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Katie Pace
Iran’s Struggle for Democracy
In 1979, a religiously inspired revolution replaced the Iranian monarchy with a
theocracy. Motivated by hatred for governments imported from the West, the desire to
reaffirm their Muslim identities, and the conviction that Islam and democracy could be
unified into a coherent and liberal political ideology, the diverse Iranian population
unified behind religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini’s efforts to incorporate the religious
establishment into the government. Today, the Iranian attempt to unite religion and
politics in a democratic manner has failed, and, as reformists call for a greater separation
of religion and state, “the government of God is ceding to secular statecraft”(Wright 4).
Iran’s failure has buttressed the claims of those who believe in the incompatibility of
Islam and democracy. Islam, they argue, is an unequal and intolerant religion. It leaves
no room for the autonomy necessary for the development of a vibrant civil society. It
adheres to an outdated and unchangeable set of laws that restrict freedoms of expression
and choice. In short, any government which is influenced by Islam will be undemocratic.
Those who assume this stance ignore the dialogue occurring today within the Iranian
government and society. Discontent with the existing system is widespread, but few
reformers are demanding the total separation of religion and state. Instead, they are
arguing that Islam and democracy are inherently compatible if only the role of
interpretation is not limited to a small group of conservative clerics. These reformers,
who draw support for their arguments from the basic tenants and history of Islam, claim
that if Islam is treated as the vibrant and dynamic religion it should be, their will be room
for the freedom and tolerance necessary for civil society and democracy.
From the time of its conception, Islamic law has encompassed the religious, social
and political aspects of life. The prophet Muhammad was both a religious and a political
leader. His creation of a community in Medina whose membership was defined by belief
in Allah cemented the connection between religion and politics. As Islam spread
throughout the Middle East, a group of religious scholars, the ulama, acquired the role of
teachers and interpreters of religious law. The ulama’s sphere of influence was the
mosques, schools and universities. Because they alone possessed the knowledge to
interpret Islamic law, they made judgements pertaining to family and social life,
commerce, property and other areas that fall under the jurisdiction of Islamic law, the
shari’ah. In doing so, the ulama legitimized the state, which was obligated to enact
policy in accordance with these judgments. The state’s other duties included protecting
the community from foreign aggressors, maintaining order, collecting taxes and
administering essential services. The ulama could not function without the order
enforced by the political rulers, and the political rulers could not maintain power without
the legitimacy granted to them by the ulama.(7) A system arose in which “religious and
political institutions play complementary roles in the pursuit of human welfare”(Kelsay
288). Both sets of institutions remained independent of each other in that they each had
different duties, but one could not function smoothly without the other.
Numerous practices outlined in the Quran reinforced the cooperation between the
ulama and state. The ruler was obligated to engage in shura, consultation with the
community, to adhere to the consensus of the community and to uphold the shari’ah.(8)
At the point at which the ruler failed to meet his duties, he could and should be
overthrown.
No branch of Islam supports the elimination of unjust rulers more than that of the
Shi’as. The emergence of Shi’ism dates back to the seventh century schism within Islam.
Muhammad named no successor before his death, nor did he leave a method by which to
choose a successor. A minority of Muslims, the Shi’as, believed only those related to the
prophet by blood could succeed Muhammad. The majority Sunnis felt this to be an
unnecessary requirement. The Muslim community was able to agree on the first three
successors; however, in 656, the third leader, or caliph, was murdered by rebellious
Syrian tribesman, and the question of succession reemerged. Ali, Muhammad’s cousin,
was chosen, but his rule was contested by the Syrian tribesman. In the ensuing civil war,
Ali was murdered and Mu’awiyah, a Syrian tribesman, assumed the caliph and
established the Umayyad dynasty. Ali’s son, Hussein, responded by leading a rebellion
against the dynasty. The rebellion failed and, in 680, Hussein was killed.(6) Following
Hussein’s death, the Muslim community divided into the Shi’as and the Sunnis. The
Shi’as viewed Ali and Hussein as martyrs who died fighting injustice and tyranny. A true
Muslim, according to Shi’ism, should emulate Ali and Hussein in resisting injustice.
