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THE :he for the Athenian Herald, informing Athenians about: BC 237 .narrow mountain passes and sea cal superiority. With invasion imminent, the people of Thessaly in the 10000 A force of troops Persian attack. direct line of appealed to the League for help. Thessaly was led by Themistocles was dispatched north. The strategy was to defend the Pass of Tempe, but the Greeks soon realised that this was impossible. Tempe was abandoned and the Greeks returned to the Isthmus. Thessaþ was left to the Persians. The meeting of 4BO BC In 480 BC a second meeting of the Panhellenic League was held at Corinth, attended by delegates from thirty-one states. It is estimated that they could have deployed 40000 hoplites and 70000 lightly armed troops. The navy consisted of 400 warships. The only cavalry that could be counted on was that of Thessaly (before they medised). According to Herodotus, Xerxes brought an army of approximately five million to invade Greece. Modern historians have tended to divide this figure by ten. Such a huge force-500 O0G-left the Greeks hopelessly outnumbered. (See Chapter 4.) The Greeks realised that the logistics of keeping such a huge army supplied could work against Xerxes, and they resolved to fight in con- Greek 5OO-44O straits-which would neutralise the Persians' numeri- : the imminent Persian inuasion : the propheciesfrom Delphi : Themistocles' a.d,qice a rnorale in Athens. A. WORLD: fined spaces //c/tr,tt/y: emp o/67 /ostî Vrite headlines GREEK Another meeting of the League was held to discuss strategy. It was decided to defend the mountain pass of Thermopylae and to send the fleet to Artemisium. (A detailed account of the battles of Thermopylae, Artemisium and Salamis can be found in Chapter 5.) WAR AGATNST XERXES Thermopylae and Artemisium Herodotus is our main informant about the decision to defend Thermopylae and dispatch the fleet to Artemisium. traitor, Ephialtes, shows the Persians a track Persian carnp across the mountains-the Persians attack Leonidas from fhe rear a Supply base West gâte of Leonidas gate Leonidas, with his 300 Spartans, makes a final heroic standall Spartans die Callidromus Mountains The Phocians guarding the withdraw, allowing the Persians to advance pass K.y f Buttl" of Thermopylae Main Greek force under a Leonidas (6000 men) Main Persian advance rcuRE 8.7 E Ancient wall sheltering Greeks I Greek lPhocian) delachment ll ftooo i"r¡ Persian The battLe of Thermopylae gr""dirg mountain track movement $ Final stand of Greeks on mound HISTORICAL 23A Th,e PERIODS that are read,y and, defend. øgainst the barbarianfor the saltn of their ownfreedom and that of th.e rest of the Greelts along wi,th the Løkedoemnnianu, thc Corinthiaru, proposal thatfound the m,ostfauour was to gunrd, thc pass of Thcrmopylo,e, on thc grounds that it was narrower than thc pøss into Thessaly and øt thn same tim,e ncarer hnme . . . and, at the same timc to send th,e fl.eet to Artemisium on the coast of Hßtiona;for thcse two plat:es being close togethcr, cotnmunicatinn would, be thc Aigirætøns and, all thc others who wish to share th.e d,anger. The gerærals are to appoinl, størting tomnrrow,200 trí,erørchs, one to o, ship,from omnng those wh,o haae legitimøte child,ren and, whn are nat oldcr thanfifiy; ø these m,en the ships are to be assigred by lot, They are ø enlist mariræs, ten to earh ship,from m,en between thc ages of menty and. thirty, andfour archcrs. They are to distribute the seruiremen [thc marines and, archcrs] by Iot at the same timc as they assign th,e trierarchs to th.e ships by lot. The gerærals are to write up the rest ship by ship on whiæ boards, [taking] thn Ath,eniøns from the eaßy. HERoDorus,The Hßtorins, trans. by AUBREY DE SÉ¡-rxqounr, p.503 Following are the main stages of the battle of Artemisium: 1. 2. 3. 27I Greek ships were stationed at Artemisium to defend Greece. The Persians, with superior forces, attempted to trap the Greeks in the na¡'row waters. lexiarchir registers, On the first day, in an indecisive battle, the Persians attempted to encircle the Greeks. The Greeks, however, formed a tight circle of bows towards the enemy and captured 30 Persian ships. 4. Violent storms destroyed many Persian ships. 5. On the second day, the Greeks attacked 6. and When thc ships høae been mnnncd, with 100 of thæm thcy are to mcet thc eræmy at Artemisium in Euboea, and, with thc oth,er 100 they are to lic off Salarnis and, th,e. coast of Attira and, keep gtnrd, u.ter th.e land.. In ordcr that all Ath,enians møy be united in th.eir dcfence were fought, with heavy losses on both sides. News arrived of the disaster at Thermopylae, and the Greeks decided to withdrew. (See also Figure 5.8 on p. 153.) agaiwt the barbarinru, thnse whn haae been sent into exil,efor ten years ale to go n Salamis and, to stay there until th,e people comn to som,e dcci;ion about th,em, whil.e thnse who haue been d.epriaed of citizen rights øre to haue thcir rights restored. Themistocles left messages carved on the rocks, urging the Ionians in the Persian forces to withdraw. In L959 an inscribed marble stela, dating from the 4th century was discovered at Troezen. The inscription, reproduced in Source 8.9, provided scholars with an insight into the strategy of the Greeks before the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium. To entrust thc city to Athcrut the Mistress of Ath,ens and, to all the other gads to gu,ard, and, dcfend,from thc barbarianfor thc salæ of th.e lnnd,, Thc Atheniøns thcmselues and. theforeígncrs whn liue in Athens are to send th,eir children ønd, wom,en to safety in Troezen, thcir protector being Pitthcus, th.efound,ing hcro of the land,. They are to send the old, mnn and, their mmable possessions