Download The outbreak of the Korean War led to direct military confrontation

Huma:660
Student name: Hui Hung Hing Patrick
Topic: National interests’ and Ideology’s role to the outbreak of the Korean war:
a study of the decision-making process.
The outbreak of the Korean War led to direct military confrontation between
China and the United States. More than twenty years Sino-American relations
improved. Historians were still studying about the causes of the war. Was it an
invasion well planned by Kim Il Sung, Stalin and Mao tse-tung? Or, misperception
and miscalculation brought about this tragedy. How national security concern and
ideology contributed to the outbreak of the war. This paper tried to answer these
questions. It would examine the role played by China, the Soviet Union, the United
States in this war since they were major actors in this war. Certainly, war could only
be make out by more than one party. Thus, it was necessary to analysis the rationale
of decision-making process among China, the Soviet Union and the United States.
Firstly, China’s decision to enter the war was examined. Secondly, the played by the
Soviet Union was examined. Thirdly, the United States response to Korean situation.
Fourthly, the interaction among the three parties consideration.
To China, Korean peninsula was vital to its national security. The memory about
how Japan made use Korean peninsula as a springboard to invade China during the
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First Sino-Japanese war in 1894-95 was unforgettable to Chinese leadership. It was
understood that since the Korean War was broke out, the CCP was alarmed that
foreign imperialist countries replaced Japan as the major foe to China and its
Northeast territory which was the base of heavy industries and rich in natural
resources was seriously threatened. As a result, scholars argued that it was reason that
China decided to intervene into the war. Was it the whole story? Were there other
considerations when the CCP decided to enter the war. How did ideology interplayed
with national security.
From newly disclosed documentary evidence, China neither did not expected
another was in foreseeable future nor had prepared for a war with the United States. In
fact, Mao believed that the United States military intervention into China on behalf of
the KMT had diminished significantly. As the CCP troops were pursuing the KMT
troops along the coastal areas in early 1949, especially when the PLA crossed the
Yangtze river and took Nanjing the next day, and seized Shanghai on 27 May 1949,
the U.S. troops had not intervened as Mao expected. To account for this, Mao
believed that the U.S. military and strategic concern were in Europe and limited
resources and support from allies did not allow the U.S. to play an active role in the
Far East. Mao’s worry was further relieved after the U.S. Secretary of State Dean
Acheson made public that Taiwan and South Korea were not included in the U.S.
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Western Pacific defense perimeter in January 1950. In addition the U.S. president
Truman stated that the U.S. military forces would stay out of the Chinese Civil War.
From this perspective, Sino-American confrontation even was possible but not
imminent.
In addition, China had neither prepared nor willing for another major war. In
reality, China needed to recover its war-torn economy. More important, the CCP
should stabilize its new regime. To defeat those remaining of KMT and reactionaries
at home and liberate Taiwan were the primary and immediate goals for the CCP. In
fact, Mao was optimistic. What the U.S. did not intervene. Even on the day before the
outbreak of the Korean War. The People’s Daily published the closing speech made by
Mao at the Second Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,
that Mao announced: “we have basically passed the test of war.”
In military aspect, large scale of demobilization process further convinced that
China did not intend and ready to combat any adversary. In May 1950, the CCP
central committee decided to demobilize the PLA from 5.4 million to 1.4 million. The
target number was further increased in June. Even on 30 June 1950, five days after the
outbreak of war, the Central Demobilization Commission further continued the
process.
However, in spite of its internal difficulties, Many argued that China did assist
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Kim Il Sung to invade South Korea. The most persuading evidence was that China
agreed to return back 14,000 North Korean communists with their arms to North
Korea. Accordingly, they had fought with Chinese Communist against KMT during
the Chinese Civil War. In fact, the figure was possibly larger than expected. As Chen
Jian believed that there were as many as 50,000-70,000 Korean-nationality PLA
soliders returned to North Korea. Nevertheless, it should be prudent with this
argument. Undoubtedly, such decision strengthened the North Korean communist
troops’ combat capacity. Yet, it could not say that Mao deliberately cooperate with
Kim in order to invade South Korea or Mao prepared to intervene Korean affairs. At
least, it was not true in the short run. Firstly, Mao was preoccupied by internal
political and economic difficulties as mentioned above. Moreover, the relationship
between China and North Korea was close but they had not further strengthened such
intimate relationship. For example, not until 6 October , 1949, did China officially set
up an official embassy in Pyonyuang and the China’s Ambassador to Pyonguang, Ni
Zhiliang was still on sick leave in Wuhan and resumed his duty since late August
1950 that Korean War was broke out for more than two months. In addition, the only
Chinese insitution in Pyongyang was the commercial Representative office of the
Northeast China Adminstration Committee. Obviously, if Mao had planned in
advance to assist Kim to invade South Korea, it was logical and necessary to establish
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communication channels between the two parties. In short, Mao did not expect war
occurred soon in Korea.
