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Demography, Capital Markets and Pension Risk Management session 2 Andrei Simonov Strategic Asset Allocation 1 7/5/2017 Analysing pension risk Surplus/Deficit Progression 300 Illustrative example Y% probability of being at least 100% funded in 10 years time 200 300 ASSET RETURN RISKS Rewarded 200 0 100 -100 -400 2009 2010 2011 5% Percentile 2012 2013 25% Percentile 2014 Year 50% Percentile 2015 2016 75% Percentile 2017 2018 2019 -300 95% Percentile Longevity hedging should be considered alongside other risk mitigation techniques using risk return framework Total Diversification Credit Alternatives -200 Equity -100 Longevity -300 0 Liabilities -200 1 in 20 chance that deficit is at least £Xm higher than expected £ million Surplus/Deficit (£m) 100 LIABILITY EXPOSURES Unrewarded (no risk premium) Demographic factors at work Increasing longevity Lower fertility Retirement of Baby Boom 3 From pyramids to columns Age Group 100 + 95 - 99 90 - 94 85 - 89 80 - 84 75 - 79 70 - 74 65 - 69 60 - 64 55 - 59 50 - 54 45 - 49 40 - 44 35 - 39 30 - 34 25 - 29 20 - 24 15 - 19 10 - 14 5-9 0-4 B B B A A A 4 People over SPA to those aged 20 – SPA* 0.6 With SPA fixed at 65 0.5 0.4 With SPA rising proportionally (to 68.5 in 2050 and 70.2 in 2070)1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 2006 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 * SPA: State Pension Age (1) This proportionate adjustment maintains the proportion of life over 20 years old which is spent in retirement at 27.5% 5 Lower fertility – The inherent challenge to pension systems PAYG Increased ratio of pensioners to contributors Lower pensions relative to average earnings Higher contribution rates Increase Pension Age more than proportionally with life expectancy Funded Savers of generation 1 have to sell accumulated assets to “smaller”* generation 2 Transitional asset price fall effect K/L rises: return on capital falls * Smaller can mean either absolutely smaller than G1 (if fertility 2.0) or “smaller than would be the case if fertility had not fallen” 6 Possible de facto demographic effects on funded systems and capital markets Lower Fertility Transitional asset price fall effect (at sale) Inherent effect of shift to lower fertility K/L rises: return on capital falls Increased Longevity Transitional asset price rise effect Longer-term effect; K/L rises, return on capital falls Not inherent but could occur if future pensioners do not adjust retirement ages but instead increase savings rate 7 Demographic impacts on returns to capital Model Results Garry Young: Baby-boom generation Increased longevity Falling fertility -0.1% -0.1% -0.3% David Miles: Given future actual trends in UK demographics, returns fall: 4.56% (1990) to 4.22% (2030) 4.56% (1990) to 3.97% (2060) if PAYG phased out 8 Real S&P500 price index and % of 40-64 year olds among total U.S population 1950-2003 34 1800 33 1600 32 1400 31 1200 30 1000 29 800 28 600 27 400 26 200 25 0 24 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Real S&P500 (LHS) Percentage of 40-64 Population Real S&P500 Price Index Forecast 2000 40-64 population/ total population (RHS) Source:: Poterba (2004), with additional data to 2006 9 Theoretical & empirical approaches to measuring demographic effects “Given the limited amount of time series on returns and demographic variation, and the difficulty of controlling for all of the other factors that may affect asset values and asset returns, the theoretical models should be accorded substantial weight in evaluating the potential impact of demographic shifts” Poterba: “The Impact of Population Ageing on Financial Markets” 10 Global glut of savings hypothesis In China and other East Asian countries • Fewer children enable higher savings rate • Awareness of greater longevity, fewer children and lack of social welfare net, require a high savings rate Developed countries save more to cope with their demographic/pension challenges Global glut of savings relative to investment Long-term, not just cyclical, fall in real interest rates Transitional positive asset price effects 11 01/01/2005 01/01/2004 01/01/2003 01/01/2002 01/01/2001 01/01/2000 01/01/1999 01/01/1998 01/01/1997 01/01/1996 01/01/1995 01/01/1994 01/01/1993 01/01/1992 01/01/1991 01/01/1990 01/01/1989 01/01/1988 01/01/1987 01/01/1986 Percent Real yields to maturity on UK index-linked gilts 1986 – 2004 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 2.5 Year 5 Year 10 Year 20 Year 1.5 1 0.5 0 12 UK Long-term real interest rates 11% Real interest rate 9% Long-term average (1700-2004) 7% Estimate for 2005 5% 3% 1% -1% -3% -5% Estimate for 2005, as of 02 March 2005 -7% 1700 1716 1732 1748 1764 1780 1796 1812 1828 1844 1860 1876 1892 1908 1924 1940 1956 1972 1988 2004 Source: Morgan Stanley Research 13 Whole world gross savings rate 1981 - 2005 25 20 15 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database 14 Gross savings rates: developing Asia