Download s and abstracts for the Pitt-London Workshop in the Philosophy of

Pitt-London Workshop: Abstracts in alphabetical order
Karen Arnold, Putting Anthropomorphism in Context
At the end of his 1993 book, The Disorder of Things, John Dupré
suggests that science, as a human product, should be evaluated on the
basis of its contributions “to the thriving of the sentient beings in
this universe” (Dupré 1993, p.264). This paper presents a case study of
this type of evaluation by analyzing critiques of evolutionary
explanations of rape. Since the late 70’s several sociobiologists and
evolutionary psychologists have attempted to provide evolutionary
accounts of rape. These accounts have come under attack for their use of
the term ‘rape’ to describe both human and animal behavior. Critics have
objected to this descriptive vocabulary as illegitimately
anthropomorphic. This paper provides a taxonomy of these attacks. With
this taxonomy in place, the focus will narrow to an examination of those
criticisms that rely on contextual values—those values that “belong to
the social and cultural context in which science is done” (Longino 1998,
245). I argue that this anthropomorphic use of language can be
legitimately attacked on the grounds that it has the potential for a
significantly detrimental impact on society.
James Bogen, What we Talk About When we Talk about Causality: Mechanistic
explanations depend on descriptions of activities, rather than
counterfactual regularities.
Systematic Dependence (SD) and Mechanistic accounts of the causality are
the most promising alternatives to covering law accounts of causality.
Both maintain that to fully understand how an effect was caused would be
to understand how it results from the workings of a system of causally
relevant items. Both maintain that to understand the influence of a
particular part of the system would be to understand its contribution to
the system's production of the effect. For Mechanism this is a matter of
understanding the activities the item of interest engages in, and what
results from them. For SD it is a matter of discerning relations of
systematic dependency between the item of interest and the effect to be
explained. Systematic dependence, in turn, is to be understood in terms
of counterfactual regularities of a special kind between manipulations
(also of a special kind) of the "values" (i.e., features, quantitative
or qualitative states, etc.) of the item of interest, and the results
they produce.
According to SD, it is these counterfactual regularities
(as opposed to activities) which distinguish non-causal from causally
productive relations among things. According to Mechanism, any
regularities involved in the operation of the system that produces the
effect of interest are to be explained by appeal to the activities. This
paper argues that SD cannot show us how to understand causality without
activities---partly because the counterfactuals it's account of
systematic depends upon are highly problematic.
Ingo Brigandt, The "role" a concept plays in science - The case of
homology
The paper tries to shed some light on the idea that a concept plays a
certain role for a scientific field or a research program by using the
homology concept as a case study. It is in particular discussed in what
sense homology plays a different role for systematics, developmental
biology, and molecular biology.
Joe Cain, Extinction concepts put to work in the philosophy of biology
In the analysis of biological processes, extinction disappears somewhere
in the miscellany between the purpose of zoos and teleological progress.
That should change. In this paper I undertake a conceptual analysis of
extinction and indicate some ways this subject can speak to general
themes in the philosophy of science. Conceptual analysis focuses on
clarification of extinction definitions, the distinction between normal
and mass extinction, and conflicting demands in notions of mass
extinction. Relevance to general themes is examined in a small study of
causal language used in extinction descriptions. A proposed distinction
between natural and artificial extinction is used to consider the
conjunction of extinction and the ethics of human impact.
Paul Griffiths, Evo-Devo meets the Mind: Towards a Developmental
Evolutionary Psychology
The view of the evolutionary process presumed in contemporary
Evolutionary Psychology is in stark contrast to the views being explored
by evolutionary developmental biologists. The fertilised egg is held to
contain a program for the adult phenotype, the content of which can be
inferred by optimality modeling and knowledge of the ancestral
environment. The psychological phenotype is thought to be modular, but
this modular structure reflects the fact that the environment contains
separate adaptive problems and it too can be discovered by Œadaptive
thinking‚. Psychological traits are defined by their adaptive function
and the concept of homology is rarely utilized.
There is, however, an alternative tradition of research in animal
behavior, represented by the work of, amongst others, Patrick Bateson,
Peter Klopfer and Gilbert Gottlieb, which focuses evolutionary thinking
on the developmental structure of the organism. Evolution is seen as
creating systems with a range of developmental potentials, rather than
programs for phenotypes. The developmental structure of the organism is
accepted as an important determinant of evolution and answers to
developmental and adaptive questions are thought to be mutually
constraining. In this paper I compare this developmentalist tradition in
the study of behavior to evolutionary developmental biology, with the aim
of enriching the former with some of the new insights that have emerged
in recent years from the study of morphological evolution. I offer some
tentative suggestions about how an evolutionary psychology might develop
along the lines suggested by this synthesis.
Catherine Kendig, Reconstructing the Concept of Homology for Genomics
Homology has been one of, if not the most, fecund concepts which has been
used towards the understanding of the genomes of the model organisms.