to safety on Sølarnß. Thc treasurers and, TF|EMrsrocl.Es' DEGREE, cited in D. KAGAN, History,Yol.l, p. 285 Probl.ems in Anr:icnt Q/n /,6e dntt / an ltng an d u s tng ,out"e, s Tb whom wøs Athens to be abandoned? a What were the people of Athens instructed to do? ; What were the men. of military age instructed to do? ; Which lines of the decree malæ it obaious tlrat the battles of Thermopylae and, Artemisium høue not yet tøken pløce? s Was this an organised, eaacuation or a hasty retreat? Proaide euideruce to support your aiew. pricstesses are to remnin on the orropolis, gtnrd,ing thc property of thc god"s. All thc other Ath.enia ns and, foreigncrs of milinry age are to embark on thc 200 ships foreignnrs from those regßtered Posei.don the Securer. destroyed some Cilician vessels. Over the next few days, several indecisive battles L th,e with thc polemarch. Thcy are to write th,em up assigning themby d,iaßinns,200 of about oræ hmd,red, [næn] earh, and, to write aboue eorh d,ioisinn thn nøm,e of thn triremc and. of th.e trierarch and, th.e serui,cem,ery so that thcy mny krnw on whfu:h trireme eorh d,íuisinn is n embark. Wh,en øll th,e diaßinns høae been cornposed, and, allotted. to th,e triremcs, thc Courrcil and. th,e gerærals are to mnn all the 200 ships, ofter sanrifiring a pl,aca.tory ffiring to Zeus thc Alrnighty ønd, Athena and, Nike and THE cREEK Herodotus suggests that a combined defence by .and and sea was to be made at Thermopylae and Artemisium-the Peloponnesian army marching north to defend the northern Greek states. According to Herodotus, however, the defeat at Thermopylae and Artemisium was unexpected, and the Athenians and northem Greeks were betrayed by the Peloponnesians, who did not send the expected number of troops north. Instead, northern and central Greece were defeated and abandoned to the Persians. The Athenians were forced to evacuate their city while the Spartans fortified the Isthmus. Go The decree of Themistocles suggests that the Athenians had agreed to abandon their city and to fight at the Isthmus before Thermopylae and Artemisium. These two battles would be delaying actions, designed to reduce the numbers of the enemy and to give the Athenians time to evacuate their city. Only the Isthmus was to be seriously defended. This explains why so few Spartan troops were present at Thermopylae, and why no morè were forthcoming. It also reflects Spartan military policy. The Spartans were unlikely to have subjected their main army to overwhelming odds so far north in Boeotia-this was to risk the prospect of devastating defeat. However, he strategy to abandon Athens and fight delaying actions at Artemisium and Thermopylae puts a different light on the cooperation of Athens and Sparta. It suggests that they had formulated a unified, wellplanned strategy against the Persians. The account in Herodotus, written some fifty years later when Athens and Sparta were at war, paints the Spartans in a bad light. They had let Athens down badly by not sending more troops north and by selfishly wanting to defend only the Peloponnese. It also explains why only I00 ships were sent to Artemisium. If Themistocles' decree is authentic, it suggests a bold and courageous plan, with both Athens and Sparta carrying our their agreed tasks-the Athenians sacrificing their city and Leonidas giving his life. The authenticity of this decree has been much disputed; but it is an important factor to take into account when considering Greek strategy at this time. ,Zot ltscussion ; ) Which strategy do you thinh the Greeks tued,? How useful is Themistocles' d,ecree as a piece of euidence? WORLD: BC 299 tell the Spartans you uho read, their ordcrs ønd, are dead.e We tooh Thermopylae continues to inspire even modem Greek poets, such as C. P. Cavafy. Horwur to those who in the life thcy lead, d.efi.ræ and. gunrd, a Thcrmapylac. Neuer betraying what is right, consßtent øndjust in øll thny do, but shonting pity ølso, and. compassinn; generous when they're rich, and. when thcy're poor, still gercrous in small ways, still helping os mtu:h as thcy cøn; always spealeing the trulh, yet without hating those whn li¿. And, euen mnre honnur ß d,un to thern when thcy foresee (as many do foresee) that Ephinlæs will turn up in thc end., that the Medcs will breøk through after all. C. P. CAvAFv, citedin G. CALLExoen,,4spects of Anci.ent Greece,p. 106 9"t /)scussion What does this mod,em poem tell tu about the ualues to be learnt from th.e battle of Thennopylae? The battle of Salamis Xerxes now marched south with nobody to hinder his attack. The evacuation of Athens was completed, while the ships that had returned from Artemesium lay off the island of Salamis. A council of war was held with Eurybiades, the Spartan commandeq calling for suggestions as to where the fleet should best engage the Persians. Most were in favour of defending the Peloponnese and therefore fighting at the Isthmus. Any action at Salamis was considered to be far too risky. While this council was proceeding news arrived that the Persians 'had entered Attica and that the whole country was ahlaze' (Herodotus, Histories, YIII, 49).The acropolis, on which a few'die hards'had barricaded themselves, was soon taken; those who remained were butchered, the temples stripped of their treasures and the city set on fire. fhe inspiration of Thermopylae Ierodotus tells of the honours that were paid to the partans who defended Thermopylae: 5OO-44O elbid., p. 520. 240 HISTORICAL 0 PERIODS l0 5 hilotnetres t Stage Buy of Eleusis I The Persian fleet blockades the exits from the Bay of Eleusis. Àthens ü Piraeus SALAMTS /¿ 66 ¡ o\\ 2 Bay of Eleusís Stage 2 Entering the strait, the Persians are attackecl at the flank and rear by the Aeginetans. The Greeks take advantage of the confined space and rout the Persian fleet, 4, Nlt I. I . Xerxes'throne I .