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Chapter IV - An Examination Of How The Absolute Is Indicated
But if we seek the vision of that great
Being
within
the
Inner
Sanctuary
-
self-gathered, tranquilly remote above all else
- we begin by considering the images stationed
at the outer precincts, or, more exactly to the
moment, the first image that appears.i
Let us take up this methodological point made by Plotinus in
order to see what light might be cast on those expressions that
indicate and affirm the presence of an absolute in these two
traditions. In the previous chapter I established a prima facie case
for accepting that this fundamental element of the absolute was
introduced in essentially a similar fashion, that in this regard both
traditions could be perceived as isomorphic. Let me in this chapter
attempt to integrate and deepen our understanding of what is meant
or implied by this sense of the absolute asking ourselves how this
aspect
is
religiously
and
philosophically
indicated,
how
the
structure of this idea or sense of the absolute is constructed and
what religious functions it appears to possess or imply in its
religious context? At the same time let me show that a general
isomorphism is preserved between these two traditions, that textual
evidence can be found to support this contention.
I have argued that a focusing and bringing into a more central
prominence of this religious and philosophical sense of the absolute
2
was an innovation developed at the start of the present era and
developed more or less simultaneously in both the European and the
Indian spheres' of influence (and I suspect in the Chinese World as
well). Not that the concept of the absolute was unknown to earlier
philosophers but that with increased negative theological treatment
and its critical pressure this vision was brought under an increasing degree of philosophic awareness, and vice versa, with as a
consequence a profound restructuralization of religious philosophy
in this period of time. Along with such a radical revolution in
thinking developed new forms of religious expression, e.g. an
increasing emphasis on devotion and its focalization upon and through
the religious image. Indeed, cultural interchange between these two
worlds is vividly manifested in the Graeco-Roman influenced creation
of the buddha-figure in Gandhara. That the buddha-image had a devotional aspect is attested to iconographically through the frequent
presence of smaller human-like figures beside or beneath the main
figure, in various attitudes of reverence and adoration, and that
this intention appears to be reconfirmed through noting the later
addition of buddha images to stupas, religious items traditionally
reserved for such a type of practice. This element of devotionalism
would seem on the surface to be an irrelevant feature in an absolute
type of religious philosophy for in such a context the human person
would seem to count for little before the infinite panorama of the
Absolute. Indeed, any attempt in the nature of reverence or prayerful
petition would seem to be a pathetic and pointless exercise. Yet,
with
the
advent
of
this
new
type
of
philosophical
restructuralization there is a simultaneously increased emphasis on
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the aspect of the devotional and in understanding the nature of this
type of absolute philosophy the coinciding presence of this feature,
I believe, must also be accounted for.
In this methodological metaphor or point made by Plotinus that
I used to open this chapter it would seem to follow from an
understanding of such an analogy that by inspecting those ontological
realities that are claimed to more closely approximate the Absolute,
in the essential nature of their constitution, we should find
ourselves in a position not only to appreciate something of what the
absolute would be like, through some form of extrapolation or
abstraction, but also be in some sort of position to appreciate in
what way the Absolute differed from those more spiritual-like realities. These two stratagems effectively map out the via positiva and
the via negativa. Although Plotinus appears to stress the aspect of
reflection in the way these higher realities mirror the One the
overall tenor of his philosophy more heavily concerns itself with
the opposite, namely, the way in which the Absolute differs from these
images. However some ambivalency must be present with this negative
theological attitude because the presuppositional ground of such an
attitude demands in the first place some form of positive theological
description in order to enter into a process of negation. Moreover,
as this negation can not maintain its presence through the complete
demolition of this positive ground some form of truce must be found
that allows its simultaneous preservation and domination by the
negative.
Indeed,
it
would
appear
that
negative
theological
treatment in the end reestablishes the positive theological element
albeit in a heavily qualified transformed state. This emphasis upon
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the negative theological is a characteristic feature of this type
of absolute philosophy and creates its own distinctive styles of
discourse in which processes of negation are heavily emphasized both
repetitively and systematically and surrounded by subtle, lengthy
and highly detailed dialectical-like qualification.
In the Neoplatonic Tradition the ontological specie closest to
the Absolute is the realm of Nous and its collection of forms. For
the Buddhist Wisdom Tradition the candidate for this role is the
realistic world of dharmas as articulated in earlier forms of
Buddhist scholasticism. Both forms and dharmas appear to perform
similar functions in a philosophical sense helping to explain the
presence in the relative world of an apparent instance of an object
of type x and at the same time establishing the this-ness of that
instantiation. Both types of items establishing the grounds for the
apparent validity of judgments made in these two regards without
trying to compromise or undermine their stance that absolute reality
is
one,
insubstantial
or
non-materialistic,
non-pluralistic,
without change or motion, etc. The heroic attempt to maintain the
distinctive sense of the absolute and the sense of the relative, as
well as their accommodation, making for some very exciting and
difficult philosophy.
In this chapter I shall examine and compare how the sense of
the absolute is introduced, stated or implied textually in both of
these traditions, the nature of its structure as a concept and inspect
the religious functions its conceptually appreciated meaningfulness
appears to imply or entail in its religious context. Firstly,
however, I must outline what is meant by this term absolute, or more
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correctly, outline what is meant by the sense of the absolute.
Secondly, I must investigate the controversial question as to whether
there is an absolute in this type of Buddhist philosophy and then
provisionally outline the main characteristics, that I believe are
held in common between these two traditions, that this sense of the
absolute appears to possess.ii
The absolute almost by definition can have no meaningfulness
in the context of a descriptive religious language. However the idea
or sense of the absolute, it would appear, can be meaningfully alluded
to through less direct forms of language. In our investigations,
therefore, the facticity of the absolute is of no importance, on the
other hand the meaningfulness or sense of this concept is for us our
prime concern.
By absolute or, more correctly, the sense of the absolute is
meant that transcendent and immanent ground postulated to be
presuppositional to the everyday reality of the relative empirical
world. This world of the absolute transcends both material reality
and intellectual reality and, therefore, can be neither described
nor directly referred to in a material mode or in an intellectual
mode. The sense of the absolute by itself does not imply a sense of
the divine although it will be shown that marked theological
overtones are present in both traditions in either an explicit or
implicit form. The absolute is also seen as that a priori ground that
surpasses the totality of the empirical world being in effect the
being of that being but not the mere being of that being. The
difficulty of this concept is aided by the fact that its introduction
is indicated through negation, analogy and other forms of intricate
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linguistic manoeuvres. In one respect it represents a fundamental
shift in philosophical thinking from the search for the fundamental
nature or archae of the world to a very questioning affirmation of
its very being. It is because the absolute can be seen as the unifying
force behind the appearance of one world that it is also referred
to as the Absolute, this unity of ground reinforcing an associated
sense of the divine.
For a number of reasons the majority of Western commentators
have either mis-stated the nature of the Buddhist absolute or
rejected the presence of the same. Difficulties in translation and
comprehension have often obscured the intended import of the
essential texts in this regard and scholarship has taken some time
in coming to grips with the subtleties of this type of absolute
philosophy. iii Translating Sanskrit conceptual terminology through
the lens of western philosophical thought has, more often than not,
distorted rather than clarified this field of research. Inadequate
understanding of the various schools, their debates and commentaries
along with an inadequate understanding of the various levels of
critique
exercised
in
this
type
of
philosophy
have
further
complicated the situation. Another complication has arisen in the
tendency to translate texts of a more philosophical nature, and hence
of a more polemical concern, leaving untranslated those of a more
experiential
interest
meditational
processes,
where
attention
psychological
is
directed
analyses,
towards
metaphorical
images, ethical matters, devotional practices, ritual procedures,
etc. A more balanced translational programme and the progress of
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scholarship itself appears to be overcoming many of these problems.
The
Buddhist
Wisdom
Tradition
finds
its
philosophical
thematization (and possible authorship) in the Madhyamaka Tradition.
This school contends that it has no views on the nature of reality
and shows through various forms of dialectical criticism that
theoretical viewpoints entertained by other denominations and faiths
are internally contradictory and completely inadequate in their
representation of reality. However such a lack of theoretical
description about the nature of the
Absolute does not by itself support the contention that there is no
Absolute
only
that
language
is
inadequate
for
this
task
of
description. It would appear that because one of the functions of
the Absolute is to religiously explain why there is a world of
relativity, with all its inherent limitations, it follows that,
correctly, nothing in this world could directly image the Absolute
except
analogically
or
metaphorically.
Any
attempt
would
by
definition fail since the worldly can only directly represent that
which is of the world, however, appropriately conducted such introduction can serve as an indication of the Absolute. Also, balancing
this
emphasis
on
the
negative
in
philosophically-orientated
discourse is a positivity in claims made for the experiential
reception of the Absolute as an intimation of the numinous. Although
various
spiritual
techniques
are
described
the
processes
of
religious experience acquired in the end appear to be, to some degree
or other, more a matter of revelation sponsored directly or
indirectly by the presence of the Absolute itself. Let me first
illustrate that a sense of the absolute does indeed appear to be
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indicated in this Buddhist Tradition....
....all this Suchness.... is just one single
Suchness, is without any trace of positivity and
negativity,
as
being
inextinguishable,
one,
non-different,
unaffected,
non-dual,
without cause for duality.iv
Suchness is not to be misconstrued as something permanent and
substantial but equivalent to emptiness, reality as it truly is, etc.
Moreover this sense of the absolute is given theological-like
overtones
through
its
personalization
and
cosmological-like
treatment as the Tathagata which is equally an epithet for a Buddha
or the spiritual ground that supports the apparent manifestation of
the same....
For the Suchness of the Tathagata and the
Suchness of all dharmas, they are both one
single Suchness, not two, not divided.v
The word Tathagata can also be formed in the plural meaning all
buddha-like figures. Yet even this vast plurality is unified by the
image of the perfection of wisdom being like a mother to them and
leading them on to the revelation of all-knowledge.....
For she (the perfection of wisdom) is their
(Tathagatas') mother and begetter, she showed
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this all-knowledge, she instructed them in the
ways of the world. From her have the Tathagatas
come forth.... It is in this sense that the
perfection of wisdom generates the Tathagatas,
instructs them in this world.vi
This sense of the absolute however must not be misconstrued to
imply some form of fixed spiritual reality supporting and hiding
behind appearances.
....a Bodhisattva, who courses and dwells in
perfect wisdom, comprehends that all dharmas
are like an echo. He does not think about them,
does not review, identify, or perceive them, and
he knows that those dharmas do not exist, that
their reality does not appear, cannot be found,
cannot be got at. If he dwells thus, he courses
in perfect wisdom.vii
This
last
quotation
indicates
the
manner
in
which
philosophically we should go about entertaining the sense of the
absolute. The sense of the absolute should be recognized but
basically not thought about in some form of cognitive
entertainment. Such an attitude does not deny the presence of the
same, indeed, the constant reiteration of this theme reinforces this
semblance of facticity, but in the process of acceptance warns us
that it should be approached in a special non-intellectual manner.
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As the Mahayana went on to develop this sense of the absolute
it became less implicit and more directly explicit. In this regard
the
Perfection
of
Wisdom
Tradition
and
its
closely
allied
philosophical school of the Madhyamaka remain more conservative in
the philosophical explication of this presuppositional feature.
Absolute philosophy or absolutism as a philosophical phenomenon
I believe effectively developed with the commencement of the present
era, not that such ideas were completely absent before this point
in time but that this type of concern was neither centrally prominent
nor sufficiently thought out to be made a subject matter for debate,
conscious formulation and reflection. With increasing explication
and
formulation
through
an
increased
emphasis
on
negative
theological treatment, and vice versa, the sense of the absolute
developed philosophically. The ramifications of this shift are
subtle but quite profound and in the process the structure of
philosophical expression changed quite radically resulting in a
relatively
religious
more
progressive,
philosophical
complex
discourse
and
whose
influential
novelty
and
form
of
greatly
increased powers of criticism and reflection rapidly assisted in its
dissemination. Stylistically we have textual evidence for the
increased
utilization
of
negational
language
devices,
dialectical-like equivocation and qualification and as a general
rule textual size lengthened considerably. As I have stated before
exceptions to this tendency in extended textual length are often summaries and as such reconfirm this observation. Overall philosophical
thinking became more complex and sophisticated with a marked emphasis
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on a systematic approach. Comparing Plotinus with Plato from a
textual point of view should reveal the considerable distance
traversed by philosophical thinking in this regard. Although Plato
is
rigorous,
ambitious,
versatile,
multi-faceted
and
very
comprehensive in no way can his speculative philosophical endeavours
be considered truly systematic. The same judgment also applies to
Aristotle. Wide ranging interests and a thoroughness in their
systematic-like
presentation
substitute
the
for
and
systematic
dogmatic
approach
formulation
that
is
translates
no
all
philosophical inquiry through the lens of a prominent central highly
articulate formulation (based on a position of absolutism).
