Download //c/tr,tt/y: empo/67 /ostî WAR AGATNST XERXES a

THE
:he
for the Athenian Herald, informing
Athenians about:
BC
237
.narrow mountain passes and sea
cal superiority.
With invasion imminent, the people of Thessaly
in the
10000
A
force
of
troops
Persian
attack.
direct line of
appealed to the League for help. Thessaly was
led by Themistocles was dispatched north. The strategy was to defend the Pass of Tempe, but the Greeks
soon realised that this was impossible. Tempe was
abandoned and the Greeks returned to the Isthmus.
Thessaþ was left to the Persians.
The meeting of 4BO BC
In 480 BC a second meeting of the Panhellenic
League was held at Corinth, attended by delegates
from thirty-one states. It is estimated that they could
have deployed 40000 hoplites and 70000 lightly
armed troops. The navy consisted of 400 warships.
The only cavalry that could be counted on was that of
Thessaly (before they medised). According to
Herodotus, Xerxes brought an army of approximately
five million to invade Greece. Modern historians have
tended to divide this figure by ten. Such a huge
force-500 O0G-left the Greeks hopelessly outnumbered. (See Chapter 4.) The Greeks realised that the
logistics of keeping such a huge army supplied could
work against Xerxes, and they resolved to fight in con-
Greek
5OO-44O
straits-which would neutralise the Persians' numeri-
: the imminent Persian inuasion
: the propheciesfrom Delphi
: Themistocles' a.d,qice
a rnorale in Athens.
A.
WORLD:
fined spaces
//c/tr,tt/y: emp o/67 /ostî
Vrite headlines
GREEK
Another meeting of the League was held to discuss
strategy. It was decided to defend the mountain pass of
Thermopylae and to send the fleet to Artemisium. (A
detailed account of the battles of Thermopylae,
Artemisium and Salamis can be found in Chapter 5.)
WAR AGATNST XERXES
Thermopylae and Artemisium
Herodotus is our main informant about the decision to
defend Thermopylae and dispatch the fleet to
Artemisium.
traitor, Ephialtes,
shows the Persians a
track
Persian carnp
across the mountains-the
Persians attack Leonidas
from fhe rear
a
Supply base
West gâte
of Leonidas
gate
Leonidas, with his
300 Spartans, makes
a final heroic standall Spartans die
Callidromus
Mountains
The Phocians guarding the
withdraw, allowing the
Persians to advance
pass
K.y
f Buttl" of Thermopylae
Main Greek force under
a Leonidas (6000 men)
Main Persian advance
rcuRE
8.7
E
Ancient wall sheltering Greeks
I Greek lPhocian) delachment
ll
ftooo
i"r¡
Persian
The battLe of Thermopylae
gr""dirg mountain track
movement
$ Final stand
of Greeks on mound
HISTORICAL
23A
Th,e
PERIODS
that are read,y and, defend. øgainst the barbarianfor the
saltn of their ownfreedom and that of th.e rest of the
Greelts along wi,th the Løkedoemnnianu, thc Corinthiaru,
proposal thatfound the m,ostfauour was to gunrd,
thc pass of Thcrmopylo,e, on thc grounds that it was
narrower than thc pøss into Thessaly and øt thn same
tim,e ncarer hnme . . . and, at the same timc to send th,e
fl.eet to Artemisium on the coast of Hßtiona;for thcse two
plat:es being close togethcr, cotnmunicatinn would, be
thc Aigirætøns and, all thc others who wish to share th.e
d,anger.
The gerærals are to appoinl, størting tomnrrow,200
trí,erørchs, one to o, ship,from omnng those wh,o haae
legitimøte child,ren and, whn are nat oldcr thanfifiy; ø
these m,en the ships are to be assigred by lot, They are ø
enlist mariræs, ten to earh ship,from m,en between thc
ages of menty and. thirty, andfour archcrs. They are to
distribute the seruiremen [thc marines and, archcrs] by
Iot at the same timc as they assign th,e trierarchs to th.e
ships by lot. The gerærals are to write up the rest ship by
ship on whiæ boards, [taking] thn Ath,eniøns from the
eaßy.
HERoDorus,The Hßtorins, trans. by AUBREY DE
SÉ¡-rxqounr, p.503
Following are the main stages of the battle of
Artemisium:
1.
2.
3.
27I Greek ships were stationed at Artemisium to
defend Greece.
The Persians, with superior forces, attempted to
trap the Greeks in the na¡'row waters.
lexiarchir registers,
On the first day, in an indecisive battle, the
Persians attempted to encircle the Greeks. The
Greeks, however, formed a tight circle of bows
towards the enemy and captured 30 Persian ships.
4. Violent storms destroyed many Persian ships.
5. On the second day, the Greeks attacked
6.
and
When thc ships høae been mnnncd, with 100 of thæm
thcy are to mcet thc eræmy at Artemisium in Euboea,
and, with thc oth,er 100 they are to lic off Salarnis and,
th,e. coast of Attira and, keep gtnrd, u.ter th.e land.. In
ordcr that all Ath,enians møy be united in th.eir dcfence
were fought, with heavy losses on both sides.
News arrived of the disaster at Thermopylae, and
the Greeks decided to withdrew. (See also Figure
5.8 on p. 153.)
agaiwt the barbarinru, thnse whn haae been sent into
exil,efor ten years ale to go n Salamis and, to stay there
until th,e people comn to som,e dcci;ion about th,em, whil.e
thnse who haue been d.epriaed of citizen rights øre to
haue thcir rights restored.
Themistocles left messages carved on the rocks, urging the Ionians in the Persian forces to withdraw. In
L959 an inscribed marble stela, dating from the 4th
century was discovered at Troezen. The inscription,
reproduced in Source 8.9, provided scholars with an
insight into the strategy of the Greeks before the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium.
To entrust thc city to Athcrut the Mistress of Ath,ens and,
to all the other gads to gu,ard, and, dcfend,from thc
barbarianfor thc salæ of th.e lnnd,, Thc Atheniøns
thcmselues and. theforeígncrs whn liue in Athens are to
send th,eir children ønd, wom,en to safety in Troezen, thcir
protector being Pitthcus, th.efound,ing hcro of the land,.
They are to send the old, mnn and, their mmable
possessions to safety on Sølarnß. Thc treasurers and,
TF|EMrsrocl.Es'
DEGREE, cited in D. KAGAN,
History,Yol.l, p. 285
Probl.ems in Anr:icnt
Q/n
/,6e
dntt / an ltng an d u s tng
,out"e,
s Tb whom wøs Athens to be abandoned?
a What were the people of Athens instructed to do?