Because of their different beliefs, the Shi’as granted their religious leaders more
authority than did the Sunni’s. According to the Shi’as, Muhammad passed his divine
inspiration to Ali after choosing him as successor. Since that time, each of the Shi’a
leaders, or Imam, designated his successor before death. The Shi’a community believed
the prophet’s divine inspiration passed from Imam to Imam. Consequently, the Imam
assumed the right to pass infallible judgements on Islamic law.
According to Twelver Shi’ism, Iran’s official religion, the twelfth Imam
disappeared in 874 but did not die. Instead, he remains concealed by God and will return
to bring justice to the earth. The twelfth Imam, or Hidden Imam, continues to make
judgements about human affairs. The problem of knowing his judgements was
eliminated in Iran when first the Safavid shahs and then the ulama assumed the role of the
Hidden Imam. Upon claiming divine inspiration, the Iranian ulama established
themselves as a powerful check on the state. The state remained obligated to uphold
Islamic law, and only the religious establishment could determine the means by which to
do this. Furthermore, the Iranian population firmly believed the ulama possessed divine
knowledge; thus, they were willing to disobey any ruler who failed to act in accordance
with ulama judgements.
This power over society and the state transformed the ulama into Iran’s first civil
society. Civil society consists of those organizations or associations that are independent
of the state but act as a check on state power. It is the means through which individuals
may express themselves without fear of suppression. Finally, it creates an atmosphere in
which people of different views interact with each other in a civil and tolerant manner.
The population’s reverence of the ulama granted the ulama the power to resist the
encroachment of state power into the society and religion. The jurisdiction of Islamic
law extended into all areas of life. Though called a religious establishment, the ulama
were less organized and centralized than their western counterparts. There was no
established hierarchy nor were there exclusionary practices that limited involvement
within the establishment; thus, anyone possessing adequate knowledge of the sacred texts
and the life of the prophet could enter into the ulama. Finally, the practice of itjihad
created the pluralistic and tolerant dialogue necessary for civil society. Itjihad is the
independent analysis and interpretation of Islamic law by individuals, that “human space
where man can exercise his freedom and use his reason, becoming thereby a responsible
trust-bearing creature”(Tamimi).
Twelver Shi’ism was not widely accepted in Iran until the establishment of the Safavid
dynasty. At the end of the fifteenth century, the Safavid tribes acquired areas of control
within Anatolia and Syria. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Isma’il, who
assumed leadership of the Safavids in 1494, proclaimed himself shah, or king, of the
order. Following numerous successful campaigns, Isma’il established the Safavid
dynasty in Iran. After proclaiming Twelver Shi’ism the official state religion, Isma’il
proceeded to import Shi’a ulama and legal experts from the Middle East to replace the
existing Sunni religious leaders. Isma’il himself claimed to be descended from the
seventh Imam; thus, his divine inspiration qualified him to render religious, social and
legal judgements. His descendants were assumed to possess the same divine authority.
Following Isma’il’s religious reforms, Shi’ism was adopted by the vast majority of the
population, and Shi’ism became a major source of national identity.(14)
The Safavid Empire lasted until 1722, when the deterioration of its army allowed
a rebellious tribal leader to seize control of the capital. Following a period of
decentralization, a Turkish tribe established the Qajar Dynasty in 1794. The Qajar shah’s
made no claims to divinity; thus, the Shi’a ulama acquired sole authority to interpret laws
and religious practices. The shahs were temporal rulers whose legitimacy depended on
their willingness to obey the ulama’s opinions. As their role and status increased, the
religious established grew. The resulting hierarchy functioned independently of and as a
check on the state.(6) Though now more organized than previously, the ulama remained
the major component of Iran’s civil society. Its role as a check on the government and an
institution expressive of society’s desires became apparent after the arrival of western
imperialists in Iran.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, Russia and Great Britain engaged in imperial
struggles over economic influence in Iran. In 1828, a defeat by the Russian army forced
Iran to grant Russian merchants extraterritorial rights and favorable tariff rates. In 1857,
British merchants were granted the same privileges. Iran’s traditional craft industries
declined as European industrialized goods flooded the market, and Iran soon saw itself
transformed into a country dependent on the exports to raw materials and the import of
manufactured goods.