With Plotinus we see, page by page, an attempt to comprehend
the world and philosophical problems through the prism of a
systematic structure in which the subject for investigation is
subjected to a reinterpretation in the light of this superstructure
or
substructure.
When
this
type
of
philosophy
is
perceived
superstructurally to the field of its intended application a sense
of the transcendent is imposed either implicitly or explicitly. On
the other hand when the emphasis is on the immanence of the
substructure a sense of the immanence of the absolute is introduced
either implicitly or explicitly. Although there can be variations
in the orientation of the emphasis placed upon the sense of the
immanent or transcendent through the degree of their explicit
thematization correctly these two aspects form complementary and
necessary components in the structure of the absolute treated from
a structural point of view. A major difference in this regard between
these two traditions can be found in the way the Buddhist Wisdom
12
Tradition emphasizes an immanent approach to the sense of the
absolute whereas the Neoplatonic Tradition has an overall emphasis
on the transcendent. Nevertheless it is my contention that both of
these aspects are necessary features in the idea or sense of the
absolute treated as a concept and that this can be made apparent
through
an
analysis
of
such
philosophical
structures
that
demonstrate this type of approach.
We could argue that in a truly absolute-orientated philosophy
because we always find the coupling of these two aspects of the
immanent and the transcendent that they must necessarily occur
together. Such an observation however does not explain why this
descriptive state of affairs must necessarily follow in all cases.
Their descriptive coexistence, either explicitly or implicitly
stated, may merely be coincidental? That being the case it might be
thought possible to describe an absolute-orientated philosophy that
articulates a sense of the transcendent without an accompanying sense
of the immanent, or vice versa? Some people would regard, for example,
Plato's sense of the numinous or God as being purely transcendent.viii
For all that an element of the immanent however does appear to surface
in the attempt to conceptually understand the forms as participating
in some way in those items in the world that are instantiated under
them?ix
I would argue that pure transcendence as a concept cannot be
entertained without also entertaining its correlative of immanence.
This does not mean we cannot orientate our attention onto one of these
correlative aspects and there upon focus our explication but that
in so doing we do not in the process actively deny the other aspect
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which in that discourse must then be left implicit whether that fact
be recognized or not. An unawareness of this necessary correlativity would seem to imply a lack of presuppositional appreciation of
the territory of an absolute-orientated discourse, and the absence
of this characteristic feature would seem to mark out earlier
attempts
in
absolute
philosophy
as
proto-absolutist
or
pseudo-absolutist by nature. In this regard we could consider both
Platonic Philosophy and Buddhist Schol-asticism, (with its dharmic
analyses) as examples of this proto-absolutism which historically
came to develop, under the impetus of systematic presuppositional
criticism, into fully recognizable forms of absolute philosophy.
My main argument for the coexistence of the immanent with the
transcendent
is
therefore
developed
on
epistemological,
or
psychological, grounds. Meaningfulness of either term arises through
its accommodation with and its distinctive separation from its
correlative correspondent. To entertain one you must entertain the
necessary presence of the other. Again, however, this does not imply
that our attention must be equally balanced upon both correlatives
at the same time or that we must take both accounts into a full explication, although, if it serves our purposes, full justice can be
only rendered when both aspects are distinctively explicated and
harmoniously accommodated philosophically.
Motivation and reasons for this transition from non-absolute
orientated
philosophical
thinking
to
instances
of
absolute
orientated thought are not simple to pin-point and integrate. It
would
appear
that
with
increasing
educational
standards
and
religious institutions with a considerable history of controversial
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religious and philosophical debate a point might be reached where
cognitive intellectual thinking becomes increasingly suspect and
critical of itself from a non-systematic critical point of view. The
desire to understand the transient phenomenal world as a whole and
transcend its bewildering plurality of experiences as well as
bypassing the controversial and unproductive ways of seeing the
nature of the world in terms of the way we come to see and know this
world
in
non-philosophical
sophisticated
philosophical
experience
thinker
to
might
set
enquire
as
the
to
more
the
presuppositional ground that underlies phenomenal experience in the
first place. A general
extrapolation or abstraction towards such essential and necessary
conditions opening the way for an absolute vision of the world. I
would contend that application of this approach would in time
systematize one's view of the world and that with increased critical
cognitiveness would bring to critical consciousness the stratified
and highly inconsistent nature of the world as perceived religiously
unleashing the severity of a reformational-like type of mentality
with its desire for ideological purity and ethical conformity. However in the period of time that this thesis covers the exercise of
the via negativa and other forms of criticism in general would appear
to be, with regard to themselves, maintained in a non-systematic form
although
their exercise in time would be productive of an increasing degree
of systematization of that religious philosophy and that at a later
point in time this systematization would be reflected in upon those
techniques
to
produce
what
I
have
referred
to
as
the
15
reformational-type of mentality. I make this point in passing to note
that in this later stage the increased focalization on imagery, both
iconographical and metaphorical, developed in this prior stage
becomes subjected to severe criticism which is lacking in the
non-systematic exercise of negative theological treatment. A reluctance to criticize the use of religious imagery may well be one of
the reasons why the Islamic religion, which developed this tendency,
could successfully replace the Buddhist religion in India and Central
Asia. This is certainly not the only reason for it would not account
for the continuation of the general Hindu Tradition in India itself,
e.g.
In regard to matters of ethical practice in this type of absolute
philosophy
language
again
ostensively
fails
by
default
in
prescribing a cognitively consistent attitude. An investigation into
the
negative
theological-like
treatment
of
accepted
ethical
priorities will be found to mirror the negative theological treatment
of doctrinal matters of a more cognitive concern. Both are introduced
in a socratic dialectical-like manner, subjected to some form of
negation or paradoxical comparison or reduced through analysis to
a position of absurdity. In the Buddhist context this dialogue is
explicit and the disturbing pronouncements made therein have this
element of ethical instability reinforced and intensified through
being made by the spiritual authority of the historical Buddha or
other enlightened beings. However this apparent ethical nihilism is
conducted in a heavily committed ethical framework whose tenor
permeates these traditions in their entirety and would seem to
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prepare, for the sake of a better term, a transcendental form of
ethical practice. By this I mean an ethical activity existentially
perceived and exercised in the spontaneity of an intuitive insight
that would be claimed to be grounded in and proceeding from reflection
upon the sense of the absolute,
(e.g. through contemplation of the
One or the perfection of wisdom). This transcendental form is
flexible and appropriately adapts itself to the situation at hand.
This skill in means (upaya) is the method whereby the perfection of
wisdom can apply itself to and through the relativity of the ethical
situation confronting it equally from the point of the Absolute
(nirvana)
and
the
Relative
(samsara).
This
transcendental
interpretation can account for both the ostensive negativity and the
scepticism of ethical pronouncements as well as the intense overall
commitment to ethical consideration. Moreover, it accounts for the
continued existence and need for an ethical attitude, albeit from
a transcendental point of view, in the very midst of an absolute
philosophy whose very dimension could be misconstrued so as to treat
all activity as pointless or as an illusory process or as an act of
a deluded mentality that believes it can exercise a real free-will.
Investigation into the negative theological-like treatment of
ethical considerations also further helps us to understand the nature
of the Absolute and the transcendental treatment of cognitive
doctrinal themes.
A brief examination of the Buddhist concept of purification
(visuddhi) will illustrate for us the paradoxical and ostensively
problematic nature of ethical practice in this type of philosophy
and in absolute philosophy in general.
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Subhuti: If all dharmas are isolated and empty
how is the defilement and purification of beings
conceivable? For what is isolated cannot be
defiled or purified, what is empty cannot be
defiled or purified, and what is isolated and
empty cannot know full enlightenment. Nor can
anyone get at any dharma outside emptiness which
has known full enlightenment .... How then shall
we understand the meaning of his teaching?x
From the absolute point of view there can be no defilement. As
all being is empty of self (and permanent substantiality) there can
be no own-being, no permanent being belonging to that appearance of
self-existence. That being the case there being no being that could
be subjected to defilement there can be no real defilement nor for
that matter no being that is pure or is able to self-subject itself
to an act of purification. From the absolute point of view the whole
raison d'être of ethical practice must seemingly collapse. This type
of exposition, however, could present for the religious person a
dangerous precedent for if from the absolute point of view there is
no need for ethical reflection and practice then it would seem to
logically follow that in the world of relativity such consideration
needn't be put into effect giving a carte blanche to any type of activity in any type of ethical situation. This type of objection is
duly noted and resolved in a number of ways, e.g. as outlined in the
following quotation (continuing on where our last quotation left
18
off).
The Lord: What do you think, Subhuti. Do beings
course
for
a
long
time
in
I-making
and
mine-making?
Subhuti: So it is, Lord.
The Lord: Are also I-making and mine-making
empty?
Subhuti: They are, O Lord.
The Lord: Is it just because of their I-making
and mine-making that beings wander about in
birth-and-death?
Subhuti: So it is, Lord.
The Lord: It is in that sense that the defilement
of beings becomes conceivable. To that extent
that beings take hold of things and settle down
in them, to that extent there is defilement. But
no one is thereby defiled.xi
In so far as beings entertain their relativity and their place
in a realm of relativity that limitation can enter and define the
person in accordance with the limitations they, and others, place
upon themselves and come to entertain. Hence the restoration of the
term purification in this new perspective involves the individual
realizing that they need to free themselves from this type of
cognitive
thinking.
That
in
effect
the
individual
purifies
themselves when they no longer primarily entertain this relative mode
19
with its fictitious mentally constructed thought-forms.
In the Neoplatonic Tradition a similar problem presents itself.
Although purification is stressed and not presented in a problematic
form its negative theological background and treatment is implicit.
As the One from the absolute point of view is beyond consciousness,
being good, etc. the same type of implication could be drawn that
as all stems from this One, via emanation, everything in its inner
essence must already be pure, be a participant in real being with
the further implication that there be no need for ethical reflection
and practice. Of course such a position for the religious person
cannot be accepted at face value for it offers a license to disregard
an ethical supervision of our interaction in the world with a
consequential ethical anarchy. However this blind freedom is quite
contrary to the spirit of absolute philosophy. To counter and
obstruct this intellectual tendency for amoral behaviour ethical
practice is reinstated but in a transcendental form, i.e. grounded
in intuitive insight and the need to develop the same.
....the Supreme is neither what is good nor what
is not good,
then, containing nothing it is the Good by that
very absence of content.
Thus we rob it of its very being as the
Absolute Good if we ascribe anything to it,
existence or intellect or goodness. The only way
is to make every denial and no assertion, feign
no quality or content there but to permit only
20
the `It is'.xii
This absence of content perfectly mirrors the Buddhist concept
of emptiness. Both expressions, I believe, indicate the desire to
seek
out
and
know
the
presuppositional
ground
prior
to
the
relativization and finitization of this ground in the presentation
of the Relative. This element of immanence forms a key aspect in the
structure of the concept of the absolute and this element is found
equally in both traditions. The presence of this feature in the
Buddhist context indicates the sense of the absolute is present or
implied, the fact that this aspect slips by, more often than not,
without being named should not fool us as to its true intentions.
Such expressions as emptiness, Suchness, Tathagata, Tathata, the
inconceivable, etc. all indicate through the province of their
apparent descriptive function this sense of the absolute. However,
these expressions cannot be exactly pinned down and oscillate or
resonate between descriptive and denotational functions acting
tentatively as names or psuedo-names in one context and descriptions
that metaphorically point towards this sense of the absolute in other
situations.xiii
Unthinkable, O Lord is the perfection of wisdom.
Because
the
perfection
of
wisdom
is
not
something that thought ought to know, or that
thought has access to....xiv
I pay homage, O Lord, to the perfection of
21
wisdom.
One
pays
homage
all-knowing
when
to
the
one
cognition
pays
homage
of
the
to
the
perfection of wisdom.
So it is. For from it has come forth the
all-knowledge of the Buddhas, the Lords.xv
The problematic question of a Buddhist absolute, I believe, can
be best approached when this question is properly placed in the entire
continuity of the Buddhist Tradition both before and after this
period in time. Reluctance to ontologically create a category called
the Absolute and consider it as the totality and reality of all
dharmas and compounded things is quite in keeping with the spirit
of Buddhist thought. However such a predilection does not rule out
a
presuppositional
transcends
ground
ontological
immanent
to
categorization,
relative
reality
and
that
for
that
matter,
epistemological categorization also. This sense of immanence is
treated
in
a
religious
and
devotional
sense
as
also
being
transcendently unified and in other Buddhist denominations with time
this aspect is treated to an increasing explication. Absolute
philosophy has a prejudice against multiplicity and this tendency
manifests itself in this tradition in reaction to the radical
pluralism and realism of early Buddhist Scholasticism. A world
constituted
out
of
the
mere
collection
of
ontological
or
epistemological realities is almost a contradiction in terms,
moreover, such a disorganized disunified assemblage cannot be
addressed in spiritual-like terms of reference. With the increasing
22
influence and development of devotional trends in philosophical
thinking such a position presents itself as inadequate and outmoded
in its intuitive appreciation of religious reality. Further, under
such limited conditions, this type of collective nihilism cannot
allow our transcendental appreciation of the world to take on an
unified aesthetical, ethical and spiritual form of experience and
expression. The collective unity of this ground of presuppositional
immanence
also
implies
the
sense
of
transcendence
and
the
increasingly devotional flavour of this period reinforces this
religious perception.
