The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory
... this, yet, despite this, it is morally engaged. For among its central questions are the questions whether any moral claims are true, and whether it is rational to commit oneself to acting morally. One cannot answer such questions without taking a position on the correctness or cogency of people’s mo ...
... this, yet, despite this, it is morally engaged. For among its central questions are the questions whether any moral claims are true, and whether it is rational to commit oneself to acting morally. One cannot answer such questions without taking a position on the correctness or cogency of people’s mo ...
Two Meanings of Disenchantment
... Modern Science. The use of scientific means—which Weber connects to the discovery of the concept (Plato), the conscious commitment to experimentation and empirical methods (Renaissance), and the technical mastery afforded by these—is considered by Weber to be the single most important contributor to ...
... Modern Science. The use of scientific means—which Weber connects to the discovery of the concept (Plato), the conscious commitment to experimentation and empirical methods (Renaissance), and the technical mastery afforded by these—is considered by Weber to be the single most important contributor to ...
can a consequentialist be a real friend? (who cares?)
... The focal point of this dissertation is a recent debate on consequentialism and friendship. The main question considered is, “Can a consequentialist be a real friend?” Prior to that discussion, the notions ‘friendship’ and ‘consequentialist’ are explained. In the second chapter, it is claimed that ‘ ...
... The focal point of this dissertation is a recent debate on consequentialism and friendship. The main question considered is, “Can a consequentialist be a real friend?” Prior to that discussion, the notions ‘friendship’ and ‘consequentialist’ are explained. In the second chapter, it is claimed that ‘ ...
Ethical and Epistemic Egoism and the Ideal of Autonomy Linda
... be yes, but I do not know what the support for that would be. A second form of epistemic egoism is the position we can call strong epistemic egoism. The strong epistemic egoist maintains that she has no obligation to count what another person believes as relevant to her own beliefs, but she may do ...
... be yes, but I do not know what the support for that would be. A second form of epistemic egoism is the position we can call strong epistemic egoism. The strong epistemic egoist maintains that she has no obligation to count what another person believes as relevant to her own beliefs, but she may do ...
Associative Duties and the Ethics of Killing in War
... that are owed in virtue of a morally important relationship. There are two broad schools of thought about the underlying justification of associative duties.1 The first justifies associative duties teleologically, by appealing to the value of the states of affairs in which they are realised. In its ...
... that are owed in virtue of a morally important relationship. There are two broad schools of thought about the underlying justification of associative duties.1 The first justifies associative duties teleologically, by appealing to the value of the states of affairs in which they are realised. In its ...
MacIntyre`s Moral Theory and the Possibility of an Aretaic Ethics of
... are partly constitutive of our well-being they themselves constitute goods. We want to be courageous, for example, because this is part of the fabric of a good life, and not merely because courage will buy us some good. Even though the virtues are eminently useful for achieving the good, one must, p ...
... are partly constitutive of our well-being they themselves constitute goods. We want to be courageous, for example, because this is part of the fabric of a good life, and not merely because courage will buy us some good. Even though the virtues are eminently useful for achieving the good, one must, p ...
`Against Hirose`s Argument for Saving the Greater Number`
... fails to ensure that everyone has enough. Pareto is simply indifferent to such considerations of equality, priority and sufficiency. Impartiality may also be questioned by those who disapprove teleological understandings of value. For instance, they may reject that X = Y on the ground that value res ...
... fails to ensure that everyone has enough. Pareto is simply indifferent to such considerations of equality, priority and sufficiency. Impartiality may also be questioned by those who disapprove teleological understandings of value. For instance, they may reject that X = Y on the ground that value res ...
Persons in time - The Open University
... why the relation should not be reflexive, so that fact r can “consist in” itself.) Even setting these points aside, there is a third problem: the inference from (2.2) to (2.3) is a non sequitur. It is a non sequitur because there is nothing in (2.1-2.2) to show that facts about physical and psycholo ...
... why the relation should not be reflexive, so that fact r can “consist in” itself.) Even setting these points aside, there is a third problem: the inference from (2.2) to (2.3) is a non sequitur. It is a non sequitur because there is nothing in (2.1-2.2) to show that facts about physical and psycholo ...
pr.4
... themselves. The performatives are indications that the question can arise, Of whom does one speak in designating persons, as distinct from things, in the referential mode? (OA7) Semantics 14 therefore, is inextricably bound up with pragmatics. Semantics, Ricoeur argues, is a referential approach, w ...
