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Transcript
Security considerations for M2M
IEEE 802.16 Presentation Submission Template (Rev. 9)
Document Number:
IEEE 802.16ppc-10/0037
Date Submitted:
2010-07-09
Source:
Eldad Zeira, Alex Reznik
E-mail: [email protected]
InterDigital Communications Corp.
Venue:
Session #68, San Diego
Base Contribution:
None
Purpose:
To be discussed and adopted by 802.16 Project Planning Committee / 802.16p
Notice:
This document does not represent the agreed views of the IEEE 802.16 Working Group or any of its subgroups. It represents only the views of the participants listed
in the “Source(s)” field above. It is offered as a basis for discussion. It is not binding on the contributor(s), who reserve(s) the right to add, amend or withdraw
material contained herein.
Release:
The contributor grants a free, irrevocable license to the IEEE to incorporate material contained in this contribution, and any modifications thereof, in the creation of
an IEEE Standards publication; to copyright in the IEEE’s name any IEEE Standards publication even though it may include portions of this contribution; and at the
IEEE’s sole discretion to permit others to reproduce in whole or in part the resulting IEEE Standards publication. The contributor also acknowledges and accepts that
this contribution may be made public by IEEE 802.16.
Patent Policy:
The contributor is familiar with the IEEE-SA Patent Policy and Procedures:
<http://standards.ieee.org/guides/bylaws/sect6-7.html#6> and <http://standards.ieee.org/guides/opman/sect6.html#6.3>.
Further information is located at <http://standards.ieee.org/board/pat/pat-material.html> and <http://standards.ieee.org/board/pat >.
• M2M networks are more vulnerable to security
threats than traditional networks
– … and handle highly critical missions
• Network attacks can lead to false situational
awareness, loss of privacy, and even become
physical attacks
– Compromised by physical or remote reconfiguration or
impersonation
• SR recognizes this issue and recommends that it is
in scope of the M2M PAR
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• M2M devices handle highly critical missions while
being…
– deployed in highly distributed networks
– provisioned in the field and managed over the air
– operated without human supervision
• M2M networks and applications are vulnerable to:
–
–
–
–
Misleading reports
Network (denial of service) attacks
Loss of privacy
Cyber attacks can become physical attacks
• The awareness of an attack is in itself an important security
related information
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3
Security susceptibilities of M2M use cases
Susceptibility

M2M use case

Misleading
reports
Network attacks
(particularly for
WAN)
Secured access,
surveillance , remote
maintenance
False situational
awareness
DoS attacks prevent
obtaining of situational
awareness
Tracking, tracing &
recovery
False location
reports
Prevents timely tracking
Public safety
Similar to security , especially if acts of terrorism are considered
Smart grid
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Cyber attacks
become
physical
attacks
Transmission of
information to
unauthorized parties
Payment
Health Care
Data privacy
False situational
awareness
Prevents awareness of
emergency conditions
Prevention of timely
control requires
unavailable electrical
resources
Transmission of
information to
unauthorized parties
Malicious control
can have serious
health implications
Malicious control
can cause lasting
damage to grid
4
The vulnerabilities, more precisely…
•
•
•
•
Physical Attacks such as insertion of valid authentication tokens into a manipulated
device, inserting and/or booting with fraudulent or modified software (“re-flashing”),
and environmental/side-channel attacks, both before and after in-field deployment.
Compromise of Credentials comprising brute force attacks on tokens and (weak)
authentication algorithms, physical intrusion, or side-channel attacks, as well as
malicious cloning of authentication tokens residing on the device.
Configuration Attacks such as fraudulent software update/configuration changes, misconfiguration by the owner, subscriber or user, mis-configuration or compromise of the
access control policies.
Attacks on the Network. These are the main threats to the network operator:
Impersonation of devices, traffic tunneling between impersonated devices, misconfiguration of the firewall in the modem/router/gateways, Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks against the core network. They may also include changing the device’s
authorized physical location in an unauthorized fashion or attacks on the radio access
network, using a rogue device.
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Security requirements in SR (0002r7, sec. 4.7)
• 802.16 security functions, including integrity protection
and the confidentiality for M2M service traffic shall be
supported for M2M devices. Expected use cases for
WAN M2M systems make them vulnerable to security
threats in the form of physical or remote attacks on
hardware, software / firmware, compromise of
credentials, configuration and network attacks (e.g.,
denial of service).
• WAN M2M system should support appropriate level of
authentication for the M2M device or M2M gateway to
provide secure access to the authorized M2M devices.
The system should support verification and validation of
the exchanged data
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What do we need to do?
• 5.7 Security (from SR)
– Enhanced security may require changes to the
network entry/re-entry procedure.
• No other standardized changes in MAC / PHY
are required
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Proposed modification to M2M PAR scope
• This amendment specifies IEEE Std 802.16 medium
access control (MAC) enhancements and minimal
OFDMA PHY modifications to provide functionalities
for efficient Machine to Machine communication.
Enhancements are lower power consumption at the
subscriber station, support by the base station of
significantly larger numbers of devices, enhanced access
priority, time-tolerant/controlled operation, improved
device authentication at network entry and efficient
support for small burst transmissions. This amendment
provides continuing support for WirelessMANAdvanced Air Interface and legacy WirelessMANOFDMA
equipment.
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