Download Performance measures, pay and accountability: A Field Study in an

Performance measures, pay and accountability: A Field Study in an audit firm
Unfinished Draft
12th October 2007
Abstract:
There is a growing strand of research that draws attention to management control
settings in which psychologically derived notions of equity (for example) may
override traditional notions of economically determined behaviour. A second strand
of research has shown that subjectivity in performance measurement offers one way
to overcome potentially problematic aspects of quantitative measures. This study
seeks to develop both of these efforts to set the role of economic theorising into a
richer perspective by introducing a sociologically informed theorisation of the role of
measurement in processes of accountability. The ambition is to emphasise that both
notions of economic rationality and psychological equity can be beneficially
understood as an ongoing social achievement. The paper presents a detailed analysis
of the role of quantitative measures in the profit-sharing process of a professional
audit partnership. Informed by practice theory the study explores the role of metrics
as a resource for collective action and evaluation played out through ongoing
engagements and discussions in everyday activity as well as in formally designated
evaluation and appraisal processes.
Keywords: Subjectivity, Performance measurement, Accountability, Professional
Service Firm
Author:
Christopher S. Chapman
Saïd Business School
University of Oxford
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
UK
Tel: +44-1865-288908
Email: [email protected]
Acknowledgements:
I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of this research from the Economic and
Social Research, Council Contract number RES-000-22-0204. I am also indebted to
David Cooper, Laura Empson, and Keith Robson, and Steve Salterio, for their
constructive questions and comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1
Performance measures, pay and accountability: A Field Study in an audit firm
Introduction
There is a large literature that addresses the design of organisational incentive systems
(c.f. Lambert and Larcker 1993; Merchant, Van der Stede, and Zheng 2003). The
challenges of understanding the issue were clearly laid out long ago now (e.g.
Ridgway 1956), yet it seems these same problems still confront us in accounts of the
day to day practice of performance measurement. In their review of the literature,
Lambert and Larcker (1993) review the economics-based literature together with
literature drawing on insights from sociology. Confronted with apparent competition
rather than co-operation between these two schools of research they conclude their
paper with the suggestion that “Agency should use simpler models that include noneconomic factors. Sociology should recognise that there are strong links to pay for
performance” P549. A decade on, Merchant et al (2003), likewise conclude that
progress in our understanding has been hampered by an ongoing failure to talk across
disciplines that might work together to address the challenge of performance
measurement in a more comprehensive fashion.
This paper seeks to respond to Larker & Lambert’s (1993) call by demonstrating the
potential for sociological forms of theorisation to shed light on issues that have been
raised as problematic in the extant economics-based literature. The intent is not to
replace economic theorisation, but to open-out an understanding of the role of
performance measures as incentives that draws on the practice turn in social theory
(Barnes 2001; Ahrens and Chapman 2007). In the following analysis of a
longitudinal field study carried out in a UK-based audit partnership1 the approach to
performance measurement and profit-sharing will be explored with a view to
understanding the role of performance measures in the ordering of the behaviour of
the partners. A practice theorisation highlights that measures act not as objective
indicators that directly guide action towards concrete ends, rather they represent a
resource for individual and collective action, drawn on in daily action by partners in
the constitution of those partnership goals and objectives.
The economics-based literature on incentives emphasises issues of measurement and
contractibility. Elegantly and comprehensively unpacking various problems of
unintended and dysfunctional behaviours arising from incentive systems, Prendergast
(1999) reviews this literature outlining various system design characteristics that
might mitigate specific problems. He concludes that whilst as a body of work the
agency literature has identified certain kinds of problems that it models well, in other
areas the empirical support is “not resounding” and there remains “a large hole to fill”
in terms of issues that have not proved tractable thus far.
In the accounting literature, this form of economic theorisation has provided a
powerful framework for assessing the question of organisational design in which the
question of the degree of delegation of decision-making that is optimal is resolved
through the contractibility of performance measures. This framework is successfully
applied in Moers (2006), for example, where we see that organisational delegation
1
This research was carried out under a confidentiality agreement, and in order to protect anonymity of
both the partnership and the interviewees, actual names and any operating statistics have been
disguised. Hereafter the paper will refer to XYZ Partnership.
1
choices are related to available performance measures in terms of their degree of
sensitivity, precision and verifiablility. The more (less) that performance measures
exhibit these characteristics the greater (lesser) the degree of delegation.
There has also been much research examining the potential for incentive system
design to elicit effort to improve performance. Banker, Lee, and Potter (1996), for
example present a field study that demonstrates the performance improvements in
response to incentive design. Elaborating on their main finding that the introduction
of an incentive payment systems in a retail organisation does increase performance
over time, they also find that the performance is weaker during the sales season, when
a higher percentage of temporary staff are employed. The argument here is that due
to their shorter time horizon for evaluating their efforts and rewards temporary staff
exert less effort. In a later study Banker et al (2000) find that “more productive” staff
self-select (both in and out) in response to incentive system design.
The explanatory power of such economic framings of behaviour having been ably
analysed and demonstrated in a wide body of literature a tempting conclusion is that
the nature of the intentions, interests and capabilities of the people may be excluded
from organisational design deliberations, since the salient aspects of these personal
characteristics may be effectively captured, expressed and analysed through the
economics of incentive design structure. Quite apart from more sociologically
oriented studies that have highlighted the danger such an assumption (e.g. Ezzamel
and Willmott 1998), economics-based research itself provides us clear indications
that this is not the case. Banker et al (1996) p203, for example, discuss literature that
has demonstrated that whilst the effect of incentives is clear for “boring or monotnous
work”, or where solutions are “mechanical”. However this same literature suggests
that where work is “interesting for its own sake”, or where the task at hand has
“neither a clear solution procedure, nor an obvious way to create or discover one”
then financial incentives may have the reverse effect.
Even in situations where we might expect performance improvements from financial
incentives, Meyer and Gupta (1994) identify an effect whereby measures “run down”
over time, gradually losing their power to discriminate good from bad performance.
They observe two main reasons behind this degeneration in the variance of measures.
The first is that people learn to manage activities better, resulting in improved
performance across the board whereby laggards catch up with leaders. The second is
that people learn how to manage the reporting of performance. The challenge of
performance measurement and accountability lies in understanding the nature of
circumstances that might encourage the desirable effects of the former reason, whilst
inhibiting the latter. In addressing this question, it would seem that a greater attention
to the individuals involved might be required.
Recently, work has begun to emerge that seeks to address incentive problems drawing
on insights from economics and psychology (e.g. Towry 2003; Colletti, Sedatole, and
Towry 2005) introduce issues such as team identity, trust and fairness, for example.