; What were the men. of military age instructed to
do?
;
Which lines of the decree malæ it obaious tlrat the
battles of Thermopylae and, Artemisium høue not
yet tøken pløce?
s
Was this an organised, eaacuation or a hasty
retreat? Proaide euideruce to support your aiew.
pricstesses are to remnin on the orropolis, gtnrd,ing thc
property of thc god"s. All thc other Ath.enia ns and,
foreigncrs of milinry age are to embark on thc 200 ships
foreignnrs from those regßtered
Posei.don the Securer.
destroyed some Cilician vessels.
Over the next few days, several indecisive battles
L
th,e
with thc polemarch. Thcy are to write th,em up assigning
themby d,iaßinns,200 of about oræ hmd,red, [næn] earh,
and, to write aboue eorh d,ioisinn thn nøm,e of thn triremc
and. of th.e trierarch and, th.e serui,cem,ery so that thcy
mny krnw on whfu:h trireme eorh d,íuisinn is n embark.
Wh,en øll th,e diaßinns høae been cornposed, and, allotted.
to th,e triremcs, thc Courrcil and. th,e gerærals are to mnn
all the 200 ships, ofter sanrifiring a pl,aca.tory ffiring
to Zeus thc Alrnighty ønd, Athena and, Nike and
THE
cREEK
Herodotus suggests that a combined defence by
.and and sea was to be made at Thermopylae and
Artemisium-the Peloponnesian army marching north
to defend the northern Greek states. According to
Herodotus, however, the defeat at Thermopylae and
Artemisium was unexpected, and the Athenians and
northem Greeks were betrayed by the Peloponnesians,
who did not send the expected number of troops north.
Instead, northern and central Greece were defeated
and abandoned to the Persians. The Athenians were
forced to evacuate their city while the Spartans fortified the Isthmus.
Go
The decree of Themistocles suggests that the
Athenians had agreed to abandon their city and to
fight at the Isthmus before Thermopylae and
Artemisium. These two battles would be delaying
actions, designed to reduce the numbers of the enemy
and to give the Athenians time to evacuate their city.
Only the Isthmus was to be seriously defended. This
explains why so few Spartan troops were present at
Thermopylae, and why no morè were forthcoming. It
also reflects Spartan military policy. The Spartans
were unlikely to have subjected their main army to
overwhelming odds so far north in Boeotia-this was
to risk the prospect of devastating defeat. However,
he strategy to abandon Athens and fight delaying
actions at Artemisium and Thermopylae puts a different light on the cooperation of Athens and Sparta. It
suggests that they had formulated a unified, wellplanned strategy against the Persians.
The account in Herodotus, written some fifty years
later when Athens and Sparta were at war, paints the
Spartans in a bad light. They had let Athens down
badly by not sending more troops north and by selfishly wanting to defend only the Peloponnese. It also
explains why only I00 ships were sent to Artemisium.
If Themistocles' decree is authentic, it suggests a bold
and courageous plan, with both Athens and Sparta
carrying our their agreed tasks-the Athenians sacrificing their city and Leonidas giving his life. The
authenticity of this decree has been much disputed;
but it is an important factor to take into account when
considering Greek strategy at this time.
,Zot ltscussion
;
)
Which strategy do you thinh the Greeks tued,?
How useful is Themistocles'
d,ecree as a
piece
of
euidence?
WORLD:
BC
299
tell the Spartans you uho read,
their ordcrs ønd, are dead.e
We tooh
Thermopylae continues to inspire even modem Greek
poets, such as C. P. Cavafy.
Horwur to those who in the life thcy lead,
d.efi.ræ and.
gunrd, a Thcrmapylac.
Neuer betraying what is
right,
consßtent øndjust in øll thny do,
but shonting pity ølso, and. compassinn;
generous when they're rich, and. when thcy're poor,
still gercrous in small ways,
still helping os mtu:h as thcy cøn;
always spealeing the trulh,
yet without hating those whn li¿.
And, euen mnre honnur ß d,un to thern
when thcy foresee (as many do foresee)
that Ephinlæs will turn up in thc end.,
that the Medcs will breøk through after all.
C. P. CAvAFv, citedin G. CALLExoen,,4spects
of Anci.ent Greece,p. 106
9"t
/)scussion
What does this mod,em poem tell tu about the ualues
to be learnt from th.e battle of Thennopylae?
The battle of Salamis
Xerxes now marched south with nobody to hinder his
attack. The evacuation of Athens was completed,
while the ships that had returned from Artemesium lay
off the island of Salamis. A council of war was held
with Eurybiades, the Spartan commandeq calling for
suggestions as to where the fleet should best engage
the Persians. Most were in favour of defending the
Peloponnese and therefore fighting at the Isthmus.
Any action at Salamis was considered to be far too
risky. While this council was proceeding news arrived
that the Persians 'had entered Attica and that the
whole country was ahlaze' (Herodotus, Histories, YIII,
49).The acropolis, on which a few'die hards'had barricaded themselves, was soon taken; those who
remained were butchered, the temples stripped of
their treasures and the city set on fire.
fhe inspiration of Thermopylae
Ierodotus tells of the honours that were paid to the
partans who defended Thermopylae:
5OO-44O
elbid., p. 520.
240
HISTORICAL
0
PERIODS
l0
5
hilotnetres
t
Stage
Buy of Eleusis
I The Persian fleet blockades the exits
from the Bay of Eleusis.
Àthens
ü
Piraeus
SALAMTS
/¿
66
¡
o\\
2
Bay of Eleusís
Stage
2 Entering the strait, the Persians are attackecl
at the flank and rear by the Aeginetans. The
Greeks take advantage of the confined space
and rout the Persian fleet,
4,
Nlt
I.
I
. Xerxes'throne
I
.¡
- ss
I
Greek fleet
I
2
3
4
0
Spartans
S,A,LÀMIS
^SS
_sss
Þss
Ðss
3
Athenians
Aeginetans
Corinthians
Persian fleet
€
Piraeus
012345
Ieilo¡netres
FIGURE 8.8
The battle of Salamis
Themistocles, strategist or trickster?
It is Themistocles who is given the main credit for the
strategy and victory at Salamis. Plutarch offers some
interesting observations.