¡ - ss I Greek fleet I 2 3 4 0 Spartans S,A,LÀMIS ^SS _sss Þss Ðss 3 Athenians Aeginetans Corinthians Persian fleet € Piraeus 012345 Ieilo¡netres FIGURE 8.8 The battle of Salamis Themistocles, strategist or trickster? It is Themistocles who is given the main credit for the strategy and victory at Salamis. Plutarch offers some interesting observations. Becau.se of the prestige of Sparta the Greelt.fleet was undßr the command, of Eurybiad.es, but h.e showed little cletermination in the fa.ce of d,anger and was anxiotrs to hoi.st sailfor the Isthmus, u¡h,ere the Peloponnesian arm.y wos corcenlrated. Th,emistocles, howeuer, opposed thß plan and it was then that he uttered a remarh uhich became famous. Eurybiades had said to him: 'You lnnw, Themistocles, at the games they thrash anybody who starts before the signal', to which Themistocles replied,, 'Yes, but they do not croun anybody who gets lefi at the post.' Then, when Eurybiades lffied. up hß stalf as if to strilte him, Thenistocles said.,'You may hit me if you like, but you must lßten to me.' Eurybiades was forced to admire his self-possession and told him to speah out, and Themßtocles then tried to læad him ba.ck to the subject. At this point somebod,y objected, that a man without a city had no right to press those who still possessed oræ to aband,on it and,forsalte their country, uhereupon Themistocles turncd on him and retorted, 'lt is quite true, you wretch, that we haue giuen up our howes ancl our city walls, becanue we did rnt choose to become erclauedfor the sal¡e of things that haue m life or soul. But uhat ue still possess is the greatest city in all Greece, our 200 ships of war, which are now reacly to dcfend you, if you are still willing to be saued by them. THE But f you run crway and ltetray us, o.s you di.d, orrce before, the Greeks wíll soon heør the ræws thøt the Atheniaru haue found themselues asfree a city and, as finc a country as the otæ they haae sacrifrced.'When he hnard Thnmistocles speahing in this tone, Eurybiad,es began to reflect and. was frightercd. at the thought that the Athenians might sail autay and. abandon him. PLUTARcH, The Rise and, Fatt of Athnns, trans. bv t. ScoTT_KtLvERr, ETIITiE E-i='l pp. g&_ö 7) Thernisøcles appears to haue chosen the time for th,e battle as jud.íciously as n" n wt o:, a tn" p,tou."ä;i;'*r4r, to let thÊ triremcs engage the blrbarian sn¡rì n*o¿ the tim,e of d.ay when rn, *¿"¿ :tn:il ^,rlUíiU*, fresnJïom the sea and, sends a heauy swell roliins through the twrrows. This breeze *; ;;;;";;:"r"r" to th.e Creelc ships, which were comparatiaely smøll ønd. in the water, but it caught'the ly ly lrÃi"""lirt , which were difficult to ûumne.¿are with thcir high d.echs and-towering sterns, and, swung thern around, broadsid¿ opponcnts, who d.ash"i ¡n -th,eir The Greek cør11iru hept awatchfut""r;rty-;rh""ulu**. to ö, ;"lh**î*r*r, *"r, tt" right t.øctirs øfouow, and, alo br"";:"-L;"'l;;;ií*ro becatue thcyfelt that he saw most cliørly what opposite him Xerxes, ad,miral, Arùtmcncs, great courage. pLurARsH, ;*""; Th.e Rise and. Fatt of Athcns,trans. by t. scorr-Ktl.vERT, t:-örl-n Uuo.*:^,ælt cr=-f -o'- -'vvvt rwvút "lthr";hthis. Rise and, Fatt of Athcns,trans. by l. sqorr-Ktlvenr, How ímporta,nt w&s the role defeøt of the persians? k*:!::úns sources p. 9å antusrny , Eualuate Themistocles, role. Was he a good, strategist or a con nrctn gambling at great od,d,s with his city,sfate? What do these documents tell us about the relcttíonship between Athens Salamis? if"""'ï, ""a BC 241 of Themistocles in the The lead up to plataea After Salamis, Xerxes retumed persia. to Themistocles proposed that a Greek X"o", to ""p"ditio.riolloJ Ionia and punish rhose states that had siJed with the Persians. The Greek victory;;Hä;meant that the vast Persian army_remained ìn Greece without an adequate supplv line. But-Ath";JJñ; desrroyed; and the persian commander, l¿".¿*irr, ;lieved Greeks, demoralisert by this, surrender. Mardonius moved Iri, the winter, and auemprea t" "rã b-reak up the alliancÀ of Greek ;;iil;;" **y-t" the fikely to äessaly for öffi# means ro Macedon was sent to offer,h" d;;ï; uì with the pe¡sians p"rri* stJtes.'ärander of in return fo, gãjto "uiur,"" ,"build their, city. The Spartans, afraid tlrui ir" et¡enians mrght accept, offered to assist Ath"rrr. À ,umb", of Greek srares submitted to ,lr" pirrl"".; ii¡".r, üL" Olynthus, had their inhabita; _î.rä"äa.'Wh"r, th" Athenians refused the p"rsian oiiãr]ïur¿o,riu, ,The marched against Athens. people oïa,fr"rr. uguln evacuated their citv. M"rrug", *Ã-råì, spartans, .*.ukjns ir,"- io,?ã1,"*'-ä"p to the rheir promises of help. Herodotus ,"";r;:';;e such message, TOU, who were LN t- terror, lest we should malæ peü:e with Persi,ø_rnw that you kr¿out our spirit without dnubt, and. that 'we shall lleÙer be tra,itors to creece_ and rlot0, too, that yourfortfrcation of the Isthmus ¿s almnst complcæ-take no a.ccount of Ather*. You agreed with us to oppose the iwader Ln Boeotia, but you broke your word ønd. allowed him to iwade Atti,ca. Thü condtrct on your pa,rt has roused the anger ofAthew; tt Øa,s ..ne EOO_44O Zc/t'r.,i/y.'ess EreTTTEI G--! I-r thøt of ølt thn Creek states Aegina receiaed the palmfor aalaur, and that o¡tn, ,rål*no t_ook part in the battle eùeryone, in ffia, award"d,-th" high¿st hnnour to Thcmisto_cles, ;t*iä;r^y PLUTARcH, The WORLD: pp. 9f_á us madc thcrn unuilting to adrnit cREEK unworthy of the hour and, ofyourselaes. Howeuer, your im,med,iate duty ¿s to a.cced,e to our present requcst: put your arml Ln, th.efrald, thor you and, we togethcr fi¡,ay mcet Mard,onitu tn Attù:a. Nou,, that Boeotia ¿s lost to lls, th.e best place to en&øge