In Towry (2003), for example, her experiment found that a strong team identity
degraded the effectiveness of a vertical approach to control, but enhanced a horizontal
one. Further psychologically informed research such as Sprinkle (2000) has shown
that incentives may improve performance only after considerable feedback and
experience.
2
A related stream of research that has sought to expand the reach of economic
theorisations of incentives relates to the issue of subjectivity in performance
measurement. These studies have sought to understand how firms may choose to
design incentive structures that allow for the fact that measurement of performance is
challenged by a variety of intractable problems such as dealing with situations where
there is not a clearly observable individual output measure, or when there is a need to
back-out unintended or uncontrollable effects (e.g. Gibbs et al. 2004; Rajan and
Reichelstein 2006). However subjectivity from an agency perspective is difficult to
handle, raising the spectre of biased measurement.
Moers (2005), for example, finds in his study that subjectivity lead to a compression
of performance ratings as supervisors unduly inflated the subjective assessments of
their subordinates. A result that echoes Prendergast’s (1993) framing that this is to
be expected, since individual managers will wish to avoid the unpleasant business of
awarding poor evaluations if they are relatively unencumbered by the costs of failing
to do this. In their field study of performance measures and incentive design, Ittner,
Larcker, and Meyer (2003) report on an organisation that became frustrated with the
unintended consequences of tieing remuneration to metrics in a formulaic way, and
shifted to an entirely subjective basis of remuneration. The challenges of establishing
this as a means of operation were amply demonstrated as this approach was quickly
dropped.
In seeking to understand the various ways in which incentives may become implicated
in organisational action in both positive and detrimental ways, there is much to be
gained from developing their theorisation from sociological perspective where there is
a long tradition of exploration research into the nature of accountability in its
organisational context (Roberts and Scapens 1985; Hoskin and Macve 1988; Roberts
1990; Ahrens 1996; Quattrone and Hopper 2005). Understood from a sociological
perspective incentive systems do not simply function, they may act to construct
individuals in certain ways (Miller and O'Leary 1987; Hoskin and Macve 1988). But
those ways are not always the ones originally intended by system designers.
Sociologically informed research has helped to highlight the role of
institutionalisation in generating loose coupling between financial control systems and
operations (e.g. Berry et al. 1985), often observing a conflict between financial
concerns and potentially competing professional or vocational agendas (e.g. Dent
1991; Oakes, Townley, and Cooper 1998) that have shaped and been shaped by
emerging calculative regimes.
In their study (Covaleski et al. 1998) explored the interaction between large
accounting firms’ implementations of Management by Objectives schemes with
mentoring and appraisal systems. Drawing on a Foucauldian analysis they describe
the intent of the MBO process as disciplinary in nature aimed at the construction of
the individual as a “self-regulating clone” of the organisation. The representational
power of the measurement system was held to construct a field of visibility over
professional action. The most potent effect of such a field of visibility is to engender
forms of behaviour shaped by the anticipation of the way in which it might be seen by
others through the measurement system, whether negative or positive, based on fear
of shame, or the anticipation of pride. As explained in Roberts (2001), p.1552
3
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes
responsibility for the constraints of power, he makes them play spontaneously
on himself. He inscribes in himself the power relation in which he
simultaneously plays both roles. (Foucault 1979), pp. 202-3
Such individualising forms of accountability emphasise formal hierarchical
accountability and involve the production and reproduction of a sense of self as
singular and solitary with only an external and instrumental relationship with others in
the organisation (Roberts 1991). Roberts argues that such individualising forms of
accountability by treating individuals as effectively appendices to their representation
through performance measures, may contribute to the very problems of opportunism,
shirking, and manipulation of measurement processes that they were intended to
preclude. In relation to the prevalence of agency thinking, with its strong emphasis on
the visibility of the isolated individual, this presents the danger that systems designed
to mitigate instrumental behaviour may actually serve to produce it (Roberts 2001;
Cohen and Holder-Webb 2006).
Building on his earlier ideas concerning accountability Roberts (2001) seeks to
reformulate the problem of corporate governance away from an agency based
understanding of organisation as a problem of securing the interests of remote owners.
In the context of professional service firms, the agency problem of remote
shareholders has traditionally been at least partially mitigated through the
organisational form of the professional partnership (Greenwood and Empson 2003).
This point notwithstanding studies of control in professional firms emphasise that
distance and individualising tendencies are prevalent in the largest public accounting
firms at least (Covaleski et al. 1998; Anderson-Gough, Grey, and Robson 2001).
In the big accounting firms studied by Covaleski et al. (1998) the field of visibility
helped reinforce a fracture between clearly distinguished hierarchical groups. There
was seen to be a clear divide between both the interests and expertise of
administrative (managerial and distant) and line (subordinate and local) partners. In
their study they go onto unpack in detail the complex ways in which the field of
visibility constructed through MBO programmes interacted with lines of resistance
and attempts to recapture a sense of professional autonomy through the mentoring
system. In the firms that they studied this became a subtle interconnection between
coercion and resistance.
Such resistance notwithstanding, the effectiveness with which professionals’ interests
and intentions were shaped are strikingly demonstrated through the character of
“Bottom-Line Bob” (Covaleski et al. 1998), p. 317. When talking with a partner who
had experienced two types of mentoring, a clear and unambiguous preference was
expressed for the mentor who acted at a distance and dealt with concrete performance
metrics. The other mentors’ attempts to build up shared norms of professionalism and
service through discussions of autonomy and client service were perceived by the
junior partner as less clear and a worrying source of uncertainty. Perceiving himself
as an individual subject to a field of visibility, the partner actively preferred someone
who would help them construct himself as a normalised individual.
The potentially individualising effects of systems of accountability and the security
thereby deliverable by hard numbers can also be seen in Marginson and Ogden’s
4
(2005) recent study of the role of budgets in relation to empowerment. This study
found the strict use of budgetary targets operated as a means to relieve the role
ambiguity that subordinates perceived in the face of a programme of empowerment
and decentralisation. In their firm, empowerment was again constructed as a
distancing exercise between senior and operational management. Strict budgetary
targets therefore provided a clear yardstick for the assessment of the appropriateness
of chosen actions in the face of this delegation (see also, Otley, 1978 ). Here again we
see the chosen form of accountability revolving around the isolation of the individual
as the locus of decision, resulting in desire for reassurance (but through accounting
rather than a sense of collective agreement), in this case through the budget.
