Download Herring The Genius of Hannibal

The Genius of Hannibal
Jack Herring, Dickson College, 2011
The following essay was submitted as part of The Roman Republic unit at Dickson
College, Semester 1, 2011. It was written in response to the question: ‘Assess
Hannibal’s ability as a military commander.’
Hannibal Barca led Carthage in the Second Punic War (218-202 BC), where he
drove the Romans to the brink of despair and defeat. The son of the Carthaginian
general Hamilcar Barca, Hannibal was born into a period of conflict between Rome
and Carthage. Hannibal’s military ability was demonstrated throughout the Second
Punic War. His brilliant military strategy and psychological warfare, his leadership
qualities, and his daring, risk-taking nature have led to him being considered one of
the most extraordinary military commanders to have lived. However, in spite of
Hannibal’s success in Italy, his ultimate failure to conquer Rome in the Second Punic
War has generated questioning of his acclaimed ability as a military commander.
Arguably Hannibal’s most important traits as a military commander were his astute
military mind and his capability to utilise psychological warfare to great advantage,
which, according to Polybius is the most valuable asset a commander can have.
For there is no denying that he who thinks that there is anything more essential to a general
than the knowledge of his opponent's principles and character, is both ignorant and foolish.
(Polybius, The Histories of Polybius III, 81)
These qualities were demonstrated through Hannibal’s success in the battle of
Trebia. Prior to the battle of Trebia in 218 BC, Publius Cornelius Scipio (a Roman
Consul) was wounded. This caused Tiberius Sempronius Longus (the other Consul)
to take charge of the Roman Army. In spite of being aware of Scipio’s advice to wait
before facing Hannibal, Tiberius was eager to force a decisive battle.
Tiberius ... was all eagerness to bring on a decisive battle as soon as possible... Scipio's view
of the situation was just the opposite...Tiberius was quite conscious of the truth and cogency
of all these reasons, but, urged on by his ambition and with an unreasonable confidence in his
fortune, he was eager to deliver the decisive blow himself and did not wish Publius to be able
to be present at the battle. (Polybius, The Histories of Polybius III, 70)
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Hannibal was most likely aware of Tiberius’ ambition and he was thus anxious to
force a battle on the enemy and exploit Tiberius’ eagerness (Polybius, The Histories
of Polybius III, 70). Hannibal then chose the destination for the coming battle and laid
his trap.
Hannibal had long ago noticed a place between the two camps, flat indeed and treeless, but
well adapted for an ambuscade, as it was traversed by a water-course with steep banks
densely overgrown with brambles and other thorny plants, and here he proposed to lay a
stratagem to surprise the enemy. (Polybius, The Histories of Polybius III, 71)
Hannibal camped across the opposite side of the Trebia River to the Romans and
prepared his men for battle.
In the night he sent out a thousand horse and as many foot, to the ambuscade, furnishing
them with guides and giving his brother orders about the time to attack. At daybreak he
mustered his Numidian horsemen ... to draw out the Romans by shooting at them, his wish
being to get the enemy to fight him before they had breakfasted or made any
preparations. He then ordered the whole army to get their breakfasts and to see to their arms
and horses. (Polybius, The Histories of Polybius III, 71)
After being lured into battle the Roman army crossed the Trebia River with great
difficulty and emerged disorganised, freezing and hungry.
“The consequence was that the whole force suffered much from cold and also from hunger,
as the day was now advancing” (Polybius, The Histories of Polybius III, 72).
The Carthaginian army, well fed and prepared in their formation, immediately
ambushed the Romans. The result was the death of approximately fifteen thousand
Romans (Polybius, The Histories of Polybius, III, 78) and an emphatic Carthaginian
victory. Hannibal’s comprehensive triumph at Trebia is an illustration of his brilliant
military mind and is also an example of his ability to utilise psychological warfare.
Hannibal’s strategic and psychological genius was once again demonstrated at the
battle of Lake Trasimene in 217 BC. Upon learning of Flaminus’ (one of the consuls
at the time) headstrong nature (Bradley, 1990 p140), Hannibal goaded him into
battle by purposely marching past his army and burning and looting the countryside.
As Hannibal had correctly foreseen and reckoned on the conduct of Flaminius, his plan had
the success he expected. For as soon as he ... invaded the country in front of him, Flaminius
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swelled with fury and resentment, thinking that the enemy were treating him with contempt.
