Download Document

Elaheh Koolaee, Professor of Regional Studies, University of Tehran
Javad Khansari, Ph.D. Candidate of Political Science, University of Tehran
Samaneh Farazi, MA. Regional Studies, University of Tehran
Iran and Islamic Fundamentalism in Central Asia
Abstract
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and independence of the Central Asian Republics,
the governments of this region faced many political-security challenges. One challenge was
expansion of Islamic fundamentalism. Foreign policy of Iran has been introduced as a factor
that has effects in the growth and the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism. The question is,
“What is the role of Iran in the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia?” The
hypothesis is: “Iran has not real role in this matter”. The descriptive-analytical methods will
help to study the role of Iran in the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia.
Keywords: Soviet Union, Central Asia, Iran, Islam, Islamic Fundamentalism, Political Islam.
Introduction
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Islamic fundamentals have been considered as
one of the factors of instability in Central Asia. Some experts have claimed that Islamic radicals
were among the factors involved in the collapse of Soviet Union. On that assumption, they predicted
that Islam could be a challenging factor for post-communist governments. The Central Asia
conditions; too, have indicated the adaptation of more radical perspective by the Islamic movements.
Tashkent bomb blast in February 1999, terrorist events in Kyrgyzstan in the same year and again in
these two countries in 2000 developed the assumption that Islamic Fundamentalism could take over
the religion.1 Collapse of communist model for development and presence of millions of Muslims
have provided a suitable ground to increase in Islamic trends in this region. The leaders of the region
except Kyrgyzstan is the elites remained from the Soviet era find political Islam as their most serious
competitors.
The Muslim of this region was under constant exposure to heavy anti-religious and anti-Islam
propagation during the communist regimes. By the collapse of the Soviet Union, many people return
to Islam as a part of their new identity.2 The political and military developments in Tajikistan and
1
Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, ICA, Asia Report, No. 14, 1999, p. 102.
E. Koolaee, ‘Sources of Islamic Fundamentalism in Central Asia’, Journal of Law and Political Sciences Faculty,
Vol. 67, Spring 2005, p. 202.
2
bloody clashes soon projected the Islamic threat- the American and Russian leaders on one hand and
governing elites on the other hand were vigorously trying to highlight. The newly established
political and social institutions witnessed with various problems and challenges that not only
affected the security of these republics, but also the whole region. Changes in Afghanistan caused
the counter effects of political-military movements in this country and its western and eastern
neighbors appear more significantly.3
By the collapse of the Soviet Union, expansion of the Islamic fundamentalism has been one
of the most important challenges. This phenomenon became more important after terrorist attacks of
11 September 2001. There have been many analysis in this connection with emphasize on different
external and internal factors, in which, sometimes, the role of Islamic Republic of Iran has been
emphasized as a major factor effective the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism in the region. This
paper studies the role of Iran in expansion of Islamic Fundamentalism in Central Asia. The
hypothesis of the authors is that despite some claims that emphasize on active role of Iran in the
establishment and expansion of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, by studying the area of
creation and expansion of Islamic fundamentalism on one hand and analyzing the foreign policy of
Islamic republic of Iran in central Asia on the other hand, it could be seen that in fact, Iran has been
conducting a realistic and pragmatic policy toward Islamic fundamentalism. In reality, with respect
to the priorities of Iran’s foreign policy in Central Asia, it could be said that after the independence
of these republics, Iran has not supported Islamic fundamentalists and hard- liners.
Islamic fundamentalism
In the second half of the 20th century, a significant return to religious trends was developed
around the Islamic countries that appeared in form of religious consciousness and fundamentalist
movements; however, the source of fundamentalism is rooted in earlier time. Fundamentalism is a
movement that appeared first among American Protestants in the beginning of 20th century as a
reaction against modernism and emphasized on unmistakability of the ideas raised in Holy Book
both in faith and morality teachings, and in interpreting the historical events. However it covered all
ideological systems that believed in return to religion and faith and in a reaction towards modernism,
expanded as a global viewpoint or movement that somehow demanded a return to traditions and
Holy Book as guidance of mankind.4 In any codes and ideological beliefs, fundamentalism
emphasizes on the past golden era and tries to reanimate the structures and values of that era again.
On the other hand, there are people who believe this thought is dangerous and emphasize on the
point that there has never been a golden age. In the first decades of the 20th century, fundamentalism
S. Gretsy, ‘Civil War in Tajikistan and international Repercussions’, Critique, Vol. 14, No. 6, 1995, pp. 19- 20.
Samuel Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996,
p. 45.
