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Title: Empathy in practical ethics education: Sketch of a work in progress
Author: Bruce Maxwell
Contact information: Institut für Allgemeine Erziehungswissenschaft (I), Westfälische
Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Georgskommende 26, 48143 Münster, Deutschland, Tel.:
49.(0)251.83.24255, Fax.: 49.(0)251.83.24184, [email protected].
Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Association for Moral Education,
Cambridge, Massechusetts, 3-5 November 2005
Abstract: This paper provides an overview of a doctoral dissertation which examines the
prospects of providing explicit educational support for empathic development as a means of
furthering practical ethics education’s goal of promoting ethical attitudes and behaviour. An
ethical naturalist methodology is adopted which, being sensitive to the relevance of the
empirical knowledge that exists in connection with how human beings are psychologically
constructed, draws on sources in both moral philosophy and empirical and theoretical studies
in psychology. The project received a Gift of Time grant from the AME in 2004 and is
supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
1. Introduction
The problem that I address in my doctoral dissertation the following. Presumably, a practical
ethics component is a requirement of now almost all programmes in higher education because
such course are thought to promote ethical attitudes and behaviour. As a review of relevant
textbooks will confirm, this aim is generally pursued by way of promoting the development of
skills in practical reasoning (cf., e.g., Ferrell, Fraedrich & Ferrell, 2004; Hayden, 2003;
Mappes, 2000; Singer, 1993; Strike & Soltis, 1998). However, the tide of opinion in
developmental psychology seems to be flowing towards a general consensus that the
Kolbergian doctrine of cognitive-affective parallelism (Colby et al., 1987), in reference to
which a judgement-focussed approach to practical ethics education could be justified, is no
longer an acceptable theoretical construct (cf. Nunner-Winkler, 1998). The practice of
practical ethics education has, however, been slow to respond. The potential of empathic
development to abrogate some of this deficit, while frequently referred to vaguely in the
practical ethics literature (e.g., Annis, 1992; Beauchamp & Childress, 1994; Bevis & Watson,
1989; Scholz & Groarke, 1996; Tong, 1997) has received surprisingly little systematic
treatment. Employing an “ethical naturalist” methodology, a conceptual approach that draws
on sources in both moral philosophy and empirical and theoretical studies in psychology (cf.
Flanagan, 1996), this work aims to give it some of the kind of attention that it seems to
deserve.
2. Multiple meanings of the word ‘empathy’
2
The first step involves more that the usual stipulative definition of key terms; when it comes
to the word “empathy” the waters of terminological confusion run deep.
First of all, different commentators in diverse fields use “empathy” to designate two
analytically distinct psychological phenomena. The first is “empathy” understood as the
faculty by which human beings form particular beliefs about other people’s inner states,
beliefs like “Bob is sad”, “Samia thinks like she will lose the match”, and “Marg is delighted
about her pregnancy”. Kohut (1959) probably had the clearest label for this capacity: otherdirected vicarious introspection. The second common but distinct use of “empathy” refers to a
particular kind of emotional response to particular beliefs about other people’s inner states. In
this sense, we empathize with Bob when we feel sad for or with Bob, or when we feel nervous
or anxious with Samia, or when we feel joy or happiness with Marg about her pregnancy (cf.
Batson, Sympson and Hindman, 1996). In Hoffman’s definition, empathy in this sense is “an
affective response more appropriate to another’s situation than [to] one’s own” (2000, p. 4).
Although there seems to be no conceptual limit on the range of emotions one might
sensibly empathize with, “empathy” in this latter sense is most commonly associated with
feelings of distress and suffering, as in when one is said to “empathize with”, say, the victims
of the latest flood, hurricane or earthquake. Because such aversive reactions to another’s
suffering is widely thought to motivate helping, the link between this emotion and pro-social
behaviour is the subject of a large body of empirical research in social psychology.1
If it weren’t already sufficiently confusing that the same term, “empathy”, is used to refer
to two discrete phenomena, many other terms are frequently used to describe both vicarious
introspection and distress at others’ suffering. Involvement in another person’s suffering as
something to be alleviated are referred to in both ordinary language and in the philosophical
literature as “sympathy” and “compassion” (cf. e.g., Smith, 1790/1976; Hume, 1751/1957;
Nagel, 1970; Mercer, 1972; Nussbaum, 2001; Blum, 1980; and Snow, 2000). Hoffman (2000)
usually employs the term “empathic distress” in his research. For its part, insight into other’s
states without an affective component—Kohut’s (1959) “other-directed introspection” is
referred to variously as “mental simulation” (Gordon, 1996), “empathic accuracy” (Ickes,
1997), “perspective-taking” (Selman, 1980) and “role-taking” (Mead, 1934).
It is clear that the emotion referred to in the various proposals to promote “empathy” in
practical ethics education is in fact “sympathy”, “compassion” or “empathic distress”. I use
the term “compassionate empathy” principally in order to keep the reflective connotations of
“empathy”. The modifier “compassionate” is intended to minimize the risk of confusing the
1
Nancy Eisenberg, Daniel Batson and Martin Hoffman are probably the leading figures in this field. Cf. esp.
