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SOUL SEARCH: THE EXTRA-PERSONAL SOURCE OF
SELF-IDENTITY
Joel D. Benedict
University of Advancing Technology
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Soul Search: the Extra-Personal Source of Self-Identity
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the relations of memory and personal identity. The
scope is the ethics of identity and the role memory plays in identity. The method is to show the
components of personal identity. The results determine the influences upon personal identity and
the effects of these constituent internal components on the exterior field of ethics. The conclusion
summarizes the ethics stemming from a view of internal personal identity. Recommendations
given to individuals for ethical decisions regarding memory are based on the source of personal
identity.
Body
Physiological Determination of Personal Identity
The purpose of discussing relations of memory and personal identity is to give
individuals information about their own identity. Thus, memory and personal identity must be
fully understood before making an ethical decision. Personal identity is physiological,
psychological, extra-personal (i.e. the self is a soul), or is a combination of the three. In the first
theory of personal identity, the self is purely physical and only exists as long as the brain
continues its status quo. If a part of the physical brain is altered via a brain injury, surgery, or
dementia, then the person has died, and a new identity is present in its place. What the physical
theory fails to factor is the minute changes in the brain throughout life—if it is the case that
significant alteration kills an identity, then a person would be in a constant state of changing
identities, constantly dying upon encountering experiences that change thought patterns.
Psychological Determination of Personal Identity
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The weaknesses of the physical theory do not to disprove that physical changes in the
brain are not a part of identity. This is because the physical brain affects the abstract psychology
of the mind. Disorders of the mind, personality, and behavior are all caused by the physical and
psychological state of the brain. Psychology deals more with the controllable aspects of the
mind, the choices that individuals make and why they make certain decisions. Thus, a
psychological decision can change the physical makeup of the brain. Theorizing that personal
identity originates from the mind fails to account for the physical changes in the brain. However,
just as with physiological traits, psychology is not disproven as a part of identity because of its
reciprocal effect on the physical brain.
Combined Body and Mind Identity Determination
The psychological and physical theories fail to address changes in behavior, personality,
and memory. If a person consciously changes a habit, the change cannot be attributed to the
involuntary regulatory movements of the body or solely to the personality and general behavior
traits of the person. The next theory combines psychology and physiology to declare the person’s
identity is composed of both mind and body components. This means that a person dies when
their body and mind have been so altered that they no longer exist, and a new body and mind
have created a new personal identity. Humans that develop from a fetus are substantially
different from their previous state in both psychology and physiology. We can judge from this
that the fetus and the adult are non-identical personal identities.
Componential State Identity Determination
Every single human of the course of a lifetime will have multiple personal identities, as
each literally dies in some fashion and is replaced by a distinct personal identity in discontinuous
linearity. The life dies in parts, as each person retains a part of their psychology or physiology
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regardless of damage or major changes to mind and body. This continuous cell-like cycle of life
and death means that the current state of a person determines their current personal identity. The
person’s present personal identity can be retained from a previous state, or may be completely
different from the previous state.
Memory Identity Determination
The question of the makeup of a person’s identity cannot be branched by the dually
psychological and physiological component of memory. Memory can be altered, manufactured
as a false or quasi-memory and can die as can any other component of the self. As such, memory
can no more be the source of personal identity than personality or behavior alone can be the sole
determinants of personal identity.
Extra-personal Identity Determination
Continuous-component-state identity
The parts of personal identity are body, mind, memory, personality, and behavior;
together the parts define a personal identity, but only a temporary identity that will die in pieces
and be replaced many times over by new individual components. Therefore, the question of a
continuous personal identity that does not discard pieces leads to the conclusion of an extrapersonal, existential personal identity—the soul.
Discernment between souls and identity components
The soul does not die in part or in whole at least throughout the duration of life, but like
the physical body remains constant throughout its term of existence. Unlike the individual
components, the soul is not damaged by changes to the body, mind, or memory. The soul is a
continuous container of each individual personal element in every state it appears. The identities
that exist before and after a brain injury are both parts of the continuous self. Therefore, even in a
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situation where an individual component like memory is identically present in two completely
different humans, the personal identities of the two are still non-identical. In the case where an
individual copies every component of personal identity to another, the individuals still have
separate souls because of previously non-identical states.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Recommendations
Because memories are just one part of personal identity, ethics should be drawn from the
personal identity of the componential and continuous self rather than from an individual
component like memory. The ethics of this soul theory mean that no amount of transfer of quasimemories or additional components like personality or physiology can create two identical
people. Since the only memories that are not quasi-memories are those held by those that
experience them, memories can only be copied, but not relived. Conflicts of interest between two
individuals claiming the same personal identity by virtue of exact memory replication can
resolve the conflict by granting identical status to matching components. However, the overall
personal identities should be granted as non-identical as the original executor of actions
established the current state of the component.
Summary
The purpose of this paper is to argue that memory is simply one part of personal identity.
The scope is the ethics of an identity made of more than just memory. The method breaks down
the components of personal identity to show that changes to parts other than memory result in a
change of identity. The conclusion summarizes how ethics decisions based on memory differ
from ethics decisions based on soul. The recommendation is that people should make decisions
based on the personal identity of their body, mind, and soul.