually emerge. The struggle for democracy in Iran must be understood within this broader context: the politics of electioneering and establishing the fundamental institutional framework for competitive politics (e.g., parliament, presidency), despite all its shortcomings and even seemingly undemocratic features…can in the long run develop more democratic features”(Abootalebi). Whatever form democracy takes in Iran, it will differ from western democracies. The history of Islam makes the total separation of religion and state improbable; thus, the values of Islam will continue to be a restrictive force in society. (8) Even Khatami has said that “a system like ours, based as it is on Islamic ideology, is bound to restrict some individual liberties”(Takeyh). The religious legal system will likely retain jurisdiction over family and penal law and will continue to fulfill a supervisory role over government legislation.(8) The struggle occurring today is not to eliminate the ulama from government, but to restrict its powers. The movement towards reform has not weakened. In the February 2000 parliamentary elections, over 80% of the population voted, giving the reformists a resounding victory. In the 2001 presidential election, Khatami won again by a landslide vote. Newly formed political parties, including Islamic Iran’s Participation Party and the Servant of the Constitution Party, participated in both elections as evidence of Iran’s growing civil society.(3) The reformers’ victories have again made obvious the popular desire for change. Unfortunately, the conservatives continue to control political and police power through the Guardians Council, the Revolutionary Guards, the security forces and mass media.(7) In April 2000, the Islamic Revolutionary Tribunal arrested 40 members of Iran Freedom Movement, simply one example of the conservative assault on reformers that has included the closing of publications, the imprisonment of journalists and the curtailing of powers of the now reform-dominated Majles. These attacks are, in the age of modern communication, self-defeating. They also possess a great deal of irony, for, during his exile, Khomeini used mimeographs, photographs, audio and videocassettes to smuggle his revolutionary message back into a highly censored Iran.(14) The reformist elements in society will not disappear. Civil society will continue to grow. Eventually, a more democratic form of government will arise from the existing religious dictatorship. This democracy will not be secular, for democracy must adapt to local traditions and values if it is to succeed. However, the role of the ulama will be severely restricted. No longer will they be the sole uncontested interpreters of Islam. As Islamic scholar Ali Banuazizi wrote: “Islamism, as a legitimizing state ideology has all but run its course in Iran. By this I do not mean to suggest that Islam as a religion, as a moral foundation for society, or even as a basis for political organization and mobilization, has lost its appeal to Iranians. But Islamism, as a political doctrine that subordinates popular sovereignty to the divine law or shari’a, as interpreted and enforced by an Islamic government, this Islamism is being rejected by an expanding majority of the population.”(Banuazizi) The Iranian revolution, the first of its kind, was a test of the compatibility of Islam and democracy. As of yet, is has not failed. Instead, Iran is undergoing a period of transformation as reformers struggle to redefine the relationship between religion and politics. This struggle is evidence of the democratic tendencies within the Republic and of the potential for the formation of a truly liberal democracy. The final product will without doubt significantly impact the development of other Middle Eastern nations. Sources 1) Abed, Shukri B. “Islam and Democracy.” Democracy, War, and Peace in the Middle East. Ed. David Garnham and Mark Tessler. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995. 2) Abootalebi, Ali. “The Struggle for Democracy in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Meria September 2000: Vo. 4. On-line. 3) Abootalebi, Ali. “State-Society Relationships and Prospects for Democracy in Iran.” Meria September 2001: Vo. 5. On-line. 4) Banuazizi, Ali. “Islamic State and Civil Society in Iran.” Joseph Strelitz Lecture. Boston College. Boston: 18 April, 1999. 5) Bertone Andrea and Farideh Farhi. “Can Islam be Secularized?” Intellectual Change and the New Generation of Iranian Intellectuals. Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2000. 6) Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East, 2nd ed. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000. 7) Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. “Iran’s Celebration of Democracy: The Return of the Moslem Democrats.” Civil Society: Democratization in the Arab World March 2000: Vo. 9. On-line. 8) Kazemi, Farhad. “Perspectives on Islam and Civil Society.” Civil Society and Government. Ed. Nancy Rosenblum and Robert Post. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002. 9) Kelsay, John. “Civil Society and Government in Islam.” Civil Society and Government. Ed. Nancy Rosenblum and Robert Post. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002. 10)Khonsari, Mehrdad. “The Iranian Parliamentary Elections: Prospects for Change and Reform.” Civil Society: Democratization in the Arab World March 2000: Vo. 9. On-line. 11) Takeyh, Ray. “God’s Will: Iranian Democracy and the Islamic Context.” Middle East Policy October 2000: Vo. 7. On-line. 12) Tamimi, Azzam. “Civil Society in Islamic Political Thought.” Dr. Tamimi Home Page: 2001. On-line. 13) “The Strengthening of Civil Society.” Baker Institute Study June 1998: No.7. 14) Wright, Robin. The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran. New York: Random House Inc., 2001. 15) Zubaida, Sami. “Civil Society, Community, and Democracy in the Middle East.” Civil Society: History and Possibilities. Ed. Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001.