Eisenberg, 1992; Batson, 1991; and Hoffman, 2000.
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intended “negative” sense of empathy with “positive” empathy—i.e., feeling pleasant rather
than aversive feelings with or for another.
3. What is a moral emotion?
The intuitive appeal of promoting the development of compassionate empathic capacities of
response in practical ethics education seems to be connected with supposition, referred to a
moment ago, that compassionate empathy is morally motivating. However, a moment’s
reflection reveals that things are somewhat more complicated that this. It is entirely possible
for compassionate empathy to motivate actions that might not be justifiable when evaluated
from the point of view of moral impartiality. Consider this classic example. Late one dark and
stormy night a close friend arrives at your door. In a state of shock and bewilderment, she
reports that she has just run down a pedestrian with her car. She says that she is quite sure that
she drank one too many martinis before hitting the road and, afraid of the possibly very
serious legal consequences, this is why she fled the scene. In this case, so the objection goes,
there is no telling whether sympathy towards your friend’s plight might motivate you to
protect your friend from the authorities and blind you to the demands of justice. As such
examples are taken to illustrate, compassionate empathy is not, contrary to first appearances
perhaps, morally good without qualification but only insofar as it is subjected to the regulative
constraint of moral judgement (cf. Verducci, 2000; Snow, 2000). And this seems to shatter
any illusions that the blanket promotion of empathic development in practical ethics education
is an unreservedly good idea.
To conclude on the basis of such considerations that compassionate empathy has
therefore no inherent moral worth seems to be hasty. Indeed, I advance that this conclusion
comes to seem quite wrong-headed once one distinguishes between three distinct senses in
which an emotion is said to have ethical significance. Τhese are: (i) in the Aristotelian sense
of being partly constitutive of the virtues and vices (cf. Aristotle, 1955); (ii) in Cartesian sense
of “passions” which interfere with the smooth functioning of the faculty of reason (cf.
Descartes, 1649/1984); and, (iii) in the moral sense theory sense of a specific class of “moral
emotions”—sympathy, compassion, love, concern and the like—which are generally
conducive to moral behaviour and a moral outlook (cf. Smith, 1790/1976).2
Observe that the claim that compassionate empathy is not an inherently moral emotion
because it can motivate morally questionable acts overlooks the fact that there is nothing
inconsistent in holding that compassionate empathy is a moral emotion in virtue of its
2
For a discussion of this distinction see de Sousa, 2001.
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characteristic objects and intentions—i.e., viewing another person’s suffering as something to
be relieved—and that it is, like all emotions, susceptible to becoming passionate and
distorting one’s judgment when excessive or otherwise unregulated. Similarly, and to return
to the example just given, whereas one might be tempted to say that the agent’s
compassionate reaction to her friend in the example was excessive, there may be
circumstances where a very strong compassionate response is highly appropriate. The point,
of course, is that the question is not of whether or not the agent should have suspended or
brought into check her spontaneous response to her friend but rather of whether her response
was appropriate in the circumstances. As Aristotle (1955) famously remarked, it is the mark
of the virtuous person to feel emotions, “at the right things, and with the right people, and,
further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought” (1125b32).
4. How is compassionate empathy a moral emotion?
At risk of stating the obvious, then, the moral worth of compassionate empathy relates to its
membership in the class of moral emotions—emotions such as love, concern, pity,
attachment, and possibly shame and guilt, which are generally conducive to moral behaviour
and moral consciousness. But what does it mean to say that compassionate empathy is
“conducive to” moral consciousness and moral actions?
As both Blum (1980) and Nussbaum (2001) argue persuasively, the characteristic
interest in the well-being of another gives compassionate empathy its moral content. As Blum
puts it “any interest in the welfare of others is morally good, especially when it promotes the
sense of equality is (ceteris paribus) morally good” (p. 515). Nussbaum makes a similar
assessment and claims that the very experience of compassionate empathy implies valuing
another person as part of one’s own “scheme of goals and ends” (2001, p. 336). This, in her
view, is what makes the very experience of compassionate empathy a “quasi-ethical
achievement”, in her compelling phrase.
A comparison between compassionate empathy and other moral emotions seems to
support the idea the experience of compassionate empathy itself has moral worth
independently of any concrete or practical effects. Further, it suggests that compassionate
empathy might be rightly considered the moral emotion par excellence. Notice that the other
members of any rough and ready list of moral emotions—love, shame, concern, attachment—
can clearly be directed at objects outside the moral domain. One can, for instance, love
architecture or gardening, feel shame in connection with the violation of a rule of etiquette, be
concerned about the state of one’s financial position and feel attachment towards a sports
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team. One can only feel compassionate empathy, however, for a suffering being. The moral
flavour of compassionate empathy seems to derive from the fact that it is characteristically
linked with the moral domain, the range of human concern which pertains to the protection
and promotion of fundamental human needs and interests (cf. Nunner-Winkler, 1994; Turiel,
1983, Nucci, 2001).