The evidence for this claim can be supported best with an examination of
current research in comparative genomics. In comparative genomics, the
information of genes or segments of the genome, and their location and
sequence, are used to search for genes similar to them, known as
‘homologues’. Homologues can be either within that same organism
(paralogues), or among different species (orthologues).
The importance in finding homologous genes within organisms or
across species is that these similarities indicate the possibility of
ascribing functions, mechanisms or structures which are required by a
variety of species which present the same homology. The interest in
structures and functions of genes and proteins common to multiple species
is one of the main foci of comparative genomics. Because of this,
research into the conservation of genes has been the basis of comparison
with regards to homologous genes among diverse organisms.
Different causal processes are involved in genetic pathways and
mechanisms. Explanations of these depend upon which pathway, structure
or mechanism is picked out. Each process has a different causal network
to which different explanations refer. What comparative genomics
explains are the different causal mechanisms which occur in processes
such as differentiation, protein synthesis, and gene regulation. How
these processes interact within the organism can only be understood when
compared with organisms which possess homologous genes, gene sequences,
similar developmental mechanisms, or those whose mechanisms for gene
regulation are similar. Explanations which result from comparative
genomics contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of both the
complex structures and the diverse functions within the genomes of
different organisms.
There are two related problems which have plagued attempts to
define the concept of homology. The first problem arises in clarifying
what kind of similarity is involved in a homological comparison. A
second problem occurs if more than one concept of homology is needed to
pick out the kinds of similarity in different contexts of homological
comparison. Homology is usually understood as picking out what counts as
‘the same’ between two or more organisms. Many of the attempts which have
been made to define the concept of homology focus on which criteria are
used to restrict the kinds of similarity which exist between two or more
organisms or parts being compared. These are criteria which can be used
reliably to infer shared ancestry. However, there have been many
different attempts to define similarity which have produced a profusion
of homology concepts. This profusion has led both to the conflation of
what counts as ‘the same’ in different contexts and has also muddled the
relations of comparison which various concepts use to identify
homologues.
James Lennox, History and Philosophy of Science: A Phylogenetic Approach
In the aftermath of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, there was much discussion about the relationship between the
history of science and the philosophy of science. A wider issue was at
stake in these discussions: ‘normativism versus ‘naturalism’ in
epistemology. If the history of science, at best, gives us reliable
information about what actually occurred historically, how can it inform
debates about such things as confirmation or explanation in philosophy of
science?
This essay makes a case for the centrality of historical investigation in
the philosophy of science. I will defend what I term the ‘phylogenetic’
approach to the philosophy of science. I will argue that since the
foundations and dominant methods of a particular scientific field are
shaped by its history, studying that history can give us considerable
insight into conceptual and methodological problems in a particular
science. The case will be made both on general, philosophical grounds,
and by instantiation. I will outline the ways in which looking at the
historical origins of the mis-named ‘tautology’ objection to evolutionary
theory can be of value in understanding, and dealing with, the problem.
Alan C. Love, Evolutionary Morphology and the Integration of Evolution
and Development
One foundational question in contemporary biology is how to integrate
evolution and development. The emerging synthesis (evolutionary
developmental biology or “evo-devo”) requires a meshing of disciplines,
concepts, and explanatory assumptions (among other things) that have been
developed largely in independence over the past century. The nature of
the hoped for synthesis is not wholly agreed upon due to divergent
viewpoints resulting from this disciplinary independence and,
consequently, the mechanics for accomplishing the task are not clearly
specified. This paper utilizes historical investigation for
philosophical purposes in the way articulated by Jim Lennox in his
presentation on the phylogenetic approach to history and philosophy of
science in order to explore the question of integrating evolutionary and
developmental biology.
In the attempt to comprehend the present separation between evolution and
development much attention has been paid to the split between genetics
and embryology in the early part of the century with its codification in
the exclusion of embryology from the Modern Synthesis. This encourages a
characterization of “evo-devo” as the integration of developmental
genetics with Neo-Darwinism. But there is a largely untold story about
the significance of morphology and comparative anatomy (also minimized in
the Modern Synthesis) in contemporary discussions. I will attempt to
reconstruct part of this story, focusing on the rebirth of functional
(and evolutionary) morphology after the 1950's. Functional morphology is
critical for understanding the development of a concept central to “evodevo”, evolutionary innovation. Understanding the story about morphology
and innovation reveals a different conception of the foundational
problem, providing an alternative way of conceptualizing the “evo” and
the “devo” to be integrated. (This paper is the beginning of a larger
dissertation project on explanations of the origin of evolutionary
novelty since the Modern Synthesis with special reference to evolutionary
developmental biology.)
Peter Machamer and Jacqueline Sullivan, Leveling Reduction
Philosophical models of reduction presuppose that there are distinct
levels entities (epistemic or ontic) in the world, and that somehow it is
desirable to have explanations that are uni-level descriptions. In this
paper we argue that explanations, typically, if not always, are multileveled descriptions. One reason for this is that activities are crucial
to explanations, and activities typically, are involved with entities at
more than one level.
We show this by a general argument and in detail
by looking at the case of LTP and memory in neuroscience.
