Download Dar as-Shahadah Yesterday, one of the first presentations it was

Dar as-Shahadah
Yesterday, one of the first presentations it was said that Islamophobia has
been swiftly increasing in the Western societies and it causes unwanted tension in
those societies. Discrimination to Muslim people, legal regulations such as veil ban
and also the act of burning mosques and Muslim’s homes are the events which we
frequently meet in those days. But, Can we say that the people, who believe that
Islam and Muslims are the threats for the societies, are the only one cause of those
events?
Last year I was in London and I can easily say that the places, in which
Muslim communities live such as Hackney, Wood green and Whitechapel are the
territories of London where crime rate is very high. Generally it is believed that lack of
education, poverty is the essential reasons of crimes. However, with regard to the
problem, let’s think of the bomb attacks on London in July 2005. Two of the convicts
are not uneducated and they weren’t living in poverty.
So, this question is very crucial: What is the reason of those bombing attacks?
Indeed, numerous motives can be proposed, but I think the core of them is the case
of Membership and belonging in any non-Muslim polity. Recently, with regard to
general position of such contemporary societies the debates and studies has been
based on liberal democracies by Muslim scholars. “Is a doctrinal affirmation of
citizenship of liberal societies possible for Muslims”?
Traditional-based concept dar al-harb (The adobe of war) and the
contemporary concept dar ad-da’wa are the main approaches to the problem but they
are not edquate concepts in order to explain the positions of the Muslims in terms of
Islam as will be stating below.
In this paper I will point out another approach dar as-shahadah -the adobe of
testimony- which is introduced by Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan.
Firstly the liberal societies as contemporary non-Muslim rules will be
explained; secondly dar al-harb and dar ad-da’wa will be described as the insufficient
approaches to the problem; lastly dar as-shahada will be stated.
In terms of liberalism, scholars, who are experts in philosophy, sociology and
politics, define the philosophical roots of liberal democracies as political liberalism.
That concept introduces a doctrinal, social and political cooperation which values the
right of individual freedom of various doctrines claiming themselves as the way of
reaching the absolute good in spite of coercing to a certain way. Accordingly, the
liberal doctrine value social solidarity based on mutual recognition and fair distribution
of the doctrines of citizens who are living in a liberal democracies.
John Rawls, one of the leading philosophers in moral and political philosophy,
established remarkably significant doctrine of political liberalism. His doctrine is
based on the concept, overlapping consensus. For him, real liberal society which
claims itself a fair social system is grounded the cooperation between reasonable
and rational citizens as free and equal. Andrew March, the Associate Professor of
Political Science at Yale, writes: “When there exist many doctrines in a society (for
example, various religions and secular philosophies) that all happen to provide their
own unique full justifications for endorsing, on principled grounds, liberal terms of
social cooperation, such a society enjoys what is known as an ‘‘overlapping
consensus’’ and accordingly “Minorities are not forced to abandon most religious
practices, to convert, to culturally assimilate, or to profess something that essentially
requires the repudiation of basic theological beliefs. They benefit (at least from the
perspective of the outside observer) from a system which does not see society
primarily as uniting citizens in a single common purpose but rather as the just
management of multiple private purposes, insofar as a public philosophy of shared
ends and values would most likely be more antagonistic to their religion than a public
philosophy of neutrality.”
In the light of above, it can be clearly said that an attempt regarding being a
part of liberal societies requires integration into such societies and the integration
involves demands of justice and demand of citizenship.
At the present time, Muslims who live in liberal societies are required to fulfil
their duties in terms of solidarity and loyalty. Indeed, they, as the residents of nonMuslim states, have been facing with a problem that to define the societies within
Islamic thought and to discourse their duties in the light of Islamic doctrine.
As I stated before, there are two basic approaches to the problem:
First one is based on the traditional Islamic concept that is called as dar alharb (the adobe of war or enemy territory). Also dar al-kufr and dar al-shirk have
been used for the same condition. That concept makes citizenship as required by
political liberalism impermissible for Muslims.