....there
is
no
multiplicity,
and
there
is no difference attained.
Past Suchness, future Suchness,
present Suchness, the Suchness of
the Arhats,
the Suchness of all dharmas, the
Suchness of the Jinas all
that
is
the
Dharma-Suchness,
and
no
difference is attained.xvi
Moreover this ground is personified in the transcendent unity
of the same as the perfection of wisdom which is like a mother to
the Buddhas, instructing them, revealing reality as it truly is,
etc.xvii
It is the distinctive nature of absolute philosophy to attempt
to transcend the limitations of language and seek out and approach
23
that which is presuppositional to the world as it presents itself
in
and
through
experience.
The
potent-ial
obscurity
of
this
philosophical stance is both its strength and its weakness. A refusal
to the let the world be encaptured by the limitations of some
cognitive-categorical structure allows the religious person who
adopts this type of absolute perspective to perceive the open mystery
of the phenomenal world. On the other hand the subtlety of this type
of approach can be easily misconstrued as either presenting some form
of intricate, yet sterile, philosophicalization or advocating the
promotion of some form of nihilism (or for that matter just mere
paradoxical nonsense).xviii This type of absolute approach must escape
such labels as monism, e.g. through the dialectical trans-linguistic
nature of its indication and only a superficial inspection could
label it as nihilism or any other ism. The very nature of this type
of philosophy is to be as a process of philosophicalization and to
mistake the methodology of this process of potential intuitional
vision for the way the world should be philosophically viewed is to
confuse `process' with `products derived from the exercise of that
process'.xix
In our examination of these two religious philosophies we shall
note how the sense of the absolute is textually indicated, what common
structural elements are present in this indication and what function
this type of exercise has for a religious-experiential dimension.
The Manner In Which The Sense Of the Absolute Is Indicated
24
It would appear that the sense of the absolute is indicated
through ....
i) positive statements that there is something that escapes our
normal
perception
and
thought
but
of
which
we
should
be
philosophically aware of,
ii) perceive that via the use of analogy a transcendent/
immanent realm is metaphorically implied,
iii) realize that via the use of specially conducted processes of
negation we can attempt to describe this realm.
It would also appear that a fourth avenue of ritual attempts
to point out, and introduce, to our cognitive awareness this element
of the numinous belonging to the sense of the absolute. But this last
aspect will be examined briefly elsewhere through the examination
of related topics, e.g. devotionalism, salvationalism, etc.
We could ask ourselves the question whether it would be possible
for the via positiva to indicate a sense of the absolute?
I
believe
this
task
would
be
impossible
being
By itself
very
much
a
contradiction in terms. However in conjunction with the via negativa
or processes of metaphor, or via some other form of introduction,
terms found in a positive theology could quite naturally be used to
indicate and name this more profound sense of the numinous. In this
mode there can be no direct descriptive use of language and
meaningfulness is generated through a metaphorical pointing or
showing. This attitude or process-direction once articulated can
then be named using terminology from a traditional positive theology
or terms defined in a negative theological critique of the same. Such
a denotational process must not, however, be confused with the normal
25
usage of names through the fact that negative theology is exercised
in a meta-descriptive frame of reference or context. It is the ability
to pass as normal names that the sense of the absolute generated in
a negative theological process of critique can easily be made to
reinvest a positive theology's terminology with a sense of immanence
and transcendence, two aspects that otherwise would be absent from
the same. Neither omnipresence nor the magnitude or extent of the
divine could account for either of these terms immanence or transcendence.
As
examples
of
this
process
of
indication
and
its
meta-descriptive sense of denotation we can note the following...
The Supreme, as the Absolute Good and not merely
a good being or thing, can contain nothing that
could be its own good.
Anything it could contain must be either good
to it or not good; but in the supremely and
primally Good there can be nothing not good; nor
can the Absolute Good be a container to the Good:
containing, then, neither the good nor the not
good
it
contains
nothing
and,
containing
nothing, it is alone: it is void of all but
itself.xx
....Suchness is also no Suchness, ....Subhuti's
Suchness
is
immutable
and
unchangeable,
undiscriminated and undifferentiated, just as
26
the Suchness of the Tathagata. ....For the
Suchness of the Tathagata, and the Suchness of
all dharmas, they are both one single Suchness,
not two, not divided.xxi
In the first of these two quotations Plotinus names his vision
of the absolute Supreme and Absolute Good. He then uses the metaphor
of a container but turns the whole idea of this metaphor inside out
by arguing that the absolute can contain nothing but itself. The
negative theological-like qualification of this metaphorical image
is typical of the way the absolute philosopher uses language to
de-describe itself and in the process reveal its presuppositional
basis or ground ostensively coincident, either by implication or
explication, with the reality of the Absolute itself. Thus we find
here the introduction of denotational-like terms, analogical devices
and processes of negative theological qualification.
In
our
second
example
we
have
in
the
introduction
of
denotational-like terms, namely, Suchness, Tathagata, also the
process of their equation, a textual feature very common in both of
these traditions (and this feature can also be found in our previous
quotation). Close to such apparent denotational introduction we also
find the almost ubiquous processes of negational treatment that
qualify these positive-like terms.
Generally we can say, from an overall textual observation, that
this type of absolute philosophy found in these two traditions has
a distinctive style characteristic of such an endeavour. A plurality
of terms are carefully allowed to masquerade before us which through
27
various forms of treatment present us with a deeper vision of the
unity of the absolute.
Both traditions go to considerable length to qualify their use
of analogies, metaphors and apparent descriptions. Plotinus often
tells us that he is speaking incorrectly (ovk opÕws). xxii It would
appear that one of the reasons for this qualification is the need
felt by the negative theologian to de-dualize their terminology.xxiii
The very basis of language and cognitive thought is dualistic, a
contrasting and partial separation of that which is under the focus
of investigation from that, by nature, which it is not. However, that
being the case, the absolute philosopher still has the option of
subjecting
their
non-dualistically
dualistically
orientated
based
qualification
terminology
letting
to
apparent
descriptions act more as indicators of what is being referred to
rather than as descriptions of that being indicated. In the same
critical
manner
our
Buddhist
text
continually
qualifies
discourse when referring to the sense of the absolute.
When one has no notion of either body,
or thought, or a being,
Standing
rid
of
perception,
coursing
in
the non-dual Dharma, That
has
been
called
by
Him
who
bestows
benefits the perfection of vigour
Of those who desire the blissful,
imperishable, foremost enlightenment.xxiv
its
28
The Structure Entailed In The Sense Of The Absolute
In
an
examination
of
the
structural
composition
of
the
conceptual sense of the absolute we have before us the appearance
of two choices, namely, to go directly to the significance of the
absolute as a concept or to examining the structures present in its
indication. The philosophical and religious nature of the sense of
the absolute, as a presuppositional ground to the relative, would
seem to deny us direct access to its essential meaningfulness and
even if experiential access is obtained in some form or other its
direct
descriptive
expression
in
language
is
to
all
intent
practically impossible being also presuppositional to the nature of
language itself. Textually we are frequently informed about this
experiential fact by both of these two traditions that the absolute
can
not
be
descriptively
expressed
in
language
based
upon
conventional world-based experience, however, the use of terms that
appear to indicate the sense of the absolute can be studied in their
religious-philosophical context and in this manner allowed to throw
some light on the significance of this type of concept. It would
appear that an important method for doing this type of research might
lie in that very procedure outlined by Plotinus himself whereby we
investigate those ontological features that more closely resemble
the sense of the absolute. In our situation, however, we will examine
those ontological realities presented by these two traditions as
being closer to their vision of the numinous, the reality of such
ontological proposals being of no concern to us here. First I shall
examine the Neoplatonic concept of nous and its congregation of forms
29
(eidos) and then I shall conduct a similar type of examination in
regard to dharmas as critically treated in the Buddhist Wisdom
Tradition. That completed I shall then attempt to show the general
degree, in this regard, of structural isomorphism that appears to
be shared by these two contemporaneous traditions.
By the time of Plotinus, through the prism of Middle Platonism,
the term nous had undergone a considerable synthesis of mainly
Platonic and Aristotelian themes. In this regard we can note
distinctive ideas taken from a number of key Platonic texts, e.g.
the Good beyond being of the Republic, the One of the Parmenides,
the nous of the Philebus, and the demiourgos of the Timaeus. xxv
Aristotelian influenced input includes the idea that the nous in a
special manner thinks itself and although unmoved is able to move
others (as an object of desire) being in effect the Divine or God.xxvi
For Plotinus the nous is the second hypostasis after the One.
On the One it is dependent and reflects the unity of the same as a
unity-in-plurality. The image is advanced of the mind being able to
entertain a multitude of individual thoughts yet preserving its unity
as one mind.xxvii The multitude of entities entertained by this Mind are
the forms - universals whose spiritual-like existences are claimed
to transcend the spacio-temporality of this empirical everyday
world. For a start these beings are treated as changeless entities
that subsist throughout eternity without spatial properties whose
intellectual-like character therefore allows us, in accordance with
certain tendencies in Platonic philosophy, to consider them to be
both real beings and true objects of knowledge at the same time, a
30
gathering together of both being and the intellectual.xxviii Although
these separate existences match the distinctive objects in this world
object for object yet their congregation also reflects the unity of
the One.xxix This unity is metaphorically compared to the way the human
body has many different parts and functions yet taken collectively
this diversity harmoniously operates under normal circumstances in
one common accord.xxx
For Plato the forms are separate existences hypothetically
proposed in order to solve a number of philosophical problems.
Although the term eidos had a long history as a technical term before
Plato's redefinition of it this term appears to have historically
evolved in his writings to take on the meaning now traditionally
ascribed to it. However for Plato himself this term remained
problematical and did not escape his own excellent and thorough
criticism
of
it.
Overall,
it
would
seem,
perceiving
Plato's
reluctance to jettison this concept, that for him this concept,
subject to his redefinition of it, would, in the final account, appear
to present us with less problems than if we tried to do without it?
Plotinus' treatment of universals in the Platonic mode is at least,
to my point of view, more satisfactory in that he harmoniously
accommodates
both
the
transcendent-Platonic
approach
and
the
immanent-Aristotelian approach. Be that as it may much of the work
of the forms appears to be subverted by the role and function of the
nous and that except for a few specific tasks the forms are more
platonic relics from the past. Certainly a pluralistic realm of
separate beings, perhaps hierarchically structured and ruled by one
arch-form of the Good or One, is more a fiction or illusion in the
31
ontological cosmology of Plotinus. The only true reality can be the
One and although the forms are eternal beings they are still dependent
on the Nous which in turn is dependent upon the One itself. Their
purpose is useful in that they theoretically supply the element of
diversity or multiplicity in the unity of Nous and thereby allow it
to mediate between the unity of the One and the plurality of the world.
Further, they are made to supply a foundation for the possibility
of knowledge. Lastly, they are also made to mediate between one of
the most fundamental dichotomies of language and thought, in their
proposed dealings with the phenomenal world of experience, namely,
that posed in the juxtaposition of thinking and being. In one of the
two main triadic formulations of Plotinus these two dichotomies of
Being (on) and Intellect (nous) are mediated by Life (zoe).xxxi But all
these functions can be performed by the nous itself and overall more
philosophical emphasis is given to that aspect of this second
hypostasis. In that other triadic formulation of Plotinus Nous itself
is the intermediary between the One (hen) and the World-Soul
(psyche).xxxii The Nous being both immanent and transcendent is left
quite capable of performing this task of mediation and in the process
would keep Plotinus' ontology simpler and more efficient.xxxiii However,
as I shall point out in this chapter, there is one important reason
why these forms should be philosophically preserved, namely, as
stepping stones in a negative theological process of indicating the
Absolute. Through a negative criticism of the forms the sense of the
absolute is introduced but as this introduction is philosophically
dependent on the preconditional presence of the same this dependence
effectively preserves their continuing philosophical existence. In
32
the same manner Buddhist dharmas are effectively preserved in some
later forms of Buddhist criticism when to all ostensive purposes
their hypothesis is superseded.
One of the motivating forces behind the adoption of the
hypothesis of the forms would seem to be the influential model of
mathematics
as
it
presented
itself
through
the
Pythagorean
Tradition. There the field of mathematics was subjected to successful
forms of simplification and unification and this ideal of the
mathematical has come to haunt the history of western philosophical
thinking ever since.xxxiv
In Indian philosophy this emphasis on the mathematical appears
to be somewhat absent and in its place appears to be an implicit
modeling on the systematic and succinct formulations of grammar as
presented by a series of influential grammarians, e.g. Panini. An
intense preoccupation with language philosophy follows this implicit
emulation along with the use of the aphoristic/commentorial style
of
exegesis.