3 And when very soon they began to lay waste the country, and the smoke rising from all
quarters told its tale of destruction, he was still more indignant, regarding this as insufferable.
(Polybius, The Histories of Polybius III, 82)
As Hannibal had anticipated, the Roman General was lured into battle.
Finally,.. he broke up the camp, and advanced with his army, utterly regardless of
time or place, but bent only on falling in with the enemy, as if victory were a dead
certainty. (Polybius, The Histories of Polybius III, 82)
Hannibal thus set a clever trap while marching through the city of Etruria.
The road led through a narrow strip of level ground with a range of high hills on each side of it
lengthwise. This defile was overlooked in front crosswise by a steep hill difficult to climb, and
behind it lay the lake, between which and the hill side the passage giving access to the defile
was quite narrow. (Polybius, The Histories of Polybius III, 82)
Hannibal strategically hid his men alongside the road during the night, waiting in
ambush, while also sending a division to block the exit, and once the Romans had
entered the road, a division to block the entrance. Flaminius, who had followed
Hannibal closely and was impatient to overtake him, (Polybius, The Histories of
Polybius III, 83) led his army hastily along the road. The Romans became strung out,
and due to the mist and trees, were unable to see Hannibal’s hidden troops.
Hannibal, as soon as the greater part of the enemy's column had entered the defile and when
the head was already in contact with him, giving the signal for battle and sending notice to
those in the ambuscades, attacked the Romans from all sides at the same time. (Polybius,
The Histories of Polybius III, 84).
The Romans were taken by surprise and were “unable either to yield to
circumstances or to do anything” (Polybius, III 84). According to Polybius, fifteen
thousand Romans died, which is a stark comparison to the Carthaginian losses,
estimated to be roughly one thousand five hundred (Polybius, The Histories of
Polybius III, 84). The large discrepancy in casualties, along with Hannibal’s ability to
lure the Roman’s into battle and utilise the landscape to his advantage illustrate his
exceptional military skill and ability as a commander. This remarkable triumph is
testament to Hannibal’s extraordinary military mind.
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The final, yet perhaps most brilliant of all Hannibal’s strategies, occurred at the battle
of Cannae in 216 BC. Rome sent an unprecedented eight legions (ninety thousand
men) into battle in order to end the Carthaginian threat once and for all (Bradley,
1990, pg 145). Despite being outnumbered nearly two to one, Hannibal coaxed the
Romans to advance then implemented his clever tactics. He drew up a battle line
with strong wings and a weak centre, so as the Romans advanced, they pushed
Hannibal’s centre backwards into an arc.
The Romans... progressed so far that they now had the heavy-armed Africans on both of their
flanks. Hereupon the Africans on the right wing facing to the left and then beginning from the
right charged upon the enemy's flank, while those on the left faced to the right and dressing
by the left, did the same. The consequence was that, as Hannibal had designed, the Romans,
straying too far in pursuit of the Celts, were caught between the two divisions of the enemy,
and they now no longer kept their compact formation. (Polybius, The Histories of Polybius III,
115)
Hannibal’s strong cavalry, which had defeated the Roman flanks easily, then turned
and encircled the Romans (Livy, The History of Rome, XXII: 47 - 49, 51). As Sean
McNight (n.d.) observes, this “... penned the Romans in, making it hard to even draw
a sword, let alone wield one...” and resulted in a blood bath (Whitby, 2004). Polybius
and Livy both estimate that the Romans lost between fifty and seventy thousand
men, whereas Hannibal’s losses are estimated to be around six thousand.
Hannibal’s overwhelming victory forced the Romans to change tactics once more, as
they never again faced him in open battle in Italy. Hannibal’s victory was resounding,
with the destruction he caused being likened to an Atomic Bomb (O’Connell, 2011)
(as a similar number of deaths occurred at both the battle of Cannae and the
Hiroshima bombing). The fact that his tactics are still studied in military colleges
around the world today (O’Connell, 2011), and the impact he left on Rome and the
Ancient World are further verification to his being one of the greatest military
commanders ever.
Other traits which contributed to Hannibal’s expertise as a military commander were
his daring, risk-taking nature and his powerful leadership. These qualities were
demonstrated in the journey over the two mountain ranges, the Pyrenees and the
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Alps. The journey over these mountain ranges, especially the Alps, was extremely
arduous due to the freezing temperatures, tough terrain and hostile tribes
encountered along the way (Polybius, The Histories of Polybius III, 51).