In addition, newly disclosed documentary evidence indicated that early in
January 1950 when Mao was discussing with Stalin about the terms of Sino-Russian
treaty, Kim was also in Moscow, Kim requested Stalin’s assistance about his
unification plan. Afterwards, Stalin sought Mao’s opinion. According to Khruschev,
Mao had not shown his stance clearly. But he agreed to Kim’s plan in principle
because he believed that American military intervention was unlikely. Meanwhile,
Stalin approved Kim’s plan to unify Korea by military means and agreed to provide
the necessary military supplies and equipments. Their boldness was based on the
calculation that the U.S. would not intervene if the war was quickly ended. Although
Kim told his plan to unify Korea by military means to Mao. However, Kim did not let
Mao know neither the date of invasion nor the detail of his plan. Kim visited China
secrety in 13-16 May, 1950 via his trip to Moscow in April 1950. Again, Kim told
Mao about his intention to unite Korea but not the details of the attack. Like before,
Mao agreed with Kim in principle. However, Mao believed that it was not appropriate
at that time to invade the South Korea.
The war did broke out in 20 June, 1950. Certainly Mao was surprised and so did
Truman. Both sides respond swiftly and decisively. At this moment, mutual
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misperception and miscalculation about the other’s motives and demands increased
mutual suspicions and security dilemma. Also, deterrence and assurances did not
work at all.
Accordingly, China entered the war reluctantly. On 7 and 10 July, 1950, one
week after the outbreak of war, the CCP held two urgent meetings to discuss the
Korean situation. To prepare the mishaps, China decided to reinforce defense
capability in Northeast Korea by transforming the Thirteeth Army Corps of the Fourth
Field Army into the Northeastern Border Defense Army (NEBDA). By early August,
more than 250,000 troops had taken position along the Chinese-Korean border”
Obviously, China was only held a defensive position. Yet, after the U.N.
successfully landed at Inchon on 15 September and the North Koreans troops were in
a very disadvantage position, China decided to prepare itself to enter the war if the
UN. troops moved northward especially across the 38th parallel. In fact, China
predicted successfully that the UN troops possibly landed at Konsan and Inchon in
order to attack North Korean troops from the rear. After UN troops landed at Inchon,
China accelerated the process to decide whether to enter the war. As Chen Jian put it:
“ It is apparent that after Inchon the question for Chinese leaders became not if China
should send troops to Korea, but when and under what circumstances. Thus, the
CMCC decided on 17 September to send military officers to Korea in order to survey
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Korean topography and situation.
In the meantime that, Chinese leaderships worried most was U.S. intervention in
the Taiwan strait. Mao perceived that the U.S. China policy had been changed from a
conciliatory to a confrontation at stance. As a matter of fact, the U.S. administration
re-emphasized the strategic importance of Taiwan after the Korean War was broke out.