Roberts (2001) contrasts this individualising approach with systems of accountability
more complexly implicated in the construction of both strategic and ethical
subjectivities. Socialising forms of accountability, he argues would emphasise faceto-face accountability between people of relatively equal power and which may
constitute a sense of interdependence of self and other both instrumentally and
morally. A concern echoed in the finding of Otley and Pearce (1995) that
dysfunctional performance measurement behaviour (in terms of under-reported hours
and lower audit quality) were lower in situations where managers exhibited a high
consideration leadership style. Treating people as people and not simply as measures
has effects. A finding clearly demonstrated in Kachelmeier and Towry (2002), where
simply the carrying out of a negotiation face to face as opposed to over a computer
link produced significantly different transfer pricing outcomes. An effect labelled in
the study as “humanisation”.
In terms of contemporary debates concerning management control, the emphasis on
dialogue and debate as a means of constructing more collective lines of action
suggests the importance of coming to understand how socialising forms of
accountability might work. The very notion of management control systems is
imbued with the notion of hierarchy, yet Robert’s concern for the potentially
detrimental aspects of strongly felt power differences can be seen in Simons’s (1995)
insistence that an important aspect of Interactive control systems must be the noninvasive nature of the decision-making jointly carried out between senior and
operational managers in their face to face discussions (Bisbe, Batista-Foguet, and
Chenhall). A similarly complex balancing act is explored through the notion of
enabling control in (Ahrens and Chapman 2004).
The above studies are suggestive that in coming to understand the role of
contemporary performance measurement systems, it is should be helpful to explore in
detail the processes of accountability within which measurement is situated. This
paper will seek to elaborate the potential for socialising forms of accountability. As
has already been noted by both Roberts and other commentators e.g. (Lindkvist and
Llewellyn 2003), in earlier discussions of the topic, the dichotomy between
individualising and socialising approaches is sketched rather too sharply, and the role
of hierarchy in particular seems to be discussed as inherently unsuitable for
socialising forms of accountability. In this paper, informed by insights from practice
theory (c.f. Ahrens & Chapman, 2007), attention will be given to the ways in which
performance measures are given meaning through the ways in which both individuals
and groups of people seek to draw on them as a resource for managerial action.
5
Through a detailed analysis of a longitudinal study this paper discusses the ways in
which professionals explained their implications for the ways in which they
approached financial planning, individual appraisals, and the management and
carrying out of their daily work. The firm operated a detailed individual level
performance measurement and remuneration system, however detailed attention to
social processes of accountability surrounding performance measurement meant that
the kinds of dysfunctional behaviours that are frequently felt to arise from
performance measurement were not felt to be a significant problem. Partners were
clear that theirs was not an “Eat what you kill” approach to professional profit
sharing. They were sensitive to the limits of “scientific” measurement, concerned to
balance the power of the numbers against a collective commitment to “grown-up”
discussions of the relationship between original targets, emerging priorities, and
mutually agreed courses of action. Through a series of both formal and informal
engagements with each other they strove to draw on individual-level performance
metrics in ways that was informed by but also informed a collective sense of the
individual in relationship with other partners as individuals and collectively as XYZ
partnership.
This case study provides a detailed basis for thinking through many challenging issues
arising from contemporary discussions of performance measurement. In what ways
can we work to overcome inevitable measurement challenges of all but the simplest of
settings such that performance data can structure evaluations and inform day-to-day
activity in ways that are perceived to be appropriate? This study will explore how
XYZ partnership strove to resolve this challenge through its ongoing emphasis on
developing a collective interpretation on what it meant to be a good or a bad partner
working with, but not strictly determined by performance measures.
Research design
This study is based on analysis of a longitudinal field study carried out in a UK-based
professional audit partnership, XYZ Partnership. In approaching the fieldwork, a
two-stage process was adopted. As described below, extensive efforts were made to
discipline the research process (Ahrens and Chapman 2006). The first round of field
engagement with XYZ Partnership was carried out with a co-researcher as a part of a
larger project on the governance of professional service firms. The first round began
with a review of various documents (including the partnership agreement, marketing
brochures relating to the firms’ activities, partnership values statements)
There followed a round of semi-structured interviews at which both researchers were
present for just under half of all interviews. These interviews were based on a semistructured interview guide designed to elicit from interviewees basic information
concerning the main management structures, processes, and performance information
that were used both to govern and support the performance of their various activities.
The interview guide served to ensure that interviews covered a common set of issues
and themes but allowed for flexibility to interact with interviewees (e.g. requesting
illustrative examples to test developing understanding). See Holstein & Gubrium
(2001) for a more detailed discussion the interactive nature of such interviews. As
interviews progressed interviewees volunteered a variety of supplementary documents
such as, completed appraisal forms, monthly management accounting information, ad
hoc memoranda etc. where they felt they might shed light on issues under discussion.
6
Initial analysis of these interviews was fed back to the senior partner and managing
partner, and also as a part of a regular management meeting of lead partners.
Following this first round, XYZ Partnership was approached to discuss the possibility
of carrying out a further round of fieldwork directed specifically towards the
partnership’s two year profit sharing cycle. This was agreed and the managing
partner suggested a timing of these interviews beginning one month after the
announcement of the results of the next profit sharing exercise. The intention was to
offer the strongest possible test of the success or otherwise of the system by speaking
to people about actual profit share they would be receiving for the coming two years.
A second and more focussed interview guide was developed and all of these
interviews, the observations, and the final round feedback were carried out solely by
the author.
[Insert table 1 around here]
Consistent with the constant comparative method discussed by (Silverman 2001,
p238) the research design was to interview multiple people fulfilling various
management and operational roles in order to allow for an assessment of consistency
and points of difference within and across roles. Interviewees represented a wide
range of professionals from the senior partner and members of the management
executive teams, to recently qualified associates. There were also interviews with
various business service staff from HR, finance, and marketing functions. Of the 24
partners interviewed, 7 were from offices outside London. In the second round of
interviews only partners were re-interviewed since they were the group affected by
the profit sharing. During the period of the research the senior partner retired, and so
one of the second round interviews was with the new senior partner who had been in
post during the profit-sharing process, but had not been interviewed in the first round.
The selection of interviewees was carried out with the senior and managing partners
of each firm to ensure that an appropriate range of individuals would be included.
Consistent with deviant case analysis (Silverman 2001, p239) a specific request was
made to include interviewees who might be regarded as holding unusual views. An
effort was also made to introduce a systematic diversity in terms of the nature of work
undertaken by client facing interviewees, focussing in detail on professionals working
in two contrasting types of business areas. One group whose work was characterised
by high levels of repeat business with established clients, and one that by contrast was
engaged in high levels of ad hoc, project based work.