By the second half the on nineteenth century, the Iranian shah, Muzzafir al-Din,
was desperate for funds due to his inability to collect taxes from rebellious tribes and
internal corruption. Consequently, in 1890, he granted an English company exclusive
rights over the production, sales and exports of Iran’s tobacco crop. The ulama, claiming
the concession was a violation of Islamic principles. responded by organizing the
Tobacco Protest of 1891, a statewide boycott of tobacco products. Their ability to rally
mass support, which resulted in the repeal of the concession, revealed that the Iranian
population could be politically mobilized around Islamic-based calls for action. The shah
had been able to eliminate all opposition to his regime except that which emanated from
the religious establishment. Consequently, the ulama was the only set of politically
independent associations within Iran able to act as a viable check on state power.
Despite the success of the Tobacco Protest, the shah again resorted to concession
granting to acquire funds. A 1901 concession gave a British company control over
Iranian oil. Low tariff rates on imported manufactured goods continued to ravage local
craft industries, thereby mobilizing merchants against the regime. At the same time,
intellectual reformers, inspired by European examples, argued that only the introduction
of a constitution would democratize and strengthen Iran. The ulama joined the merchants
and reformers in the fight for a constitution to protect its independence from the state. In
1905, the discontent within these three groups resulted in the beginning of the
Constitutional Revolution, which culminated in the shah’s convening of a constituent
assembly. The resulting constitution reduced the powers of the monarch, granted
additional powers to the legislature and defined citizens’ rights. The ulama ensured that
the constitution was not a secular one. Instead, the constitution made Twelver Shi’ism
the official state religion and created a committee of ulama leaders to guarantee that
legislation conformed to Islamic law. Once again, the ulama led the attack on state
power.
A counterrevolution that reestablished the Qajar dynasty was followed by eleven
months of civil war that returned the constitutional government to power. However, the
government was paralyzed by internal feuding. To protect their sphere of influence,
British sent troops to occupy southern Iran in 1911. Russia followed suit with an
occupation of the North. The economic devastation caused by first World War and
continued occupation by foreign powers weakened the government’s authority. In 1921,
Colonel Reza Khan led his brigade into Tehran and forced the shah to appoint a reformer
as prime minister. By 1923, however, Khan has assumed enough power to claim the
office of prime minister for himself, force the shah into exile and convince the Majlis, or
national assembly, to crown Khan as king. In 1926, Khan became Reza Shah and the
Pahlavi dynasty began.(6)
The shah’s goal was to strengthen Iran while maintaining sole military and
political control. He manipulated elections, ignored the constitution, banned political
parties and trade unions, imposed censorship laws and arrested and murdered his political
opponents. Like many Middle Eastern reformer of the time, the shah believed
secularization was essential to modernizing Iran. In 1928, the Iran adopted a new secular
code that created a hierarchy of state courts in which secular officials replaced the ulama
as judges. The shari’ah judicial system was not eliminated, but state courts assumed the
right to regulate their jurisdiction. The state attacked the ulama’s financial independence
by seizing their waqf lands, lands owned by the ulama whose revenues were not taxed by
the state. Other secularization measures included forcing men to dress in European
clothes, banning women from wearing the veil and ending segregation of the sexes in
public places.(6)
During World War II, British and Soviet forces invaded Iran due to suspicions of
the shah’s pro-German attitude. Following Reza Shah’s abdication in 1941, the two
forces divided Iran into zones of influence, where they remained until 1946. Reza Shah
was succeeded by his son Muhammad Reza Shah. When Muhammad assumed power,
Iran was in the middle of a battle between those who wanted reform and those, such as
the officer corps, who benefited from the shah’s rule.
In the 1940’s a reformer named Mosaddiq began an antiroyalist movement whose
aim was to end foreign interference in Iran and replace the country’s dictatorship with a
democracy. In 1949, Mosaddiq formed the National Front along with other reformist
groups. The National Front mobilized around demands for an end to British control of
Iranian oil. Dissatisfied with the writing of new concessions in 1950, National Front
organized nationwide demonstrations. It was joined by the ulama who lent as Islamic
component to the struggle. In 1951, the Majlis [parliament] responded by nationalizing
the oil industry and asking Mosaddiq to become prime minister. Great Britain and the
United States responded by boycotting Iranian oil(6).