Firstly, General Douglas MacArthur visited Taiwan without authorization in Spring
1950. He explicitly pointed out that Taiwan was an “ unsinkable aircraft carrier and
submarine tenders”, which opposited to Dean Acheson’s official view. Chinese
leadership took these changes seriously. Mao’s speech at the Central People’s State
Conference could illustrated this clearly. He said: “ Truman proclaimed on 5 January
of this year that America would not interfere in Taiwan; now he has proven that was
false. Moreover, at the same time (he) tore up all international agreements (stating that
the U.S. would) not intervene in China’s civil war. By doing this America has exposed
its own imperialist face.”According to Chinese leadership’s analysis, if both Korea
peninsula and Taiwan fell to American, China’s national security was under serious
and constant threat. On one hand from Korea peninsula, the U.S. could launch attack
to Northeast China where was China’s heavy industry base and rich in natural
resources, the U.S. could cooperate with KMT troops and launch on an attack toward
east and southeast coast of China like Shanghai and Tietsin on the other. In fact, Zhou
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En-lai expressed the same worry. He linked the Korean and Taiwan issue together. He
emphasized that: “ For us, the Korean question is not simply a question concerning
Korea, it is related to the Taiwan issue. The U.S. imperialists have adopted a hostile
attitude towards us and set up their defence line in the Taiwan strait while paying lip
service to non-aggression and non-intervention. From the information we got, they
wanted to calm China first and after occupying North Korea, they will come to attack
China”.
From this moment, China had to prepare itself to enter the war. Yet, it was
doubtful whether China would enter the war if the UN. troops did not cross 38th
parallel and move toward the Yalu river. On 2nd October 1950, two days after the third
Division of the South Korean Army crossed the 38th parallel, the CCP convened an
urgent meeting of the Party Politburo Standing Committee and decided to enter the
war. As Mao declared to his comrades: “ the question now is not whether we should
send troops to Korea or not, but how fast we can do this. One day’s difference will be
crucial to the whole situation. Today we will discuss two urgent questions―when
should our troops enter Korea and who should be the commander.” In fact, during the
meeting between Mao and Kim on 16 May, about the terms of treaty of friendship and
alliance between China and North Korea, Mao indicated that unless the imperialist
countries crossed the 30th parallel China would not intervene into Korean internal
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affairs.
Since Mao’s greatest concern was the physical security of the newly established
regime, it was logical that China would intervene in one way or the other. Would
China decide not to enter the war if the U.N. troops did not cross the 38th parallel?
Definitely, it could not be complety known. What we know from these new evidence
was that after U.S. troops occupied and altered its policy toward Taiwan, Mao
perceived that the Sino-American confrontation could not be avoided. As Thomas J.
Christensen said: “ Mao believed war was inevitable after the earlier American
reversal on Taiwan policy and the crossing of the 38th parallel.” Even before the
Inchon landing, Mao had told his comrades the reasons why China should prepare at a
politburo meeting on 4 August 1950 that: “If the U.S. imperialists won the war, they
would become more arrogant and would threaten us. We should not fail to assist the
Koreans. We must lend them our hands in the form of sending our military volunteers
there. The timing could bee further decided, but we have to prepare for this.” Again
on 13 October, Mao explained his decision to enter the war more clearly to his
comrades. He said that: “If we are able to eliminate several puppet divisions in this
stage, the Korean situation would take a turn for our favour. The above positive policy
will be very advantages to China, to Korea, to the East, and even to the whole world.
If we do not send off our troops, and allow the enemy to reach the Yalu River, the
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enemy will be swollen with arrogance. This will result in a variety of disadvantages to
us, especially to the Northeast area. The whole Northeast Border Defense Army will
be tied down there, and electric power in South Manchuria will be controlled (by the
enemy), In short, we think that we should enter the war, we have to enter the war. To
enter the war will be very rewarding, not to enter the war will be extremely harmful.”
Besides, Mao’s decision included the internal political situation. Mao believed
that American reactionary behaviour would stimulate those reactionaries at home.
This was a serious threat to the new regime. Thus, it was necessary for China to enter
the war and to punish foreign imperialist countries especially the U.S. Michael H.
Hun judged the situation correctly : “ An unchecked American advance in Korea
would draw wavering countries and classes to the side of the U.S., strengthen the
resolve of reactionaries at home and abroad and encouraged the U.S. to send troops to
other points along Chinas broder.” If war was unavoidable, China would be better to
choose the place to fight against foreign foe. According to Mao’s analysis, the U.S.
troops could invade mainland China from three areas. They were Vietam, Taiwan
strait and Korea. Mao believed that China should took the initative to stage an
offensive war against foreign foes in Korea where hilly areas made logistic difficult
for enemies. In addition, it was close to China and Soviet Union’s Far East that it was
convinent for China to transport necessary supplies to the ba ttle field.
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Moreover, China’s decision should be put in the context of Sino-Soviet relations.