Wherever possible (more than 90%) interviews were recorded and transcribed in full.
Where recording was not possible detailed notes were made as soon as possible
following the interview. Transcripts were analysed with the help of Altas.ti software.
This software was used as a tool for data management in the analytical process rather
than constituting the analysis itself (Kelle 1997). The software was used to dissect
and reorganize the original transcripts around emerging issues of significance and to
explore areas of agreement and disagreement. Following Silverman’s (2001: 240)
notion of comprehensive data treatment, there was an extensive analysis of transcripts
using the software to facilitate the comparison of accounts of different individuals
regarding common issues, seeking to guard against anecdotalism in analysis.
7
Performance measurement, pay, and accountability
The profit-sharing system – a brief description
In response to an opening question concerning what information was available to help
professionals in assessing their performance, almost without exception the first
response related to the availability of a wide range of financial and operational
statistics. It was explained that the basic business model of the professional firm
revolves around the selling of professional’s time and the leveraging of client
relationships, consistent with standard texts on the management of professional
service firms (e.g. Maister 1982).
Detailed records were kept outlining time spent. Based on this information, staff and
partner costs were accumulated against client accounts, and various internal accounts
such as marketing, recruitment, etc. Whilst the intensity of scrutiny of utilization
information (percentage of hours worked that were billable to clients) varied between
business areas in the short run, all areas needed to construct a justification for their
headcount based on expected utilization figures in comparison to expected fee income
when it came to budgeting for the coming financial year.
On a far more frequent basis however, accumulated billable, but un-billed costs (work
in progress) were closely tracked. Along-side this was a careful monitoring of any
writing-off of charged hours where a client would not pay. This was of immediate
concern from a cash-flow point of view since wages and drawings were regular
payments, but also as a means of managing profitability.
In XYZ there was a general acceptance as natural of a relationship between a
partner’s financial contribution to the firm and their status and remuneration. There
was an equally widespread acceptance of the idea that capturing this relationship
precisely was more than a question of quantified performance measures however. In
considering the specifics of the profit sharing arrangements in XYZ Partnership, it is
worth noting that it shares many features noted as common in Burrow and Black’s
(1998) study of profit sharing arrangements in Big-6 audit firms in Australia, in which
they observed a striking number of similarities in approach amongst their
participating organisations. The first point to note is that XYZ rejected firmly any
notion of equal sharing of profits, stating unequivocally that a performance-based
approach was required. A second point is that XYZ’s process produced considerable
variation in profit shares of established partners.
[Insert Figures 1&2 around here]
Burrow and Black also found that profit sharing was administered through the
allocation of profit points awarded following annual or biennial (XYZ) subjective
performance appraisals. They go on to note that the variously named “deciding
groups” either comprise, or were drawn from, firms’ overall management and
executive committees. In XYZ’s case the “deciding body” included the executive, but
also a larger number of elected representatives. As in all Burrow and Blacks’ firms
XYZ’s allocation of profit points were public amongst all partners. Also as in Burrow
and Black, there was evidence of a “portfolio approach” with broad pooling of profits
(in XYZ there was a single profit pool), and the absence of a direct linkage between
profit shares and short run returns from particular specialisations.
8
XYZ partnership ran a major exercise to individually determine appropriate profit
shares every two years. The process was carried out by an elected body, the
Partnership Council. This body was chaired by the Senior Partner, and the Managing
Partner was an ex-officio member, the remaining people (10 in this case) were elected
by the partnership. The partnership council met regularly throughout the year
carrying out two main roles. Firstly as an initial sounding board and source of
challenge for proposals from the executive group, and also as a body that might act to
deal with a variety of partner matters, whether in terms of disputes, grievances, or as a
source of support in the face of personal or professional need. The members of the
council split between them the task of attending annual partner appraisal meetings
each year. Appraisals were carried out by the relevant business group Lead Partner
and a member of partnership council around April.
The profit sharing exercise was carried out in the summer of the second year of the
council, and so at this point, the members would be attended two successive
appraisals for a subset of the entire partnership. Each partnership council member
was furnished with the appraisal forms of all partners, together with a standard set of
performance information on a partner basis (including chargeable hours, relationship
and project partnership billings, etc.) and was independently expected to come up
with an initial profit sharing schedule for all partners. The resulting twelve
independent profit sharing profiles were tabulated and used as the basis of an
intensive meeting of the council during which a final version was agreed. The
resulting profit share decision, accompanied by a detailed memo outlining the general
principles of evaluation were then distributed to the whole partnership. A multi-stage
appeals process was formally set out for the process. The first port of call would be
the lead partner, then the senior partner, then the partnership council, with ultimate
recourse to a vote of the entire partnership available. In the profit share round studies
here, two changes to profit shares were made (out of approximately thirty appeals to
council). All changes required a partnership vote of approval since this change
reduced all other partners’ shares.
In the interviews carried out there was a general consensus that overall the profit
sharing had gone well. Most strongly from partners directly involved in the process,
but also from those on the outside. Whilst there may have been a tendency to want to
report a success, partners were quite free in mentioning that the previous profit share
round had not gone smoothly, in the words of one partner it had “gone down like a
lead balloon”. They were also quite frank in their assessment that whilst the overall
process had gone well, that did not mean they thought it was perfect. In discussing
the appeal process with members of the council it was routinely described as
providing an opportunity for appellants to get things off their chest and to discuss with
the council the basis on which decisions had been made. The point consistently
emphasized was that this was not seen as a strictly scientific process. More than that,
the nature of its subjectivity was seen as essential to the nature of the organization.
In the following section, a series of extended quotations have been selected from a
variety of partners. The choices behind the selection are driven by two main
principles. The first was to ensure a balanced presentation of viewpoints and
perspectives between those partners who, as members of the partnership council were
directly involved in the profit sharing decisions, and those partners who were not. In
9
each individual case care has been taken to demonstrate the inherent tensions arising
from a consistent rejection of a simple rules based approach.