and the US % of GDP 1981 - 2005 40 35 Developing Asia 30 25 20 15 USA 10 5 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database 15 Demographic challenges to funded pension systems Increasing longevity • Lower fertility Not inherent problem but possible de facto Overwhelmed in short-term by globalisation effect • Uncertainty of longevity forecasts 16 Survivor Products: Managing longevity risk & mortality improvements 17 Current Forces Affecting the Size and Ownership of Longevity Risk The Mosaic Today Retirement population growing Longevity continues to increase for retirees at historically high rates against largely fixed retirement / entitlement dates The current cost of life extension in the UK is estimated at £12.5 to £24.7 billion per year Current fiscal and monetary policy may be sowing the seeds of high inflation and expectations of inflation Strong forces are causing corporates to close existing Defined Benefit (DB) schemes and transition to Defined Contribution / Personal Account schemes The Credit Crunch is causing a significant increase in DB pensioner risk to move to the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) Longevity extending Cost of longevity significant and rising Inflation could exacerbate longevity costs Longevity risk moving from corporates to individuals Credit Crunch moving longevity risk arguably to Government 18 The UK population of retirees (i.e. people 65+) is set to increase by 60% by 2032 from 10 million to 16 million due mainly to the ageing of the baby boom generation 2012… Strategic Asset Allocation 19 7/5/2017 Date Fund Provider Approx size Solution February 2013 BAE Systems Legal & General £3.2bn Pensioner bespoke longevity swap December 2012 LV= Swiss Re £800m Pensioner and all members over age 55 May 2012 Akzo Nobel Swiss Re £1.4bn Pensioner bespoke longevity swap January 2012 Pilkington December 2011 British Airways Goldman Sachs / Rothesay Life £1.3bn Pensioner bespoke longevity swap November 2011 Rolls-Royce Deutsche Bank £3bn Pensioner bespoke longevity swap August 2011 ITV Credit Suisse £1.7bn Pensioner bespoke longevity swap February 2011 Pall J P Morgan £70m Non-pensioners index based longevity hedge July 2010 British Airways Goldman Sachs / Rothesay Lif £1.3bn Synthetic buy-in (longevity swap plus asset swap) February 2010 BMW Abbey Life / Deutsche £3bn Bank Pensioner bespoke longevity swap November 2009 Royal Berkshire Swiss Re £1bn Pensioner bespoke longevity swap July 2009 RSA Insurance Group Goldman Sachs / Rothesay Life £1.9bn Synthetic buy-in (longevity swap plus asset swap) May 2009 Babcock Credit Suisse £1.5bn Strategic Asset Allocation Legal & General £1bn of other Pensioner bespokeUK longevity swap Here’s a useful list major longev Pensioner bespoke longevity swap (three schemes) 20 7/5/2017 Strategic Asset Allocation 21 7/5/2017 Strategic Asset Allocation 22 7/5/2017 The problem Nothing is certain in life except death and taxes (B Franklin). Over last 20 years, it has become clear that, while death is no less inevitable than before: – it is getting later – and its timing has become increasingly uncertain. 23 The problem When British welfare state began in 1948, men could draw their state pension at 65 and expect to live until 67 and only a few lived beyond 70. At beginning of 21st Century, British men can still draw their pension from age 65 but now live into their early 80s. Significant proportion of women living into 24 their late 80s. Mortality improvements over time 25 Strategic Asset Allocation 26 7/5/2017 Strategic Asset Allocation 27 7/5/2017 What is longevity risk? (Broken limits to life expectancy – Oeppen & Vaupel) 28 Stochastic nature of mortality improvements Evident for many years that mortality rates have been evolving in apparently stochastic fashion. Sequences do exhibit general trend, but changes have an unpredictable element: – not only from one period to next – but also over the long run. 30 Longevity risk Large number of products in life insurance and pensions have mortality as key source of risk. Products exposed to unanticipated changes over time in mortality rates of relevant reference populations. Eg annuity providers exposed to risk that mortality rates of pensioners will fall at faster rate than accounted for in pricing and reserving calculations: – Current pool of annuitants living 2 years longer than anticipated 31 Longevity risk Annuities are commoditised products selling on basis of price, profit margins have to be kept low in order to gain market share. If mortality assumption built into price of annuities turn out to be gross overestimate, cuts straight into profit margins of annuity providers. Most life companies claim to lose money on annuity business. 32 Longevity risk Yet life annuities are mainstay of pension plans throughout the world: – they are the only instrument ever devised capable of hedging longevity risk. Without them, pension plans will be unable to perform their fundamental task of protecting retirees from outliving their resources for however long they live. Real danger that they might disappear from financial scene. 