First of all, the supporters of that discourse define the liberal societies as
secular and there is a certain contradiction between Islam and secularism as the
contemporary jurist Yusuf al-Qaradawi indicates: For Muslim societies, as Islam is a
comprehensive system of worship (‘ibada) and legislation (shari‘a), the acceptance of
secularism means abandonment of shari‘a, a denial of divine guidance and a
rejection of God’s injunctions. It is indeed a false claim that shari‘a is not suitable to
the requirements of the present age. The acceptance of a legislation formulated by
humans means a preference for humans’ limited knowledge and experiences over
the divine guidance: “Say! Do you know better than God?” (Q. 2:140)
Secondly, although pluralistic character of liberal societies regarding equality
and rights, Islamic doctrine recognizes no other nation but only nation of Islam and
the nation of kufr according to several Qur’an verses such as “And those who
disbelieved are allies of one another.” (Q. 8:73) and “Indeed this, your religion, is one
religion, and I am your Lord, so worship Me.”(Q. 21:92). Therefore, “On the
assumption that the aim of Islam was the whole of mankind, the world was sharply
divided, under the law of Islam, into the dar al-Islam (abode or territory of Islam) and
the dar al-harb (abode of war or enemy territory)” and accordingly “...the Law of Islam
was based on the theory of a universal state”.
Bearing that entire in mind, it is proposed by the explanation that the ordinary
relationship between dar al-islam and dar al-harb is always at war; peace between
them is only specific and strategic condition.
That discourse can be called as fundamentalist doctrine that provides Muslim
communities to conserve their so-called “Islamic identity” because this is the fact that
such a claim causes alienation to the society and isolation. When observing first
generation the Muslim immigrants in Western countries such as Turkish in Germany
or Moroccans in France, they have tried to keep their cultural based religious life with
that discourse. However, there are basic contradictions between the Islamic Doctrine
and the fundamental discourse and also although the description had been adequate
for a long time through the history of Islam; the social, economic, and environmental
circumstances of present time entirely differ from the past and Dar al-Harb cannot
meet the needs of the Muslim community of non-Muslim territory.
Firstly, the concept of dar al-harb (adobe of war or enemy territory) has
various definitions by different Muslim schools. The concept of dar al-harb had been
generally used for foreign states in the traditional Islamic Law of Nations (Siyar) and
this classification was not identified in the fundamental sources of Islam which are
Qur’an and Hadith, therefore it is only temporal discourse, accordingly, as looking at
the time when the concept came into existence, it can be clearly seen that the
ordinary condition between states was war. But the conditions of the present time
are, conversely, different and for Islamic doctrine, the basis of international relations
is peace. Ahmet Ozel, Turkish Muslim scholar, characterizes that current position
with three arguments: that the essence of this life for all human being is to be tested
by Allah regarding “Indeed, We have made that which is on the earth adornment for it
that We may test them [as to] which of them is best in deed.” (Q. 18:7), “Then did you
think that We created you uselessly and that to Us you would not be returned?" (Q.
23:115) and “[He] who created death and life to test you [as to] which of you is best in
deed - and He is the Exalted in Might, the Forgiving” (Q. 67:2); that in terms of divine
inherent and natural balance (al-mizan al-ilahiyye bi’l-fitra ve’t-tab’) each Muslim
should prefer such life which is primarily based on goodness, justice, peace; that the
superiority between human beings is not related to gender, race, nations but
adoration as required “O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and
female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed,
the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah
is Knowing and Acquainted.” (Q. 49:13)
Secondly, this is very clear that the use of the concept of dar al-harb and the
concept of jihad by various Muslim jurists and ijtihads related to the various
definitions are in confusion. For Hanafi and Maliki schools, a territory becomes dar alharb when treating as an enemy for Muslim or a declaration of war against Muslim
states; and prohibitions such as interest, alcohols, pork meat and gamble or
dishonouring word are legal (mubah) during the war (jihad). With regard to the
definition of dar al-harb, that refers to de facto war between Muslims and nonMuslims. For Shafi’i, Hanbali and Zahiri schools, the cause of being dar al-harb and
jihad is only infidelity (kufr) but this does not demand of changing law statues. So the
concept of dar al-harb has broad meaning which refers to the status of non-Muslim
rule rather than de facto war. However, Muslim residents in non-Muslim societies,
who support the fundamentalist discourse, follow the fatwa of former schools
whereas they acknowledge the latter discourse of dar al-harb.
Hence, the concept of dar al-harb as traditional and temporal discourse cannot
be a suitable way to identify the present condition of liberal societies.
On the other hand, the second approach to the problem of defining the lands
in which Muslims live as minority entirely differs from the first approach. Brotherhood
scholars Faisal Mawlawi and Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Shi’ite scholar Mohammad
Hussein Fadlallah have introduced a new concept that is based on the Islamic
jurisprudence, derived from the definition of Muslims under non-Muslim rules as
minorities, “The Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities” (al-fiqh al-aqalliyyat). Compare
to the prohibition of being citizen in non-Muslim territory, the concept of dar ad-da’wa
(Abode of Proselytizing) conversely legitimizes membership and belonging in nonMuslim polities. The aim of da’wa is to genuinely motivate the other (non-Muslim)
towards accepting Islam for the right reasons.