In
this
light
Nagarjuna's
polemical
text
the
Mula-Madhyamika-Karikas would be a prime example. In one aspect where
revolutionary mathematical thinking did make some impact would
perhaps arise with the invention and adoption of the zero and its
transference to the world of philosophy in the concept of emptiness
(sunya, sunyata which has the meaning of zero in mathematical
language) and needless to say this concept is very central to the
Buddhist Wisdom Tradition.xxxv
xxxvi
In the chronological treatment of the development of Plato's
thought we can see an evolutional development in his hypothesis of
the forms, however, at no stage is a proof of the same undertaken.
33
Rather the forms are assumed to be known through a number of avenues
,e.g. recollection and through processes of dialectical reasoning.xxxvii
This hypothesis has a number of tasks to perform and various difficulties can be seen to stem from an inability to completely harmonize
this diversity. The forms are invoked to unify various fields of
thought,
e.g.
the
mathematical,
sense
perception,
ethical,
religious, political, etc. In another quotation similar to the one
I used to open this chapter we can glimpse something of the variety
of tasks imposed upon the theory of forms.
....filled with God, he has in perfect stillness
attained isolation; ....utterly resting he has
become very rest. He belongs no longer to the
order of the beautiful; he has risen beyond
beauty; he has overpassed even the choir of the
virtues; he is like one who, having penetrated
the inner sanctuary, leaves the temple images
behind him - though these become once more first
object of regard when he leaves the hollies; for
There his converse is not with image, not with
trace, but with the very Truth in the view of
which all else is but of secondary concern.xxxviii
In this quotation we can find an implied element of irony for
indirectly the province of the forms is compared to a hierarchy of
temple images. First we leave behind matters dealing with beauty,
then the philosopher bypasses concerns of an ethical nature to
34
confront the very being of Truth itself. As Plotinus states all else
is secondary. Although central to the metaphysics of Plato the forms
are not so prominently placed in the philosophy of Plotinus. On his
own implicit admission we find them hierarchically structured with
respect to themselves and dependent on the intellectual being of Nous
which in turn is dependent upon the One from which all emanates. In
a quotation just prior to this last one we can see this same type
of stratification at work in the following manner....
Life in the Supreme is the native activity of
Intellect; in virtue of that converse it brings
forth gods, brings forth beauty, brings forth
righteousness, brings forth all moral good, for
of all these the soul is pregnant when filled
with God.xxxix
Between
these
two
last
quotations
there
is
an
apparent
inconsistency for in becoming pregnant with god are we to assume we
really leave behind the orders of the beautiful and ethical? Must
we not, in order to harmonize these two quotations, perceive that
at the level of the numinous that forms of beauty and morality, in
effect all forms in distinction to the fields in which they have
themselves applied, find themselves coming together and becoming as
one? No longer, under this type of situation, can forms maintain a
truly self-sufficient existence and this trend began by Plato now
finds more consistent and explicit treatment. Thus with historical
hindsight we can perceive the use of the concept of forms as being
35
made to operate on at least two levels - in a number of fields, e.g.
aesthetics and ethics, and also in such a manner as to integrate these
miscellaneous provinces of application.
As I earlier intimated the usefulness of the concept of the forms
in Neoplatonic philosophy came to serve an absolutist platform and
in the process emphasis passes from these beings to the very
preconditional ground of being itself, i.e. the Absolute.
In one sentence Plotinus tells us ....
It is in virtue of unity that beings are beings.xl
In the same tractate he elaborates this theme...
Above
all,
unity
is
the
First:
but
In-
tellectual-Principle, Ideas and Being, cannot
be so; for any member of the realm of Forms is
an aggregation, a compound, and therefore since components must precede their compound is a later.... In sum: The Unity cannot be the
total of beings, for so its oneness is annulled,
it cannot be the Intellectual-Principle, for so
it
would
be
that
total
Intellectual-Principle is,....
which
the
xli
Plotinus then asks the question....
What then must that Unity be, what nature is left
36
for it?
No wonder that to state it is not easy; even
Being and Form are not easy, though we have a
way, an approach through the Ideas.xlii
In answering this question Plotinus tells us that we have a way
of coming to understanding the reality of this Unity. The one resource
to hand is that the (my italics)....
Soul must see in its own way; this is by
coalescence, unification;....
We are in search of unity; we are to come to know
the principle of all, the Good and First;
therefore we may not stand away from the realm
of Firsts and lie prostrate among the lasts: we
must strike for those Firsts, rising from things
of the sense which are the lasts. Cleared of all
evil intention toward the Good, we must ascend
to the Principle within ourselves; from the
many, we must come one;.... We shape ourselves
into Intellectual-Principle, we make over our
soul in trust to intellectual-Principle and set
it firmly in That, thus what That sees the soul
will waken to see;....
If the quester has the impression of extension
or shape or mass attaching to That Nature he has
not been led by Intellectual-Principle which is
37
not of the order to see such things;.... only
Intellectual-Principle can inform us of the
things of its scope, its competence is upon its
priors, its content and its issue: but even its
content is outside sense; and still purer, still
less touched by multiplicity, are its priors,
or rather its Prior.
xliii
Plotinus gives the game away by saying in effect the Firsts
(forms) are not the First or i.e. the One. Although we come to an
understanding of the Nous through a contemplation of the forms and
extracting our attention from the world of sense (and being like them
with a purity in our moral intentions) ultimately we must bypass even
the forms. It would appear from a reading of Plotinus that this last
jump, in an act of faith on our part, proceeds more from the decision
of the One itself. Then the One is experienced as a
presence
overpassing all knowledge.xliv As the forms are realized through the
negation of the things that participate in those correspondent forms
in a like fashion it is suggested we negate and abandon even the forms.
From the point of view of the One even the Nous and its world of the
forms is more an illusion and real only in so far as this realm is
more real than the material world of sense. In this task Nous as a
mediator between the world of sense and the One has the ability of
directing its intellection in these two directions.xlv To the former
it looks outward, with respect to the latter it concentrates its
attention and looks inward. In looking inward and accomplishing this
highest state of vision Plotinus urges us to cut away everything!xlvi
38
In an absolute-orientated philosophy the absolute is perceived
as being that which is preconditional to the world and all its
spectrum of ontological categories as we come to know them. As
Plotinus states that First is no being but precedent to all being.xlvii
Basically, Plotinus' account of the One is to treat it as being that
unity of ground presuppositional, preconditional and logically prior
to the world of the material, sense perception, thought, the realm
of the intellectual and the very forms themselves as they congregate
in the living choir of the Nous. The structure of this account is
therefore essentially three tier with two distinctive transitions.
First the world is disvalued by redirecting our esteem and interest
towards the realm of the intellectual, then a similar process is
undertaken in our intuitive re-understanding of this realm of the
intellectual in order to realize the presence of the absolute. This
first transition is inherited from Plato. Plato, I believe, anticipates
this
second
transition
but
its
discussion
and
reli-
gious-philosophical investigation would correctly seem to occur only
in an absolute-orientated philosophy that is sufficiently well
developed in its powers of criticism, systematization, appreciation
of the phenomenal, and when it recognizes a need to transcend the
limitations of cognitive thought and language in order to appreciate
the very roots of being that must by necessity be presuppositional
and preconditional to such thought constructions in their intellectual distortion of this reality (on either or both personal or cosmic
levels of intellection).
The first tier, or meta-level of language discussion, concerns
its self with the world as it is communicated on a normal public
39
everyday basis. Essentially it an object-language which grounds
itself in the utility of a natural-language.
In distinction to the natural-language basis of the first level
of language discussion the second level of exposition is an
artificial-language designed to reinterpret the first through the
prism of some type of philosophical attitude. When put into effect
this allows us to reperceive and reinterpret the contents of the
relative object-language in the light of this new attitude. In the
transition from the former language context to the latter it would
be claimed a process of insight is effectively engineered. In both
the Neoplatonic and Buddhist frames of reference this transition
involves a movement to a pluralistic world of epistemic entities that
deal in their respective fashions directly or indirectly with
universals. In the Neoplatonic context they are affirmed as more real
than their expressed particulars whilst in the Buddhist context as
universals
they
are
denied
and
initially
treated
as
thought
constructions secondary to specific combinations of unique momentary
particulars (dha-rmas). In either case the deeper motivation is
basically
the
same
even
though
the
end
result
is
expressed
differently in these two traditions. Together both can be seen to
initially invite us to retranslate the world through a schema that
results in our reperceiving it as an expression of one all encompassing ontological category that involves a large number of
elemental components.
In
a
second
transition
the
meta-translation
of
the
ob-
ject-language is itself subjected to further criticism in order to
realize the underlying unity of those pluralistic elements or
40
principles invoked in our first transition. Seemingly divorced from
the realm of the multiple both traditions, however, come to equate
this absolute vista with the phenomenal experience of the relative
world in so far as the latter is allowed to be derived from the former
though the discursive and constructive ability of consciousness.
This
meta-meta-language
discussion
of
absolute-orientated
discourse through its double removal from the normal realm of
description derived from a public world of sense-reports has within
its powers a number of techniques in order to meaningfully manipulate
language which essentially must remains embedded in its natural
object-grounded foundations. Metaphors can be chosen and qualified,
criticisms can be expressed pointing out the perceived limitations
of relative discourse, items defined in the meta-language can be
negated in a process of negative theological treatment. In this
regard we can examine the following quotation and perceive the use
of metaphor (in this case of generation), qualification and processes
of negation seeing the interplay of these various meta-levels of
language.
Generative of all, The Unity is none of all;
neither thing nor quantity nor quality nor
intellect nor soul; not in motion, not at rest,
not in time: it is self-defined, unique in form
or, better, formless, existing before Form was,
or Movement or Rest, all of which are attachments of Being and make Being the manifold
it is.xlviii
41
Let us now turn our attention to an examination of our Buddhist
Tradition and investigate the manner in which the traditional theory
of dharmas came to be treated therein.
Dharmas are momentary entity-like features argued for by
various traditional Buddhist schools in the scholastic development
of their respective philosophical positions. Various lists detailing
the number of types of different dharmic features proposed by these
various schools became formulated and commentated upon. Essentially
these lists agree in their more basic categories and only differ in
the number of dharmic features proposed for these more traditional
subdivisions. Besides disputes over the question of the appropriate
number of dharmic features per basic category philosophical debate
centered on more divisive issues of their ontological nature, their
role in matters of identity, their implication in questions of time
and causality, their relationship to consciousness and experience,
etc.xlix These dharmas also played a role in meditational analysis of
experiential-reality as perceived in the Buddhist perspective. It
would appear that the primary overall motivational reason for their
proposal was the reductive desire of this type of philosophical
attitude to make, in its quest to see the experiential-world as it
is in itself, no appeals to substances, souls and other persistent
unchanging entities. It was claimed that through the development of
meditational insight into the phenomenal world of sense perception
one could come to realize therein a lack of substantial reality
beneath
the
presentations
of
things
and
personalities.
That
42
ultimately all reality could be reduced to assemblages of essential
momentary irreducibles that were substance-less and ego-less.
The word dharma has many technical senses in the Buddhist and
Hindu Traditions and the appropriate meaning is usually determined
contextually. In the plural it has, however, a unique Buddhist usage
as briefly introduced above. This particular usage has presented
Western
scholarship
with
a
long
history
of
problematic
interpretation and much controversy has arisen from the very
difficulty of trying to comprehend this terminological concept,
moreover,
the
particular
Buddhist
Traditions
themselves
have
disagreed about the nature of their constitution and the manner of
their interaction. In philosophical discourse this term is best left
untranslated as there is no safe western equivalent to substitute
in its place. In coming to understand the constituent concepts behind
its proposal we have, however, thankfully at hand, a number of other
possible stratagems, e.g. an analysis of its historical development,
examination of its textual instantiation in the light of associated
commentaries, an understanding of the motivation behind its proposal
and a general philosophical appreciation of its usage.