33 Longevity risk Equitable Life: Embedded options in annuity contracts became very valuable in 1990's due to combination of falling interest rates and improvements in mortality. Problems avoided if EL could hedge exposures to: – interest-rate risk – mortality improvement risk. 34 Longevity risk in UK pension provision, £billion of total liabilitiesbroad estimates: end 2003 35 Figure 5.17 p181 Significant concern! Reinsurers (eg Swiss Re) have stopped reinsuring longevity risk of life offices! 36 Survivor Products Long-dated survivor bonds: Life annuity bond: coupon payments decline in line with mortality index: – Eg based on population of 65-year olds on issue date. As population cohort dies out, coupon payments decline, but continue in payment until the entire cohort dies. Eg, if after one year 1.5% of population has died out, 2nd year’s coupon payment is 98.5% of 1st year’s etc 37 Survivor Products Bond holder, eg life office writing annuities, protected from aggregate mortality risk it faces. Based on Tontine Bonds issued by European governments in 17th and 18th centuries Recently revived by Blake and Burrows (2001) and Lin and Cox (2004). 38 BNP Paribas Longevity Bond November 2004 Issuer: European Investment Bank (AAA) Issue: £540m, 25 year Mortality index: 65 year-old males from England & Wales (ONS) Structurer/manager: BNP Paribas (assumes longevity risk) Reinsurer of longevity risk: PartnerRe, Bermuda Investors: UK pension funds 39 BNP Paribas Longevity Bond Bond holders Floating S(t) Issue price Interest-rate swap EIB BNP Issue price Mortality swap Partner Re 40 41 Advantages of longevity bond Provides better match for liabilities of pension funds and life insurers than other available investments: – other than purchasing (re)insurance to cover the longevity risk (i.e annuities) Bond also provides long term interest rate hedge. Longevity index transparent EIB has AAA credit rating. Life insurers holding longevity bond as hedge may be able to hold lower prudential margins. 42 Longevity Bond Annuity Partial hedging of the longevity risk Full hedging of longevity risk Low credit risk of EIB (rated AAA) Higher credit risk of the insurer but there is additional protection through the government compensation scheme Fixed term of 25 years Covers the full term of the liability Only level pensions matched Different annuities can be used to match non - level pensions 43 Survivor Products Short-dated, mortality-linked securities: Market-traded securities whose payments are linked to mortality index Similar to catastrophe bonds (Schmock, 1999, Lane, 2000, Wang, 2002, and Muermann, 2004) 44 Swiss Re Bond 2003 Designed to securitise Swiss Re’s own holding of mortality risk! 3-year contract (matures 1 Jan 2007) which allows issuer to reduce exposure to catastrophic mortality events: – severe outbreak of influenza – major terrorist attack (WMD) – natural catastrophe. Mortality index (MI): – US (70%), UK (15%), France (7.5%), Italy (5%), Switzerland (2.5%). – Male (65%), Female (35%) – Also age bands 45 Influenza pandemics All resulted from avian flu virus mutating with human flu virus 11 outbreaks in 300 years 1580 – First confirmed flu pandemic 1782 – Summer Flu – Started in China – Hit young adults 1889 – Russian Flu – Over 20% of world population infected – 1m deaths 47 Influenza pandemics 1918-19 – Spanish Flu – Started in Kansas – Killed 50m people worldwide: 250,000 in UK – More than died in WW1, in shorter period – 20% of world’s population infected and 1% killed – Spread along trade routes and shipping lines 48 Influenza pandemics 1957-58 – – – – Asian Flu 2m deaths Hit teenagers hardest Spread around world in 6 months 1968-69 – – – – Hong Kong Flu Started in China 1m deaths Spread slowly with moderate symptons 49 Influenza pandemics 2005-06 – Started in SE Asia – H5N1 virus – Closely related to 1918 Spanish virus 50 Swiss Re Bond 2003 $400m, principal at risk ‘if, during any single calendar year, combined mortality index exceeds 130% of baseline 2002 level’. Principal exhausted if index exceeds 150% Equivalent to a call option spread on the index with: – Lower strike price of 130% – Upper strike price of 150% Investors get quarterly coupons of 3-mo USD Libor + 135bp 51 Swiss Re Bond 2003 Off balance sheet Swiss Re Annual coupons (USD LIBOR + 135bps) SPV (Vita Capital) Bond holders Principal payment $400m Up to $400m if extreme mortality is experienced Check terminal mortality index value Up to $400m if extreme mortality is not experienced 52 100% 90% 80% 70% - Exhaustion point 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1 Capital erosion Attachment point Principal Repayment (%) Swiss Re Bond 2003 1.05 1.1 1.15 1.2 1.25 1.3 1.35 1.4 1.45 1.5 1.55 Mortality Index Level (q) 53 1.6 Swiss Re Bond 2003 Bond valued using Extreme Value Theory (Beelders & Colarossi (2004)) Assume