The scholars depart from the point that the status of Muslim minorities in nonMuslim lands can be defined as the contract between them and the government of
such states. Muslim minorities have to honour the contract as long as it guaranties
the fundamental rights of Muslims such as security and freedom of worship. Along
with the contract, they acknowledge being a part of the society in which they live; so
they have to pay attention to the social problems and think about their societies “their issues, worries and problems- from their Islamic perspective.”
At first glance, this loyalty and solidarity seems to be contradictory with the
fundamental doctrine of Islam which “The believers are but brothers, so make
settlement between your brothers...” (Q. 49:10). However, Faisal Mawlawi proposes
that there are various types of brotherhood such as human brotherhood, national
brotherhood, familial brotherhood and Islamic brotherhood. And he indicates “it
means that believers can be but brothers to one another, it does not restrict
brotherhood to believers. For brotherhood between believers and unbelievers have
other reasons, such as shared morality, humanity or interests.” In addition,
contemporary Mauritanian scholar ‘Abd Allah Ibn Bayya says “The highest and most
exalted of these loyalties is that based on shared creed, which includes faith in basic
pillars of religion, the shared practice of rituals and adherence to moral virtue. This
relationship of loyalty is not incompatible with loyalty in homeland, which binds
people together into a contract of citizenship and defends territory against
aggression.”
Indeed, the discourse provides powerful motivation to the Muslim citizens in
terms of integration and involvement but as mentioned before the concept of dar adda’wa is grounded on al-fiqh al-aqalliyyat and this jurisprudence contains
considerably pragmatic aims. For instance, with regard to the participation of nonIslamic government, al-Qaradawi justifies it in dar ad-da’wa even though it is not
permissible as one of the basic principle. He indicates three cases: “a) reducing evil
and injustice to the extent one can, (b) committing the lesser of two harms (akhaff aldararayn), and (c) descending from the higher example to the
lower reality.”
Another significant point is the doctrine of jihad which is significantly different
from the fundamentalist discourse. Firstly, jihad cannot be identified as a way to force
non-Muslim in for conversion to Islam. The basic evidences of this argument are two
Qur’an verses: “And had your Lord willed, those on earth would have believed - all of
them entirely. Then, [O Muhammad], would you compel the people in order that they
become believers?” (Q. 10:99) and “There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of]
the religion.” (Q. 2:256) Secondly, jihad is defined by contemporary scholars as a
defensive war rather than as a holy war or attack and the duty of da’wa in dar adda’wa instead of eradicating unbelief.
Compare to the first approach, the dar ad-da’wa discourse seems to be very
compatible with the conditions of the Muslim citizens and successful approach to the
issue. March supports the discourse as being very compatible with political liberalism
and theorizing the legitimacy of citizenship of Muslims in liberal democracies and also
he indicates “I believe that da’wa is one of the most creative and fertile area of fiqh
and ethical thought.” However, various points make the discourse suspicious in terms
of the compatibility with political liberalism. Those are summarizes in three
arguments: that the fundamental belief for da’wa is Islamic universalism, that it
contains significantly utilitarian character with regard to the participation of liberal
constitutes and that it classifies non-Muslim as potential Muslims rather than affirming
them with their beliefs or religions as the parts of shared society. It could be clearly
said that those arguments make the concept insufficient though being significantly
successful attempt.
Now I am moving on dar as shahadah.
The concept of dar as-shahada (Abode of Testimony) is proposed by Muslim
scholar, intellectual and activist Tariq Ramadan. His concept is primarily based on
reformist and modern thought. Before examining his discourse, what has to be done
is to explain his views on the fundamental faiths of Islam and Islamic Law.
He begins with examining the fundamental faiths and Islamic Law because he
claims that at the present time, the dominant and de facto concept of fundamental
faith of Islam is an misunderstanding because the laws the Islamic social codes
which can be different from one culture or time to another one have been turning into
the core concepts of Islam. He indicates that the only the laws of worship are the
cores of the religion. Although the social codes provide the possibility of living Islam
and with respect to that they have a great importance, they are not immutable: the
assumption of “the Islamic juridical frame [is] entirely immutable, fixed once and for
all” is the result of dominant character of cultures, particularly Muslim immigrants and
citizens who have been coming from different cultures and following different schools
(madhab) in liberal countries. For him, therefore the first mission is to specify this
differentiation.