By 1953, economic problems caused by the boycott and disunity within the
National Front weakened Mossadiq’s power. A group of military officers planned a coup
to remove him from power. They were aided by the United States, which sent CIA
agents to organize the coup due to its fear of the Tudeh’s reemergence as a political
power. The 1953 coup returned the shah to power who in turn solidified his dictatorship.
He destroyed both the national Front and the Tudeh party, created the SAVAK, an
internal security organization, to suppress opposition, and controlled elections. However,
due to pressure from the United States to liberalize his regime and discontent created by
economic problems, the shah allowed the National Front to participate in elections. This
small step towards greater political freedom began a protest movement which spiraled out
of the shah’s control.
In 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini, a prominent member of the religious establishment
began preaching against the regime. He accused the shah of having lost his legitimacy by
failing to abide by and protect Islamic law. As in 1901, 1905 and 1953, the ulama was
able to rally the public behind Islamic calls to action. The ulama was threatened by
secular reforms within the country and state encroachment on their power. Furthermore,
they, like much of the population, disliked the corruption within the monarchy, the shah’s
emulation of western practices and his disregard for Islamic concepts of social
justice.(14)
When the shah responded with repression, he only solidified opposition to his
regime. In 1977, United Nation human rights reports resulted in pressure from the United
States to liberalize the country. The shah’s relaxation of police controls, introduction of
court reforms, and release of political prisoners encouraged opposition groups to voice
their complaints. The Freedom Movement of Iran emerged as one of the opposition’s
leaders. The movement called for a secular government, but one which would be
distinctly Iranian and not totally abandon Islamic principles. Th movement appealed to
the Islamic tendencies within Iran by reminding the public of the Shi’a duty to emulate
Hussein by resisting oppression.
The ulama emerged as another opposition leader. While many moderate ulama
agreed with the Freedom Movement, a more militant wing called for the creation of an
Islamic state controlled by the ulama. Its leader was Ayatollah Khomeini. Though the
opposition was divided, Khomeini proved a strong leader. His personal appeal and his
religiously based political activism united diverse segments of the population against the
shah. The shah, in response to mass demonstrations and violence by the police and
Islamic vigilantes, declared martial law in 1978. The declaration was ignored as protests
continued. In 1979, a nationwide wave of strikes halted the economy. During the day of
mourning for Hussein’s death, protestors downed shrouds of martyrdom to signify their
willingness to die for their cause. Instead of suppressing the demonstration, army troops
joined the demonstrators. Soon after, the shah was forced into exile, where he died a year
later. As shah left, Khomeini returned from his fifteen-year exile.
The anti-royalist movements within Iran differed greatly in their vision of the new
Iranian state. Though they had unified under Khomeini, once the shah was deposed they
proceeded to struggle about the role of religion in government. Khomeini led the militant
Islam faction, whose goal was both a political and cultural transformation overseen by a
government ruled by the ulama. Beyond his desire for a theocracy, Khomeini had no
political or economic plan. Furthermore, he, nor his followers, had any political
experience. More liberal factions believed Islam was compatible with modernity and
sought to establish a secular government through non-violent means.
After his return to Iran, Khomeini named Mehdi Bazargan to be prime minister.
Bazargan, a liberal, sought the creation of a secular government. However, his powers
were limited by the Council of the Islamic Republic. This council, composed of mainly
ulama, was the supreme administrative and legislative body in Iran and possessed veto
power over Bazargan’s legislation. Frustrated with his inability to act, Bazargan resigned
less than a year after his appointment.(6)
Before his resignation, Bazargan’s government drafted a constitution that
recognized the Islamic nature of the Iranian state but granted no special powers to the
ulama. The drafts were submitted to the popularly elected Assembly of Experts, also
dominated by ulama. In an effort to ensure their political power, the assembly wrote a
new draft requiring all laws and regulations to comply with shari’ah. The constitution
was ratified in 1979, granting the ulama supreme power within the country.