5. Compassionate empathy in moral judgement
The apparent coextension between the moral domain and particular interest of compassionate
empathy raises the interesting question of whether active compassionate engagement is a
precondition of the ability to construct and analyse moral problems and arrive at moral
judgments—that is, of the exercise of the faculty of moral judgement.
Barbara Herman (1985) has suggested that it does. She argues that the ability to construct
moral problems presupposes the mastery of certain moral categories or “rules of moral
salience” which enable agents to pick out morally relevant features of a situation. Though
such categories do seem to require a certain comprehension of a general notions of human
well-being and interest, whether the faculty of moral perception requires active affective
involvement is an open question.
The phenomenon of pscyhopathy, a personality disorder characterized by full cognitive
integrity co-existing with complete or almost complete emotional stagnancy (cf. Hare, 1991;
Cleckley, 1950), seems to provide some insight. The psychopath’s apparent theoretical
facility with moral concepts suggests that affective engagement is not a necessary condition of
moral perception or moral reasoning. Indeed, a small body of empirical research on moral
development and psychopathy supports this hypothesis (cf. Lose, 1997; O’Kane, Fawcett &
Blackburn, 1996; Link, Sherer & Byrne, 1977; Trevethan and Walker, 1989; and the
discussion of Simon, Holzberg and Unger’s research in Cleckley, 1950)
However, even though the psychopath is able to comprehend and assess moral problems
with no more or less difficulty than a person in the normal range of emotional development it
seems semantically odd to say that a psychopath is capable of moral judgement. Why is this
the case? There are surely several reasons for this but the most salient one for present
purposes is this. Despite the fact that the psychopath’s emotional deficit does not seem to
impair his ability to reason about moral problems, the psychopath shows no interest in
exercising practical judgement in real life (cf. esp. Cleckley, 1950). Although the matter is of
a degree of complexity which precludes a simple formulation, the profile of the psychopathic
personality suggests—interestingly, I think—that an inability to experience compassionate
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empathy does not impair moral judgement or impede moral development. What it does do,
however, is dramatically curb one’s motivation to exercise competently whatever moraljudgement abilities one happens to have. In other words, the role of compassionate empathy
in moral judgement is not as a precondition of the ability to competently exercise moral
reasoning processes. A concern for others, rather, is connected with motivation to exercise the
faculty of moral judgement in real-life situations.
6. The basic problem of educating for compassionate empathy in higher education
In closing, let me draw attention to what I see as one of the most important lessons to be
drawn from this study with regards to practical ethics education.
We should not to lose sight of the fact that a basic capacity for compassionate empathy
is normal. Accordingly, to follow the educational model of some strains of humanistic
psychology in viewing students as psychologically “damaged goods” and setting out as the
deliberate aim of education the “fully-functioning person” (cf. esp. Rogers & Freiburg,
1994)—rather than viewing basically normal human beings as what should be presupposed in
education and teaching—seems to misconstrue the educational enterprise (cf. Reichenbach &
Oser, 1995).
Lest I stand accused of belabouring of an educational platitude, it is not uncommon for
educational discussions of the perceived moral-educational imperative of promoting
“empathy” and “sympathy” to overlook this.3 There is no case for denying that generalized
attempts to strengthen children’s empathic dispositions using such interventions as Hoffman’s
“inductions” (cf. 2000) or by promoting the development of connected “soft skills” such as
imagination (cf. Nussbaum, 2001; and Noddings, 1998) are worthy educational goals. By late
adolescence and early adulthood, however, any comprehensive deficit in a student’s cognitive
or affective faculties is probably beyond the reach of any standard educational regime.
For this reason, then, it seems to be a mistake to view the educational problem of
promoting compassionate empathy in higher education as one of providing a context
propitious to empathic development writ large. Students should be viewed as being, like most
adults, in possession of the basic structure of compassionate empathic responding—i.e., as
having a sufficiently developed conscience and capacities for advanced situational moral
insight. And like most adults as well their disposition to respond with appropriate
compassionate empathy contains gaps: gaps such as a generally weak or exaggerated affective
response to some “moral objects” rather than others (e.g., members of a certain race or class,
3
As Blum (1991) points out. See for example Greene (1995) and Noddings (1998).
7
animals, children or adults), weakness or excess in response to certain moral categories (e.g.,
justice as opposed to physical suffering or affronts to personal dignity, etc.), and finally in
relation to certain domains such as the environment, bioethics, business, or sexuality. That is
to say, the basic educational situation connected with the promotion of compassionate
empathy in practical ethics education is a highly particularist affair. No two students can be
expected to be identical in regards to their own affective gaps. Any practical-educational
regime that is serious about éducation sentimentale, it seems to me, has to take this into
account.
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