3
4
faced the opposition of religious society too showed itself under coverage of hostile and aggressive
groups and people.5
Fundamentalism is one of the vaguest and most complicated concepts in social sciences and
as all religious movements are incorporated in that framework, the overall concept of
fundamentalism has become more expanded and intensive. The concept of “Islamic
Fundamentalism” was more widely applied in political sciences and sociology literature by the
emergence of Islamic movements in the Islamic World, victory of Islamic Revolution of Iran and
particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although, some social and political analysts do
not see this concept sufficiently capable to explain and describe Islamic Movements and some see its
use as a shallow-minded, enemy creation and ideological flaw; nonetheless, there are many who
have accepted this concept for describing contemporary religious currents in Islamic World.
Islamic movements in Central Asia
The Muslims of Central Asia, like other Muslims across the world, started their efforts in 19th
century to address the questions on the causes and factors of the backwardness of the Islamic
societies. Although, with some delay, compared with the Caucasian Muslim which was in more
mental and cultural interactions with the European, there were some Islamic movements in this
region which have had their different characters.
1) Islam in the Soviet Era: For many people of Central Asia, the revolution of October 1917 might
have been able to help in the revival of Islam; however, as the expectations of Central Asian
Muslims were not fulfilled by the Bolsheviks regime, it turned into a ground for Basmachi rebel.6
Basmachi Movement started in February 1918 and its center was Farqana Valley. Eventually, the
movement found extensive support among the Muslim people. The leaders of this movement
supported the nationalists of Kokand and the Muslims of the region. The first phase of Basmachi
revolt ended with the fall of Muslims’ government in Kokand. After surpassing the first phase of the
rebel by the Red Army, a second round of rebels started in April 1920; however, this time, its center
was Khiva (Khwarezm) region. The government of Khiva backed the Movement but once again,
communists surpassed the movement. Surpassing Muslim revolutionaries in Khiva expanded the
waves of Basmachi Movement to Bukhara and it soon took over the entire Central Asia.
The coordinated and integrated actions were formed by the communists in Moscow to surpass
the rebel and local clashes too such as Uzbeks and Kirgiz clashes in Fargana Valley weakened the
rebel. Gradually, Russians changed their view on mere reliance on military tools in Central Asia.
The Sharia courts were revived in Central Asia in 1922 and efforts were made to decrease the
5
6
Martin E Marty and R. Scott, Fundamentalism Observed, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 3.
Basmachi means bugler and here it mostly meant rebel. It was a nationalist and freedom movement.
pressure against Muslim in the region. On the other hand, Lenin’s New Economic Policy reduced the
political-economic pressures on Central Asia. Basmachi revolt gradually became weaker in
Samarqand and Bukhara due to internal and external factors and it only survived in a part of
Khwarezm (Khiva). The rebel was intensively weakened from 1926 although in 1929 as forced
collectivism projects were adopted during Stalin, the rebel revived. The Red Army of the Soviet
Union destroyed any effects of the existence of any such rebels. There has been no reference in
Soviet literature of Basmachi. This Movement was similar to many freedom movements in postSecond World War Asian-African countries.7
Despite the systematic anti-Islamic programs which were implemented in Central Asia by the
communist regimes, supporting Islam continued and up to one decade after the establishment of new
communist regime, the Sharia courts were held in secret. However, gradually, the entire properties of
religious institutions were confiscated by the then Soviet government. Propagations against religion
were presented in the same places which were used for teaching religious in not long ago. The new
teachings omitted religious and supernatural issues and mainly discussed logic, modern sciences.
Change in the society and imposing “New life style” after the October Revolution pushed people
away from Islamic beliefs and conducts. The policy of challenging and fighting Islam was so
effective that after a while, Islam moved to underground and its followers were reduced.8
Another measure which was taken by the Soviet government to reduce the importance and
influence of Islam among the people was to establish centers for propagating a controlled Islam. In
this way, a form of official Islam, supported by the communist party of the Soviet Union established
its entities in a limited number. In this part, the religious activities were fully controlled and defined
in a legal way. In this way, a “parallel Islam” emerged in secret in a fundamentalist way which had
been created in 19th century. The followers of that Islam had communications with followers of
Muhammad Abdolvahab who had already introduced his ideas in Saudi Arabia. The propagators of
“Parallel Islam” benefitted from Sufis and their sects in establishing their especial institutes and
entities. Anne Mary Schimmel, the famous Islam expert believes the Sufis ideas a type of
“ambiguous” implication of Islam.9 The Vahabies of the Central Asia sometimes mingled with the
followers of Naqshbandieh sect and integrated with them. Their focus was aimed at cleaning
religious thoughts from beliefs that had been added to Islam during several centuries. The
fundamentalists of Central Asia contacted Vacation in Saudi Arabia in different forms since the
Soviet era and benefitted from their financial sources. 10
7
Elaheh Koolaee, Politics and Government in Central Asia and the Caucasia, Tehran: SAMT, 2013, pp. 36-37.