him, u¡ithin our own tenitory, ¿s the pIøin of Thria. ThÊ ephars undcrtooh to gwe their &ftßwer on thc following tuy; ba when tt caûtÊ, they madÊ afurther postponemÊnt till the day afier, and, thcn till the ú", that; LNf*t thcy k"pt putting ú off"fro* onÊdo'y doy to thc nextfor tæarly a fortnight. Meanwhile the Peloponræsiøns Ln a bìody were working hard at thß wall PERIODS HISTORICAL 242 which was rurw nearing completion. Why was it that, when Alexand,er akited Athens, the Spartans were d,esperately antciow lest the Athenians a.cross the Isthmus, tory of Thebes, where he would be able to use hrcavalry. He constructed a palisade and took up a posi tion along the Asopus River, near Plataea. shnuld go ouer to Persia, wh.ereos nnw they d,id, nat seem to care ajot? The onþ explanation I can giue ß, that the fortíftcatinrc of th,e Isthmrs uere now complete, ønd they therefore felt that Athenian hclp was rw longer The lnlted,aem.oniøns halted at th,e Isthrntu on their arriuøI th.ere, ønd, th,e other Peloponræsiarx who chose to d.o thcir duty-some of them only whcnthcy saw the Spartans on thc mørch-feh osham,ed to stay behind and takc n part in the exped,ition. Accordingly, after necessary. HERoDorus,Th,e Hßtori,es, trans. by AUBREv SÉu¡rqounr, DE pp. 579-80 getting fo,uourabl,e omcns from thn sarrif,c.e, th.e combirædforces of thc Pel.oponnese left the Isthmus ønd, adøanced to Elewis Here they again ffired. sarrffi.ce, and, again getting good, omcns continu,ed thcir aduønce, haaing rcw been joircd by the Ath.eniaw, who had, crossed, n th,e møinland,from Salamis. At Erythra,e in Boeotia th,ey learnt tfuú th,e enemy had talæn up hi"s position on thc Asopus, and,, in ai.eut of this, th.emselues The Spartans finally responded after an in{luential Tegean representative, Chileus, addressed the ephors. oAs I see it, gentlemen [sai.d Chílcts], if th,e Athnnians dcsert us and, ma.læ an alliarrce with Persia, thcn, howeuer strongly th,e Isthmw isfortffied, the occupind, th,e lower slopes of Cithacron. postern HERoDorus, gates are wíde openfor the Persínn inuosinn of the Peloponrrcse. So you hod, better lßæn to thcm before they Th,e Hßtori,es, trans. by AUBREY ÞE SÉu¡rcounr, p.584 change th,eir mind,s and oÅ.opt a polircy whichwill ruin It Greece,' Thc eph,ors toolc th,e warning to heart, anl. without a word, to thn dclcgates, immndiaæly, before daybrealc, dispatch,ed aforce of 5000 Spartan troops, earh man attend,ed by seuen helots, with Pøusønias, son of I was probably at Eleusis that the oath of Plataea was made by the combined forces of the Athenians and Peloponnesians. Keombrotus, in command,. HERoDorus,Th,e Hßtorins, trans. by AuBREY DE sÉuI¡rqounr, p.580 dntt / on {t'ng an I /6e sources (Un : : Why did somc Greek støtes decid,e to u st ng join the Persiøns? th¿ dcath, ønd, I will not count my llf: precinus thanfreednm. I will rnt leaae my offu:er, thc commandcr of tny regiment or company, either aliae or d¿ad,. I will wt withdraw unlcss mry command,ers l¿ad mc bo,ck, and, I will do whatsoeuer the gercrals order. I willfi,ght n m.ore I will bury th.e d,eol, of thnse whn hauefought as my allies, on thß field, and, will ¡nt lnaue orc of them unburi,ed,. After defeating th¿ barbario.ns in battle, I will tithe the city of thc Thnbaru; and. I will neuer destroy Athew or Sparta or Pk*ona or any of thn citi¿s whirh hnae fouglx os ow allins, rcr will I cottserú n their being starued,, nar ctû offfrom running water, whnthnr we befricnds or at war. How had the Spartans broken, their word to the Athenians? a What did the Athenia,ns want the Spartans to do? ; Why did the Spørtøns suddenly d,ecid,e to moue? : How ma,ny tnerl were sent? What does this tell w ) oATH oF PLATAEA, cited in E. BRADFoRD, Th,ermnpylae, p. 227 about the Spartans? ) From Herodotus' accotrnt, what can be leørnt about Sp art an -Athenian relati o ns ? Deployment of troops at Plataea The Argives had previously agreed with Mardonius to prevent the Spartans taking the field, but now had to send a messenger to inform him that the army had left Sparta. Mardonius left Attica and moved to the teni- Q/n lntt /on lzng an I us tng /,6e soutces : : Wh.ere d,id, Mard,onius position his forces? Wh,at møde the other Peloponnesíanforces decide to tofi.ght? s Wh.ere did the Greeks position themselues, ønd, why?- THE GREEK WORLD: 5OO-44O BC Zot ltscussion : 245 Thebes Persian fort Ca.n you explain, why the Greeks would ha,ue made this oath? a What can be learnt about Greek rutrølefrom the oath? of Cornposition of the Persian army ¡ Herodotus' account of the battle of Plataea is rather confusing, and he exaggerates the numbers of troops involved. Herodotus himself admits that an accurate count was not taken (Herodotus, Histories, IX, 31). Modern estimates suggest that 8000 Athenians and about 30 000 Peloponnesians made.up the Greek contingent. Although Herodotus claims that the Persian force numbered 300 000, it was probably composed of 35 000 infantry and 12 000 cavalry. The Persian forces, commanded by Mardonius, consisted of: o heavily armed cavalry o cavalry contingents from Persia, Media, Scythia, Bactria and India o Greek cavalry from Macedonia, Boeotia and Thessaly o an infantry component of l0 000 Immortals . some hoplites from the states of central Greece. Cornposition of the Greek arrny The major contingents of the Greek forces commanded by Pausanias were: o 5000 Spartiates, 5000 perioikoi and 35 000 helots o 8000 Athenians, commanded by Aristides o 600 Plataeans, Island Plataea Temple of Demeter Hysiae Eleutherae pass rõl v Mt Cithaeron pass To,{.thens I @ Persians build a wooden palisade @ Greeks take up position on the foothills of Mt Cithaeron @ Ä"opo. ridge-Pausanias moves from the foothills to a @ @ @ position across the ridge Puss through Mt Cithaeron, where Greek supply columns are surprised and massacred Sprlng poisoned by Persians Greeks retreat to this position; Mardonius attacks FIGURE 8.9 Støges I and 2 ofthe battle of Plataea 3000 Megarians, 500 Aeginetans and smaller contingents from other Greek states. From the information that can be gleaned from Herodotus, it appears that Plataea was a protracted battle, taking place over a number of weeks, in a number of stages and over a wide area. The Persians were the more mobile force, having the advantage in cavalry and archers; the Greek were superior in infantry and would therefore have had the advantage in a close fight. 