It would appear that the term developed as the Philosophical
Division (abhidharma) of the Buddhist scriptural tradition developed
in its oral pre-written format finding its classical scholastic
definitions in the commitment of this tradition to a literary form
along with its philosophical amplification through the use of
commentaries which in turn heavily reflect the debates between the
various schools in this regard. Lists are an important component in
an oral tradition and this aspect is also prevalent in the literary
43
construction of the Rules of Discipline (vinaya) and the Religious
Discourses (sutras). It would appear that this type of reductive
philosophy
developed
and
influenced
Sankhya-Yogic
grew
out
Traditions
of
the
but
materialistically
with
the
important
philosophical difference that the persistence of identity was not
seen to be supported by the presence of changeless substantial
entities.l This shift from a substance-attribute attitude to that of
a process-orientated analysis of phenomena marks an essential
differential characteristic of the Buddhist Tradition from its
general Hindu context (which in many ways runs counter to the
subject-predicate structure of the Indo-Aryan family of languages).li
The term dharma normally supports a cluster of meanings that
center themselves around the senses of law, duty, doctrine, truth,
way or path of righteousness, natural order, etc.lii In the distinctive
plural form there is some indirect association with this general
ground through seeing the sense of these dharmic-factors as essential
principles or forces, or laws of nature, that through some form of
necessity help maintain the appearance of identificational stability
in the phenomenal world. Although these dharmic forces are momentary
their distinctive congregation and causal propagation in a stream
or flow of existence (san-tana) continuously recreate and thence
maintain
the
phenomenal
appearance
or
illusion
of
persistent
identity.
Initially it would appear that the word dharmas was a term
loosely applied to a list of types of mental states with doctrinal
and/or moral overtones whose features could be better discerned in
a meditative state of reflection and whose development should either
44
be promoted or discouraged, e.g. the formulation of the seven dharmas
on the side of enlightenment. liii Along with this loose generally
unsystematic usage there is a more strict and specific use of this
idea in its application to the classifications of the skandhas, the
ayatanas and the dhatus.
In the desire to reductively demonstrate the non-existence of
the soul or ego a very early Buddhist formula dissolves the self into
five heaps (skandhas), namely, form, feeling, perceptions, impulses
and general consciousness. The first heap treats the body of the
person as just the presentation of a material form whilst the latter
four categories have a distinctive psychological bias. As well, between these five categories, the whole world and all its experiences
can be reductively treated to such analysis and in the process the
need for the persistence of unchanging language and mentally based
entities can be done away with. liv Under these five fundamental
headings all conditioned dharmic-forces can then be subsumed.
An elaboration of this schema invokes the categories of the
ayatanas and the dhatus. Ayatanas are bases of cognition and are
equally divided between the six senses (mind being the sixth) in
regards to a faculty of sense cognition in conjunction with its
corresponding object giving us twelve items all told. Extending this
idea to the process interaction of the sense faculty in conjunction
with its object realizes six more sub-categories of the dhatus,
namely,
visual
consciousness,
auditory
consciousness,....
non-sensuous men-tal consciousness.lv
Under these basic categories various lists of conditioned
dharmic-elements were subsumed in accordance with the particular
45
philosophical tenets and dictates of the
school proposing such
tables. Finally, to complete the list, a miscellaneous number of
unconditioned factors were added. In the light of this schematization
the world of experiential reality could then be reexamined and
redescribed as a specific and coordinated pattern of interdependent
dharmic factors. Allied with practices of meditation the whole
process could be seen as akin to some form of scientific-like investigation of the phenomenal with the successful reception of insight,
as defined by this system, giving validation to, and reinforcing,
the fabric of this applied schema.
Although sometimes translated and described as elements dharmas
are more correctly seen as non-substantial predicational-like
qualities that act like forces with the proviso that their existence
or manifestation be recognized as momentary. In the Buddhist
perspective universals are nominalistically treated as fabrications
created and reified beyond their language dependent basis. In a
dharmic analysis they are seen as secondary to the primary facticity
of
dharmas.
Accepting
the
fundamental
Buddhist
dictum
that
everything is subject to change (sarvam anityam) the dharmic theory
takes this principle to heart by proposing the momentary existence
of these unique particulars whose staccato-like existences amount
to no more than their simultaneous flashing into and out of existence
in a stream of phenomenal flux whose essential perception is
conveniently arranged under the auspices of some nominated concept.
Finding an English philosophical equivalent that matches its usual
meaning with this sense of momentary procession is therefore not
without some difficulty although there are some terms that do seem
46
to approximate this particular type of situation. One term that has
been suggested is that of principles a word that does convey their
non-substantial nature, their process-activity, their apparent
individuation but for all that does not indicate or allude to their
momentary existential status.lvi
The theoretical structure of dharmic theory finds a thorough
reformulation under the great Buddhist logicians and epistemologists
Dignaga (ca.480-540 A.D.) and Dharma-kirti (ca.600-660). The latter
philosopher treats the nature of dharmas in the following fashion.
He perceives them to be basically indescribable in empirical
perception and without the appreciation of a yogic-based insight we
perceive instead the stream (cetana) of these momentary forces or
factors. On the momentary nature of these dharmas a summary of his
analysis
would
show
that
they
are
characterized
as
causally
efficient, real, unique, changeless, inexpressible, particular and
related directly to sensation as that which is given prior to our
cognitive-intellectual awareness of the same. On the other hand the
perception of this stream of dharmic activity is seen as secondary
being, more correctly, a series of constructions generated by mind
that conceal the absolute reality of its dharmic constitution.
Consequently, the appearance of this perceptual reality can be
characterized by the opposite of those features that essentially distinguish the momentary nature of dharmas, i.e. as that which is
causally inefficient, fictional, common or general, changeable,
expressible, universal and related to judgment.lvii An implication of
such analysis is that we are presented with two truths, namely, an
47
absolute truth that operates at the level of the dharmas themselves
and an empirical or conventional truth that is constructed by the
powers of the imagination on a level secondary to this dharmic content. This secondary level of mental activity is seen as effectively
concealing this dharmic aspect and to operate in the realm of
discursive thought and judgment, in that language based form that
characterizes
public
discourse.
This
latter
truth,
although
pragmatically viable on an empirical level, effectively conceals the
true reality of the world in its dharmic constitution.
In such a schema we can find, in structural terms of reference,
much that appears to be held in common with the Platonic operation
of forms. Although the forms are unchanging universals and the
dharmas are momentary particulars the nett result of their respective
operation in the phenomenal world of experience and perception is
to all purposes practically the same. Both forms and dharmas are
indescribable, both transcend the temporal-spatial constitution of
the empirical appearance of the world, both are also simultaneously
immanent to the same, both account for the appearance of change and
identity in the world and the fact that there can be knowledge in
the midst of such flux.
The raison d'être behind a dharmic analysis would appear to be
the establishment of a rationale for the reductive, meditational and
process-orientation
of
Buddhist
philosophy
both
in
the
interpretation of its own texts and in its interaction with, and in
maintaining its distinction from, non-Buddhist traditions. With its
doctrinal emphasis on the impermanence of empirical reality, its
reductive dismissals of the personality, universals and the nature
48
of things in general and the meditational emphasis upon phenomenalogically orientated analysis of experiential processes the
Buddhist Tradition from its very inception presented itself as a
distinctively different type of project in the midst of the Hindu
world where the traditional emphasis was on a subject-attribute
language-based attitude.
In an attempt to understand the nature of this difference let
me enter into the following short digression. I would contend that
for a simple non-complex proposition to be meaningful it must be
constructed
of
at
least
two
cognitive
components,
namely,
a
logical-subject orientated aspect coupled to a functional component
that
qualifies
that
predicational-qualification
logical-subject
or
a
with
either
a
relational-qualification.
Normally language is primarily centered in its concern for the
qualification of its logical-subjects with a weighted emphasis upon
the logical subjectivity of the proposition. Only in reflection does
the emphasis of our attention rarely switch to an examination of the
functional nature of our predicational or relational qualifications
per se turning the latter into logical-subjects for what becomes in
effect a meta-analysis of the propositional state of consciousness.
It would appear that to switch the emphasis of our attention to the
functional at the expense of the static subjectivity of the logicalsubject would involve an opening up of ourselves to the dynamic
process-orientated nature of the cognitive process as it goes about
the construction of propositional proposals. Normally we attend to
the end results of our cogitations and overpass the process of their
construction and thereby focus our interest on the logical-subject
49
in its relatively-final fixed state of qualification. Now to
reorientate our attention upon the process of qualification, I
believe, also heads us towards a reductively biased attitude with
a phenomenalistic-like interest and emphasis on the essential nature
of that qualification. Altogether the overall shift of our interest
towards the qualificational aspect of propositional functions
induces
those
tendencies
that
favour
the
reductive
approach,
meta-level shifts in language expression, an emphasis on the dynamic,
a disvaluation of the logically-subjective, and a general emphasis
on processes. Moreover, I would argue, that this trend away from
traditional language based habits of intellection is as equally
viable as more traditional types of philosophical practices but that
neither style of analysis can completely dismiss the other and go
it alone.lviii Correctly, the generation and reception of meaningfulness
necessitates the cooperation of both logical-subjects and their
applied qualificational functions. Finally, we can note that an
emphasis on the logical-subjectivity of propositional structures
tends to imply a dependence on the logical with its insistence on
the principle of non-contradiction, whilst, on the other hand, an
emphasis on the functional nature of qualification induces a more
dialectical-like
approach.
lix
Consequently
a
process-orientated
emphasis on the functional nature of qualification would be more
inclined to permit the presence of unqualified contradictions,
inconsistencies and paradoxes. In a general comparison of Buddhist
Traditions with the overall nature of Greek Philosophy we should find
that the former have less trouble with the acceptance of such logical
dissonance. Where Greek Philosophy has an acceptance of contra-
50
diction, etc. then there is a shift towards a process-orientated type
of analysis (like that found in Heraclitus, e.g.?)? An image springs
to mind that might help us come to understand this possibility of
the dialectical being able to enter into propositional structures.
Around a potential victim birds, wasps, bees, spiders and other
insects can all equally gather in contest but once the victim is stung
and trapped by its predator it is so bound in its fate by that
particular force. In a like fashion as forces all manner of
predications
and
relations
can
gather
in
a
process
about
a
logical-subject but once that logical-subject is attached to a
particular qualifying force that facet of it becomes bound by such
qualification until such time that that situation is essentially
altered.
The
general
motivation
behind
a
process-orientated
dharmic-style of analysis would appear to be the desire to fully
explicate this reductive attitude and thereby maintain the strength
and integrity of the Buddhist Tradition in its interaction with, and
difference from, the Hindu Traditions both orthodox and heterodox.
The specific motivation behind this type of project is the creation
of insight (prajna) and, more particularly, the achievement of
salvation (nirvana). Effectively this type of tradition tries to persuade us to examine our everyday normal interpretation of the world
in our experience of it and subject it to a reinterpretation in the
light of a dharmic-analysis. In this process of reflection the
empirical object-language of worldly experience becomes subjected
to a meta-level transformation through the grid of dharmic theory.
Speaking metaphorically the object-language in its transformation,
51
through the process of reinterpretation, could be seen as being made
to pass through a sieve with those entities not being able to pass
through having to be further ground down in order to facilitate their
final passage. The resultant meta-language translation of the
object-language
ensures
the
dissolution
of
certain
types
of
conceptual entities originally entertained in the object-language.
In this fashion the Buddhist argues, from their perception of the
absolute point of view, i.e. from the theoretical point of view of
the truth of things in themselves (yatha bhutam), that personalities
or egos, universals and things in general have no real existence.
These entities that only exist in the context of the object-language
can therefore not be real as only those features expressible in the
meta-language are to be accepted as such. Although treated as
relevant
in
the
object-language
these
mentally
constructed
fruitful-fictions (prajnapti) can only be useful in those restricted
non-real public terms of reference.lx In the midst of a process of
meditation, or analysis (vicara), this type of realization is claimed
to be enlightening and new attitudes to empirical experience are
engendered that would appear to assist a spiritual transformation
of the person.
In hindsight we can appreciate the direction and overall
momentum of the exercise of this type of reductive attitude as the
process of Buddhist history continued to unfold itself realizing a
point in time when even its utilization of apparently irreducible
factors
(dharmas)
themselves
became
subjected
to
a
reductive
criticism. This new critical attitude would appear to have developed
with the Sautrantika (ca. 100 B.C.?) finding a more complete
52
explication with the Buddhist-Wisdom Tradition and its philosophical
systematization in and through the Madhyamaka.lxi Now the theory of
dharmas, itself a theory of criticism, is subjected to an intense
presuppositional criticism and the conclusion is arrived at that even
dharmas themselves are imaginative constructions of the mind and
therefore in their own right fruitful fictions useful in (the realm
of meditation e.g.) but for all their utility definitely not real.
Just as the apparent self-existence (svabhava) of things and
personalities was analyzed, through argument and meditation, and
found to be wanting, in a like fashion the apparent self-existence
of dharmas was equally attacked and found to be deficient.
Just as the platonic theory of forms can be seen as a critique
of the naive realistic point of view so too can dharmic analysis be
seen in a similar light. Moreover, with the passage of time these
critical perspectives themselves came to be subjected to critical
investigation and the advent of this transition saw the development
of this type of absolute philosophy as we have previously defined
its essential characteristics. In this regard we are presented with
a profound isomorphic structural correspondence between these two
traditions that allows us to enter into a productive comparative
analysis.