The constitution provided for a directly elected president who would appoint a
prime minister, and a popularly elected single-chamber national assembly, called the
Majlis. Both males and females above the age of fifteen could vote. The Majlis’
decisions were subject to supervision by the twelve-member Council of Guardians, which
could veto any legislation that did not comply with Islamic law. The Council also
determined who could run for parliamentary election. Furthermore, the constitution
adopted the principle of vilayat-I faqih, governance of an Islamic jurist on behalf of the
Hidden Imam. This supreme jurist, the Faqih, had the power to appoint members of the
Council of Guardians, appoint and dismiss the chief of the armed forced and the
Revolutionary Guards (created in 1979 to suppress opposition to the revolution), decide
who was qualified to run for presidential office, and confirm presidential elections.
The constitution was the result of a search for a complementary relationship
between religion and state that would reflect their historically complementary
relationship before the rule of the modern shahs. Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers
believed, due to the policies of the shahs, that “the record of modern Iranian governments
was so dominated by attempts to usurp the proper authority of the ulama that [they]
would have to take a place within government on order to protect the independence of
Islam”(Kelsay 294)
Consequently, the constitution was written so as to safe guard the ulama.
Article 4 of the constitution stated: “All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative,
cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic
criteria…and the religious scholars of the Guardian Council are judges in this
manner”(Kelsay 297). Article 8 reads: “In the Islamic republic of Iran, the commanding
of the good and the forbidding of the evil is a universal and reciprocal duty that must be
fulfilled by the people with respect to one another, by the government with respect to the
people, and by the people with respect to the government”(Kelsay 297). Article 175 gave
the supreme jurist the right to appoint and dismiss the heads of state and radio television
network so as to fulfill the governments duty to use “all its resources [to raise] the level
of public awareness”(Kelsay 298).
The result of granting the ulama such power was the elimination of independent
political and religious spheres and the development of a tyrannous religious
establishment. Once a member of government, the ulama could not longer serve as a
member of civil society. Following their rise to power, the ulama set about crushing all
opposition to their rule and Islamicizing Iranian society, thereby preventing the
development of a new civil society to replace the one just lost. Khomeini formed
revolutionary tribunals with religious judges, which tried, convicted and executed
opponents. He formed the Islamic Republic Party, the only political party sanctioned by
the government, to mobilize popular support. To ensure social justice and equality, the
state expanded its influence into the private economic and social spheres. Though
lacking a coherent economic policy, government nationalized banks and industries. It
created new judicial rules that required judges to be proficient in Islamic law and to base
their decisions on shari’ah, not on the existing secular legal codes. The government
restricted freedom of choice and expression by enforcing a dress code that required
women to wear the hijah, a lose veil, banned music and dancing in public places and
censored newspapers, journals, books and films.(7)
The factionalism within the government and society about the nature of the
relationship between religion and politics was apparent in the turmoil following the
revolution. The ruling clergy eliminated their former allies who in turn responded with
violent counterattacks. (14) In 1981, the country’s first president, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr,
was forced to flee after clashes with the clerics. That same year, the second president
was killed in a bombing. (14) By the election of the third president, Ali Khamenei, the
ulama dominated every branch of government.
Despite the ulama’s encroachment on civil liberties, the revolution did not falter
immediately. Khomeini remained a respected leader capable of unifying the various
factions within the government and society. Furthermore, the Iraqi invasion of Iran in
1980 garnered nationalistic support for the revolution. It wasn’t until after the end of the
Iran-Iraq war in 1988 that widespread discontent became apparent within Iran. Declining
oil prices, the destruction caused by the war, and inefficient state economic policies
resulted in economic stagnation. The lack of oil revenues and an enormous debt
prevented a quick recovery from the war. To worsen the problem, Iran’s population
nearly doubled in less than twenty years after the revolution. By the mid 1990’s, average
per capita income was only a quarter of what it was in 1979. Due to corruption in the
public sector, domestic and foreign investors refrained from investing in the economy.