Generalised Pareto Distribution Probability of attachment: – P[MI(t)>1.3MI(2002)] = 0.31% Probability of exhaustion: – P[MI(t)>1.5MI(2002)] = 0.15% Expected loss = 22bp < 135bp A good deal for investors! Bond trading at Libor + 100bp in June 2004 54 Survivor Products Survivor swaps: Counterparties swap fixed series of payments in return for series of payments linked to number of survivors in given cohort: – UK annuity provider could swap cash flows based on UK mortality index for cash flows based on US mortality index from a US annuity provider counterparty – Would enable both counterparties to diversify their longevity risks internationally. Dowd et al (2004) 55 Survivor Products Annuity futures: Prices linked to specified future market annuity rate Mortality options: Payout depends on underlying mortality table at payment date. Eg, EL guaranteed annuity contract 58 Demand side of market Reference population underlying calculation of mortality rates central to both: – Viability – Liquidity of contracts. Hedging demand from investors (eg life offices) wishing to hedge mortality exposures. If reference population v different from investor’s specific population, then investor will be exposed to significant basis risk: – Might conclude that mortality derivative is not worth holding. 59 Demand side of market Speculative demand: – depends on liquidity. Adequate liquidity will require small number of reference populations: – Need to be chosen carefully to ensure that level of basis risk is small for investors with hedging demands. Demand from hedge funds: – seeking instruments that have low correlation 60 with existing financial instruments Supply side of market Government: – Securitising social security budget Corporates long longevity risk: – Pharamceuticals 61 Barriers to development in cash market After more than year, BNP Paribas longevity bond had not generated sufficient demand to be launched: – Has been withdrawn for redesign Suggests significant barriers need to be overcome before sustainable market in survivor products and derivatives emerges. 62 Barriers to development in cash market Reasons why BNP bond did not launch: – design issues which make bond an imperfect hedge for longevity risk – pricing issues – institutional issues 63 Design issues Small scheme will find it difficult to use bond to match its liabilities: – as variance between actual and expected mortality will be quite large. Mortality experience of individual pension funds and life insurers may be different from reference UK population. Bond only provides hedge for longevity of males: – pension funds and life insurers also exposed to significant longevity risk from females. 64 Design issues Liabilities for pension funds and life insurers give greater weight to the lives receiving larger pensions. Further, significant differences in mortality of those receiving larger pensions compared to those receiving lower pensions. As payments under bond effectively give equal weight to all the lives in the UK population, the already imperfect hedge provided by the longevity bond is worsened. 65 Design issues Bond only matches cashflow under level pension – while large portion of pensions paid by pension funds and life insurers will be increasing at RPI/LPI/CPI. Bond is progressively worse hedge for pension liabilities related to younger or older cohorts. 66 Pricing issues d .MI 3 d .MI1 d .MI 2 P= + + + 2 3 (1+ r1 ) (1+ r2 ) (1 + r3 ) Need to forecast mortality index MI’s Need to estimate r’s Correlation between MI and r: – Anticipated to be low 67 Pricing issues d .MI 3 d .MI1 d .MI 2 P= + + + 2 3 (1+ r1 ) (1+ r2 ) (1 + r3 ) Above model valid only in complete market In incomplete market, need to convert projected deterministic mortality rates into risk-neutral probabilities – E.g using Wang transform – Lin & Cox (2005) 68 Pricing issues Longevity risk premium built into initial price of bond set at 20 basis points. Given that this is first ever bond brought to market, markets have no real feeling as to how fair this figure is. However, concern that up-front capital was too large compared with risks being hedged by bond: – longevity and interest rate risks leaving no capital for other risks to be hedged – e.g. inflation 69 Institutional issues Issue size too small to create liquid market. Consultants reluctant to recommend it to trustees. Fund managers do not currently have mandate to manage longevity risk. Fund managers have not welcomed bond: – since believe it would be closely held and they would not make money from it being traded. Partner Re is unlikely to be perceived as being a natural holder of UK longevity risk. 70 Institutional issues Last point highly significant Reflects view that key determinant of future issue of longevity bonds is availability of sufficient reinsurance capacity. Neither UK-based nor EU-based reinsurer willing to provide cover for BNP bond Partner Re not prepared to offer cover above issue size of £540m. Has been questioned whether EU’s solvency requirements render reinsurance cover within EU prohibitively expensive. 