Basically religious language defined in the meta-language
treatment of an object-language discourse becomes the subject matter
for a critically conducted process of negational critique. Negation,
however, does not negate religious terminology or religious concepts
in a destructive sense but modifies them, demonstrates their
restrictions or limits. To a certain degree religious language is
53
de-constructed and then re-constructed in the light of this type of
absolutism. This type of three tier structure, as found in the
critical meta-meta-language treatment of a traditional-critical
treatment of an object-language, would appear to have been adopted
by both traditions as one of the methodological avenues developed
by them in their attempt to discuss the nature of the Absolute from
the point of view of the absolute. The mechanics of this negative
theological approach can not be understood if the process of the via
negativa is read on one level of language only. Correctly three levels
at least are involved with two transitions taking place between them.
This vertical tripartite structure is a fundamental feature of the
absolute approach as previously defined and marks out a prominent
structural feature isomorphic to both traditions. At this point in
time let me map out some of the essential features of this isomorphic
aspect and let me do this using the following schema.
Realizing the religious necessity to develop ways of relating
the Absolute to the world of relativity, to rectify the tendency for
their increased logical separation engendered by the intellectual
historical trends preconditional to the development of this critical
absolutist approach, various stratagems were adopted in order to
cross over this otherwise increasingly unbridgeable gap. These
attempts
can
be
more
easily
understood
and
appreciated
when
approached via the following schema. Taking a two truths approach,
i.e. an absolute realm (of things as they are in themselves) and a
realm of relativity, we can come to view either from the same point
of view or from its alternative. This gives us the following
formula....lxii
54
i
The Absolute from the point of view of the absolute,
ii
The Absolute from the point of view of the relative,
iii
The Relative from the point of view of the absolute,
iv
The Relative from the point of view of the relative.
Negative theological treatment concerns itself with the attempt
to articulate the nature of the Absolute from the point of view of
the absolute. Language ostensively ceases to be used in a descriptive
fashion and adopts a pragmatic type of approach severely criticizing
in the process ordinary language usage and its everyday naive way
of seeing the world.
Our second category has implicit theological overtones. The
numinosity of the Absolute, and its reputed experience, being treated
as something religious or spiritual, this aspect being subjected to
an explicit or implicit explication to some degree or other.
The Relative from the point of view of the absolute in this type
of philosophy is perceived as something in the manner of an illusion
or
dream,
etc.
Such
disvaluation
being
subjected
to
various
qualifications as previously outlined that separate this approach
from being mis-labelled as extreme scepticism, nihilism or nonsense.
An hierarchical vision of the world is also implicated with the
potential for some form of an emanational-like generation from the
Absolute.lxiii
The last category perceives some relative value in the world
from the empirical point of view. Under this heading traditional
treatment of universals, their preservation of identity under
55
change, etc., is allowed to operate, within these restricted terms
of reference, without critical interference from the point of view
of the absolute.
Let me now illustrate using this classificational scheme some
of
the
prominent
features
of
this
isomorphic
structural
correspondence that I believe are held in common between these two
traditions. Compare the following quotations from Plotinus with
their more or less equivalent Buddhist counterparts.
In discussing the concept of the One in relation to the
possibility of its own self-consciousness, i.e. the Absolute from
the point of view of the absolute, Plotinus states....
....the Supreme does not know itself as Good.
As what then?
No such foreign matter is present to it: it can
have
only
an
immediate
intuition
self-directed.lxiv
In comparison we can note the following similarities...
.... you should contemplate the true reality of
dharmas, i.e. that all dharmas are without
defilement and purification. For all dharmas
are empty in their own-being.lxv
Perfect wisdom neither knows nor perceives.
From purity....
56
Perfect
wisdom
neither
helps
nor
hinders
all-knowledge.lxvi
Deep, O Lord is perfect wisdom. Certainly as a
great enterprise has this perfection of wisdom
been set up, as an enterprise which equals the
unequaled....
And why is it an unthinkable enterprise? Because
unthinkable
are
Tathagatahood,
Buddhahood,
Self-Existence, and the state of all-knowledge.
And on these one cannot reflect with one's
thought, since they cannot be an object of
thought, or of volition, or of any of the dharmas
which constitute thought.lxvii
In that Beyond there is no discrimination.
Through their non-discrimination do all dharmas
become fully known to the Bodhisattvas.lxviii
In these four quotations we are informed, in the first, that
the reality of reality (the reality of dharmas) is without both
defilement and purification, i.e. that correctly an appellation of
goodness is not possible to make as such an evaluation is just not
applicable (of the Absolute from the point of view of the absolute).
In the second quotation we are informed that the perfection of wisdom
neither knows nor perceives (as a subject), and in the third that
it is unthinkable (as an object for us to entertain) whilst the fourth
57
quotation tells us that in that Beyond there is no discrimination.
Yet, for all that, without the perfection of wisdom there would be
no wisdom and its intuition of all-knowledge.
On this aspect of the trans-conscious self-consciousness of the
Absolute the Neoplatonic Tradition would appear to have this notion
more fully explicated in comparison to the more implicit treatment
by the Buddhist Wisdom Tradition. On the other hand this latter
tradition is a lot less reluctant to criticize and transcend their
traditional treatment of universals. In the Wisdom Tradition dharmas
are continuously disvalued. In the same type of breath there are often
long lists of traditional religious items subjected to negation or
contradiction and a consequent disvaluation or de-emphasization. In
this regard, in comparison, Plotinus is often reluctant to dismiss
the dominating role of the Platonic forms but there are times when
his intellectual honesty forces him to diminish the primal status
of these beings and to make comments like the following....
But, first, if multiplicity holds a true place
among the Beings, how can it be an evil?
As
existent
it
possesses
unity;
it
is
a
unit-multiple, saved from stark multiplicity;
but
it
is
interwoven
a
lessened
unity
multiplicity,
it
and,
by
is
evil
that
in
comparison with unity pure.lxix
In a similar fashion the primary role of the scholastic dharmas
became
de-emphasized.
Subjected
to
negation,
criticism,
58
disvaluation,
dismissal,
philosophical-entities
forms
were
of
effectively
contradiction
transcended,
these
but
not
bypassed, in the development of a philosophical vision of the
Absolute. With the advent of the absolute-type of approach taking
a more central position in religious discourse these multiple
entities or realities became more like stepping stones in the
articulation of the sense of the absolute. In this type of treatment
they effectively have preserved for themselves a religious role,
albeit a diminished one, and in this manner perpetuate the religious
usefulness they had previously acquired. Invocation of the Absolute
by itself as a sufficient explanation for the existence of universal
categories, the preservation of identity through change, etc. would
seem bound to fail for the lack of some form of adequate metaphorical
mediation between these philosophical realms of the Relative and
Absolute. Ultimately, from the absolute point of view, there is only
the One, Suchness, etc. and the world of relativity is identified
with the same but this process of identification, convenient as it
may be, remains philosophically and religiously unsatisfactory. In
order to account for the relationship between absolute and relative
by other means other intellectual devices are introduced, explicitly
or
implicitly,
e.g.
emanation,
concepts
dealing
with
transcendence-immanence, processes of abstraction, sacralization of
the relative (by the divine and
through ritual or theurgy),
revelation, meditation, prayer, etc.
Both forms and dharmas are critical schemes proposed for a
number of philosophical reasons with religious overtones. The sense
of the Absolute considered from the absolute point of view in the
59
process
of
its
development
subjects
these
critical
schemes
themselves in turn to criticism and being dependent upon this complex
substrata
cannot
overthrow
and
remove
such
a
basis
without
disestablishing its own critical super-structural development. In
such
a
light
forms
and
dharmas
become
effectively
redefined
preserving their utilization but with a diminished status. Allowed
to continue in their traditional operation, but restricted to the
relative world from the relative point of view, these entities also
act as stepping stones in processes of negative theological critique.
Under such treatment, and being systematically redefined in the light
of
some
form
of
absolutism,
these
meta-level
devices
become
increasingly more sophisticated in their overall philosophical
formulation. Moreover, an experiential element also appears to be
preserved in their continued proposal, assisting an insightful
intuition that is allowed to realize this absolute point of view.
This state of realization being seen to arise through the intuitive
receptivity and activity of a spiritually productive state of wisdom
founded in, and grounded upon, some form of analysis of the
world-condition. Again, in this regard, both traditions are very
close to the essential nature of the other.
As I have indicated previously dharmas and forms in the
development of the absolute perspective are used in the manner
suggesting
the
metaphor
of
stepping
stones.
In
the
negative
theological treatment of these conceptual entities the vision of the
Absolute is pointed to and characterized as being in some way not
related to the nature of that conceptualized item as it is allowed
to express itself, but, rather, by implication, to be centered on
60
that ground that is immanent and transcendent to such a feature. In
the Buddhist Wisdom Tradition this utilization of the via negativa
often occurs in the form of paragraphs containing lengthy lists of
negations and in this regard The Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Verses
is no exception, e.g....
As simply empty has the Tathagata described all
dharmas.
And, being empty, they are also inexhaustible.
And
what
is
emptiness,
that
is
also
immeasurableness. Therefore then according to
ultimate reality, no distinction or difference
can be apprehended between these dharmas. As
talk have they been described by the Tathagata.
One
just
talks
`immeasurable',
when
or
one
speaks
`incalculable,'
of
or
`inexpressible,' or of `empty,' or `signless,'
or
`wishless,'
or
the
`Unaffected,'
`Non-production,'
`non-existence,'
or
`no-birth',
`dispassion,'
`cessation,'
`Nirvana.'lxx
In comparison we can note the following quotation....
It (the One as Authentic Beauty) can be no shape,
no power, nor the total of powers and shapes....
it must stand above all the powers, all the
61
patterns. The origin of all this must be the
formless....
It can be none of existing things; yet it is
all:.... no extension; it must be limitless and
so without magnitude;...lxxi
With respect to Plotinus any form of negation must in some
fashion negate the appropriate form. The attempt to describe the
Absolute, or more correctly point out its transcendent existence,
must involve some transcendence of the form just as the form itself
must in some way transcend its spacio-temporal instantiations. As
Plotinus states it must stand above all the powers, all the patterns
and by implication the forms as well. The consequence of all this
is that forms (and dharmas) are made to do even more work, to work
overtime and to suffer at the same time a diminishment of their status
with the introduction of the sense of the absolute.
Accompanying attempts to discover the essential nature of the
Absolute from the point of view of the absolute are plentiful
disclaimers circulated to the effect that language must ultimately
fail us in this regard.lxxii
An interest in the Absolute from the point of view of the
relative would appear to impart a theological-like tenor to this type
of
philosophy.
This
does
not
imply
the
admis-sion
of
an
anthropomorphism although some metaphorical imagery does hint of its
presence, a residual element that does find some reinforcement
through the strong undercurrent of devotionalism. With Plotinus we
have his addressing the Absolute as Father and in the Buddhist Wisdom
62
Tradition
we
find
the
personification,
metaphorically
and
iconographically, of Wisdom (Prajnaparamita) in feminine terms.
Coincidentally Plotinus also refers to the personification of wisdom (sophia) as feminine in presence. With this philosopher the
divine, its being and presence, also has functions more in keeping
with a godhead than a creator god. There is an emphasis on power
without
active
production,
in
emanation
there
is
a
sort
of
material-like bubbling over of creativity without the divine moving
or actually being involved in the active creation of material
relatively lesser to the nature of itself. Interestingly, in
comparison, our Buddhist text tells us (my italics)....
Perfect wisdom does not reproduce herself.lxxiii
Also all dharmas are isolated in their essential
nature. And the isolatedness of the essential
nature of all dharmas is identical with the
nature of the perfection of wisdom. For the
Tathagata has fully known all dharmas as not
made.lxxiv
In the appreciation of the relative from the point of view of
the Absolute this type of philosophy insists that we would discover
that the world is an illusion. This aspect of the illusion discovered
in this vision is, however, heavily qualified and the empirical
validity of the world of appear-ance is not dismissed only its claim
to present an authentic picture of the reality of reality (vis à vis
63
the Absolute) is in dispute. Concomitant with this type of position
is a consequent disvaluation of the relative world, an examination
of this third perspective having been dealt with in detail in Chapter
II. Interestingly in this regard the attitude that concerns itself
with, or looks outward into, the relative world of multiplicity is
regarded as being spiritually immoral. In both traditions there is
an equal distaste for the multiple. In The Perfection of Wisdom in
8,000 Lines and Its Verse Summary we are told....
Intent
on
the
perception
of
multiplicity
he is perfectly immoral.
He
is
faulty
in
his
morality,
not
perfectly pure in it.
He who has no notion of I and no notion
of a being,
He
has
performed
the
withdrawal
from
perception,....
He
has
been
proclaimed
by
the
Leader
as
restrained by morality.lxxv
In a similar fashion Plotinus states....
In sum, we must withdraw from all the extern,
pointed wholly inwards; no leaning to the outer;
the total of things ignored, first in their
relation to us and later in the very idea; the
self put out of mind in the contemplation of the
64
Supreme;....lxxvi
Otherwise, as Plotinus states, in our turning away from the real or
the Absolute (my italics)....