Unemployment and inflation soared while living conditions deteriorated.(13) At the
same time, the regime continued to restrict civil liberties by implementing strict
censorship laws, weakening labor unions and banning political parties. Voluntary
associations were closely watched. Political dissidents were arrested and murdered. In
1995, the United Nations condemned Iran’s human rights’ compliance, estimating the
number of political prisoners to be 19,000.(13)
Because of its control of political, economic and social institutions, the ulama
became the target of discontent. Following the revolution, "the clergy's direct
involvement in state affairs has made it the main target of blame for the ills of society and
the state. The cleric's mismanagement of the economy, totalitarian control over the
country's cultural life, and above all, abuse of power, have severely undermined their
once untarnished moral authority."(Abootalebi 34) Khomeini’s death in 1989 and his
replacement by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, appointed by the popularly elected 83-member
Assembly of Experts, further weakened the ulama’s legitimacy, for Khamenei was less
respected as a religious leader.(3)
In the early 1990’s, a more moderate faction within government emerged, the
pragmatists, who, aware of the shortcomings of government, were less doctrinaire and
more willing to compromise with moderates.(3) President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, who
held office form 1989 until 1997, allied with Khamenei to moderate government policies.
Together, they eliminated the position of prime minister and increased presidential
authority. They reigned in the action of revolutionary committees, which had been
created to monitor public compliance with government regulations. The president
created an agenda to reconstruct the economy through privatization of businesses and
opening the country to foreign investment.(14) However, conservatives blocked
economic reforms. More importantly, the alliance did not reduce the power of the jurist
or of the council of Guardians, nor did it eliminate the many restrictions on civil liberties.
Rafsanji’s attempts at reforms only increased the divisions within government.
From 1992 to 1996, parliament, paralyzed by factionalism, passed no major legislation,
and disillusionment with the revolution increased.(14) As discontent mounted, new
voices for reform emerged. Among the loudest and most convincing was that of
philosopher Abdol Karim Soroush. Soroush is one of many intellectuals arguing that
Islam and democracy are perfectly compatible, but only if Islam as treated as a dynamic
religion capable of adjusting to changing human conditions. According to Soroush,
“Islam and democracy are not only compatible. Their association is inevitable. In
Muslim society, one without the other is not perfect”(Wright 40). Soroush argues that
freedom is essential to Islam, for “in order to be a true believer, one must be free. To
become a believer under pressure or coercion won’t be true belief…you should be free as
well to leave your faith or belief”(Wright 41). This freedom is only possible if Islam is
adaptable to changing human needs. Soroush believes that religion can be dynamic
without abandoning its fundamental beliefs and laws, without losing its “essence”.
“There is nothing heretical about new interpretations of Islam that differ from
interpretations of the past. An ideal religious society cannot have anything but a
democratic government. As interpretations of Islam evolves, Islamic law can
even be the basis of modern legislation.”(Takeyh)
The scripture, according to Soroush, demands freedom and equality and requires a
process of consultation between rulers and the rules. Furthermore, Islam has a rich
history of intellectual inquiry and interpretation due to itjihad. The gates of itjihad were
closed generations ago. If opened again, they could pave the way for a true Islamic
democracy.
Unfortunately, the existing religious establishment is unwilling to open itself to
change. The ulama’s entrance into politics and their ties to the interests of a particular
group has turned religion into a stagnant force and the ulama into a religious
dictatorship.(5) The supreme jurist, a position which is antithetical to Islam because it
can easily ignore popular will, is the most conspicuous proof of the ulama’s dictatorial
behavior.(8) Even members of the religious establishment “decry the fact that religion
has become the handmaiden of politics”(Bertone).
The problem with Iranian government, Soroush argues, is that the ruling clerics
assume only they have the right to interpret Islamic law and that their judgements should
remain unchanged. This strict adherence to the interpretation of a few is “smothering”
religion.
“Nothing is sacred in human society. All of us are fallible human beings.
Though religion itself is sacred, its interpretation is not scared, and therefor it can
be criticized, modified, refined and redefined. The interpretation of religious texts
is thus always in flux. There’s no single, inflexible, infallible or absolute
interpretation of Islam. Interpretations are also influenced by the age you live in,
the conditions and mores of the time, and by other branches of knowledge…In
other words, interpretations evolve with time. Any fixed version would
effectively smother religion. It would block the rich exploration of the meanings
in the sacred texts.”(Wright 42)
Consequently, the clergy should not resist criticism of their opinions regarding Islamic
law nor impose their beliefs on the community. To claim a monopoly on understanding
is heretical, for it places the clergy on the same footing as God.(14) It ignores the
Quran’s command to consult with the community. And it risks forming the basis for a
totalitarian state. To prevent this threat, clerics should be accountable to the public, and
lines should be drawn to separate the roles of religion and politics without excluding one
from the other.