... themselves. The performatives are indications that the question can arise, Of whom does one speak in designating persons, as distinct from things, in the referential mode? (OA7) Semantics 14 therefore, is inextricably bound up with pragmatics. Semantics, Ricoeur argues, is a referential approach, w ...
(Routledge Contemporary Readings in Philosophy)
... “good” makes a claim about social conventions (cultural relativism), personal feelings (subjectivism), or God’s will (supernaturalism). Cultural relativism, our first view, holds that “good” means what is “socially approved” by the majority in a given culture. Racism, for example, is not good or bad ...
... “good” makes a claim about social conventions (cultural relativism), personal feelings (subjectivism), or God’s will (supernaturalism). Cultural relativism, our first view, holds that “good” means what is “socially approved” by the majority in a given culture. Racism, for example, is not good or bad ...
Intuitive Methods of Moral Decision Making, A
... is a conflict between different normative reasons, assessing what one ought to do is a reflective process of justification through which a certain moral perspective gains “weight”. With regards to normative presuppositions, principlism assumes a normative framework based on four moral principles ext ...
... is a conflict between different normative reasons, assessing what one ought to do is a reflective process of justification through which a certain moral perspective gains “weight”. With regards to normative presuppositions, principlism assumes a normative framework based on four moral principles ext ...
in defense of the primacy of the virtues
... we can use these actions in this way precisely because they are the sorts of actions that virtuous agents would perform. Furthermore, and crucially, we must distinguish between how we identify those who possess the virtues, and how we are to understand the relationships between rightness and virtue ...
... we can use these actions in this way precisely because they are the sorts of actions that virtuous agents would perform. Furthermore, and crucially, we must distinguish between how we identify those who possess the virtues, and how we are to understand the relationships between rightness and virtue ...
Arguing about War
... the other. It’s a line which Walzer himself seems to teeter on with some discomfort. Even if they should have been, US ‘soldiers and dollars’ have not, of course, been offered in some neutral way. They are there with a purpose: not simply to allow for reconstruction, but to police that reconstructio ...
... the other. It’s a line which Walzer himself seems to teeter on with some discomfort. Even if they should have been, US ‘soldiers and dollars’ have not, of course, been offered in some neutral way. They are there with a purpose: not simply to allow for reconstruction, but to police that reconstructio ...
Normative Ethics, Normative Epistemology, and Quine`s Holism
... independent course of observable nature, we can judge the morality of an act only by our moral standards themselves; adding that science \"thanks to its links with observation, retains some title to a correspondence theory of truth; but a coherence theory is evidently the lot of ethics\".15 However, ...
... independent course of observable nature, we can judge the morality of an act only by our moral standards themselves; adding that science \"thanks to its links with observation, retains some title to a correspondence theory of truth; but a coherence theory is evidently the lot of ethics\".15 However, ...
Glory as an Ethical Idea
... technical term either, but the point of Williams’ usage is that reflection on our own ethical standards can lead to a corrosive scepticism about them, especially when we think about their histories. This is not my point here (and anyway, I doubt that Williams’ reflection need be as corrosive as he i ...
... technical term either, but the point of Williams’ usage is that reflection on our own ethical standards can lead to a corrosive scepticism about them, especially when we think about their histories. This is not my point here (and anyway, I doubt that Williams’ reflection need be as corrosive as he i ...
Is Kierkegaard correct in thinking that there is such a thing as `the
... in Hegel is not compatible with a temporal reading. Kierkegaard suggests that teleological suspension is (1) incompatible with “forfeiting” what is suspended and (2) necessarily includes preserving what is suspended in something higher. But a temporal suspension meets neither of these conditions. Fi ...
... in Hegel is not compatible with a temporal reading. Kierkegaard suggests that teleological suspension is (1) incompatible with “forfeiting” what is suspended and (2) necessarily includes preserving what is suspended in something higher. But a temporal suspension meets neither of these conditions. Fi ...
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... impoverished” (Baron 1987, 238). On the other hand, there may be some philosophical approach to salvaging Kant’s ethical framework by exposing that his theory can in fact take the concept of supererogation into account after all, even if he himself might not have intended it to do so. Ultimately, th ...