Individual accounts of performance measurement and pay
Historically, there's a belief in professional practice that fees earned and
supervised must be the key measures of performance, and it's understandable
why, because it's the most obvious measure of performance. But the reality is
that it doesn't tell you anything about the way in which the work is won, who
won it, the real relationship with the client that underlies those fees, the degree
of penetration of that particular client that it represents. […] I know in my gut
whether people are performing or not. I know from seeing them in meetings,
from the enthusiasm with which they pick this up, from the way that clients react
to them, from their success rate, in terms of proposals and various other kinds of
work winning, from their relationship with staff, from the quality of the stuff that
they do. All of that together gives me a picture of whether they're performing
and at what level.[…] I'd expect the data to be complementary to my beliefs over
a period. Not necessarily in the short run. (SBU 1 Lead partner)
In this account we see that financial performance is important and valued, but a clear
statement that this valuing is a process of judgement of not by numbers.
My appraisal discussions are interesting in the sense of first of all, there's a
difficulty in understanding what I'm doing. Secondly, there's even more of a
difficulty understanding where I'm going. And the where I'm going thing will fit
into two broad routes. “Do you want to go up or do you want to stay where you
are? […] Up tends to be associated with the amount of profit you take out of the
place, then you are going to have to change the mix of what it is that you're
doing. And, in that sort of sense, I think there is an association between the
client side of what I do and how far I go within the partnership rather than with
the non-chargeable stuff that I do. […] there was one partner who was very
keen to, using foul means rather than fair, to make sure that she had more
billings associated with her name than other partners in her office. You could
see what was going on and she was going ‘that's going to stand me in good
stead next year [for profit sharing].’ And I had to tell her ‘no, that's not the way
it works. Yes, of course, we'll look at the numbers, but …’. It's not a straight
line between the one and the other. There is that hefty subjective element in
there, which is, in some ways, a defining characteristic of the partnership. And
you've got to understand that and if you don't understand that, you're not really
understanding what the partnership that you joined is how it works or what it's
about. […] (Partner and member of council)
As with the previous partner we see here the importance of financials coupled with a
firm positioning of the numbers as a tool to support judgement, not replace it.
I expect sometimes we get it [profit sharing] wrong. If I have to brutally honest,
if I look in particular at the partners who have appealed against their profit
share, I suspect that there are occasions when quiet under-stated partners who
don’t sell themselves well are not as well regarded or perhaps don’t get the
recognition they are entitled to, or deserve, as compared to the others. […]
10
although in some way I do find our process terribly cumbersome … there are
some advantages to a judgement by peers. […] If you asked the lead partners to
do profit sharing it would have been a different set of numbers in part because
some of them have rose-tinted spectacles when they look at the partners in their
group. […] If numbers are driving your profit share it basically says behave
how you damn well please because we’ll just pay you based on […] And, you
start having to have a very sophisticated metric because it’s not just the billing
that matters it’s the profitability of the job, it’s how quickly is the cash in? […]
One of the things that [Senior Partner] has done particularly well, I think, is to
make absolutely sure that there was transparency to the process and that we
have stuck to the process ... So, the partners cannot argue that there’s been
some favouritism. But those who don’t get out of it what they think they deserve
have to find a problem with it, don’t they? […] At the end of the day the top
earning partners are those that pull in the business and people know and
understand that. I think people recognise it directly but different people have
different views as to how closely linked volume of business is to profit share.
There has to be some linkage but it’s not a linear one by any stretch of the
imagination.(Managing Partner)
The managing partner whilst beginning with an honest statement that with
subjectivity (the major efforts towards transparency and inclusiveness of process) will
come mistakes, subjectivity in assessment remains the best approach.
… it is absolutely not as simple as saying that the person who builds the most,
gets the most at all. […] The financial criteria are extremely important to us but
it's not THE criteria, people have heard this time after time. It's not the criteria,
it's not what you actually bill, it is about how somebody helps in the wider sense
to ensure that the business makes a profit and that people make profitable
contributions in all sorts of ways. There are people who through dead man's
shoes are billing a couple of million pounds a year because they've been in the
right place at the right time. They should not be rewarded any better than
somebody who wins £500,000 worth of new work during the year at all. […] At
the time of doing the appraisal the appraisers probably have a pretty good idea
of how they think this person is performing. But they're diffident about feeding it
back until we all sit together and form a view on the individual. It's only when
you get the collective view that you start to put people into positions and it's
only when you've really debated the individual and you've looked at this
appraisal and previous appraisals and you've heard from stream leaders and
other people providing feedback that you start to get an overall view of the
individual. […] At the time we were doing it [profit sharing] the budget [profit]
for this year was exactly the same as last year. So, we were cutting the pot up.
For everybody who got an increase there had to be a corresponding decrease.
[…] quite sharp messages were being delivered […] we had an example of a 55
year old partner two years ago who got a real significant reduction in his profit
share and it was explained to him in words of one syllable what he had to do to
get it, he did it. … He absolutely changed his behaviour and it wasn't financial,
some of it was financial, but most of it was behavioural. (Senior Partner)
So, you hear examples of people having excellent appraisal meetings, where all
of the comments are positive and the council member concludes by saying,
11
you've done really well, you're progressing well, you're going in the right
direction and the profit share stays flat or goes down […]If you move towards
some sort of score card system where you could measure and evaluate and
attribute a mark towards hard measures, manager performance, soft measures
contributing to your HR policy, clients referred, what have I done in terms of
training or developing or coaching or whatever; what you would have then is a
consistent system that might work as long as it is applied consistently, then it's
open, it's transparent, people can see exactly where they are. From an
accountant's point of view huge attractiveness. But very wary of the caveats
that I made about consistent application of process. What we have now is a
system that pretends to take account of hard and soft measures but ends up
being a judgement and where does that judgement come from, how is that
judgement influenced by lots of factors that are not open, that are not
quantifiable and to some extent are caused by history? […] probably one of the
most successful relationship partners that we've got who last year billed nothing
because he gave the whole lot to the project partner who was really delivering
the engagements. [...] And, that to me was such a positive demonstration of
partner behaviour, and so you repeat that and spread that as often as you can
but unfortunately some individuals and characters respond to that and will say
‘that is right and that's what I want to emulate to be successful to be able to do
that’. And, others say ‘I'm not taking that risk on, I'll hang on to that billing’.
(Partner and member of executive)
This quotation strongly reinforces the collective judgement message of previous
accounts. It also sets out the strongest statement of the value of measurement as a
process. But even this advocate of measurement concludes his account with an
example which demonstrates why even with better numbers, judgement of value and
contribution are not simply a formulaic analysis of numbers. So the praised partner
would in numeric terms have undergone a significant drop in the financial statistics,
but represents an exemplary demonstration of partner behaviour.