Although Stalin send limited military forces to Korea, the Soviet Union played an
important role in the war and Mao’s calculation. Precisely, Stalin had several strategic
concerns over Korea up to late 1949. firstly, Stalin did not want to see either a
re-militarized Japan or the United States dominated Korea that the Soviet Union’s Far
East territory would be seriously and constantly threatened. Thus, Stalin helped North
Korea to establish its government and trained its cadres. Secondly, as the leader of the
socialist camp, Stalin wanted to exert its influences in the Far East but avoided
military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S.
In order to achieve
these objectives, Stalin took a cautious Korea policy. Stalin adopted former Tsarist or
pre-1905 strategy over the Far East, that was the balance of power among actors so
that the status quo and Soviet’s interest could be maintained. Stalin agreed trusteeship
for Korea at the foreign minister conference held in Moscow in December 1945.
Stalin tried to maintain a socialist and friendly regime in the North. Also, he was
uncomfortable with a hostile government set up by Syngman Rhee. Other Soviet
leadership including foreign minister Andrei Moscow in December 1945. After Stalin
felt safe, he ordered Soviet troops to withdraw from Korea Peninsula by the end of
1948, seven months earlier than the U.S. At the same time, Stalin turned down Kim’s
request Soviet’s assistance to unify Korea during Kim’s visit to Moscow in March
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1949.
In fact, other Soviet leaders including foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and
defense Minister Nikolai Bulgonin opposed Kim’s plan to unify Korea by force. They
believed that: “ an advance to the South by the People’s Army can give the Americans
a pretext to raise this issue at the UN Session, to blame the government of the PPRK
for aggression and get the consent of the General Assembly for the introduction into
South Korea of Americans troops.” In this context, Stalin instructed his ambassador in
Pyongyong, Terentii F. Shtykov, that he should obstruct Kim to provoke an assault to
the South. In addition, Stalin ordered to dismantle the Soviet naval base in Chongjin
and the air force liason officies in Pyongyang and Konggye,
Yet, Stalin like Mao and Kim misperceived that the U.S. planned to lessen
commitment to Syngman Rhee’s government. The U.S. adminstration published the
NSC-48 in December 1949 which pronounced that the U.S. defense perimeter only
included Japan and Philippines but not Korea Peninsula in Western Pacific. Due to
decrease in risk of U.S. intevention Stalin increasing inclined or eager to assist Kim to
unify Korea by force although she still feared that such a move would drag the Soviet
Union into direct conflict with the U.S. In fact, the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet
alliance treaty on 6 January 1950 and he recognized Ho Chi Minh’s government in
Vietnam. All these policies indicated that Stalin took an more active role in the Far
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East.. In order to show his sincerity, Stalin even sent a military advisory group led by
Lieutenant General Bashiler, a hero of the German-Soviet War, to North Korea and
helped to draft the military plan for Kim to pursue his ambitious goal. Accordingly,
the military plan entitled Preemptive Strike Operational Plan.”. Obviously, at that
moment Stalin endorsed Kim’s long request plan to invade the South. Even though
Stalin adopted an more aggressive policy in Korea, he was cautious that it would not
lead to the U.S. intervention. Thus, he urged Kim to seek assistance from Mao. .
The UN. troops landed at Inchon successfully was a serious blow to Stalin’s
optimistic calculation. Immediately, Stalin urged Mao to rescue Kim’s fate. Stalin
rehtorically used national security consideration to persuade Mao that: “ If a war is
inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese militarism
will be restored as an ally of the USA and when the USA and Japan will have a
ready-made bridgehead on the continent in the form of the entire Korea run by
Syngman Rhee.” Clearly, Stalin was extremely worried that the Soviet Union would
be dragged into the war and comfront directly with the UN. troops. So, China’s
intervention was vital. And after Mao notifed Stalin his decision to enter the war,
Stalin was reliefed. In order to guarantee Soviet Union’s non-involvement, Stalin
ordered that all Soviet’s ships and aircrafts were not allowed to intrude into battlefield.
In addition, he refused to offer air protection for Chinese troops across the Yalu River.
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Even in later stage, Soviet aircrafts had limited operation in Korea, Stalin ordered
those pilots to wear North Korea uniform and not to communicate in Russian. More
important, they were not allowed to fly across the 38th parallel.