Becau.se of the prestige of Sparta the Greelt.fleet was
undßr the command, of Eurybiad.es, but h.e showed little
cletermination in the fa.ce of d,anger and was anxiotrs to
hoi.st sailfor the Isthmus, u¡h,ere the Peloponnesian arm.y
wos corcenlrated. Th,emistocles, howeuer, opposed thß
plan and it was then that he uttered a remarh uhich
became famous. Eurybiades had said to him: 'You lnnw,
Themistocles, at the games they thrash anybody who
starts before the signal', to which Themistocles replied,,
'Yes, but they do not croun anybody who gets lefi at the
post.' Then, when Eurybiades lffied. up hß stalf as if to
strilte him, Thenistocles said.,'You may hit me if you
like, but you must lßten to me.' Eurybiades was forced to
admire his self-possession and told him to speah out,
and Themßtocles then tried to læad him ba.ck to the
subject. At this point somebod,y objected, that a man
without a city had no right to press those who still
possessed oræ to aband,on it and,forsalte their country,
uhereupon Themistocles turncd on him and retorted, 'lt
is quite true, you wretch, that we haue giuen up our
howes ancl our city walls, becanue we did rnt choose to
become erclauedfor the sal¡e of things that haue m life
or soul. But uhat ue still possess is the greatest city in
all Greece, our 200 ships of war, which are now reacly to
dcfend you, if you are still willing to be saued by them.
THE
But
f
you run crway and ltetray
us, o.s you di.d, orrce
before, the Greeks wíll soon
heør the
ræws thøt the
Atheniaru haue
found themselues asfree a city and, as
finc a country as the otæ they haae sacrifrced.'When
he
hnard Thnmistocles speahing in
this tone, Eurybiad,es
began to reflect and. was
frightercd. at the thought that
the Athenians might sail
autay and. abandon him.
PLUTARcH, The
Rise and,
Fatt of Athnns, trans. bv
t. ScoTT_KtLvERr,
ETIITiE
E-i='l
pp. g&_ö
7)
Thernisøcles appears to haue
chosen the time for th,e
battle as jud.íciously as n" n
wt
o:,
a tn"
p,tou."ä;i;'*r4r,
to let thÊ triremcs engage the
blrbarian sn¡rì n*o¿
the tim,e of d.ay when rn, *¿"¿
:tn:il
^,rlUíiU*,
fresnJïom the sea and, sends a heauy swell
roliins
through the twrrows. This breeze
*; ;;;;";;:"r"r"
to th.e Creelc ships, which were
comparatiaely smøll ønd.
in the water, but it caught'the
ly ly
lrÃi"""lirt
,
which were difficult to ûumne.¿are
with thcir high d.echs
and-towering sterns, and, swung
thern around, broadsid¿
opponcnts, who d.ash"i ¡n
-th,eir
The Greek cør11iru hept awatchfut""r;rty-;rh""ulu**.
to
ö, ;"lh**î*r*r,
*"r, tt"
right t.øctirs øfouow, and, alo
br"";:"-L;"'l;;;ií*ro
becatue thcyfelt that he saw
most cliørly what
opposite him Xerxes, ad,miral,
Arùtmcncs,
great courage.
pLurARsH,
;*"";
Th.e Rise and. Fatt of Athcns,trans.
by
t. scorr-Ktl.vERT,
t:-örl-n
Uuo.*:^,ælt
cr=-f
-o'- -'vvvt rwvút
"lthr";hthis.
Rise and,
Fatt of Athcns,trans. by
l. sqorr-Ktlvenr,
How ímporta,nt w&s the role
defeøt of the persians?
k*:!::úns
sources
p. 9å
antusrny
, Eualuate Themistocles,
role. Was he a good,
strategist or a con nrctn gambling
at great od,d,s
with his city,sfate?
What do these documents tell
us about the
relcttíonship between Athens
Salamis?
if"""'ï,
""a
BC
241
of Themistocles in
the
The lead up to plataea
After Salamis, Xerxes retumed persia.
to
Themistocles
proposed that a Greek
X"o", to
""p"ditio.riolloJ
Ionia and punish rhose states
that had siJed with the
Persians. The Greek victory;;Hä;meant
that
the vast Persian army_remained
ìn Greece without an
adequate supplv line. But-Ath";JJñ;
desrroyed;
and the persian commander,
l¿".¿*irr, ;lieved
Greeks, demoralisert by this,
surrender. Mardonius moved
Iri,
the winter, and auemprea t"
"rã
b-reak up the alliancÀ of Greek
;;iil;;"
**y-t"
the
fikely to
äessaly for
öffi# means ro
Macedon was sent to offer,h"
d;;ï; uì
with the pe¡sians
p"rri*
stJtes.'ärander of
in return fo,
gãjto "uiur,""
,"build
their, city. The Spartans,
afraid tlrui ir" et¡enians
mrght accept, offered to assist
Ath"rrr. À ,umb", of
Greek srares submitted to ,lr" pirrl"".;
ii¡".r, üL"
Olynthus, had their inhabita;
_î.rä"äa.'Wh"r,
th"
Athenians refused the p"rsian
oiiãr]ïur¿o,riu,
,The
marched against Athens.
people oïa,fr"rr. uguln
evacuated their citv. M"rrug",
*Ã-råì,
spartans, .*.ukjns ir,"- io,?ã1,"*'-ä"p to the
rheir
promises of help. Herodotus
,"";r;:';;e such
message,
TOU,
who were
LN
t-
terror, lest we should malæ peü:e
with Persi,ø_rnw that you kr¿out
our spirit without
dnubt, and. that 'we shall lleÙer
be tra,itors to creece_
and rlot0, too, that yourfortfrcation
of the Isthmus ¿s
almnst complcæ-take no a.ccount
of Ather*. You
agreed with us to oppose the
iwader Ln Boeotia, but you
broke your word ønd. allowed
him to iwade Atti,ca. Thü
condtrct on your pa,rt has roused
the anger ofAthew; tt
Øa,s
..ne
EOO_44O
Zc/t'r.,i/y.'ess
EreTTTEI G--!
I-r
thøt of ølt thn Creek states
Aegina
receiaed the palmfor aalaur,
and that o¡tn, ,rål*no
t_ook part in the battle
eùeryone, in
ffia, award"d,-th"
high¿st hnnour to Thcmisto_cles,
;t*iä;r^y
PLUTARcH, The
WORLD:
pp. 9f_á
us
madc thcrn unuilting to adrnit
cREEK
unworthy
of the hour and, ofyourselaes.