We constantly talk in the departments about what people are doing and there's
continuous appraisal, for want of a better word. People are very clear on what
I think of them; they're very clear on what they're doing against anything that
they've set themselves as targets and how they fit into things. We've all got a
pretty good idea of the relative contribution that people are making, successes
and the things that we're struggling at. So, there's a lot of knowledge within the
partner group in the SBU I think about where people are at. The main purpose
when you sit down with a partnership council member is, I think, as an SBU
leader is to steer the conversation towards things that might be getting
overlooked, to just introduce issues rather than actually force your views into
the process. You [as SBU leader] have less context. You have hard numbers,
you have a list of new business and those are the two key financials and also, I
guess, recoveries. So you want to know, it's not just the fees but how profitable
is it? People are very keen to talk about that, there is, I think still a general
belief in the partnership that these are the 95% drivers of profit share. […]
therefore people in general who fill in their forms in a lot of details in these
areas are keen to claim credit particularly on new work for anything that they've
introduced to other people, any phone call that they've taken. You will see
patterns of three or four people claiming … because a lot of it is teamwork but it
12
always comes out as something that an individual has done. So, there's a lot of
information thrown at you in the forms and it's what people like to talk about
when you set them off and say ‘tell me about your year?’ And, they instantly go
for the numbers. […] what I'm here [in an appraisal meeting] to do is to get an
understanding of what you have contributed so that when we get to that
discussion your contribution can be fed in, everyone is aware of it and
collectively people will try and form a view on what the value of that is relative
to other partners. That's the other big thing about profit share; it's a relativity's
exercise. […] Some people would simply say, that's an SBU lead part, he
deserves a pay rise, he deserves to be the same as that SBU leader but actually
every one of our lead partners has a completely different job, has a completely
different business profile, partner profile, office size team size profile. The mix
of things between administration, marketing and client service varies
enormously; there are barely two that are similar. […] It's more fees, or it's not
necessarily for yourself, but more opportunities for others, it's making a bigger
financial contribution. […] The younger partners coming through who are
doing particularly well and again assuming that comes through in some way in
the papers and the conversation and your personal experience of them, the issue
with those guys is how quickly you accelerate them through the profit share, so
there were a lot of different view on that, so how fast do you move someone over
two years and how many rungs or how much value should they move up by.
[…] There's an area of divergence and similarly those partners that were not
contributing to the extent that they should have, given their profit share. Again,
you've got an issue of how far do you bring people down; it's a rate thing
normally. There were very few of those two categories, people who were really
flying up or people where actually you thought that they weren't contributing as
they should do […] I think that the broad assumption that the starting position is
pretty much right and what you're evaluating on movements is what it's about.
You're not questioning the starting position of every partner out there. […]
What my biggest fear going into it Chris was, I thought we would come up with
a profit share that I couldn't put my name to … You are out there trying to be as
fair as you possibly can, and these are big decisions for people that will effect
the extent to which they can provide for their family, their future, it's big, and
you have to crawl all over it, but we put in a huge amount of time … It is robust,
we can sit down with anyone and say, well this is how you got to the number
[profit share], you still might not agree, but these are things that we took into
account, there will be reasons. In the actual council meeting nothing was
rushed, if people wanted to make a comment they're allowed to make the
comment, if they wanted to challenge something, they were allowed to challenge
it. (SBU 2 Lead partner and member of council)
Consistent with past speakers emphasis on the significance of process, there is also a
consistent and powerful presentation of the recognition that this is not an abstract
measurement process, but is intimately bound up with partners lives.
What I started off with was a philosophy that if I could work out a personal
agenda was, what my partners wanted to do, how they wanted to do it, how
much time do they want to spend, what sort of person they want to be? Then if I
got into that for each of the individuals and we shared it amongst ourselves, a,
we'd get individuals helping other individuals and we could run a business
13
agenda on the back of the whole series of personal agendas. And, they should
run in parallel on their mind. And, where there was a divergence of a personal
agenda from the overall business agenda then there was a conversation
required either with the individual who would say, okay, well, I'm willing to
draw back from my personal agenda or adjust my personal agenda to come in
line with the business agenda. Or, well, this is really important to me as an
individual, in which case let's have a conversation about how we as a business
can best help you to achieve that. And, if that's somewhere else, that's
unfortunate but at least it crystalises that point […] I also assured them that the
conversation we were going to have at the back end of this was either fantastic,
well done, where's the next stage? Or, it was going to be, okay, so you didn't
make it on whatever measure or objective it was, why was that, what could we
have done differently, me, the firm, you, to have achieved it or did the world just
move? Because sometimes the world moves, you set out with best intentions, I'm
going to set up this type of business and you do your research and you go, the
research tells me I shouldn't start that type of business. In which case you go,
I'm not going to achieve that objective. That's fine, but it wasn't going to be
‘okay, please come in here you've failed on two of the six measures and that
means a month and a half in leg irons and we're going to stick you out in the
front corridor and throw tomatoes at you and just publicly humiliate you.’ […]I
think they did a pretty good job this year, a) in communication, and b) if they're
wrong, they're only wrong by a box. […] I have one partner whom I felt was a
box below where she should have been and that was difficult because I felt that
too. And, I told her so but we had the conversation and she did appeal and she
had the conversation that's good and it's unusual for her to appeal as well. It
was a process, she did get hurt, there was no outcome in terms of increase but
there was a process she did go through and we've talked about it and she still
feels bruised and that will lessen over time and then we'll fix her. I'm making
sure she gets what she deserves next time round. (SBU 3 Lead Partner)
Here again we see (this time from someone outside the process) an honest recognition
that the system will entail mistakes, and that people will get hurt. However these
aspects are the basis of an explanation of the kinds of communication process which
are important in reducing the likelihood of these, together with a statement of
collective commitment on the part of the injured partner and the speaker to continuing
to work to make the system work in the future.
I had a conversation with [SBU 3 Lead partner] before I joined, which was,
having left a very measurement focussed business albeit one that was inherently
failing in my view to get any sort of balance in those sort of conversations, I
didn't want to join another one like that. So, I was happy that [SBU 3 Lead
partner] would look and agree that I'm not based on, I not measured on the
hours I work, I'm not measured on when I'm here, I'm measured on the
contribution I make to the business. And that is both in tangible and intangible
ways and the latter is obviously much harder to measure. […] I thought, I don't
understand this [Profit share at old firm]. Whereas here, I think there's much
more integrity here because there's more integrity frankly in the people, but I
don't think we've got a process and an approach that is actually sufficiently
robust, still flexible, but robust, to ensure those conversations. […] What I was
saying to [SBU 3 Lead partner in appraisal meeting] was, this is the business
14
that I have brought into the firm irrespective of which year it's going to be done.