Our
being
is
the
fuller
for
our
turning
Thither;.... here it has its Act, its true
knowing; here it is immune. Here is living, the
true; that of to-day, all living apart from Him,
is but a shadow, a mimicry.lxxvii
In the realm of the Relative from the point of view of the
relative it would appear that the theories of dharmas and forms are
allowed to operate, as they did traditionally, without restrictions.
Negative theological treatment it would appear only restricts their
operation when they step beyond their transcendental employment as
empirical structures (pertaining correctly only to our understanding
of the empirical). These pre-scientific hypotheses, however, can not
be radically dismissed in a negative theological critique for the
very fact and persistence of that critique itself necessitates their
continued existence, or similar, in order for it to persist in its
ongoing negational operation. The result of such a critical symbiotic
interrelationship is the re-examination and re-definition of these
theoretical
structures
effectively
disvaluing
these
religious
realities when their application is made to extend beyond their
empirical employment whilst, at the same time, utilizing their
relative incapacitation (to pass beyond this boundary that separates
65
Absolute
from
Relative)
as
a
methodological
device
in
the
articulation of a sense of the absolute. Outside their interpretation
of the relative world of the empirical their disvalued utility can
only be pragmatic, potentially experiential (through some form of
intellectual
provocation
or
revelation)
and
indirectly
non-descriptive in scope. In our investigations this aspect can be
subsumed
under
a
functional
examination
of
those
textual
indications, in the light of the total religious context, that
properly suggest such an aspect. In this regard we are left with an
examination of relevant textual sources and the textually transmitted reports of religious experiences relevant to this topic.
The Functional Aspect of the Via Negativa.
It stands to reason that entering into repeated pro-cesses of
philosophical negation is going to be found, on retrospective
reflection, to be either a productive and fruitfully useful exercise,
or, as a useless and pointless expenditure of time. It would seem
to suggest, therefore, an inadequate appreciation on our part to
regard this textual emphasis on negation in these two traditions as
a mere exercise in intellectual wastefulness. Such a pursuit must
have delivered some form of payoff or benefit in order to explain
the
frequency
of
its
much
laboured
persistence.
Unwittingly
philosophers may embark on a course that results in a definite dead
end, that would appear to be often the case, but for all that much
good must also come out of such an exercise through an appreciation
of the fact that it informs us, on retrospective reflection, that
66
we need to redirect our efforts towards some other direction or
develop wider terms of reference. Rather than seeing the increased
emphasis on the via negativa developed in this period of time as a
dead end it would appear, on the contrary, to be have been, and to
have been seen, as more of an attempt to make an exciting and positive
exit from the relatively fruitless world of the interminable debates
conducted between, and within, traditionally opposed religious
schools. The novel consequences of this approach must have quickly
carved out for itself a new place or niche in the religious psyche
assisted by the pressures induced by the psychological consequences
of the critical disvaluation of traditional positive theology. The
advent of this type of philosophical inquiry in the Indian World
radically restructured its entire philosophical format, at least on
those influential margins of it, leaving behind those traditions that
ignored this new ground or that inadequately adapted themselves to
its critical onslaught. The same type of revolution must have
occurred in the Western World and this fact might explain the loss
of many of its relatively less critical traditions, Paganism
included. On the other hand the relative dis-inclination of the
Christian World to take up a fully developed negative theology (after
the demise of the Neoplatonic Tradition in Alexandria and Athens,
etc.) may well indicate a general decline in intellectual standards
with the political breaking up of the Graeco-Roman world and its
consequent de-urbanization, especially in the western half of
Europe, postponing its general acceptance and recognition.lxxviii
Plotinus
makes
an
experiential
claim
for
the
correctly
conducted pursuit of the via negativa. This type of exercise, he would
67
claim, is not a mere indulgence in a negativistic or passive form
of philosophicalization but an awakening of our understanding into
what is really true or truly real. Under the auspices of the Nous
both the thinker and the object of thought merge realizing their more
fundamental nature, as a unity, from the point of view of the
Absolute. In this attempt to describe the Absolute a method is
prescribed that claims we can also come to experience the essential
and unified nature of this absolute. Such experience however is
neither perceptual nor conceptual and appears to be open to
discursive thought, albeit indirectly, only retrospectively to its
original-immediate intuition. Plotinus makes numerous references to
such a process of experiential insight although the details are more
alluded to through the use of analogy and metaphor. One avenue of
approach that appears to be stressed is that found through some form
of meditation on the forms and then from the level of Nous a
transcendence of the same and along with it in such flight, by
implication, a transcendence of the forms in turn. In a similar
fashion dharmas appear to be entertained and then transcended in
turn. Compare the following two quotations.
No wonder that to state it is not easy; even
Being and Form are not easy, though we have a
way, an approach through the Ideas.... thus what
That sees the soul will waken to see; it is
through the Intellectual-Principle that we have
this vision of The Unity: it must be our care
to bring over nothing whatever from sense, to
68
allow
nothing
even
of
soul
to
enter
into
Intellectual-Principle: with Intellect pure,
and with the summit of Intellect, we are to see
the All-Pure.... The Unity, then, is not Intellectual-Principle but something higher still.lxxix
In comparison we can note that our Buddhist text echoes the same
types of ideas ....
Deep is this perfection of wisdom. Hard to win,
exceedingly
hard
to
win
is
full
enlightenment,...
How can the Lord say that full enlightenment is
hard to win,.... when there is no one who can
win enlightenment? For, owing to the emptiness
of all dharmas, no dharma exists that would be
able to win full enlightenment....lxxx
In both quotations we are told that this ultimate experience
is difficult to obtain, moreover, both forms and dharmas indicate
an avenue or approach in our coming to some understanding or intuition
into the nature of the Absolute. But, however, in the final analysis
even these multiple religious entities must be transcended along with
the realm of appearances that they are made to structure (in empirical
terms of reference). In this regard emptiness would seem to suggest
a transcendence of that which is declared to be empty. Of course the
logical subjectivity in the expression that states x is empty can
69
only have a provisional and empirical relevance for from the point
of view of the Absolute the same is equally denied.
It is interesting to note that the Buddhist term samvrti-satya
(relative or conventional truth), in the doctrine of Two Truths, has
an etymology based on the sense of covering up or veiling, that aspect
that distorts the reality of things as they really are, moreover,
it is claimed that this distortion is the result of cognitive
intellection in its dichotomization of concepts and conceptual
components
and
their
reification
and
ontologicalization
as
self-existent and unchanging substances. Absolutism as a philosophy
is committed to making this distinction of things as they are in
distinction to how they appear.lxxxi The basic intellectual conflict
between these two modes, however, resides in the manner in which the
two aspects of the dichotomy are to be formulated and treated. In
the Buddhist context dharmic reality was treated as the causally
efficient whilst the concealed truth of the relative and empirical
is seen as being mistreated in a static reificational mode. On the
other hand in the Neoplatonic context the static substantial reality of the forms was contrasted with the relative unreality of the
changing fragmentary nature of the empirical. With the full advent
of absolutism, however, much of this apparent dichotomy in either
tradition, between the relative and the absolute is resolved, through
advocating an absolute-relative distinction in which, correctly, the
Absolute transcends all empirical-like appellations of a relative
nature. In other words the sense of the absolute is so constructed
that it attempts to totally transcend dichotomies, e.g. change versus
changelessness, etc. and thereby defuse these types of dilemmas that
70
are made to interpose between forms or dharmas and the empirical
world.
The concept of two truths is made explicit in this Buddhist
context, on the other hand, in the Neoplatonic context this necessary
feature is left relatively implicit and blurred by the maintenance
of a still dominant and central role for the forms both individually
and collectively as Nous. However in Plotinus' final account the
forms must go, loose their role as absolutely ultimate entities. In
this regard forms must take on something of the disvalued, illusive
and emanationally derived nature previously handed out to those
entities in the realm of the everyday world. For Plotinus the process
of emanation can be likened to the metaphor of one face being seen
as many images in a mirror whereas from the absolute point of view
reality is one, has one face.lxxxii In the same manner but not to the
same degree forms must also be treated. In searching for this One
Plotinus tells us to strip away the alien and the metaphor is adopted
in illustration of this of the purification of gold ore in the quest
for pure gold.lxxxiii Another metaphor is also adopted from the enactment
of the mysteries in the progressive removal of layers of garments
until such a time is reached that the aspirant is left completely
naked, symbolically pure. By implication the reality of reality is
a transcendent and immanent unified whole that is distorted, if not
concealed, by intellectual processes. It follows that by stripping
away such concretion reality itself finds itself revealed. As I have
stated before, in connection with this type of position between the
real and the apparent, both of these two traditions have a heavy
emphasis on the theoretical need for purity as a necessary first
71
condition for the achievement of insight or wisdom, for the
development and reception of spiritual intuition.
It is at this point that I would like to conclude this chapter
by indicating the intimate connection that can be made between these
isomorphic religious elements of purification, insight, analysis
involving the use of the via negativa, devotional practices and this
type of absolutism.
To begin with purification appears to have two spheres of
application, namely, a more archaic level, derived from the desire
for ritual purification, with an emphasis on a physical and moral
purity predating the advent of philosophical absolutism and a more
important
aspect
superimposed
on
the
first
of
an
intellectual-spiritual purification through the performance and
exercise of a restructured and insightful pattern of thought. The
increasing emphasis on the element of the intellectual necessary for
the
development
of
this
type
of
sophisticated
philosophical
thinking, and dependent therefore on a reasonably high level of
education, induces a number of important psychic changes both psychologically and socially. Increased educational standards assist in
the general development of the ability for a society to enter more
deeply into processes of reflection along with the increased powers
of criticism concomitant with this. Psychologically this increased
tendency for reflection is also reinvested in more thorough processes
of self-criticism producing and inducing a greatly enhanced sense
of conceptual-self or egotistic-self along with the potential for
the expression of individuality that flows from such an exercise and
appreciation (although paradoxically, at least superficially, a
72
critical society attempts to straight-jacket deviant forms of individualistic behavior it considers to be ideologically unsound,
thence the vehemence of the Reformation and Inquisition, e.g.). When
this tendency reaches a critical degree of maturity cognitive
criticism of self reaches an intensity of awareness that realizes
the full dissonance of cognitive inconsistency that otherwise would
not be intellectually appreciated as such. This discrepancy being
discovered
between
accumulated
the
compartments
various
and
historically
layers
of
and
religious
culturally
beliefs
and
practices that collectively constitute the religious psyche of a
society and its individuals. Between the ideality of religious theory and practice and the social truth of the matter a vast distance
is experienced. Critical intellectual emphasis placed upon ideal
perfectionist
tendencies
exaggerating
the
intensity
of
this
experience of cognitive dissonance and widening this perception of
religious inadequacy. This gulf or rift is discovered, through
processes
of
reflection,
to
occur
within
and
between
ideal-
istic-prescriptive based attitudes and realistic-descriptive based
attitudes of a society and/or individual and is experienced as an
intense form of cognitive dissonance. In reaction to this relatively
new critically-extreme perspective, in an attempt to diminish and
overcome this sense of dissonance and inadequacy, there develop new
forms of social activity ushering in e.g. processes of reformation,
etc. indicating what I have previously termed as a reformational-type
mentality. This sees unleashed patterns of behavior, both socially
and psychologically, that one finds in periods of religious and
political iconoclasm, revolution and reformation along with their
73
new emphasis on the word (in a rational non-magical sense) and not
the image, their emphasis on ideological purity, behavioral and moral
consistency, their emphasis on individuality along with intense
social conformity.
It would appear, however, that the birth of absolutism arose
with the initial development of this increased cognitive awareness
and not with its more developed reformational phase. Under these
initial circumstances emphasis is on a more scholastic approach with
a desire for systematization without an awareness of an intense
cognitive dissonance that would be felt if critical tendencies were
more extremely developed. Although a gulf has widened between the
sense of the numinous (experienced as an ideal) and the sense of the
profane (that seen as the empirical every day world) this distance
is not experienced in the self-critical and extreme manner of the
reformational phase. Here the emphasis develops on the image, both
metaphorically and visually, along with the development of a sense
of the devotional. This cognitive separation between the sense of
the sacred and the profane creates the psychic need for its bridging
and closure. This need, induced by this process of dichotomization,
is met through a more personalized form of religious experience and
this finds itself expressed though various forms of devotionalism,
the
intensity
of
which
reflects
the
degree
to
which
this
dichotomization between the sacred and profane is cognitively
developed and is critically reflected upon.
It is therefore no accident that this period of history sees
the development of a number of novel features in keeping with this
relatively new non-extreme development of individualism. For example
74
we may witness Plotinus' interest in psychological questions, St.