Consequently, his army’s morale was seriously challenged throughout their journey.
However, Hannibal combated these complications by creating a notion of equality
between his men and himself.
Many have seen him wrapped in a military cloak, lying on the ground amid his
soldiers. His dress was not at all superior to that of his equals, his was at once by
far the first of the cavalry and infantry and foremost to lead the charge, the last to
leave the engagement. (Livy, The History of Rome, XXI: 32-34)
Hannibal’s charisma and sense of equality enabled him to motivate his army, which
was a “hotch-potch of the riff raff of all nationalities” (Bradley, 1990, pg 173). His
ability to unite individuals of different ethnic backgrounds and cultures into a fully
fledged army demonstrates his outstanding leadership qualities. Hannibal’s strong
leadership is also illustrated through his successes in the battles he fought in Italy,
especially at the battle of Lake Trasimene, where has was able to instil complete
discipline in his soldiers to wait quietly before attacking the enemy (Fleming, 2001).
In spite of Hannibal’s success in Italy, he was ultimately unable to defeat and
conquer the Roman Republic. Due to the Roman general Publius Cornelius Scipio
Africanus’ decision to invade Africa, Hannibal was forced to leave Italy and return
with his army to defend Carthage (Lazenby, 1998). It was the Battle of Zama in 202
BC that marked the end of the rule of Hannibal, as he was finally defeated by the
Romans. Hannibal spent the next twenty years in exile, before choosing to commit
suicide, rather than hand himself over to the Romans (Dodge, 1891).
Hannibal’s ultimate failure to conquer the Romans can be attributed to a number of
factors. His ambition to persuade Roman allies to switch sides achieved a certain
amount of success, with the defection of several Celtic tribes; however, overall he
was unsuccessful in gaining the support of many of Rome’s allies, which further
increased the difficulty of his mission. Hannibal’s inability to force his arm when the
opportunity arose after his overwhelming victory at Cannae has also been
considered a mistake.
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While the defeat suffered by Carthage and Hannibal’s inability to gain allies are
relevant in assessing Hannibal’s ability as a military commander, it was factors
beyond Hannibal’s control which dictated the result of the Second Punic War.
Rome’s “inexhaustible supply of manpower” (Bradley, 1990. pg 175), the failure of
the Carthaginian government to reinforce Hannibal’s troops and Rome’s control of
the sea were the main reasons for Hannibal’s inability to ultimately defeat Rome.
Due to the Romans’ control of the sea, they were able to easily transport their forces,
whereas Carthage’s limited efforts to increase their navy provided a severe handicap
in their ability to supply troops to Hannibal (Hoyus, 1983). The Carthaginian
Government’s failure to support Hannibal was extremely costly, especially
considering they had the required funding, since until around 208 BC, they had
enjoyed the wealth of Southern Spain (Hoyus, 1983).
The result of the Carthaginian Government’s failure to support Hannibal resulted in
Hannibal’s army consisting of roughly twenty-six thousand men (which rose to
roughly forty-five thousand with the defection of Celtic tribes), in comparison to threequarters of a million men that Rome were able to utilise (Polybius, The Histories of
Polybius III, 54-56). And thus in spite of Hannibal’s great victories at Trebia,
Trasimene and Cannae, he was unable to destroy Roman power. Failure by
Carthage to effectively deploy its forces was a further factor which prevented a
Roman defeat. The forces they did send from Carthage were dispersed to cities
irrelevant to Hannibal’s quest and several forces did not even reach Hannibal at all.
While there has been justifiable criticism of Hannibal’s military generalship because
of his ultimate failure to defeat the Romans, it can be seen that this failure stemmed
from circumstances beyond his control and not as a direct consequence of his ability
as a military commander.
Hannibal’s brilliant strategic skill, daring nature and aptitude as a leader has seen
him fairly placed as one of the world’s greatest military commanders. Hannibal’s
ability to lead men from different races and win resounding victories, despite coming
up against a significantly larger Roman army, has resulted in him leaving a
substantial legacy. And while he ultimately failed in his quest to defeat Rome, the
fact that Rome and many other civilisations came to adopt his military tactics is
testament to his ability a general. Hannibal helped shape the ancient world, and has
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continued to significantly affect the modern world, leading to his becoming one of the
world’s most brilliant military commanders.