Not only did American reaction an important factor influencing Stalin’s
consideration, Sino-Soviet relationship was also an important factor. As, Kathryn
Weathersby believed that: “ Stalin’s relationship with Mao affected his decision
regarding Korea because if Stalin were to refuse to support Kim Il Sung’s perfectly
reasonable goal of reunifying his country, which was comparable to what Mao had
just accomplished in China, then Stalin would again he open to the charge of
hindering the cause of revolution in the East. His position as the leader of the
communist camp would be weakened while the authority and prestige of Mao, to
whom Kim would obviously turn and who had a blood debt to support the Korea
communists, would rise. “
Moreover, Adam Ulam estimated that Stalin could make use this war to put
China more dependent on the Soviet Union. He put that: “ It is difficult to resist the
conclusion that the Korean imbroglio was instigated by the Russians for the specific
purpose of discouraging the Chinese Communists from breaking away from Soviet
tutelage.” .
Mao understood Stalin’s caution so that he tried to show Stalin his faith and
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loyalty to the socialist bloc. And he was not pursuing titoism. Also, Mao needed
Soviet’s protection and supplies especially air umberlla over Chinese coastal territory
and Korea. In fact, by late 1950, the Soviet Union had sent two air force divisions to
defend the Yalu river bridge and the major transport line 100 kilometres south of the
Yulu river.
Although Mao needed Soviet’s supplies, he also tried to compete with Soviet’s
over revolutionary leadership. Mao put the Korea crisis into an East Asian affair.
From Mao’s telegram to Zhou dated 2nd October 1950 about his decision to enter the
war, his ideological concern was clearly illicited. Mao stressed: “ We think this is a
necessary step because if we allow Korea to be occupied by the Americans, the
Korean revolutionary forces will be completely destroyed. We will then see the
American invaders more rampant which will be very unfavourable to the whole East.”
Even Mao was notified by Zhou who was negotiating on military support with Stalin
in the Black Sea, that Stalin would not offer air protection for Chinese Reople
Volunteers (CPV), Mao still implemented his decision. As he told Zhou that Korea’s
fate was not only vital to China but also the destiny of an Eastern and world
revolution.
Finally, what role did the United States played in generating the war. Similar to
Mao’s concern, Truman perceived serious Soviet’s threat in the earlier stage that he
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approved to rescue South Korea and, more important, to contain the spread of
communism in the Far East. In fact, Korea, unlike Japan and Philippines, had limited
strategic importance to the U.S. Yet, after the Soviet Union acquired the first atomic
bomb in August 1949 and Soviet’s tense relations with west over Germany and
Eastern Europe, the U.S. adminstration felt insecure. Moreover, the victory of
Communism in China furtheer increased the power of the socialist bloc in the Far East.
Thus, the U.S. government approved the NSC-68 in the Spring of 1950. Accordingly,
the U.S. offered $100 million economic and military aid to South Korea. Thus, the
sudden attack by North Korea to the South was interpreted as a serious challenge to
the U.S. interest in Asia that the U.S. should respond firmly and rapidly.
Based on earlier bitter experience between the U.S. and China like the ward case
and red scare atmosphere initiated by politicians like MaCarthy Truman and Acheson
had difficultly to alter China policy that was to drive communist China away from the
Soviet Union. As Thomas J. Christensen said: “ the CCP’s anti-American policies
must strongly constrained the adminstrations” options by amplifying domestic
criticisms of any proposal for change in China policy. “
To make the matter worse, mutual distrust added with lack of communication
channel due to non-recognition policy pared the way of confrontation 46 i. P. 271.
Firstly, the U.S. did not pay much attention to China’s warning and determined to
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push through the 38th parallel. On 2nd October, although China had already decided to
enter the war, Zhou still warned the U.S. not to cross the 38th parallel through Indian
Ambassador to China Panikkar, otherwise China would enter the war and fight with
the North Koreans.
Eventually, since U.S. wanted to win the war as quickly as possible and
underestimated the determination of Chinese leaders. Truman authorized MarArthur
to cross the 38th parallel and approach to the Yulu river. At that moment, direct
military confrontation between China and the U.S. was unavoidable.
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