Soroush is only one of many demanding government accountability, democracy,
human rights, liberty, equality, social justice and tolerance. After years of harassment, he
was forced into silence and then exile, but other voices in the film, literary, art and
intellectual communities remained behind to spread his message. The improved
education system created a generation of educated and demanding youth whose views
shifted from those of the conservative Hizballah to those of reformers. They, along with
the newly politicized female population, are joining voices to demand greater political
and civil liberties.
In 1997, popular discontent culminated in the election of reformer Muhammad
Khatami to president. In a landslide victory, Khatami garnered two-thirds of the vote.
His victory was the more impressive because he overcame the manipulation of elections
by the conservative right and defeated former president Hashemi Rafsanjani.(2) His
platform was a synthesis of religion and liberty, one which called for increased political
and civil liberties and a greater sphere of individual autonomy. His stated goal was the
creation new “Islamic political society”(8) based on the rule of law and existing
alongside a vibrant civil society.
“An Islamic government is one that considers itself to be the servant of the
people, not their master. A government’s authority is not realized by coercion or
arbitrariness, but by legal acts, by respect for rights and by encouraging people’s
participation in decision making.”(Wright 64)
Khatami acted first to create civil society within Iran, believing it to be essential
to broadening political participation, restricting state encroachment on civil liberties and
creating an atmosphere of pluralistic and tolerant debate, whether it be in a secular
democracy or an Islamic democracy.(3) Because civil society is a western term, there
exists debate about application of the concept of civil society to non-Western
countries.(8) Though Khatami supports reform of the Iranian government, he has
expressed no desire to secularize the system; thus, he raises the question of whether civil
society can exist within an Islamic society. Khatami has remarked that Islamic attitudes
towards civil society differ from the West, because “the emphasis of Muslims seems to
be on the creation of a sphere of citizen liberty…[while the West seems] focused on
citizen participation in specific organizations”(Kelsay 285). Despite differences,
Khatami has stressed the importance of allowing certain institutions, such as the media
and business sector, degrees of autonomy from state control.
Consequently, Khatami, upon entering office, attempted to purge the security
forces, which stifled the growth of civil society, and he supported the proliferation of
newspapers, journal and professional associations.(8) In 1999, Khatami held Iran’s fist
local elections in an effort to decentralize power. Local elections were required in the
constitution but had never been implemented. The elections, the largest ever in Iran,
involved about 330,000 candidates for 200,000 council positions.(2) Despite the
conservatives’ manipulation of the elections through a Central Oversight Committee that
supervised the selection of candidates, Khatami supporters were clearly victorious. The
elections were held to make the state more responsive to the people’s needs but also to
further the development of civil society by giving more people a role in government and
increasing the number of avenues through which to influence government.
The state of civil society in Iran today remains precarious as Khatami struggles to
increase freedom of choice and expression but is countered by restrictive measures by the
conservatives as they continue to shut down publishers and arrest journalists and
outspoken reformers. (2) Because of the lack of coherent associations, “the pressure for
change toward civil society and democracy in Iran emanates not so much from agents of
civil society--which remains relatively few in numbers, organizationally weak and mostly
ineffective in influencing public policy--but from the overall mobilized population across
all sectors of society”(Abootalebi). Frustrated youth, dissatisfied women and
disillusioned middle and lower classes, all more educated and literate in the past because
of an improved education system and modern communications, are calling for a greater
sphere of autonomy from the government. These calls have only grown louder since
Khatami’s election. The Ministry of Culture has, despite conservative attempts at
suppression, become been more tolerant of public debate about civil society, religion and
politics. In response, media organizations are growing, organizing and playing an
increasingly political role.(13) Consequently, though many opponents of government
have been silenced, essential dialogue is occurring within society.
The student riots in Tehran in the summer of 1999 were the most conspicuous
example of this dialogue. That summer, after inflaming the students with arrests of
prominent reformers and media members, the parliament approved a new law to further
restrict the media. The next day, student at the University of Tehran mobilized a protest.