Annotated Bibliography
Books:
Abbot, J, 2008, Makers of History – Hannibal, Harpers and Brothers Publishers,
London
Abbot’s book “Makers of History – Hannibal” is an extremely reliable piece of writing as it draws its
conclusions from the works of Polybius, Livy and other historians from ancient times. Abbot’s book
provides a history of Hannibal’s early life and goes on to illustrate accomplishments and failures of his
life and his impact on history. Abbot’s book is very useful in providing a summary of the Carthage’s
military general Hannibal.
Bradley, P (1990), Ancient Rome using evidence, Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge
Pamela Bradley’s secondary school textbook Ancient Rome Using Evidence provides a
comprehensive introduction to early Roman civilisation. Bradley’s work is extremely helpful and very
reliable as it draws on both ancient and modern sources. It presents a brief overview of Hannibal and
is useful in providing information on his exploits throughout the Second Punic War.
Dodge, T, 1891, Great Captains – Hannibal Volume 1 & 2, Houghton, Mifflin and
Company, New York
Analyses Hannibal’s successes, and also his failures, as a military general. It is very useful in
providing insight into Hannibal’s quest in Italy, and it is also successful in providing an understanding
of why Hannibal ultimately failed in his quest. It is an extremely useful source in gaining insight into
Hannibal’s ability as a military commander.
Fields, N, 2011, Hannibal, Osprey Publishing Limited, London
Nic Fields’ novel Hannibal looks at the Second Punic War between Rome and Carthage, and also
provides a brief history of Hannibal’s life. The novel demonstrates slight bias towards Hannibal;
however it is a useful source in providing an evaluation of Hannibal as a military commander.
Lazeny, J.F, 1998, Hannibal’s War: A Military History of The Second Punic War,
University of Oklahoma Press, Oklahoma
Lazenby’s book Hannibal’s War: A Military History of The Second Punic War, covers the Second
Punic War between Rome and Carthage from the years 218-202 BC. Lazenby provides an
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interpretation of Polybius’ and Livy’s workings, and also examines several other ancient sources.
Lazenby’s analysis of primary sources is extremely valuable in providing accurate information.
Although Lazenby displays clear admiration for Hannibal’s achievements, he does not demonstrate
much bias throughout his novel.
O’Connell, R. L, 2010, The Ghosts of Cannae: Hannibal and the Darkest Hour of the
Roman Republic, Random House Publishing Group, Sydney
Analyses the famous battle of Cannae in 216 BC, and also several battles which followed that of
Cannae. It is very useful as it focuses on Hannibal and his enemy Scipio Africanus, and in doing so
considers both Roman and Carthaginian perspectives. The novel looks at the difference in Roman
and Carthaginian battle tactics and armament, as well as looking into their different belief and
philosophies. The book is very helpful in analysing Hannibal’s qualities as a general.
Polybius, The Histories of Polybius, (Loeb Classical Library edition), accessed on 12
April 2011 at
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/home.html .
Polybius’ work “The Histories of Polybius” covers the years 264 – 146 BC, and they trace the downfall
of the Greeks, the rise of Rome and also the Punic Wars. Polybius’ work is written from a combination
of sources and portrays opinions from Roman, Greek and Carthaginian perspectives. It is useful in
providing details about matters concerning the Roman Republic, however it shows slight bias, to do
Polybius certain bias towards Romans.
Rollin, C, 1836, The Ancient History of The Egyptians, Carthaginians, Assyrians,
Babylonians, Medes and Persians, Grecians and Macedonians, George Dearborn
Publisher, New York
Charles Rollin’s work provides a history of Ancient Egyptian, Carthaginian, Assyrian, Babylonian,
Macedonian, Grecian and Persian civilisation. It is useful in providing a history of Carthage from its
founding’s and beginning, to its destruction, including an analysis of the Punic Wars with Rome. It is
valuable in providing a history of Carthage, however it does not provide much information on
Hannibal.
Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome (English Translation by. Rev. Canon
Roberts), Dutton and Co: New York, 1912 accessed on 9 April 2011 at
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.02.0144 .
Livy’s “The History of Rome” provides a history of Rome from its founding to his lifetime. His work
covers the period 753 – 9 BC, and it follows Polybius writings very closely. However as he was
extremely patriotic his sources should be treated with caution as they may show bias towards Rome.