He departs with indicating the global concept of thought of Islam that is to be
“apprehended in light of every specific era and environment. Armed with the general
rulings, tied to them, the silence of the sources on very precise questions obliges the
‘ulama’ to ponder on the revealed matter, to think about their era and to formulate
adequate rulings for their contemporaries. The silence is, in fact, the specific part
given to human analytic reason to stipulate inevitably diverse Islamic rules, through
space and time, but ones which are still Islamic.” According to that, it can be easily
sad that Ramadan calls for re-thinking Qur’an and Hadith as the fundamental sources
of Islam and recovering the core of Islam.
The concepts of da’wa and plays a great role in Ramadan’s terminology. He
uses da’wa differently from the previous discourse of dar ad-da’wa. He aims to
“present Islam, explain the content of this Faith and the Islamic teaching as a whole”
with the concept of da’wa. He says “(it) must not be confused with either proselytism
or efforts to convert: the duty of the Muslim is to spread the Message and to make it
known, no more no less. Whether someone accepts Islam or not is not the Muslim’s
concern, forte inclination of every individual heart depends on God’s Will. The notion
of da‘wa is based on one principle, which is the right of every human being to make a
choice based on knowledge, and this is why Muslims are asked to spread the
knowledge of Islam among Muslims as well as non-Muslims’’
Here the concept of dar as-shahada takes place: “...the European environment
is a space of responsibility for Muslims. This is exactly the meaning of the notion of
‘‘space of testimony’’ that we propose here, a notion that totally reverses
perspectives: whereas Muslims have, for years, been wondering whether and how
they would be accepted, the in-depth study and evaluation of the Western
environment entrusts them, in light of their Islamic frame of reference, with a most
important mission. Muslims now attain, in the space of testimony, the meaning of an
essential duty and of an exacting responsibility: to contribute, wherever they are, to
promoting good and equity within and through human brotherhood. Muslims’ outlook
must now change from the reality of ‘‘protection’’ alone to that of an authentic
‘‘contribution.’”
A Muslim, who remembers the core of his faith by returning the fundamental
sources of Islam, perceives the consciousness of being a Muslim and then obtains
self-confidence. This recognition shows him that he is a part of his society and that
he is carrying the responsibility of da’wa. Along with the self-confidence, he exits his
ghetto and his outlook, which is based on conservation, would turn into contribution
as an individual part of his society.
For Ramadan, Loyalty to social contract is a necessity for Muslim residents
because “By signing a work contract or asking for a visa, they acknowledge the
validity and authority of the constitution, the laws and the state all at once’’ and
theologically “One can then see that it is clearly in the name of faithfulness to the
Islamic teachings of Shari‘a and Fiqh that Muslims can live in the West, and that it is
their duty to respect the law of the country. In other words, Islamic law and
jurisprudence order a Muslim individual to submit to the framework of positive law in
force in his country of residence in the name of the tacit moral covenant which
already underlies his very presence. To put it differently again, implementing the
Shari‘a, for a Muslim citizen or resident in Europe, is explicitly to respect the
constitutional and legal framework of the country in which he is a citizen. Whereas
one might have feared a conflict of loyalties, one cannot but note that it is in fact the
reverse, since faithfulness to Islamic teachings results in an even more exacting legal
implementation in the new environment. Loyalty to one’s faith and conscience
requires firm and honest loyalty to one’s country: the Shari‘a requires honest
citizenship within the frame of reference constituted by the positive law of the
European country concerned”.
According to March, the discourse is clearly based on political liberalism in
terms of its social values: mutual recognition, and individual freedom and also
overlapping consensus.
At first glance, the discourse seems to be the most suitable and successful
one between introduced discourses. Indeed it is well-ordered and consistent in it. The
concept of da’wa by Ramadan has, indeed, deep and sophisticated meaning with
regard to its three sided mission: for Muslim as the carrier of the responsibility, for
other Muslims and non-Muslims citizens. In addition, emphasis on responsibility,
justice, self-confidence and contribution is remarkably fertile approach to the problem
in terms of the terminology.
However, there are two essential problems with that approach
Firstly, Tariq Ramadan is not an expert of Islamic Law and that makes his
doctrine philosophical-based rather than a fıqhi approach. Secondly he often appeals
two the Islamic juridical concepts maslaha “public interest” and maqasid al-shari’a
“purposes of the shari’a” but while establishing his arguments, he does not bring the
evidence from the Islamic Law and that might causes some questions regarding the
validity of his doctrine in the area of Islamic studies.
Nevertheless, I think it may be concerned as a starting point. If it is
strengthened with the sources of Islam - there is no reason to claim that is
impossible-, its potential success would be a way of understanding the message of
Islam for both Muslims and non-Muslims.
Huseyin Taha Topaloglu