Howeuer,
your im,med,iate duty ¿s to a.cced,e
to our present
requcst: put your arml Ln,
th.efrald, thor you
and, we
togethcr fi¡,ay mcet Mard,onitu
tn Attù:a. Nou,, that
Boeotia ¿s lost to lls, th.e best
place to en&øge him, u¡ithin
our own tenitory, ¿s the pIøin
of Thria.
ThÊ ephars undcrtooh to gwe
their &ftßwer on thc
following tuy; ba when tt caûtÊ, they madÊ afurther
postponemÊnt
till the day afier, and, thcn till the
ú", that; LNf*t thcy k"pt putting ú off"fro* onÊdo'y
doy to
thc nextfor tæarly
a fortnight. Meanwhile the
Peloponræsiøns Ln a bìody
were working hard at thß
wall
PERIODS
HISTORICAL
242
which was rurw nearing completion.
Why was it that, when Alexand,er akited Athens, the
Spartans were d,esperately antciow lest the Athenians
a.cross the Isthmus,
tory of Thebes, where he would be able to use hrcavalry. He constructed a palisade and took up a posi
tion along the Asopus River, near Plataea.
shnuld go ouer to Persia, wh.ereos nnw they d,id, nat seem
to care ajot? The onþ explanation I can giue ß, that the
fortíftcatinrc of th,e Isthmrs uere now complete, ønd they
therefore felt that Athenian hclp was rw longer
The lnlted,aem.oniøns halted at th,e Isthrntu on their
arriuøI th.ere, ønd, th,e other Peloponræsiarx who chose to
d.o thcir duty-some of them only whcnthcy saw the
Spartans on thc mørch-feh osham,ed to stay behind
and takc n part in the exped,ition. Accordingly, after
necessary.
HERoDorus,Th,e
Hßtori,es, trans. by
AUBREv
SÉu¡rqounr,
DE
pp. 579-80
getting fo,uourabl,e omcns from thn sarrif,c.e, th.e
combirædforces of thc Pel.oponnese left the Isthmus ønd,
adøanced to Elewis Here they again ffired. sarrffi.ce,
and, again getting good, omcns continu,ed thcir aduønce,
haaing rcw been joircd by the Ath.eniaw, who had,
crossed, n th,e møinland,from Salamis. At Erythra,e in
Boeotia th,ey learnt tfuú th,e enemy had talæn up hi"s
position on thc Asopus, and,, in ai.eut of this, th.emselues
The Spartans finally responded after an in{luential
Tegean representative, Chileus, addressed the ephors.
oAs
I see it, gentlemen [sai.d Chílcts], if th,e Athnnians
dcsert us and, ma.læ an alliarrce with Persia, thcn,
howeuer strongly th,e
Isthmw isfortffied,
the
occupind, th,e lower slopes of Cithacron.
postern
HERoDorus,
gates are wíde openfor the Persínn inuosinn of the
Peloponrrcse. So you hod, better lßæn to thcm before they
Th,e Hßtori,es,
trans. by AUBREY ÞE
SÉu¡rcounr, p.584
change th,eir mind,s and oÅ.opt a polircy whichwill ruin
It
Greece,'
Thc eph,ors toolc th,e warning to heart, anl. without a
word, to thn dclcgates, immndiaæly, before daybrealc,
dispatch,ed aforce of 5000 Spartan troops, earh man
attend,ed by seuen helots, with Pøusønias, son of
I
was probably at Eleusis that the oath of Plataea
was made by the combined forces of the Athenians
and Peloponnesians.
Keombrotus, in command,.
HERoDorus,Th,e Hßtorins, trans. by AuBREY DE
sÉuI¡rqounr, p.580
dntt / on {t'ng an I
/6e sources
(Un
:
:
Why did somc Greek støtes decid,e
to
u st
ng
join
the Persiøns?
th¿ dcath, ønd, I will not count my llf:
precinus thanfreednm. I will rnt leaae my offu:er,
thc commandcr of tny regiment or company, either aliae
or d¿ad,. I will wt withdraw unlcss mry command,ers l¿ad
mc bo,ck, and, I will do whatsoeuer the gercrals order.
I willfi,ght n
m.ore
I
will bury th.e d,eol, of thnse whn hauefought as my allies,
on thß field, and, will ¡nt lnaue orc of them unburi,ed,.
After defeating th¿ barbario.ns in battle, I will tithe the
city of thc Thnbaru; and. I will neuer destroy Athew or
Sparta or Pk*ona or any of thn citi¿s whirh hnae fouglx os
ow allins, rcr will I cottserú n their being starued,, nar ctû
offfrom running water, whnthnr we befricnds or at war.
How had the Spartans broken, their word to the
Athenians?
a What did the Athenia,ns want the Spartans to do?
; Why did the Spørtøns suddenly d,ecid,e to moue?
: How ma,ny tnerl were sent? What does this tell w
)
oATH oF PLATAEA, cited in E. BRADFoRD,
Th,ermnpylae, p. 227
about the Spartans?
)
From Herodotus' accotrnt, what can be leørnt about
Sp
art an
-Athenian relati o ns ?
Deployment of troops at Plataea
The Argives had previously agreed with Mardonius to
prevent the Spartans taking the field, but now had to
send a messenger to inform him that the army had left
Sparta. Mardonius left Attica and moved to the teni-
Q/n
lntt /on lzng an I
us tng
/,6e soutces
:
:
Wh.ere d,id,
Mard,onius position his forces?
Wh,at møde the other Peloponnesíanforces decide to
tofi.ght?
s
Wh.ere
did the Greeks position
themselues, ønd,
why?-
THE
GREEK
WORLD:
5OO-44O
BC
Zot ltscussion
:
245
Thebes
Persian fort
Ca.n you explain, why the Greeks would ha,ue made
this oath?
a
What can be learnt about Greek rutrølefrom the oath?
of
Cornposition of the Persian army
¡
Herodotus' account of the battle of Plataea is rather
confusing, and he exaggerates the numbers of troops
involved. Herodotus himself admits that an accurate
count was not taken (Herodotus, Histories, IX, 31).
Modern estimates suggest that 8000 Athenians and
about 30 000 Peloponnesians made.up the Greek contingent. Although Herodotus claims that the Persian
force numbered 300 000, it was probably composed of
35 000 infantry and 12 000 cavalry. The Persian
forces, commanded by Mardonius, consisted of:
o heavily armed cavalry
o cavalry
contingents from Persia, Media, Scythia,
Bactria and India
o Greek cavalry from Macedonia, Boeotia and Thessaly
o an infantry component of l0 000 Immortals
.
some hoplites from the states of central Greece.