Shoshana Keller, To Moscow not Mecca: The Soviet Campaign against Islam in Central Asia, United States:
Praeger, 2001, p. 151.
9
H.B. Paksoy, ‘The Question of “Religious Fundematalism” in Central Asia’, World Wide Web Virtual Library
History Central Catalogue, http://vlib.iue.it/carrie/texts/carrie_books/paksoy-6/cae03.html (accessed 20.01.2013).
10
Koolaee, Politics and Government in..., p. 210.
8
The Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 intensified concerns of the Soviet leaders on
transferring political Islam. The notion of “Green Belt” around the Soviet Union was raised in the
beginning of 1980s because of that event. Fears of formation of Islamic governments around the
Soviet Union and the effects of internal changes in Iran on Afghanistan were responded by the
presence of the Red Army and occupation of Afghanistan in 1979.11 The long and persistent resilient
against occupation of that country provided areas for reinforcing the Saudi Arabia backed
fundamentalists’ activities. The U.S in the template of bipolar system era terms and the Cold War
made an overall support to that policy.12 The communist regime in Kabul was facing intensive
pressures from different groups including fundamentalists. The economic planners of the Soviet
Union; too, had aimed at integrating Afghanistan and Central Asia.13 Gorbachev’s politicaleconomic reforms expanded the arena of regional interactions. Gorbachev’s Glasnost provided a
better atmosphere for Muslims’ activities and Islamic Fundamentalism found more significant
dimensions in the Central Asia.
In this way, Islamic revivalism was given another opportunity to spread in 1980s. The first
factor was the expansion of religious revival supports movement that was established in the rural
regions of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, particularly in Forgana Valley. This movement was mostly in
form of secret groups of supporters around the local instructor that would be respected for his pious
conduct and Islamic teachings. Conservatism was the specific characteristics of this group. The
Soviet media usually considered the activities of that group as the outcome of Vahabies’ efforts.14
The spiritual origin of this group was in Afghanistan. By invasion of the Red Army to Afghanistan
in 1979 and occupying, in order to lower the sensitivity of Afghan Muslims, Russians dispatched
their Tajik and Uzbek soldiers and staff to that country as their front army. After a short time, this
group was largely affected by Afghan revolutionary Muslims in general and supporters of
fundamentalist movements in particular. After the fall of Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan in
1992 and the futility of the existence of Mujahidin volunteers, those forces gradually returned to
their homeland, although many of those groups moved to Afghanistan by receiving supports of their
countries’ rulers. On the other hand, their return faced serious opposition of the authoritarian
governments in the region. It seems that fearing the experiences, military skills and their aggressive
policies against any superior power and their radical approaches were causes of those opposition.15
11
Alexander Benigsen and Mery Bracksup, Soviet Muslims, Past, Present, Future, Tehran: Office of Islamic Culture
Publication, 1991, pp. 182-183.
12
Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Oles M. Smolansky, Regional Rivalries in the New Eurasia, London: Armonk, 1995, p. 35.
13
Raul Ram, Modern Central Asia, New Delhi: Vikas Publication House LTD, 1979, pp. 40, 51.
14
Shireen Akiner, ‘The Politicization of Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia’, Religion State and Society, Vol. 31, No.
2, 2003, pp. 97,122.
15
A. Faraji Rad and J. Khansari, ‘Geopolitics of Terrorism in Afghanistan and its Effects on the Importance of
Central Asia’, Geography and Regional Planning, Vol. 2, No.1, 2011, p. 98.
The second factor was changes in official policy of the Soviet Union towards Islam,
particularly enforcing Glasnost policy by Gorbachev. In reaction to the Islamic threats, the Soviet
government took a more peaceful approach towards religious entities. This policy led to the
formation of “Islamic Revival Party” in the Soviet Union. That party was run by Sunni clergymen
and religious intellects. At first, it acted as an overall and fully-covering party across the Soviet
Union with neo-fundamentalism dialogue and tried to analyze social issues with Islamic teaching.16
As noted before, the mental fundamentals of those movements arrived from Afghanistan; although it
worked in the template of the Soviet Policies.