9", þt/6nt tn 0 es lrylalton Using your library resotrces, compile brief biographies of the tuto command,ers, Mard,onius and, Pa,usanias. Stage The Whcn the Greelt forces showed no intentinn of leauing thc Mardnnitu sent his caualry to atta,ch thcm inforce, undcr command, of thn distinguished Persian offirer Masßtius . . . who rodc a Nisaean horse with a bridle of gold and, othcr splendid trappings. The caualry aduanced, to thc attorlc in strccessiae sqtnd,rons, arul at each assault infli.cted heaty losses on the Greek, taunting them ønd, calling th,emuomÊn. It so happeræd that the point in the Greel¡ Ii¡æ whi.ch was ffnst open and, aulncrable to a caaalry charge wos held by the Megariarc, whofound. themselues hard, pressed by the high, ground' repeated attorks. The Megarians sent & ûtessøge reEtesting assistance. Pawanias sent I o For a considerable ffirtraLr-::-I:l a pirlæd contingent of Athenian archers, skilled bowmen were hnown to be a danger to atta,clring caaalry. For som,e timc the battle continued, until d,uring th.e surcessiae attaclts of the Persian squadrons, Masistiw' horse, which was in ad,uønce of the rest, 'tt)os shot in the flanh, and the pain of the wound mad.e hím rear and throw his ridcr. No soonør wos o"s time (estimates vary from twelve days to three weeks), the two forces faced each other across the Asopus river. Mardonius wanted to use his cavalry against the Greek forces, so he tried to lure them down from the foothills of the mountains and onto the plains. 244 HISTORICAL PERIODS him. Thcy his hnrse and,fi,rwlly-though rct withow Mosistit¿s dnwn than th,e Ath.enians were upon seized, difftruhy-hillcd M asistius himself, wh,o fought hard for his li,fe. Thc reason why they could rct kill him at oru:e was th.e armnur hc wore-a corslet of golden scalcs undcr his scørlet tuni,c. No bkru upon the corslet had, any ffict, until auive, the Greeks had to contend with constant øt lost a sold,ier saw how it was and Persian cavalry attacks and inegular supplies. Both sides took the omens and were advised to be cau- hefell dead,. Thß occurred, withnut thc kwutlcd,ge of thc rest of the sqtndro4 wh,o stru,ck him in o th,e eye, and. hod rct obseraed eithcr their command,er'sfall or hi^s death . . . It was only when they d,rew rein agøin thøt thcy missed hirn-for thcre wos tto onÊ to giae them commnnds . . . a shàrp strugglc toolt ploce around. Masistitn' body . . . ¡fhe Persiønslfailed to keep possessinn of thc bod.y, and, lost, itu the ottem,pt, a number of thcir m,en besides. Thcy then retired, a qunrter of a milc or so, to takc snclc of their siaøtiaq and f,nnlþ decidcd., funing lost thcir commnndnr, to report to Mard,onitu. On thcir arriaal at h.ead4uarærs with the tious. One of the omens informed Mardonius to watch the pass of Cithaeron, which he did. o other pro-Persian states for food. deepest distress at harses and, mules, and, aband,onnd thnmselaes cri.es of to o su.ch grief . . . , . . thc Greelts, funing both h¿Id. and. repulsed, thc cøaalry charge, were murh encouraged,, They put Masistiw' body on a cart and, paradcd, it along the lincs. h uas certaäy worth loohing at,þr Masistius uos & tøll and, splcnd,i.d,ly hand;omc mnn-thi"s was why they did it-and, thn m.en brolæ ranJæ to get ø sight of unable to bring about an engagement, consulted Artabazus. His recommendation was that the Persians should move into Thebes and send out gifts to leading men of the Greek states to break up the alliance. Mardonius, however, favoured a military solution. The Persian cavalry continued to attack the Greeks. In one of these attacks the Gargaphia Spring was poisoned. The Greeks were in a dreadful position, for they had little food and were effectively without a water supply. They could not retreat during daylight because the Persian cavalry would cut them down. o Pausanias held a conference, at which tus, refused to retreat, as this was against the lntt / an dt'ng an I us tng Spartan code ofhonour. The Greeks were to take up position at a piece of land called 'the Island', where they would have better access to a water supply and some protection from Persian cavalry attacks. One half of the army was to head for the Island, while the other half was to move to the Cithaeron foothills and relieve the food convoys. reason, the withdrawal was not completed in the night. /6e sources o For some unknown o Stage 3 How díd the Persians insuh the Greelts? What does thís tell w about ancient attitud,es ctnd uøIues? a What type of man was Masistius? a What impact did Masistius' death høae on the Persians? What fficæ did Masistius' d,eøth høae on th,e Greeks? Stage 2 o was Plataea. One of the Spartan officers, Amomphare- l{ERoDoTus,Th.e Historics, trans. by AUBREY DE SÉuuqounr, pp. 584-ó s it decided to withdraw to the foothills closer to Masistius. Q,/n The Persian forces intercepted a supply column of 500 mules that was bringing much-needed food for the Greeks. Mardonius also had problems with supplies in that he had to rely on the Thebans and the o Mardonius, neuts, Mardnniu"s ønd, th,e whnle armry showed thn Masßtitu' d,eath-a mnn mnre highly