Cornposition of the Greek arrny
The major contingents of the Greek forces commanded
by Pausanias were:
o 5000 Spartiates, 5000 perioikoi and 35 000 helots
o 8000 Athenians, commanded by Aristides
o 600 Plataeans,
Island
Plataea
Temple of
Demeter
Hysiae
Eleutherae pass
rõl
v
Mt Cithaeron
pass
To,{.thens
I
@ Persians build a wooden palisade
@ Greeks take up position on the foothills of Mt Cithaeron
@ Ä"opo. ridge-Pausanias moves from the foothills to a
@
@
@
position across the ridge
Puss through Mt Cithaeron, where Greek supply columns
are surprised and massacred
Sprlng poisoned by Persians
Greeks retreat to this position; Mardonius attacks
FIGURE
8.9
Støges
I
and 2 ofthe battle of Plataea
3000 Megarians, 500 Aeginetans
and smaller contingents from other Greek states.
From the information that can be gleaned from
Herodotus, it appears that Plataea was a protracted
battle, taking place over a number of weeks, in a number of stages and over a wide area. The Persians were
the more mobile force, having the advantage in cavalry
and archers; the Greek were superior in infantry and
would therefore have had the advantage in a close
fight.
9", þt/6nt
tn 0 es lrylalton
Using your library resotrces, compile brief biographies
of the tuto command,ers, Mard,onius and, Pa,usanias.
Stage
The
Whcn the Greelt forces showed no intentinn of leauing thc
Mardnnitu sent his caualry to atta,ch thcm
inforce, undcr command, of thn distinguished Persian
offirer Masßtius . . . who rodc a Nisaean horse with a
bridle of gold and, othcr splendid trappings. The caualry
aduanced, to thc attorlc in strccessiae sqtnd,rons, arul at
each assault infli.cted heaty losses on the Greek,
taunting them ønd, calling th,emuomÊn. It so happeræd
that the point in the Greel¡ Ii¡æ whi.ch was ffnst open and,
aulncrable to a caaalry charge wos held by the
Megariarc, whofound. themselues hard, pressed by the
high, ground'
repeated attorks.
The Megarians sent & ûtessøge reEtesting assistance.
Pawanias sent
I
o For a considerable
ffirtraLr-::-I:l
a pirlæd contingent of Athenian archers,
skilled bowmen were hnown to be a danger to
atta,clring caaalry. For som,e timc the battle continued,
until d,uring th.e surcessiae attaclts of the Persian
squadrons, Masistiw' horse, which was in ad,uønce of the
rest, 'tt)os shot in the flanh, and the pain of the wound
mad.e hím rear and throw his ridcr. No soonør wos
o"s
time (estimates vary from twelve
days to three weeks), the two forces faced each
other across the Asopus river. Mardonius wanted to
use his cavalry against the Greek forces, so he tried
to lure them down from the foothills of the mountains and onto the plains.
244
HISTORICAL
PERIODS
him. Thcy
his hnrse and,fi,rwlly-though rct withow
Mosistit¿s dnwn than th,e Ath.enians were upon
seized,
difftruhy-hillcd
M asistius himself, wh,o fought hard for
his li,fe. Thc reason why they could
rct kill him at oru:e
was th.e armnur hc wore-a corslet of golden scalcs
undcr his scørlet tuni,c. No bkru upon the corslet had,
any
ffict, until
auive, the Greeks had to contend with constant
øt lost a sold,ier saw how it was and
Persian cavalry attacks and inegular supplies. Both
sides took the omens and were advised to be cau-
hefell dead,. Thß occurred,
withnut thc kwutlcd,ge of thc rest of the sqtndro4 wh,o
stru,ck
him in
o
th,e eye, and.
hod rct obseraed eithcr their command,er'sfall or hi^s
death . . . It was only when they d,rew rein agøin thøt
thcy missed hirn-for thcre wos tto onÊ to giae them
commnnds . . . a shàrp strugglc toolt ploce around.
Masistitn' body . . . ¡fhe Persiønslfailed to keep
possessinn of thc bod.y, and, lost, itu the ottem,pt, a
number of thcir m,en besides. Thcy then retired, a qunrter
of a milc or so, to takc snclc of their siaøtiaq and
f,nnlþ decidcd., funing lost thcir commnndnr, to report
to Mard,onitu. On thcir arriaal at h.ead4uarærs with the
tious. One of the omens informed Mardonius to
watch the pass of Cithaeron, which he did.
o
other pro-Persian states for food.
deepest distress at
harses and, mules, and, aband,onnd thnmselaes
cri.es of
to
o
su.ch
grief . . .
, . . thc Greelts, funing both h¿Id. and. repulsed, thc
cøaalry charge, were murh encouraged,, They put
Masistiw' body on a cart and, paradcd, it along the lincs.
h uas certaäy worth loohing at,þr Masistius uos
&
tøll and, splcnd,i.d,ly hand;omc mnn-thi"s was why they
did it-and, thn m.en brolæ ranJæ to get ø sight of
unable to bring about an engagement,
consulted Artabazus. His recommendation was that
the Persians should move into Thebes and send out
gifts to leading men of the Greek states to break up
the alliance. Mardonius, however, favoured a military solution.
The Persian cavalry continued to attack the Greeks.
In one of these attacks the Gargaphia Spring was
poisoned. The Greeks were in a dreadful position,
for they had little food and were effectively without
a water supply. They could not retreat during daylight because the Persian cavalry would cut them
down.
o
Pausanias held a conference, at which
tus, refused to retreat, as this was against the
lntt / an dt'ng an I
us
tng
Spartan code ofhonour. The Greeks were to take up
position at a piece of land called 'the Island', where
they would have better access to a water supply and
some protection from Persian cavalry attacks. One
half of the army was to head for the Island, while
the other half was to move to the Cithaeron foothills
and relieve the food convoys.
reason, the withdrawal was not
completed in the night.
/6e sources
o For some unknown
o
Stage 3
How díd the Persians insuh the Greelts? What does
thís tell w about ancient attitud,es ctnd uøIues?
a What type of man was Masistius?
a What impact did Masistius' death høae on the
Persians?
What
fficæ did Masistius'
d,eøth høae on th,e
Greeks?
Stage 2
o
was
Plataea. One of the Spartan officers, Amomphare-
l{ERoDoTus,Th.e Historics, trans. by AUBREY DE
SÉuuqounr, pp. 584-ó
s
it
decided to withdraw to the foothills closer to
Masistius.