The third factor was undesirable economic status of the region that had been ruined as a result
of cotton production single-product agricultural system. For that reason, Moscow on one hand
provided large investment facilities of the Arab fundamentalist and conservative countries including
Saudi Arabia and Jordan in the Central Asia and on the other hand, encouraged them to support and
supervise revival of Islam.17
2) The Islamic movements after the Soviet Union: After the expansion of political Islam following
the victory of Islamic Revolution in Iran, Central Asia, although still under rule of communism
regime, witnessed serious threats. The end of the bipolar system and the end of the communist
modernization programs provided suitable ground for fundamentalist Islamic Groups. The remained
leaders from the communism era tried to keep their powers under the title of leaders of national
governments. They found political Islam as their real competitors. Following a long, though failed,
efforts of the Soviet leaders to separate Central Asian Muslim from their identity, it was soon
recognized that Islam still makes an important part of the identity of the Central Asian Muslims.18
This new trend and regained attention to Islam was the result of moral vacuum and an
implication of religion-fighting policy of the communist era. Furthermore, geographic looseness of
Central Asia to Turkey, Pakistan and Middle East Countries was an effective factor in the flourishing
and expansion of Islamic sciences, trips of preachers and re-building mosques. As an example, in the
beginning of 1992, around 3000 mosques were built or restored in Uzbekistan and 130 mosques
started to be effectively used. Revival of Islam in Central Asia was not solely limited to return to
past values but also, Islam was introduced as the core of national identity of these societies and
alongside it, values that had been surpassed during the Soviet era found new life.19
S.R. Mousavi, ‘Islamic Movements in Central Asia’, Geography and Regional Planning, Vol. 2, No.1, 2011, p.
98.
17
O. Roa, ‘Soviet, Islam and Central Asia’, Foreign Policy, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1991, pp. 53, 67.
18
M.B. Olcatt, ‘Politics in Central Asia after Collapse of the Empire’, Journal of Central Asia and the Caucasus
Studies, Vol. 2, 1992, pp. 47, 73.
19
L. Polonskaya, and A. Malashenko , Islam in Central Asia, UK: Ithaca Press, 1994, p. 115.
16
Thus, three groups expanded their activities in the Central Asia. The first one was Tajikistan Islamic
Movement, second Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the third Hizb- ul- Tahrir. The root of all
these groups and activities turns to the Islamic conscious movement that had been initiated by
scholars such as Seyyed Jamaleddin Asadabadi (1828-1898). By inviting Muslims to unite and put
aside differences, this movement believed Islam as the sole way to save Muslims from colonialism.
In the views of Seyyed Jamal and his followers, returning to the Islamic teachings and reviving
Islamic values and traditions were the best way in fighting colonialism.20
3) Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP): The founders of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP)
held their meeting in Astrakhan in June 1991. Delegates from different regions of the Soviet Union
and Central Asia attended the meeting.21 This party was founded as a politically integrated
organization that would cover all Muslims in the Soviet Union and its main idea was the unity of all
Muslims in the Soviet Union, inviting them to follow Islamic laws and encouraging them to
participate in religious, cultural, social, political and economic affairs. This party publicly criticized
the official clergymen of Muslims for their cooperation with the Soviet government. IRP started
presenting its ideological and theoretical fundamentals
22
through publishing Al-Wahdat daily from
January 1991. This party seriously rejected any ethnical clashes or any radicalism and terrorism. The
party recognized constitutional law and nevertheless, its basis and core had many ties with
fundamentalism. For example, the party propagated following Islamic commands, blamed official
clergymen, demanded Islamic education in schools and ultimately, seek the establishment of Islamic
government. Moreover, it is official declaration, the party supported Algeria Freedom Movement
and established relationships with Sudan, Pakistan, Egypt and Iran and gradually, formed a hostile
attitude towards the West.23
After formation in Astrakhan, IRP tried to expand its penetration across the Soviet Union. In
Central Asia, the party was more active in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The Uzbek branch was
established in 1992. The major claims of the Uzbek Branch of trips in the founders’ meeting
included: Determining the true concepts of Quran and narrations, life based on Islam, campaign
against national discriminations, radical movements, alcohol drinking and enforcing other
commands as banned by Sharia, teaching young people based on Islamic principles, reinforcing
Islamic bounds and unity and expansion of inter-religious
relations among Muslims of other
Mousavi, ‘Islamic Movements in…’, p. 112.
L. Hunter, ‘Religion, Politics and Security in Central Asia’, SAIS Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, Summer/Fall 2001, pp.
65, 90, http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=jourals/sais_revuew/v02/21hunter.pdf (accessed
20.01.2013).
22
Haghayeghi, Mehrdad, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995, p.87.
23
P. Akcah, ‘Islam as a “Common Bond” in Central Asia: Islamic Renaissance Party and the Afghan Mujahidin’,
Central Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1998, p. 271.