Two interesting conclusions follow. First, if "level" is used in
a the way scientists use it, it is a harmless, adequately clear notion
relativized to a research project; neither of these is true when
philosophers use "level" in an ontic or episetemic sense. Second, what
scientists seem to mean when they talk about "reduction" is finding the
mechanisms by which things work, and this is what philosophers ought to
mean too. In which case "reduction" becomes a harmless, mostly clear
concept that means filling in mechanism schemata. Philosophical talk
about reduction and levels obscures the way in which explanations
(mechanisms) are sought and given.
Gianmatteo Mameli, On The Gene-Centric View of Natural Selection
The gene-centric view of natural selection is the view that when natural
selection acts upon a population of organisms it always produces changes
in the gene pool of that population. There are three distinct arguments
that can be or have been proposed in support of such a view: "the
argument from development", "the argument from transgenerational
stability of form", and "the argument from transgenerational stability of
variation". Both the supporters and the critics of the gene-centric view
show little or no awareness of the differences between the three
arguments. I spell out the three arguments, show how they differ, and
show what is wrong with each of them.
Sandra Mitchell, Anthropomorphism:
Cross-Species Modeling
There has been a recent resurgence of interest in anthropomorphism,
attributable to both the rise of cognitive ethology and the requirements
of various forms of expanded, environmental ethics. The manner and degree
to which non-human animals are similar to human beings has thus become a
focus of scientific research and a necessary component to our decisions
to act morally.
At its basis, anthropomorphism involves claims about the similarity of
non-human objects or beings to humans. Critics of anthropomorphism often
attack the presumptive character of such claims. In this paper I
consider a range of stances toward anthropomorphism from global
rejections to specific models. The bumper sticker version of this talk
could be: science made too easy is bound to be wrong. In the end I will
argue that specific anthropomorphic theses are supported or not supported
by the same rigorous experimental and logical reasoning as any other
scientific model.
David Papineau, The Evolution of Means-End Cognition: Why Animals
Ain't Smart
Why is there a cognitive gulf between other animals and humans? Current
fashion favours our greater understanding of Theory of Mind as an answer,
and Language is another obvious candidate. But I think that analysis of
the evolution of means-end cognitive mechanisms suggests that there may
be a further significant difference: where animals will only perform
those means which they (or their ancestors) have previously used as a
route to some end, humans can employ observation to learn that some novel
means is a route to a desired end. In short, human can learn from
observation, where animals can learn only from first-hand experience.
Karola Stotz, Bringing Life back to Mind: Bodily experience, situated
activity, and environmental embeddedness of cognition
The center of qualitative experience as cognition, feeling, and
awareness, is not the mind alone but the whole organism including beside
the mind its body and its environment. And it is the whole organism that,
as the center of agency, is, in Kauffman’s words, acting on its own
behalf. Living a life instead of computing it allows the organism to act
spontaneously and appropriately, an end less achieved by means of rich
but passive inner models of the world than by the ‘cheap and efficient
production of real-world action in a real-world context’ (Clark). In this
paper I shall discuss some of the artificial mysteries of the mind
created by mainstream representationalist approaches of cognition, and I
will explore some of the implications of reaching beyond the information
processing and computation metaphor in cognitive science.
D.M.Walsh, The Causes of Adaptation and the Unity of Biology (draft of
paper available)
Evolutionary Biology has two principal explananda, fit and diversity
(Lewontin 1978). Natural selection theory stakes its claim to being the
central unifying concept in biology on the grounds that it demonstrates
both phenomena to be the consequence of a single process. By now the
standard story hardly needs reiterating: Natural selection is a force
that operates over a population, preserving the better fit, culling the
less fit, and along the way promoting novel solutions to adaptive
problems. Amundson’s historical survey of the concept of adaptation
captures the idea succinctly:
The phenomenon of adaptation is at the core of modern evolutionary
biology. Natural selection, the mechanism universally regarded as the
primary causal influence on phenotypic evolutionary change, is first and
foremost an explanation of adaptation. (1996: 11)
At the same time, it appears that the capacity of natural selection to
cause adaptations cannot account for every feature of the nature and
distribution of biological form. Reason to believe this devolves from
the simple fact that the bearers of biological form are organisms and a
salient fact about organisms is that each faces the tribunal of the
environment as a corporate entity, not as a loose aggregate of
independent traits. One consequence of this fact is that at each stage of
its development from egg to adult an organism must be an integrated,
functioning whole. Another is that for any form to arise in an organism
at a time, it must develop from the materials and processes at the
organism’s disposal. The requirement of integration and the processes of
development that produce it leave their distinctive marks on form. It
seems reasonable, then, to suppose that one might appeal to the processes
of development and the principles by which they operate in explaining the
nature and distribution of biological form. (See here Gould 1977; Rose
and Lauder 1996)
John Dupre',
Comments on Mitchell and Arnold
Jonathon Hodge, Comments on Lennox and Love
These issues (and more) are raised in Gould and Lewontin (1979).