thnught of, both by thc king and, his subjects, than anyone else in th.e Persian armry except Mardnniw himself; thcy shaued, thcir hea.ds, cut thc mønes of th,eir Persians) and took up a position across the AsopJ, r{dge, close to Plataea, where he had better accesr to water at the Gargaphia Spring (see Figure 8.9). This also gave him a better position for his hoplites. Both sides waited, neither willing to risk an engagement. Although Greek reinforcements continued to Pausanias moved down from the foothills (probably under cover of darkness to avoid detection by the o At dawn, o Mardonius was surprised to see that the Greeks had retreated. He ordered his whole army to engage. The Persians, whose sight of the Greeks was obscured by the hills, believed that they had them on the run, and streamed forward in a disorganised mass. o At this point the battle became divided. The Greek allies of the Persians-the Thebans anC Boeotians-cut off the Athenians on the left anr there they fought a pitched battle. The Thebans los i THE 300 of their best men before the Athenians finally beat them. When the Boeotians realised the a 245 First thcre was a struggle øt thc baniradc of shield"s; then, the banícadc døwq there wos a bitter and protrarædfi.ght, hand, to hand, close by the Temple of Demeter,for the Persiaru would lay hold of the Spartan spears and, brealt. thcm; in courage and, strength they were cls good os their a.duersaries, but they were d.ef.cient to Thebes in annour, untrairæd, and, greatly inferior in shill . . . thcyfell upon the Spartan liræ and, were cut d,own. They pressed, hard,est øt the point whcre Mard,oniusfought in person-rid,ing hß white charger, and, surround,ed. by Persian etockade his thnttsani, Persian troops, theflower of the armry. While Mardnnius was aliue th,ey contiruted to resist and to dcfend, thnmselaes, and, stnrck. døwn many of tlæ La.hed,aem,oniarc; but øfter his d,eath, and, the d.estnrction of hß persornl guard-the fi.ncst of th,e Persian troops-thc remøindcr yi,elded to thc lnkedo.emnniaru and. tooh toflight. The chi.ef catue of thcir di^scornfi,ture uos thcir larh of armnur, fi,ghting withnut it agairæt h.eaaily armed infantry. Thus th.e prophecy of thc ora,cle wasfuffilled, and Mardanius rendcred, satisfortinn to thc Spartaræfor the hilling of Inonid,os; and, thus, too, Pausanias . . , won the mnst Gargaphia o Spring Persians Rfuer BC th,emfo,ce toface. infantry. Deroe 5OO-44O sami.ficial airtims promised strccess. At thi"s, the Spartaru, too, at last runed,forwørd, agøinst th,e eræm,y, whn stopped shooting their arrows and, prepared to meet Persians were being defeated, they fled. The Lakedaemonians and Tegeans, on the right, fought alone against the onslaught of the Persian ,{soPus Rh:et WORLD: GREEK splend,id, Plataea airtory that hßtory records. HERoDorus,The ¿o Historins, trans. by AuBREv DE sÉu¡rcounr, pp.60l-2 Cithaeron to FIGURE 8.f O Stage 3 of the battle of Plataea (Un dnrt / on lt'ng an I /tÇe soutces ... o"s [th.e Spartarx] were about to engage tßith mcarwhile mnny of the Írcn't/)ere kill.ed,, and, møny more wounded,for the Persians had, madc a barri,cadc of thcir wiclær shi¿tds ond, from thc protectinn of it øere shnoting arrows in strch numbers that the Spartan troops were in serinw distress; thiß, odd¿d to thc unføaourablc .. results of thc sarriftre, at la,st catßed, Pøtuanios to turn his eyes to thc Temple of Hera and, to call upon th,e goddcssfor her ai.d,, praying hcr nnt to øll,ow th¿ Greelæ to be robbed, of their hope of ai,ctory. Theu while th,e words were still upon hß lips, th,e Tegearc sprang forutørd, to leo.d thc attock, and, a mamÊnt later thn tny s What can be leørnt from Source B. 19 about the role of religion in ancient times? (You might ølso lilæ to read Plutarcå, Aristides, I 1, 19-21 on religion and the battle of Plataea.) a List the adaantages and disaduantagesfor each side in the battle of Plataea. s What d,o you consider were the signfficant føctors that enabled the Greelts to win? L-.-rtIiI---::r-IÐ Mardnnitn and, hß mcn, they performed, thc ritwl of særifi.ce. Thc om¿ns were rntfauourable; and, us o Plutarch (Life of Aristides, l9), tells us that Mardonius was killed by a Spartan who crushed his skull with a stone. o The wily Artabazus, who had earlier advised Mardonius against fighting, fled with the men in his command to Phocis. Surprisingly, Xerxes did not execute him for desertion. o The remainder of the Persian forces retreated behind the wooden palisades. Pausanias and the 246 HISTORICAL PERIODS Spartans, who, according to Plutarch, were oinex- perienced at attacking fortifications', were unable to breach the Persian palisade. The arrival of the Athenians changed the balance, and the Greeks were able to force their way into the Persian stock- Q/n dnrt /an ltng an I us tng /.6e soutces ; What ís an epitaph? What do the sentiments ott, ade, where a great slaughter took place. these epitaphs reaeal about the soceities ønd, ue,lues The serpent column at Delphi-on the coils of of Athens ønd Sparta? which were inscribed the names of the Greek allieswas dedicated by the Greeks after Plataea in 479. This column was one of three dedications made from the spoils after the victory over the Persians. Source 8.20 reproduces two epitaphs from Plataea: (i) is the Athenians'; (ii) is the Spartans'; . What were sorne of the dfficuhies faced by the Greeks at Plataea? ; Do you consider Pløtaea to be the d,ecisiae battle in the Persiøn Wars? Giue reasons : for your answer. How critical was Pausønias' leadershíp? Øclioiþ'essay How importarut was Spørtø's contribution to the defence in 480-79 BC? (i) If d,y'tng nobly is thc greatest part of aalour, To tu aboue all othcrs Forturæ has granted, this; For after striaing to crown Greece