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Warrick, C.K, 2006, Hannibal – Great General of the Ancient World (Rules of the
Ancient World), Enslow Publishers, New Jersey, USA
Biography of the Carthaginian General Hannibal Barca. It traces his early childhood, and
follows his rise to Carthaginian General, where it examines his achievements throughout the
Second Punic War. Warrick’s novel is very helpful in providing an understanding of
Hannibal’s accomplishments and abilities as a leader, and its use of primary sources shows
its reliability.
Articles:
Hoyus, B.D, 1983, Hannibal: What Kind of Genius? Second Series, Vol. 30, No. 2,
Cambridge University Press, accessed 28 April 2011 at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/642568
Hoyus’ article “Hannibal: What Kind of Genius?” analyses whether Hannibal’s failures were a direct
result of his decisions, or whether they were a result of factors which he could not control. Hoyus
believes that Hannibal was a brilliant general, however he also considers Hannibal to have made
several mistakes, and he discuss’ them throughout his article. It is very useful in providing a different
opinion on Hannibal’s ability as a general.
O’Bryhim, S, 1991, Hannibal’s Elephants and the Crossing of The Rhône,
Vol. 41, No. 1, Cambridge University Press, accessed 28 April 2011 at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/639029 .
The article “Hannibal’s Elephants and the Crossing of The Rhône” looks at the method of transport
that Hannibal used for his elephants when crossing The Rhone river. It analyses the opinions of Livy
and Polybius, and also takes into consideration Elephant behaviour studies, and comes to the
conclusion that a method which Livy states, is the most believable account of the truth. The article is
useful in demonstrating the truth of Polybius and Livy’s accounts, and in showing Hannibal’s
intelligent thinking.
Film:
Quigley, J, Greatest Heroes in History – Hannibal, 2003, videorecording, A Wark
Clements Production,
The documentary “Greatest Heroes in History – Hannibal, discusses Hannibal’s leadership abilities
and also looks at his success in the battles of Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae. It is very useful in
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providing a brief history of Hannibal and his battles, however due to the lack of primary sources used,
it’s reliability should be treated carefully.
Hannibal – The Man Who Hated Rome, 2001, videorecording, Mentorn, United
Kingdom
The DVD “Hannibal – The Man Who Hated Rome” provides a brief history of Hannibal and his journey
throughout the Second Punic War. It is very helpful in giving a brief understanding of Hannibal’s quest
against Rome.
Internet Sites:
Hooker, R, 1999, “Rome – The Punic Wars”, World Civilisations, viewed 13th April
2011 http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~dee/ROME/PUNICWAR.HTM
This site supplies a brief outline of Carthage and Rome, and also briefly outlines the first, second and
third Punic Wars between Rome and Carthage. It is helpful in providing a overview of the conflict
between the two civilisations.
Halsall, P, 1998, “Polybius: The Character of Hannibal”, Ancient History Sourcebook,
viewed 13th April 2011 http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/polybius-hannibal.html
Halsall’s translation of Polybius’ histories is very reliable as it is a direct translation from Polybius’
accounts. It analyses the Character of Hannibal, stating that he was a difficult man to understand the
extract also looks at the decisions Hannibal made, out what were the motivating factors behind these.
It is very useful in providing a more in-depth insight into Hannibal.
Lendering, J, 2008, “Hannibal”, viewed 14th April 2011 http://www.livius.org/hahd/hannibal/hannibal.html
The Internet article “Hannibal” is a biography of Hannibal’s life, beginning from his early childhood,
and ending with his death. It also provides an evaluation on his impact on ancient society. It is useful
in providing a brief outline of Hannibal, however it does not go into much detail, and due to the lack of
primary sources used, it should be treated with caution.
Lendering, J, 2008, “Hannibal In The Alps”, viewed 14th April 2011
http://www.livius.org/ha-hd/hannibal/alps_text.html
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This website discusses Hannibal’s journey over the Alps. It utilises extracts from both Polybius and
Livy’s histories and is thus very reliable. It is useful in showing the difficulties that faced Hannibal and
is also useful in demonstrating his ability as a leader.
“Battle of Zama”, 2011, viewed 18th April 2011 http://www.unrv.com/empire/battle-ofzama.php
This online source provided a brief yet useful overview of the Battle of Zama. It discusses the tactics
used throughout the battle and is helpful in providing a summary of Hannibal’s strategy.
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