Q,/n
The Persian forces intercepted a supply column of
500 mules that was bringing much-needed food for
the Greeks. Mardonius also had problems with supplies in that he had to rely on the Thebans and the
o Mardonius,
neuts, Mardnniu"s ønd, th,e whnle armry showed thn
Masßtitu' d,eath-a mnn mnre highly
thnught of, both by thc king and, his subjects, than
anyone else in th.e Persian armry except Mardnniw
himself; thcy shaued, thcir hea.ds, cut thc mønes of th,eir
Persians) and took up a position across the AsopJ,
r{dge, close to Plataea, where he had better accesr
to water at the Gargaphia Spring (see Figure 8.9).
This also gave him a better position for his hoplites.
Both sides waited, neither willing to risk an engagement. Although Greek reinforcements continued to
Pausanias moved down from the foothills (probably
under cover of darkness to avoid detection by the
o At dawn,
o
Mardonius was surprised to see that the
Greeks had retreated.
He ordered his whole army to engage. The Persians,
whose sight of the Greeks was obscured by the
hills, believed that they had them on the run, and
streamed forward in a disorganised mass.
o At this point the battle became divided. The
Greek allies of the Persians-the Thebans anC
Boeotians-cut off the Athenians on the left anr
there they fought a pitched battle. The Thebans los
i
THE
300 of their best men before the Athenians finally
beat them. When the Boeotians realised the
a
245
First thcre was a struggle øt thc baniradc of shield"s;
then, the banícadc døwq there wos a bitter and
protrarædfi.ght, hand, to hand, close by the Temple of
Demeter,for the Persiaru would lay hold of the Spartan
spears and, brealt. thcm; in courage and, strength they
were cls good os their a.duersaries, but they were d.ef.cient
to Thebes
in annour, untrairæd, and, greatly inferior in shill . . .
thcyfell upon the Spartan liræ and, were cut d,own. They
pressed, hard,est øt the point whcre Mard,oniusfought in
person-rid,ing hß white charger, and, surround,ed. by
Persian
etockade
his thnttsani, Persian troops, theflower of the armry.
While Mardnnius was aliue th,ey contiruted to resist and
to dcfend, thnmselaes, and, stnrck. døwn many of tlæ
La.hed,aem,oniarc; but øfter his d,eath, and, the
d.estnrction of hß persornl guard-the fi.ncst of th,e
Persian troops-thc remøindcr yi,elded to thc
lnkedo.emnniaru and. tooh toflight. The chi.ef catue of
thcir di^scornfi,ture uos thcir larh of armnur, fi,ghting
withnut it agairæt h.eaaily armed infantry. Thus th.e
prophecy of thc ora,cle wasfuffilled, and Mardanius
rendcred, satisfortinn to thc Spartaræfor the hilling of
Inonid,os; and, thus, too, Pausanias . . , won the mnst
Gargaphia
o Spring
Persians
Rfuer
BC
th,emfo,ce toface.
infantry.
Deroe
5OO-44O
sami.ficial airtims promised strccess. At thi"s, the
Spartaru, too, at last runed,forwørd, agøinst th,e eræm,y,
whn stopped shooting their arrows and, prepared to meet
Persians were being defeated, they fled.
The Lakedaemonians and Tegeans, on the right,
fought alone against the onslaught of the Persian
,{soPus Rh:et
WORLD:
GREEK
splend,id,
Plataea
airtory that hßtory records.
HERoDorus,The
¿o
Historins, trans. by
AuBREv
DE
sÉu¡rcounr, pp.60l-2
Cithaeron
to
FIGURE 8.f O
Stage 3 of the battle of Plataea
(Un
dnrt / on lt'ng an I
/tÇe soutces
...
o"s
[th.e Spartarx] were about to engage tßith
mcarwhile mnny of the Írcn't/)ere kill.ed,, and, møny
more wounded,for the Persians had, madc a barri,cadc
of thcir wiclær shi¿tds ond, from thc protectinn of it øere
shnoting arrows in strch numbers that the Spartan troops
were in serinw distress; thiß, odd¿d to thc unføaourablc
.. results of thc sarriftre, at la,st catßed, Pøtuanios to turn
his eyes to thc Temple of Hera and, to call upon th,e
goddcssfor her ai.d,, praying hcr nnt to øll,ow th¿ Greelæ
to be robbed, of their hope of ai,ctory. Theu while th,e
words were still upon hß lips, th,e Tegearc sprang
forutørd, to leo.d thc attock, and, a mamÊnt later thn
tny
s
What can be leørnt from Source B. 19 about the role
of religion in ancient times? (You might ølso lilæ to
read Plutarcå, Aristides, I 1, 19-21 on religion
and the battle of Plataea.)
a
List the adaantages and disaduantagesfor each
side in the battle of Plataea.
s
What d,o you consider were the signfficant føctors
that enabled the Greelts to win?
L-.-rtIiI---::r-IÐ
Mardnnitn and, hß mcn, they performed, thc ritwl of
særifi.ce. Thc om¿ns were rntfauourable; and,
us
o Plutarch (Life of Aristides, l9), tells us that
Mardonius was killed by a Spartan who crushed his
skull with a stone.
o The wily Artabazus, who had earlier
advised
Mardonius against fighting, fled with the men in his
command to Phocis. Surprisingly, Xerxes did not
execute him for desertion.
o The remainder of the Persian forces
retreated
behind the wooden palisades. Pausanias and the
246
HISTORICAL
PERIODS
Spartans, who, according to Plutarch, were
oinex-
perienced at attacking fortifications', were unable
to breach the Persian palisade. The arrival of the
Athenians changed the balance, and the Greeks
were able to force their way into the Persian stock-
Q/n dnrt /an
ltng
an
I
us
tng
/.6e soutces
;
What ís an epitaph? What do the sentiments
ott,
ade, where a great slaughter took place.
these epitaphs reaeal about the soceities ønd, ue,lues
The serpent column at Delphi-on the coils of
of Athens ønd Sparta?
which were inscribed the names of the Greek allieswas dedicated by the Greeks after Plataea in 479.
This column was one of three dedications made from
the spoils after the victory over the Persians. Source
8.20 reproduces two epitaphs from Plataea: (i) is the
Athenians'; (ii) is the Spartans';
.
What were sorne of the dfficuhies faced by the
Greeks at Plataea?
;
Do you consider Pløtaea to be the d,ecisiae battle in
the Persiøn Wars? Giue reasons
:
for your answer.