IV Right. IE Quite different to the firm's accounting system which will say, what
have you built in the period? … Either as project partner i.e. you are doing the
work or relationship partner where you have the overall relationship with the
client but you are not explicitly involved in the delivery of that project. […] I
would hope that actually, because of the fact that we are in a small team and we
talk that that information would not have individually have been news to him.
Actually there was quite a lot that was […] I think if you want to make it
complicated and be divisive, which I think is part of what you're getting at in
terms of people saying, that's my bit and that's my bit and then you can. I don't
think that in itself is anything of a symptom of something bigger. If you've got a
business unit that's working well as a team then you're not going to get into that.
For example, a lot of what I'm doing at the moment is actually bringing
opportunities for corporate finance. I can see it, you're like everybody, you
have to push the button (and even more for the man execs [management
executive team]) to push a button and get this beautiful clear [picture of
performance] … I don't think it's ever going to happen because it misses the
nuances; it misses some of the little twists that you need to be able to put onto
something more tailored. […] when I read that [profit sharing results] and I
looked at that I was disappointed, I suppose, because you always like to think
you're worth more. But, I thought it was okay, but that was my initial reaction, I
thought, yeah, that's okay. Tick with expectation, tick with this is what I'd heard
and tick with the conversation with [Managing Partner]. Not big tick but okay.
There was nothing that said, you've been telling me I'm a superstar and you've
given me nothing. Or, you told me that I'm crap and you've given me something
because that would have been like, what's going on here? (Partner in SBU 3,
recent lateral hire)
In this final quotation we see that even someone only recently arrived in the
organisation recognises the integrity and intent of the process. Whilst beginning with
a clear statement of the representative power of numbers in assessing their
contribution, the speaker clearly recognises that the interpretation and nuancing of
these numbers is essential.
Tentative discussion and conclusions
A typical agency theory analysis of the link between performance measures and pay
might seek to operationalize such aspects of metrics as their informativeness,
precision, sensitivity. Foucauldian analysis of measurement as a disciplinary practice
has emphasised the potential of performance measures as mechanism of control
through the ways in which it constructs in individuals an internal dialogue with
themselves such that the self is constantly constructed in the light of particular
metrics. People are made governable (Miller and O'Leary 1987). Following the lead
of (Roberts 2001), this paper seeks to unpack in more detail the complex ways in
which dialogue surrounding systems of accountability might actively constitute as
well as reinforce particular interests given expression through performance measures.
Informed by a practice perspective, we observe that in individual accounts references
are made to competing concerns, most strongly and consistently an ideal of scientific
measurement versus a concern to retain judgement of performance that is informed
but not determined by the results of such measurement.
15
Measurement was not held up as an entirely scientific process in which performance
was accurately represented, and which might allow/force individuals to construct
themselves in isolation. Instead measures provided a framework for ongoing
discussion. Through ongoing dialogue performance metrics set out an agenda, a set
of values through which future actions were shaped in recognizable ways. The
emphasis was on the collective and normative aspects of activity whereby the
numbers were necessary, but definitely not sufficient for the determination of
performance or pay.
In XYZ Partnership we saw that despite a well developed structure of individual level
performance evaluation and the central implication of these measurements in
determining individual’s remuneration, there was also a concerted effort to mobilize
performance metrics as a means to share knowledge, skills, and activity. Whilst there
was concern to encourage people to develop themselves, this was not an
individualistic activity, but one aimed at engendering a wider sense of connectedness
and reciprocal obligation in both instrumental and moral terms. Consistent with
Roberts notions of the need to re-couple moral and instrumental aspects of action, in
XYZ Partnership performance measurement sought to maintain a collective
judgement of the “goodness” or “badness” of performance.
Roberts notes the likelihood that relative hierarchical distance might tend to
encourage individualizing approaches (as seen in Covaleski et al., 1998) distance
(both geographic and hierarchical) did seem to be a significant factor in understanding
the functioning of MBO as an individualizing field of visibility. At around 200
partners, XYZ Partnership was far from small, but it was far smaller and more
geographically clustered than the Big 6 firms most often studied. This concern
notwithstanding, the hope is that this study contributes to the development of a clearer
understanding of the ways in which performance measurement can become implicated
in the construction of daily activity without generating the kinds of dysfunctional
behaviours that have become common place in the numerous accounts of failed
implementations of contemporary performance measurement systems.
16
Table 1 – Fieldwork statistics
Round 1 Interviews
Formal feedback
Round 2 Interviews
Observations of meetings etc.
Formal feedback
Total for both rounds
Dates
Occasions Hours
Jun 03 - Mar 04 31
40.67
May 04 - Jun 04 3
4.42
34
45.08
Oct 04 - Nov 04 17
14.52
Aug 04 - Oct 04 2
4.75
May 05
1
1.25
20
20.52
54
65.60
17
Figure 1 – scatter plot of chargeable hours against profit share
0
Figure 2 - scatter plot of project partner billings against profit share
0
Figure 3 – scatter plot of relationship partner billings against profit share
0
18
References
Ahrens, T. 1996. Styles of accountability. Accounting, Organizations and Society
21:139-173.
Ahrens, T., and C. S. Chapman. 2004. Accounting for flexibility and efficiency: A
field study of management control systems in a restaurant chain.
Contemporary accounting research 21 (2):271-301.
Ahrens, T., and C. S. Chapman. 2006. Doing Qualitative Accounting Research:
Positioning Data to Contribute to Theory. Accounting, Organizations and
Society 31 (8):819-841.
Ahrens, T., and C. S. Chapman. 2007. Management accounting as practice.
Accounting, Organizations and Society 32 (1/2):1-27.
Anderson-Gough, F., C. Grey, and K. Robson. 2001. Tests of time: organizational
time-reckoning and the making of accountants in two multi-national
accounting firms. Accounting, Organizations and Society 26 (2):99-122.
Banker, Rajiv D., S. Y. Seok-Young Lee, Gordon Potter, and Dhinu Srinivasan. 2000.
An empirical analysis of continuing improvements following the
implementation of a performance-based compensation plan. Journal of
Accounting and Economics 30 (3):315.
Banker, Rajiv D., Seok-Young Lee, and Gordon Potter. 1996. A field study of the
impact of a performance-based incentive plan. Journal of Accounting and
Economics 21 (2):195.
Barnes, B. 2001. Practice as collective action. In The practice turn in contemporary
theory, edited by T. R. Schatzki, K. Knorr Cetina and E. v. Savigny. 17-28.