Augustine's
innovative
autobiographical
approach
in
his
Confessions, development of the religious image in the form of a
person (as a trans-human-divine religious leader), an increased
interest
in
devotion-al
practices
and
increased
interest
in
religious experience outside the framework of state-orientated
ritualism.
Hand in hand with this increased cognitive awareness was the
development of the intellectual environment for sustaining the
critical development of negative theology and its criticism of
traditional and less individualistic forms of religious expression.
Emphasis shifts from venerated religious icons to religious icons
subject to adoration along with a non-exclusive division between
emotional
forms
of
religious
intellectually-orientated
analytical
approaches
approaches.
claim
to
expression
Both
overcome
and
more
devotional
this
psychic
and
rift
cognitively felt to occur between this absolute sense of the numinous
and the spiritual deficiencies of the profane. Although both the
Neoplatonic and the Buddhist Wisdom Traditions include a prominent
emphasis on the element of the devotional true emphasis in both traditions in the final analysis can be seen to reside most decisively
with
the
intellectual
and
its
analytical
tendencies.
Therein
philosophical behavior is not treated as a mere passive exercise in
describing the numinous and prescribing religious behavior but as
an essential step in the very engagement with this sense of the
numinous developed in this type of absolutism. In this transcendental
awareness of the Absolute it is claimed that both the elements of
75
intellectual awareness and behavioral appropriateness are born in
the same insight or intuition that reveals the numinous or absolute.
Thus although both traditions fail to directly describe this sense
of
the
Absolute
and
articulate
its
inherent
prescriptive
consequences, and this failure is guaranteed both by the nature of
this pursuit and through admissions to this effect, religious contact
with and experience of this sense of the numinous, it is claimed,
still remains an open possibility that the person can entertain and
with perseverance realize. Analysis of the world and one's condition
therein is therefore not a mere prelude on the path to enlightenment
but one of the very doors by which the same is to be gained. The nature
of that analysis is heavily invest-ed with the use of the via
negativa. It would appear therefore that negative theology, utilized
as a process of analysis, has both an ostensively visible negative
dimension and a relatively implicit positive experiential dimension
and that this latter aspect is claimed in some way to assist the
religious person in their coming to experience the absolute reality
of the numinous.
I began this chapter with the hope that by inspecting the nature
of those religious entities claimed by these two traditions to be
spiritually closer to the essential nature of reality we might find
ourselves in a better position to positively understand the nature
of the respective absolutes these two contemporaneous traditions
entertain and measure the degree of isomorphism, if any, in their
comparative
correspondence.
Furthermore
it
was
hoped
that
an
indirect appreciation of experiential claims might throw some light
on the nature of the numinous found in this type of absolutism. It
76
would appear that to continue with this ambition we must investigate
both the nature of the negative theological process and the
experiential relationship between such analysis and insight in
effect coming to explore both the negative and the positive
dimensions of the via negativa.
To conclude this chapter let me point out a concurrence of these
themes of purification, analysis, insight, devotionalism in the
following brief quotations....
We come to this learning by analogies, by
abstractions,
by
our
understanding
of
its
subsequents, of all that is derived from the
Good,
by
the
upward
steps
towards
it.
Purification has The Good for goal; so the
virtues, all right ordering, ascent within the
Intellectual, settlement therein, banqueting
upon the divine....lxxxiv
What, then, is Philosophy?
Philosophy is the supremely precious.
Is Dialectics, then, the same as Philosophy?
It is the precious part of Philosophy....
Dialectics does not consist of bare theories and
rules: it deals with verities,....lxxxv
She (the perfection of wisdom) is identical with
all-knowledge (sarvajnata). She never produces
77
any dharmas, because she has forsaken the
residues relating to both kinds of coverings,
those produced by defilement and those produced
by the cognizable.lxxxvi
A source of illumination is the perfection of
wisdom.
From purity.lxxxvii
Footnotes to Chapter IV - How The Absolute Is Indicated
i
E 5I6.
ii
An interesting paper on this controversy of an Absolute in the
Madhyamaka school can be found in the paper by De Jong, J.W. - The
Problem of the Absolute in the Madhyamaka School, Journal of Indian
Philosophy, 1972.;
iii
A brief discussion on this point can be found in the short paper
by De Jong, J.W. - Emptiness, Journal of Indian Philosophy,1972.;
4
P 271-272.
v
P 307.
vi
P 254-255.
vii
P 197.
viii
More, Paul Elmer. - in his book The Religion of Plato in his
footnote number 8 on page 172 states....
78
But it is important to note that there is no hint of pantheism in
Plato. His God is transcendent, not immanent.
ix
The transcendence and the immanence (to some degree or other)
of the forms is pointed out by Peters, F.E. - Greek Philosophical
Terms, A Historical Lexicon, pg. 48, note 10.
x
P 399.
xi
P 400.
1
2
xiii
E 5V13.
A parallel can be drawn here to the sense-reference distinction
of Frege.
xiv
P 193.
xv
P 210.
xvi
P XVI/1-2.
xvii
P 254-255.
xviii
Samkara. in his criticism of Madhyamaka Philosophy unfairly,
but perhaps wisely, dismisses the same as nihilism. The same type
of
uncritical
attitude
could
equally
dismiss
the
religious
philosophy of Zen as nonsense. In the same manner Plotinus could be
dismissed as a philosopher subject to too much equivocation. In
regard to Samkara's position see Ingalls, Sankara's
Arguments
Against The Buddhists, Philosophy East and West, pgs. 291-306 (1954).
xix
It is a moot point as to whether it is possible a philosophical
process does not in some way through its philosophical tools reflect
the world it is meant to operate within however, regardless of whether
that is the case or not, this distinction must be still upheld.
xx
E 5V13.
79
xxi
P 307.
xxii
E.g. E 6VIII13/18,19.
xxiii
This point is made by Deck, John N. - Nature, Con-templation
and the One, pg. 10.
xxiv
P Verse Summary, Chapt.xxx, 7. Along with this avoid-ance from
the dualistic is an equal desire to avoid or dis-tance oneself from
the realm of the multiple.
xxv
F.E.Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms, pg. 136.
xxvi
For a general examination of this term in Greek philosophy refer
to F.E.Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms, A Historical lexicon, pg.
132-139.
xxvii
E 6IV4.
xxviii
E 6II8.
xxix
E 5VII1, 5I4.
xxx
E 2III7, 4IV36, 3II2.
xxxi
F.E.Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms, pg. 197.
xxxii
Ibid.,pg. 197.
xxxiii
A.H.Armstrong, Plotinus. pg. 95.
xxxiv
The Greek preoccupation with mathematics is continued by the
Neoplatonic philosophers, witness Plotinus' discussions on the
subject e.g. E 6VI and Proclus' commentary on Euclid's Elements.
xxxv
Douglas D. Daye recognizes a derivation of this concept of
emptiness from Indian mathematics. See Major Schools of the Mahayana.
Madhyamika, Chap. 17 in the book
Buddhism - A Modern Perspective,
ed. C.S.Prebish, pg.94.
xxxvi
This emphasis of the Indian philosophical world on the
80
grammatical is noted in passing by Williams, Paul M. - On The
Abhidharma Ontology, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 1981, pg. 233.
This person states (my bold italics)....
In giving examples of absolutely nonexistent entities Indian
thinkers never clearly distinguished between logical contradictories and merely non-exampled terms, probably due to the fact
that linguistics rather than mathematics served to provide the
impetus behind philosophical change and so the notion of analytical
necessity was not clearly formulated.
A discussion of some of its effects on philosophical thinking is
conducted by Matilal, B.K. - Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in
Indian Philosophical Analysis, chapter 3. This same person also
recognizes a possible role played by Indian mathematicians in the
formulation of the concept of emptiness, ibid, pgs. 151-152.
Belvalkar, S.K. in his book Systems of Sanskrit Grammar
states, pg. 1....
It would be hardly an exaggeration to say that in no other country
has the science of grammar been studied with such a zeal and carried
to such a perfection as it has in India.
The same author also notes that this development of grammatical
speculation and codification occurs before similar developments
occur in the Graeco-Roman World, pg. 2, probably due to the fact that
Sanskrit became a dead language very early on in its literary usage.
xxxvii
F.E.Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms, pgs. 47-48 note no.8.
xxxviii
E 6IX11. Armstrong translates the expression.... he has in
perfect stillness attained isolation by in a quiet solitude and a
81
state of calm.
E 6IX9. Armstrong translates the expression.... native activ-
xxxix
ity of Intellect by active actuality of Intellect.
xl
E 6IX1.
xli
E 6IX2.
xlii
E 6IX3. Armstrong translates the end of this quotation by we
do have a knowledge based upon the Forms.
xliii
E 6IX3.
xliv
E 6IX4. Armstrong translates this expression by.... by way of
presence superior to knowledge.
xlv
E 6II22.
xlvi
E
5III17.
Armstrong
translates
this
line
as
take
away
everything. (Plotinus, pg.154).
E 6IX3. Armstrong translates this expression by.... since the
xlvii
nature of the One is generative of all things it is not any one of
them.
xlviii
E 6IX3.
xlix
Some of these controversial aspects can be examined in depth
in the book by B.K.Matilal, Epistemology,Logic and Grammar in
Philosophical Analysis, chapters 1-4.
l
Th.Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, and the
Meaning of the Word "Dharma", pgs. 18-19.
li
C.S.Prebish, Buddhism-A Modern Perspective, pgs.78-79.
lii
For an excellent paper on the early development and the use of
the term dharmas refer to the paper by Warder, A.K. - Dharmas and
Data, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 1971, pgs. 272-295.
82
liii
Ibid., pgs. 278-287.
liv
The five skandhas have been declared by the Tathagata as the
world (loka). Which five? Form, feeling, perceptions, impulses and
consciousness. P 256.
lv
Stcherbatsky, Th. - The Central Conception of Buddhism, pgs.
5-14.
lvi
A.K.Warder, Dharmas and Data, Journal of Indian Philosophy,
1971, pgs 290-291.
lvii
This can be found discussed in detail in the paper by Katsura,
Shoryu.
-
Dharmakirti's
Theory
of
Truth,
Journal
of
Indian
of
either
Philosophy, 1984.;
lviii
T.R.V.Murti
argues
for
the
equal
viability
orientation, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pg.32.
lix
In an emphasis on the process of qualification there is more
interest in the Principle of Identity and the variable changes that
can be made and remade in the process of its application hence the
more
dialectical-like
concern
exercised
in
this
type
of
propositional attitude or orientation.
lx
Meta-levels of translation, etc. are discussed by Douglas
D.Daye in Buddhism - A Modern Perspective, ed. C.S.Prebish, chap.
17. See also Robinson, Richard H. - Early Madhyamika In India And
China, pgs.18-19.
lxi
The Sautrantikas appear to be the first Buddhist school to
propose that concepts, dharmas included, were prajnapti (fruitful
fictions). See Buddhism - A Modern Perspective, ed. C.S.Prebish, pg.
91.
83
lxii
A schema similar to this one seems to have been proposed by the
Svatantrikas branch of the Madhyamaka. The division is made by this
sub-school between a higher and lower Empirical Truth and a higher
and lower Ultimate Truth with an identification being made between
the Lower Ultimate Truth and the Higher Empirical Truth. A brief discussion of this can be found in the book by Potter, Karl.H. Presuppositions of Indian Philosophies, pgs.239-241. See also
T.R.V.Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pgs. 248-249.
lxiii
In the Buddhist Wisdom Tradition the concept of buddha-fields
(buddha-ksetra) would seem to implicate some form of emanation. The
doctrines of the Two/Three Bodies of the Buddha would also seem to
indicate a similar type of development?
lxiv
E 6VII38.
lxv
P 483.
lxvi
P 188.
lxvii
P 277.
lxviii
P 295.
lxix
E 6VI3.
lxx
P 348. See also P 187-189, 204-207, 280, 306-308, 313-319, 341,
351-357,525-526.
lxxi
E 6VII32.
lxxii
E.g. see P 200, E 6VII334.
lxxiii
P 187.
lxxiv
P 192.
lxxv
P Verse Summary, Chap.XXXI 7-8.
lxxvi
E 6IX7.
84
lxxvii
E 6IX9.
lxxviii
It
would
appear
that
the
Christian
Tradition
after
the
disestablishment of the Neoplatonic Tradition generally rejected
placing an emphasis on the via negativa. It is my contention that
this indicates a degree of institutionalization and a decline in
general intellectual standards along with a reduction in debate and
a de-emphasis placed on the powers of criticism itself. See Mortley,
Raoul. -
From Word To Silence, Vol.II pg. 254.
lxxix
E 6IX3.
lxxx
P 313.
lxxxi
T.R.V.Murti, The Central Conception Of Buddhism, chap. 9
section IV, pgs. 243-246.
lxxxii
E 1I8, 2V1.
lxxxiii
E 1VI5.
lxxxiv
E 6VII36.
lxxxv
P 1III5.
lxxxvi
P 171.
lxxxvii
P 187.