How critical was Pausønias' leadershíp?
Øclioiþ'essay
How importarut was Spørtø's contribution to the
defence in 480-79 BC?
(i) If d,y'tng nobly
is thc greatest part of aalour,
To tu aboue all othcrs Forturæ has granted, this;
For after striaing to crown Greece withfreed,orn
We lie here enjoying praise thøt will neuer age.
(ä) These m,en gaiue their
ircxtinguishablefame
bekvued
Mycale: a Greek offensive
Mycale was important in the Persian Wars because for
the first time the Greeks took the initiative. In 479 BC
the Greek fleet of 250 ships set sail under the command of the Spartan king, Leotychides. They made
country
And enrompossed themselaes with the d,ark cloud.
of
dcath.
They dicd but are
rct
dcad,, sin¿e their aalour glorifi,es
themfrorn abute
And. brings them
upfrom the howe of Hadcs.
M. DTLLoN & L. eARlAxo,AncicntGreece,
p.2I1
L
Thc aictory at Plato.ea was a re¡narha,ble ot:hieuemcnt
for the
Greelæ.
If
Themistocles and the Athcnians were
primarily responsiblefor søuing
Greece at Salamis,
Pausanias and the Spartarc and, other Peloponncsian
contingents played that rolc øt Plata,ea. When otæ trícs
to enaßage the difftcuhi,es Pausaniasfa,ced, in hnlding
togetherfor weelæ an arm.y consísting of ouer 100 000
mcnfrom som,e tutenty-four citi.es, plagu.ed, by dissension,
insubordination and, lo,ck ofþod and,water, os well as
the dfficulty of ward.ing off the constant threat of the
excellent Persiøn caaalry, one can only øpplaud,
Herodnttæ' ju.dgm,ent (lX, 64), rßing superinr to thc
anti- Sp artan an d, anti- P elop onne sian prop ag an da
whi.ch h,e heard, d,uring his residcnre in Athcns, when he
writes thøt at Plataea, 'thefi,ncst ui,ctory in all hisnry
'lmnwn
to ÍtÊ toos won by Pausanias, the son of
Kleombrotus, th,e son of Ananønd,ridøs.'
J. FINE,
The
Greelt.
Arcient Creehs,p.320
their way initially to Samos, expecting to find the
Persian fleet. The reasons for this expedition were:
o to liberate the Ionian Greeks of Asia Minor
o to incite a revolt among the Ionian cities
o to prevent Persian troops from joining Mardonius
o to ensure that no further Persian
invasions
occur:red.
Greek spies from Samos (the headquarters of the
Persian fleet), reported to the Greek high command
that the Persian ships were in poor condition. The
Greeks were persuaded that this was an opportune
time to attack. On reaching Samos, they found that the
Persians had sailed to Mycale, on the coastline of Asia
Minor.
L-.rlIiIaT-3-D
Thc Persiaw, howeuer, learning of their approarh,
dismissed their Phnenician contingeni ønd, thcmselaes
mndc offtmtards the Asiatic coast;for th,ey had, dccidcd
after disctusing th.e møtter that, os they were rc march
had, better tnt rish an
engagenænt. Accord,ingly, th,ey sail,ed to Mycale on the
møinland, wh.ere thcy could, haae the protection of thcir
oun troops which, at Xerxes' ord,ers, had been detachcd
from the mnin army to guard, Ionia. Thß force wos
for the Greehfleet, they
60 000 strong, and commøndcd, by Tigrørcs, thc tallest
and, best-looking nurn in thc Persian armry. Their plan
wos to beo,ch their aessels undcr thc protection of thnse
t
THE
troops, and to constnrct ø dcferuiue ram,pa,rt round them,
within whi.ch they could themselaes takc refuge . . .
Thc Creelæ were mtæh aexed, when thcy d,ßcouered
that the Persia¡u had, giaen them thc slip and, cleared
outfor thc møinlønd,, ønd, could ¡nt at o¡æe dccidn
wh.ethcr to return h,omc or sailfor thc Hellespon.
Mycal,e. No eræmy aessel wos to be seen coming out to
them as th.ey approo,ched thc Persian positinn . . .
Leotychi.dcs took his ship as close in-sh.ore os he could,
m,eet
and,, as hc passed, along, got a cricr to shout the
follouting appeøl to th,e lonians who were seruing with
the eræmy: 'Men of lonia, lisæry if you can hcar mn, to
what I haae to say. The Persintæ, in any case, won't
undcrstønd, aword, of it. Whenth.e battlc begins, let ea,ch
man of youf.rst remember Freednm-ønd, second,ly our
password,, Hera. Arryoræ whn cøn't hear me shnuld be
I say by
th.ose
whn can.'
In
thß h¿ had th¿
same intention as Thcmistocles ha.d, at Artemisiurn.
Eithcr
Persiøns øould not knaw what h¿ hod. søi.d.
and the lonia.tu would, be persuaded to leøue th,ern, or
his words were reported to thc Persians th,ey uould,
mßtrtut their Greek subþcts . . .
Thefi,rst ort of the Persians wh,en thcy saw th.e Greeks
th.e
if
preparing tofi,ght, was to disann the Samiaru, whnm
th,ey stupected of syrnpatlry utith th.e Greek cawe.
H
Q/n
/Âe
:
ERoDoTUs, Thc Historics, trans. by Au BREv DE
SÉuxqounr, pp.614-15
lntt
/an
ltng
an
I
us
tng
"out"e"
What did the Persians d,o when they learnt of the
Greeh øpproøch?
WORLD:
5OO-44O
BC
247
deserted to the Greeks. This led Herodotus to comment that 'this day saw the second Ionian revolt from
Persian domination'. Despite what Herodotus says,
that Mycale occurred on the same day as Plataea, most
historians dismiss this as poetic licence.
The importance of Mycale
In all the previous battles of the Persian Wars, the
Greeks had been on the defensive. At Mycale, the
Finølly, howeuer, thcy dccid,ed to d,o rcither, ba to
makefor thc Asiatit codst . . . and, thefl.eet søilcd.for
told, what
GREEK
Canyou expløintheir action?
Greeks carried the war into Persian territory. Despite
the victory at Mycale, the Greek forces were unable to
hold Asia Minor and the Ionian Greeks were still not
secure from the Persian threat. Mainland Greeks,
however, had valiantly repulsed the massive Persian
invasion. The Aegean waters and the important trade
routes through the Hellespont to the Black Sea were
now opened up to Greek trade. The Athenians, in particular, saw the advantages of trade in this region and
seized the opportunity.