withfreed,orn We lie here enjoying praise thøt will neuer age. (ä) These m,en gaiue their ircxtinguishablefame bekvued Mycale: a Greek offensive Mycale was important in the Persian Wars because for the first time the Greeks took the initiative. In 479 BC the Greek fleet of 250 ships set sail under the command of the Spartan king, Leotychides. They made country And enrompossed themselaes with the d,ark cloud. of dcath. They dicd but are rct dcad,, sin¿e their aalour glorifi,es themfrorn abute And. brings them upfrom the howe of Hadcs. M. DTLLoN & L. eARlAxo,AncicntGreece, p.2I1 L Thc aictory at Plato.ea was a re¡narha,ble ot:hieuemcnt for the Greelæ. If Themistocles and the Athcnians were primarily responsiblefor søuing Greece at Salamis, Pausanias and the Spartarc and, other Peloponncsian contingents played that rolc øt Plata,ea. When otæ trícs to enaßage the difftcuhi,es Pausaniasfa,ced, in hnlding togetherfor weelæ an arm.y consísting of ouer 100 000 mcnfrom som,e tutenty-four citi.es, plagu.ed, by dissension, insubordination and, lo,ck ofþod and,water, os well as the dfficulty of ward.ing off the constant threat of the excellent Persiøn caaalry, one can only øpplaud, Herodnttæ' ju.dgm,ent (lX, 64), rßing superinr to thc anti- Sp artan an d, anti- P elop onne sian prop ag an da whi.ch h,e heard, d,uring his residcnre in Athcns, when he writes thøt at Plataea, 'thefi,ncst ui,ctory in all hisnry 'lmnwn to ÍtÊ toos won by Pausanias, the son of Kleombrotus, th,e son of Ananønd,ridøs.' J. FINE, The Greelt. Arcient Creehs,p.320 their way initially to Samos, expecting to find the Persian fleet. The reasons for this expedition were: o to liberate the Ionian Greeks of Asia Minor o to incite a revolt among the Ionian cities o to prevent Persian troops from joining Mardonius o to ensure that no further Persian invasions occur:red. Greek spies from Samos (the headquarters of the Persian fleet), reported to the Greek high command that the Persian ships were in poor condition. The Greeks were persuaded that this was an opportune time to attack. On reaching Samos, they found that the Persians had sailed to Mycale, on the coastline of Asia Minor. L-.rlIiIaT-3-D Thc Persiaw, howeuer, learning of their approarh, dismissed their Phnenician contingeni ønd, thcmselaes mndc offtmtards the Asiatic coast;for th,ey had, dccidcd after disctusing th.e møtter that, os they were rc march had, better tnt rish an engagenænt. Accord,ingly, th,ey sail,ed to Mycale on the møinland, wh.ere thcy could, haae the protection of thcir oun troops which, at Xerxes' ord,ers, had been detachcd from the mnin army to guard, Ionia. Thß force wos for the Greehfleet, they 60 000 strong, and commøndcd, by Tigrørcs, thc tallest and, best-looking nurn in thc Persian armry. Their plan wos to beo,ch their aessels undcr thc protection of thnse t THE troops, and to constnrct ø dcferuiue ram,pa,rt round them, within whi.ch they could themselaes takc refuge . . . Thc Creelæ were mtæh aexed, when thcy d,ßcouered that the Persia¡u had, giaen them thc slip and, cleared outfor thc møinlønd,, ønd, could ¡nt at o¡æe dccidn wh.ethcr to return h,omc or sailfor thc Hellespon. Mycal,e. No eræmy aessel wos to be seen coming out to them as th.ey approo,ched thc Persian positinn . . . Leotychi.dcs took his ship as close in-sh.ore os he could, m,eet and,, as hc passed, along, got a cricr to shout the follouting appeøl to th,e lonians who were seruing with the eræmy: 'Men of lonia, lisæry if you can hcar mn, to what I haae to say. The Persintæ, in any case, won't undcrstønd, aword, of it. Whenth.e battlc begins, let ea,ch man of youf.rst remember Freednm-ønd, second,ly our password,, Hera. Arryoræ whn cøn't hear me shnuld be I say by th.ose whn can.' In thß h¿ had th¿ same intention as Thcmistocles ha.d, at Artemisiurn. Eithcr Persiøns øould not knaw what h¿ hod. søi.d. and the lonia.tu would, be persuaded to leøue th,ern, or his words were reported to thc Persians th,ey uould, mßtrtut their Greek subþcts . . . Thefi,rst ort of the Persians wh,en thcy saw th.e Greeks th.e if preparing tofi,ght, was to disann the Samiaru, whnm th,ey stupected of syrnpatlry utith th.e Greek cawe. H Q/n /Âe : ERoDoTUs, Thc Historics, trans. by Au BREv DE SÉuxqounr, pp.614-15 lntt /an ltng an I us tng "out"e" What did the Persians d,o when they learnt of the Greeh øpproøch? WORLD: 5OO-44O BC 247 deserted to the Greeks. This led Herodotus to comment that 'this day saw the second Ionian revolt from Persian domination'. Despite what Herodotus says, that Mycale occurred on the same day as Plataea, most historians dismiss this as poetic licence. The importance of Mycale In all the previous battles of the Persian Wars, the Greeks had been on the defensive. At Mycale, the Finølly, howeuer, thcy dccid,ed to d,o rcither, ba to makefor thc Asiatit codst . . . and, thefl.eet søilcd.for told, what GREEK Canyou expløintheir action? Greeks carried the war into Persian territory. Despite the victory at Mycale, the Greek forces were unable to hold Asia Minor and the Ionian Greeks were still not secure from the Persian threat. Mainland Greeks, however, had valiantly repulsed the massive Persian invasion. The Aegean waters and the important trade routes through the Hellespont to the Black Sea were now opened up to Greek trade. The Athenians, in particular, saw the advantages of trade in this region and seized the opportunity. Zchoi/7.' reotsion Draw up a table on a large sheet of paper, Iisting the battles of the Persian Wars down the page in the lefthand column. Across the top of the page d,raw up columns under the following head,ings: 'Date of battle', Releuant geo gr aphical fe atures',' Greek leøders', 'Persian leaders', 'Numbers on eacll side', 'Strategies of each side', 'Signifi,cance