London and New York: Routledge.
Berry, A., T. Capps, D. Cooper, P. Ferguson, T. Hopper, and E. Lowe. 1985.
Management control in an area of the NCB: Rationales of accounting practices
in a public enterprise. Accounting, Organizations and Society 10 (1):3-28.
Bisbe, Josep, Joan-Manuel Batista-Foguet, and Robert Chenhall. Defining
management accounting constructs: A methodological note on the risks of
conceptual misspecification. Accounting, Organizations and Society In Press,
Corrected Proof.
Burrows, Geoff, and Christopher Black. 1998. Profit sharing in Australian Big 6
accounting firms: An exploratory study. Accounting, Organizations and
Society 23 (5-6):517.
Cohen, J., and L. Holder-Webb. 2006. Rethinking the influence of agency theory in
the accounting academy. Issues in Accounting Education 21 (1):17-30.
Colletti, A., K. Sedatole, and K. Towry. 2005. The effect of control systems on trust
and co-operation in collaborative environments. The Accounting Review 80
(2):477-500.
Covaleski, M. A., M. W. Dirsmith, J. Heian, and S. Samuel. 1998. The calculated and
the avowed: Techniques of discipline and struggles over identity in Big Six
public accounting firms. Administrative Science Quarterly 43 (2):293-327.
Dent, J. F. 1991. Reality in the making: A study of organizational transformation.
International Studies of Management and Organization 21 (4):23-36.
Ezzamel, M., and H. Willmott. 1998. Accounting for teamwork: A critical study of
group-based systems of organizational control. Administrative Science
Quarterly 43 (2):358-397.
Foucault, M. 1979. Discipline and punish. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
19
Gibbs, M., K. A. Merchant, W. Van der Stede, and M. E. Vargus. 2004. Determinants
and Effects of Subjectivity in Incentives. The Accounting Review 79 (2):409436.
Greenwood, R., and L. Empson. 2003. The professional partnership: relic or
exemplary form of governance? Organization Studies 24 (6):909-933.
Holstein, J. A., and J. F. Gubrium. 2001. The active interview. In Qualitative
research: Theory, method and practice, edited by D. Silverman. 140-161.
London: Sage.
Hoskin, K, and R Macve. 1988. The genesis of accountability: The West Point
connections. Accounting, Organizations and Society 13 (1):37-73.
Ittner, C., D. Larcker, and M. Meyer. 2003. Subjectivity and the weighting of
performance measures: Evidence from a Balanced Scorecard. The Accounting
Review 78 (3):725-758.
Kachelmeier, S. J., and K. Towry. 2002. Negotiated Transfer Pricing: Is Fairness
Easier Said Than Done. The Accounting Review 77 (3):571-593.
Kearns, K. P. 1994. The strategic management of accountability in nonprofit
organizations: An analytical framework. Public Administration Review 54
(2):185-192.
Kelle, U. 1997. Theory Building in Qualitative Research and Computer Programs for
the Management of Textual Data. Sociological Research Online 2 (2).
Lambert, R., and D. Larcker. 1993. The structure of organizational incentives.
Administrative Science Quarterly 38 (3):438-461.
Lindkvist, L., and S. Llewellyn. 2003. Accountability, responsibility and organization.
Scandinavian Journal of Management 19:251-273.
Maister, D. 1982. Balancing the professional service firm. Sloan Management Review
24 (1):15-30.
Marginson, D., and S. Ogden. 2005. Coping with ambiguity through the budget: the
positive effects of budgetary targets on managers' budgeting behaviours.
Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (5):435-456.
Merchant, Kenneth A., Wim A. Van der Stede, and Liu Zheng. 2003. Disciplinary
constraints on the advancement of knowledge: the case of organizational
incentive systems. Accounting, Organizations and Society 28 (2-3):251.
Meyer, M. W., and V. Gupta. 1994. The Performance Paradox. Research in
Organizational Behaviour 16:309-369.
Miller, P, and T O'Leary. 1987. Accounting and the construction of the governable
person. Accounting, Organizations and Society 12 (3):235-265.
Moers, F. 2006. Performance Measure Properties and Delegation. The Accounting
Review 81 (4):897-924.
Moers, F. 2005. Discretion and bias in performance evaluation: The impact of
diversity and subjectivity. Accounting, Organizations and Society 30 (1):6780.
Oakes, L., B. Townley, and D. Cooper. 1998. Business planning as pedagogy:
Language and control in a changing institutional field. Administrative Science
Quarterly 43 (2):257-292.
Otley, D. 1978. Budget Use and Managerial Performance. Journal of Accounting
Research:122-149.
Otley, D., and B. Pearce. 1995. The Control Problem in Public Accounting Firms: An
Empirical Study of the Impact of Leadership Style. Accounting, Organizations
and Society 20 (5):405-420.
20
Prendergast, C. 1993. Discretion and bias in performance evaluation. European
Economic Review 37:355-365.
Prendergast, C. 1999. The provision of incentives in firms. Journal of Economic
Literature 37 (1):7-63.
Quattrone, P., and T. Hopper. 2005. A 'time-space odyssey': management control
systems in two multinational organisations. Accounting, Organizations and
Society 30 (7-8):735-764.
Rajan, M., and S. Reichelstein. 2006. Subjective Performance Indicators and
Discretionary Bonus Pools. Journal of Accounting Research 44 (3):585-618.
Ridgway, V. 1956. Dysfunctional consequences of performance measurement.
Administrative Science Quarterly 1 (2):240-247.
Roberts, J. 1990. Strategy and accounting in a U.K. conglomerate. Accounting,
Organizations and Society 15:107-126.
Roberts, J. 1991. The possibilities of accountability. Accounting, Organizations and
Society:355-368.
Roberts, J. 2001. Trust and control in Anglo-American systems of corporate
governance: The individualizing and socializing effects of processes of
accountability. Human Relations 15 (12):1547-1572.
Roberts, J., and R. Scapens. 1985. Accounting systems and systems of accountability
- understanding accounting practices in their organizational contexts.
Accounting, Organizations and Society 10:443-456.
Silverman, D. 2001. Interpreting qualitative data: Methods for analysing talk, text
and interaction. 2nd ed. London: Sage publications.
Simons, R. 1995. Levers of control. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Sprinkle, G. B. 2000. The effects of incentives on learning and performance. The
Accounting Review 75 (3):299-326.
Towry, K. 2003. Control in a teamwork environment - The impact of social ties on the
effectiveness of mutual monitoring contracts. The Accounting Review 78
(4):1069-1095.
21