... impoverished” (Baron 1987, 238). On the other hand, there may be some philosophical approach to salvaging Kant’s ethical framework by exposing that his theory can in fact take the concept of supererogation into account after all, even if he himself might not have intended it to do so. Ultimately, th ...
Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism Author(s)
... if not superstitious argument. We should not be concerned with the socalled 'rights' of France or any other country but with whether the cause of humanity would best be served by discussing Morocco in U.N. (I am not saying that the answer to this is 'Yes '. There are good grounds for supposing that ...
... if not superstitious argument. We should not be concerned with the socalled 'rights' of France or any other country but with whether the cause of humanity would best be served by discussing Morocco in U.N. (I am not saying that the answer to this is 'Yes '. There are good grounds for supposing that ...
Choosing from a Moral Point of View
... Choosing from a Moral Point of View “How could you possibly have done that?” says Sheila to her friend Betsy, “You really did the wrong thing.” “I don’t really know,” comes the answer. “I guess I just wasn’t thinking about it clearly; I didn’t have the right perspective on it.” Sheila is obviously ...
... Choosing from a Moral Point of View “How could you possibly have done that?” says Sheila to her friend Betsy, “You really did the wrong thing.” “I don’t really know,” comes the answer. “I guess I just wasn’t thinking about it clearly; I didn’t have the right perspective on it.” Sheila is obviously ...
Chapter One: Introduction
... caused by prejudice in the economy of credibility; and that hermeneutical injustice is caused by structural prejudice in the economy of collective hermeneutical resources. ...
... caused by prejudice in the economy of credibility; and that hermeneutical injustice is caused by structural prejudice in the economy of collective hermeneutical resources. ...
John McDowell`s theory of moral sensibility
... ticular situation, and the proper reaction is defined as the recognition of those requirements, resulting in silencing the non‑moral reasons. It is easy to notice that the reaction described by McDowell has a defi‑ nitely active nature. This refers both to the act of recognition and to the act of s ...
... ticular situation, and the proper reaction is defined as the recognition of those requirements, resulting in silencing the non‑moral reasons. It is easy to notice that the reaction described by McDowell has a defi‑ nitely active nature. This refers both to the act of recognition and to the act of s ...
Title: ... . Author: ... Word length: ...
... good deal of intimate acquaintance with oneself and abandonment of habits that place oneself against others. At the same time I think that all six can be universalized – in the sense that Kant’s categorical imperative can be. The question is whether Ives’ imperatives are solely matters that each mus ...
... good deal of intimate acquaintance with oneself and abandonment of habits that place oneself against others. At the same time I think that all six can be universalized – in the sense that Kant’s categorical imperative can be. The question is whether Ives’ imperatives are solely matters that each mus ...
First Reader: Ashok Gangadean Second Reader: Jerry Miller ABSTRACT:
... traditional ethics to include sentient nonhuman animals (8). Tom Regan first endeavored to assign animals "rights" in the sense that humans enjoy. These philosophers primarily focused on applying ethics to individual animals, which is quite different from environmental ethics that must take collecti ...
... traditional ethics to include sentient nonhuman animals (8). Tom Regan first endeavored to assign animals "rights" in the sense that humans enjoy. These philosophers primarily focused on applying ethics to individual animals, which is quite different from environmental ethics that must take collecti ...
Moral Theory and Experience
... theory-laden characterization of those facts."10 If all facts of experience are theory-laden (and the "given" is a myth), then it seems that Dewey's empiricism, in particular his appeal to a "primary experience" (i.e., to things as they are "present" and "given" in our everyday practical life) is at ...
... theory-laden characterization of those facts."10 If all facts of experience are theory-laden (and the "given" is a myth), then it seems that Dewey's empiricism, in particular his appeal to a "primary experience" (i.e., to things as they are "present" and "given" in our everyday practical life) is at ...
Dynamic Ethics
... conceptions of privacy have changed in many ways in response to the new information technologies. The new contexts require and constitute different concepts of personal identity, different concepts of society, and also different concepts of morality. The new concepts may be very different, but not b ...
... conceptions of privacy have changed in many ways in response to the new information technologies. The new contexts require and constitute different concepts of personal identity, different concepts of society, and also different concepts of morality. The new concepts may be very different, but not b ...