When the protesters were attacked by conservative supporters, the police failed to
intervene. Later, the police raided the university dorms, killing one students, injuring
dozens and arresting hundreds.(14) Despite the violence, the students continued to
protest. As police responded by firing tear gas into the crowds, and vigilantes attacked
the students with chains and rods, protest spread throughout the nation. On the sixth day
of protests, students and police broke out into street battles. Though the police regained
control, the summer demonstrations marked a turning point in Iran’s political
development, for they were the biggest challenge to the government since the
revolution.(14) Though defeated, the students forced the nation and its government to
acknowledge the discontent growing in society and the repressive actions of the state.
Dialogue is also occurring within the government itself as it is split by ideological
differences between the conservative Hizballah and the reformers.(3) The debate centers
around “how to modernize without risking moral bankruptcy”(Wright 63). Though the
conservatives retain primary control over the government, an important power struggle is
taking place within the government. This power struggle is the only means by which “a
polyarchy, a system based on multiple power centers, can eventually emerge. The
struggle for democracy in Iran must be understood within this broader context: the
politics of electioneering and establishing the fundamental institutional framework for
competitive politics (e.g., parliament, presidency), despite all its shortcomings and even
seemingly undemocratic features…can in the long run develop more democratic
features”(Abootalebi).
Whatever form democracy takes in Iran, it will differ from western democracies.
The history of Islam makes the total separation of religion and state improbable; thus, the
values of Islam will continue to be a restrictive force in society. (8) Even Khatami has
said that “a system like ours, based as it is on Islamic ideology, is bound to restrict some
individual liberties”(Takeyh). The religious legal system will likely retain jurisdiction
over family and penal law and will continue to fulfill a supervisory role over government
legislation.(8) The struggle occurring today is not to eliminate the ulama from
government, but to restrict its powers.
The movement towards reform has not weakened. In the February 2000
parliamentary elections, over 80% of the population voted, giving the reformists a
resounding victory. In the 2001 presidential election, Khatami won again by a landslide
vote. Newly formed political parties, including Islamic Iran’s Participation Party and the
Servant of the Constitution Party, participated in both elections as evidence of Iran’s
growing civil society.(3) The reformers’ victories have again made obvious the popular
desire for change. Unfortunately, the conservatives continue to control political and
police power through the Guardians Council, the Revolutionary Guards, the security
forces and mass media.(7) In April 2000, the Islamic Revolutionary Tribunal arrested 40
members of Iran Freedom Movement, simply one example of the conservative assault on
reformers that has included the closing of publications, the imprisonment of journalists
and the curtailing of powers of the now reform-dominated Majles. These attacks are, in
the age of modern communication, self-defeating. They also possess a great deal of
irony, for, during his exile, Khomeini used mimeographs, photographs, audio and
videocassettes to smuggle his revolutionary message back into a highly censored
Iran.(14)
The reformist elements in society will not disappear. Civil society will continue
to grow. Eventually, a more democratic form of government will arise from the existing
religious dictatorship. This democracy will not be secular, for democracy must adapt to
local traditions and values if it is to succeed. However, the role of the ulama will be
severely restricted. No longer will they be the sole uncontested interpreters of Islam. As
Islamic scholar Ali Banuazizi wrote:
“Islamism, as a legitimizing state ideology has all but run its course in Iran. By
this I do not mean to suggest that Islam as a religion, as a moral foundation for
society, or even as a basis for political organization and mobilization, has lost its
appeal to Iranians. But Islamism, as a political doctrine that subordinates popular
sovereignty to the divine law or shari’a, as interpreted and enforced by an Islamic
government, this Islamism is being rejected by an expanding majority of the
population.”(Banuazizi)
The Iranian revolution, the first of its kind, was a test of the compatibility of Islam and
democracy. As of yet, is has not failed. Instead, Iran is undergoing a period of
transformation as reformers struggle to redefine the relationship between religion and
politics. This struggle is evidence of the democratic tendencies within the Republic and
of the potential for the formation of a truly liberal democracy. The final product will
without doubt significantly impact the development of other Middle Eastern nations.
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