Zchoi/7.' reotsion
Draw up a table on a large sheet of paper, Iisting the
battles of the Persian Wars down the page in the lefthand column. Across the top of the page d,raw up
columns under the following head,ings: 'Date of battle', Releuant geo gr aphical fe atures',' Greek leøders',
'Persian leaders', 'Numbers on eacll side', 'Strategies
of each side', 'Signifi,cance of the battle'. Complete the
o
table.
TÐ^6o't ø.6o
Uor"
ìn lÂe Tnrrr'on
Draw up ø tøble on a lørge sheet of paper. Read, baclt,
through this chapter (Chapters 2 a,nd, 5 will also be
useful). Compile a list of all the people mentioned,. In
the left-hand column, write down the names of tlte
;
Why did, the Greeks hesitate atfi.rst?
a
What was Leotychides' intention in, cctlling out to
giuing their
the loníøns?
their main o,chieuements or importance. An exømple
follows:
The Greek force at Mycale numbered 6000. The
Persian numbers are uncertain. The Greeks attacked
the Persians, who positioned themselves behind a barricade of shields. The Athenians advanced across the
people.
In other columns, state who
d,øtes
each person was,
(if possible), and briefly d,escribing
Person
Status/date
Description
Croesus
King of Lydia
Fought and lost øgøiwt
King Cyrus of Persia
frorn 56046 BC
{lat ground of the beach, while the Spartans took
in 546 BC
the more difficult route over rough terrain. At first, the
Persians stood firm against this onslaught. Herodotus
'IX, 104) suggests that the Athenians wanted the glory
Zc/ioi/y;
rf the victory for themselves and so increased their
rfforts. They burst through the barricades and suc-
:
Expløin whether Spørta or Athens played the
greater role in defeating the Persian*
a
,4ssess
:essfully defeated the Persians. The Spartans and the
ther Greek contingents ar:rived to finish the battle.
Iany of the Ionian Greeks in the Persian army
essagl
the unity of the Greek forces in defeating the
Persíans.
l
24A
HISTORICAL
PERIODS
THE DELIAN LEAGUE
were wel¡:omed by the Atheniøns, who rnad.e up
their
Ä.thens' leadership of the League
miwls to put a check on Pausanias and, to arrange
ma.tters gercrally in a way that would, best suit their
After Mycale the Spartan king Leotychides and the
Peloponnesian allies returned home. The Athenians,
under the command of Xanthippus, and with the help
of the Ionian Greeks, beseiged the stronghold of
Sestos, held by the Persians. This independent action
of the Greek forces took the war into Persian territory.
After laying siege to the city, which they captured, the
Athenians returned to Greece, taking with them their
spoils. Sparta was still considered to be the leader of
the Greek states. This situation was soon to change.
The islands of Lesbos, Chios and Samos appealed to
Athens who made a separate agreement with them
while remaining loyal to the Panhellenic League.
Athens was in favour of driving the Persians from the
Aegean. The Athenians and lonian Greeks relied on
maritime trade, and needed control of the Hellespont
in order to obtain grain and other commodities from
the Black Sea. Sparta did not favour continuing the
war-as a self-supporting agricultural state it was not
as dependent on trade. Sparta gave the helpful advice
to the Ionian Greeks that they should migrate away
ownínterests...
from Persian influence.
Sparta was already leader of the Peloponnesian
'Wars,
League, but as a consequence of the Persian
and the emergence of Athens, was no longer the
supreme military state of Greece. Spartan leadership
of the League was being questioned by some of the
Peloponnesian states. With great reluctance, the
Spartans continued the fight against the Persians.
Pausanias , . . uas sent outfrom Spørta in cammand, of
thn Helleni.c forces. He had with hirn twenty ships from
the Peloponræse; the Athenians joircd hßforce with
thirty ships and, there were a numher marefrom the
other allies. They wentf.rst to Cyprw and won ot)er ûnst
of th,e ßland; later they went agøinst Byzantium, which
was in Persian occupation, and, still under thc
cornmnnd, of Pausanias,forced the plo,ce to surrend¿r.
But Pausanias had, alread.y begun to to reueal the
arrogaÍLce of his nature, and, was becoming unpopular
with the Hellencs, particularly so with thc loniøns and
those whn hadjust recently been liberatedfrom Persian
domina,tion. Thcse states approach,ed, the Ath.eniaræ,
asldng them, since th.ey were th.eir own kircmen, to tahe
th.em und,er their protectinn ønd, if Pøu,sønias arted in a
d,ictatorial rtnwìßr, rnt to allow it. These approaches
ffhe Spartarul nn longer wanted to be burdened with
the war
agairct Persia.
Th,ey regard,ed the Ath.enians as
being perfectly capable of exercising the cornmand, ønd
as being also at
that timefriend,ly to themselues.
THUcyDtoes, Peloponnesian War, trans. by
R. WARNER, pp. óló
For when th.e Persiaw had, been d,riuen.from Greece and
the war had, been carried, to Persian tenitory, thc
Ath,eniøns made the insffirøble behaaiour of Pansanias
their exasefor depriuing the Inkedaemonians of the
comman¡L.
HERoDorus,The
Hßtori.es, trans. by
AuBREv DE
sÉl¡¡rqounr,
pp. 525-ó
9orf"r/6n, ìnues/ìVa/ìon
Read about Pausanias in Thucydides, I, l28-33.
How d,id. the actions of Pausanias ffict Athens a,nd
Sparta?
The role of Aristides
The Athenian general, Aristides, gained the approval
of the allies by treating them courteously. Plutarch
comments on the significance of this.
. before thc Spartarn hnew it, [Aristid,es] had eased.
thcm out of thn leadcrship, and, he di.d this not with th¿
help of troops or ships or caualry, but through tart and
d,iplomacy. Thc Ath.enians were alread,y well lihed,
thanlts to the jtutíce of Ari"stides and thc afføbìlìty
shown by Kimnn, but the gro,sping and ouerbearing
conduct of Pøusanio"s seraed, to end¿ar them to the
..
Greeles euen more. The allied cornmandnrs uere
constanly teøted, with arroganre and, ill ternper by
Pannanias, and. th,eir ftLen were punish,ed, withfloggings
or by beíngforced to stand, all day with an iron anchnr
on th.eir shouldnrs. No one uas alloued, to get straw for
bedding, or fodd,er for his horse, or to d,raw wøter until
thc Spartans ha.d, helped thcmselues, and their seruants,