71 Barriers to development in futures market Following factors key to success of particular futures contract: – defined as having consistently high volume of trade and open interest: Must be large, active and liquid spot market for underlying with good price transparency: – – by far the most important factor: indeed no futures contract has ever survived without a spot market satisfying these conditions. 72 Barriers to development in futures market Spot prices must be sufficiently volatile to create hedging needs and speculative interest. Relative hedging demand can be measured by level of open interest relative to volume: – since former excludes the many speculators who do not hold overnight positions. Low open interest to volume ratio is an indication of high liquidity : – another sign of successful futures contract. 73 Barriers to development in futures market Underlying must be homogeneous and/or have well-defined grading system. Market in underlying must not be heavily concentrated on either buy or sell side: – since this can lead to price manipulation. Futures contract must be effective in reducing risk. 74 Barriers to development in futures market Liquidity costs: – – bid-ask spreads execution risk: risk of adverse price movements before trade execution Liquidity costs in the futures contract must not be significantly higher than those operating in any existing cross-hedge futures contract. 75 Failure of futures contracts CPI futures contract listed on US Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange in June 1985 Delisted in April 1987 with only 10,000 contracts traded. Reasons for failure: – – – no inflation-linked securities market at the time. underlying was infrequently published index. no stable pricing relationship with other instruments. 76 Failure of futures contracts Futures contract on Treasury inflationprotected securities (TIPS) listed on Chicago Board of Trade in June 1997 Delisted before end of the year with only 22 contracts traded. Reasons for failure: – – – – TIPS had only started trading five months before. Only a single 10-year TIPS outstanding. Futures contract competed with underlying for liquidity. Uncertainty over fate of TIPS programme. 77 Failure of futures contracts CME launched CPI futures contract in February 2004 which is still trading. Reasons for survival: – – – – – – Inflation-linked securities have gained acceptance amongst investors TIPS have evolved into recognised asset class. Well understood pricing relationships allowing for arbitrage possibilities between TIPS, fixed-interest Treasury bonds and CPI futures. US Treasury committed to long-term TIPS issuance. CPI futures do not compete directly with but rather complement TIPS and uses same inflation index. Contract traded on Globex electronic trading platform: automated two-sided price quotes from lead market maker. 78 Important lessons for development of mortality-linked futures market Sufficiently large, active and liquid spot market in longevity bonds must be established well before any futures market started. Mortality index behind longevity bond must be fair estimate of true mortality and have minimal time basis risk: – – CPI index suffers from same potential problems so survival of CPI futures contract on CME suggests these problems can be overcome. 79 Important lessons for development of mortality-linked futures market Although mortality indices are calculated infrequently, spot prices of longevity bonds likely to exhibit high degree of volatility on account of bonds’ high duration. Underlying mortality indices must be few in number and well-defined: – – small number of contracts helps to increase liquidity but also leads to contemporaneous basis risk arising from different mortality experience of population cohort covered by mortality index and cohort relevant to hedger. 80 Important lessons for development of mortality-linked futures market Potential weak point in longevity bond market is on the supply side: – Futures contract would be effective in reducing aggregate risk,: – since few natural issuers on supply side. but small number of mortality indices might well leave substantial basis risk. No reason to suppose liquidity costs in futures contract would be any higher than for other bond futures contracts. 81 Conclusion Existence of survivor products: – will facilitate the development of annuities markets in the developing world – and could well save annuities markets in the developed world from extinction. Essential to prevent annuity providers going bust! 82 Conclusion If survivor products fail to be issued in sufficient size: – either the state (i.e., the next generation) is forced to bail out pensioners – or companies withdraw from pension provision – or insurance companies stop selling annuities – or pensioners risk living in extreme poverty in old age, having spent their accumulated assets 83