of the battle'. Complete the o table. TÐ^6o't ø.6o Uor" ìn lÂe Tnrrr'on Draw up ø tøble on a lørge sheet of paper. Read, baclt, through this chapter (Chapters 2 a,nd, 5 will also be useful). Compile a list of all the people mentioned,. In the left-hand column, write down the names of tlte ; Why did, the Greeks hesitate atfi.rst? a What was Leotychides' intention in, cctlling out to giuing their the loníøns? their main o,chieuements or importance. An exømple follows: The Greek force at Mycale numbered 6000. The Persian numbers are uncertain. The Greeks attacked the Persians, who positioned themselves behind a barricade of shields. The Athenians advanced across the people. In other columns, state who d,øtes each person was, (if possible), and briefly d,escribing Person Status/date Description Croesus King of Lydia Fought and lost øgøiwt King Cyrus of Persia frorn 56046 BC {lat ground of the beach, while the Spartans took in 546 BC the more difficult route over rough terrain. At first, the Persians stood firm against this onslaught. Herodotus 'IX, 104) suggests that the Athenians wanted the glory Zc/ioi/y; rf the victory for themselves and so increased their rfforts. They burst through the barricades and suc- : Expløin whether Spørta or Athens played the greater role in defeating the Persian* a ,4ssess :essfully defeated the Persians. The Spartans and the ther Greek contingents ar:rived to finish the battle. Iany of the Ionian Greeks in the Persian army essagl the unity of the Greek forces in defeating the Persíans. l 24A HISTORICAL PERIODS THE DELIAN LEAGUE were wel¡:omed by the Atheniøns, who rnad.e up their Ä.thens' leadership of the League miwls to put a check on Pausanias and, to arrange ma.tters gercrally in a way that would, best suit their After Mycale the Spartan king Leotychides and the Peloponnesian allies returned home. The Athenians, under the command of Xanthippus, and with the help of the Ionian Greeks, beseiged the stronghold of Sestos, held by the Persians. This independent action of the Greek forces took the war into Persian territory. After laying siege to the city, which they captured, the Athenians returned to Greece, taking with them their spoils. Sparta was still considered to be the leader of the Greek states. This situation was soon to change. The islands of Lesbos, Chios and Samos appealed to Athens who made a separate agreement with them while remaining loyal to the Panhellenic League. Athens was in favour of driving the Persians from the Aegean. The Athenians and lonian Greeks relied on maritime trade, and needed control of the Hellespont in order to obtain grain and other commodities from the Black Sea. Sparta did not favour continuing the war-as a self-supporting agricultural state it was not as dependent on trade. Sparta gave the helpful advice to the Ionian Greeks that they should migrate away ownínterests... from Persian influence. Sparta was already leader of the Peloponnesian 'Wars, League, but as a consequence of the Persian and the emergence of Athens, was no longer the supreme military state of Greece. Spartan leadership of the League was being questioned by some of the Peloponnesian states. With great reluctance, the Spartans continued the fight against the Persians. Pausanias , . . uas sent outfrom Spørta in cammand, of thn Helleni.c forces. He had with hirn twenty ships from the Peloponræse; the Athenians joircd hßforce with thirty ships and, there were a numher marefrom the other allies. They wentf.rst to Cyprw and won ot)er ûnst of th,e ßland; later they went agøinst Byzantium, which was in Persian occupation, and, still under thc cornmnnd, of Pausanias,forced the plo,ce to surrend¿r. But Pausanias had, alread.y begun to to reueal the arrogaÍLce of his nature, and, was becoming unpopular with the Hellencs, particularly so with thc loniøns and those whn hadjust recently been liberatedfrom Persian domina,tion. Thcse states approach,ed, the Ath.eniaræ, asldng them, since th.ey were th.eir own kircmen, to tahe th.em und,er their protectinn ønd, if Pøu,sønias arted in a d,ictatorial rtnwìßr, rnt to allow it. These approaches ffhe Spartarul nn longer wanted to be burdened with the war agairct Persia. Th,ey regard,ed the Ath.enians as being perfectly capable of exercising the cornmand, ønd as being also at that timefriend,ly to themselues. THUcyDtoes, Peloponnesian War, trans. by R. WARNER, pp. óló For when th.e Persiaw had, been d,riuen.from Greece and the war had, been carried, to Persian tenitory, thc Ath,eniøns made the insffirøble behaaiour of Pansanias their exasefor depriuing the Inkedaemonians of the comman¡L. HERoDorus,The Hßtori.es, trans. by AuBREv DE sÉl¡¡rqounr, pp. 525-ó 9orf"r/6n, ìnues/ìVa/ìon Read about Pausanias in Thucydides, I, l28-33. How d,id. the actions of Pausanias ffict Athens a,nd Sparta? The role of Aristides The Athenian general, Aristides, gained the approval of the allies by treating them courteously. Plutarch comments on the significance of this. . before thc Spartarn hnew it, [Aristid,es] had eased. thcm out of thn leadcrship, and, he di.d this not with th¿ help of troops or ships or caualry, but through tart and d,iplomacy. Thc Ath.enians were alread,y well lihed, thanlts to the jtutíce of Ari"stides and thc afføbìlìty shown by Kimnn, but the gro,sping and ouerbearing conduct of Pøusanio"s seraed, to end¿ar them to the .. Greeles euen more. The allied cornmandnrs uere constanly teøted, with arroganre and, ill ternper by Pannanias, and. th,eir ftLen were punish,ed, withfloggings or by beíngforced to stand, all day with an iron anchnr on th.eir shouldnrs. No one uas alloued, to get straw for bedding, or fodd,er for his horse, or to d,raw wøter until thc Spartans ha.d, helped thcmselues, and their seruants,