20
21
countries, cooperation with democrat and moderate parties and governmental organizations, assisting
in the reinforcement of place of family and guaranteeing women and children’s rights.24 Following
detention of 400 members of the party by Uzbek government, deportation and sending the remaining
members on exile, the party’s activities were banned and since then, the members of the party
continued their activities in underground.25
4) Islamic Movement Uzbekistan (IMU): The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has begun its
activities in a small fertile village in the center of Fargana Valley. After political reforms of
Gorbachev (and creation political openness) in Central Asia, the conscious of the Muslims in the
region improved. Following the Soviet Union collapse, a group of young and jobless men in
Namangan were building a mosque in their village that faced the objection of municipality of the
town. Enraged by municipality act, they moved to the central building of Uzbekistan community
party and occupied there. It was the initiation of the activities of a movement that later echoed across
Central Asia.26
At the end of Tajikistan Civil War, Tahir Uldashov and Joma Namangani founded Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan in 1998. The Movement was an alliance made of Uzbek Muslim fighters
and Muslims of other states of Central Asia that opposed Uzbekistan regime. Many of members of
this party were those who had fought in Tajikistan Civil War 1992-1997. Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan has adopted armed Pan-Islamic ideology. Until US war against terrorism and attack on
Afghanistan, this Movement aimed at overthrowing Islam Karimov’s regime and establishing an
Islamic government in Uzbekistan. In this line, Tahir Uldashov in an interview in 2000 stated,
“Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan” has declared Jihad against the government of Islam Karimov and
is seeking establishment of a religious-Islamic system based on pure Sharia laws, taken from
instructions of Prophet of Islam. In this system has not been established in anywhere, neither in
Afghanistan, or any other country since 1999
27
the group has adopted more hostile approach,
including few bombing and abduction by its members. Uzbekistan government, in turn, has declared
I.M.U. in the list of fundamentalist groups and has banned its activities. The Uzbek government has
been prosecuting and searching for the leaders and members of the Group.28
A. Abduvakhitov, ‘Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan’, in Russia’s Muslim Frontiers: New Directions in CrossCultural Analysis, Dale F. Eickelman (ed.), Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993, p. 97.
25
A.V. Malashenko, ‘Islam and Politics in the Southern Zone of the Former USSR’, in Central Asia and Trans
Caucasus: Ethnicity and Conflicts, Vitaly Naumkin (ed.), Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994, p.118.
26
Najibeh Mohammadi Khorshidi, ‘Grounds and Outcomes of Hizb al Tahrir in Central Asia’, M.A. Thesis, Tehran
University, 2010, p. 93.
27
E.Sandstorm, ‘Central Asia a New Afghanistan?: The Consequences of the Socio-economic Environment for
Religious and Ethnic Strife’, in From Taiwan to Taliban: Two Danger Zones in Asia, Scientific Report, Swedish
Defense Research Agency, Ingolf Kiesow(ed), Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2002, p. 299.
28
Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
2002, p. 148.
24
After terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 U.S. government put I. M.U. in the list of
terrorist organization. This led to the participation of Uzbek government and facilitation of military
cooperation of this government (with Americans) in Afghanistan war as well. Although, attacks of
the members of this Group to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000 and apparent
involvement in Tashkent bomb attack in February 1999 were not ineffective in that decision. After
these bans, U.I.M. established close relations with Taliban and Al-Qaida and survived by stationing
in the mountain regions of North Afghanistan by receiving financial and military aids from the two
former groups. 29
Nevertheless, no one could talk about American success in sending troops to Afghanistan and
destruction of IMU. Based on some unverified reports, Joma Namangani, the military leader of the
movement has been killed by America forces in a military operations and the Movement has
suffered serious loss and casualties. On the other hand, destroying Taliban and Al-Qaida has stopped
the flow of financial and military aids to this movement and it seems that if those reports are true,
IMU is in the edges of collapse.30
5) Hizb-ut-Tahrir: The Islamic Hizb-ut-Tahrir, briefly named as Hizb-al-Tahrir was founded
in 1953 by Sheikh Taghi Aldin Alnahbani, one of the graduates of Al Azhar University in Egypt.
Hizb-ut-Tahrir was founded in Beytol Moghadas and soon expanded in the Middle East, North
Africa and later, South East Asia. Based on the contents of the official website of Hizb-ut-Tahrir,
this group is a political party and its ideology is formed based on Islamic thoughts. The goal of this
ideology is to return the Muslim communities of the world into the Islamic way of life based on the
laws of Sharia and under the banner of caliphate. Membership of this party is open to any Arab and
Non-Arab, white or colored skin males and females. This party believes itself to belong to all
Muslims of the world. The party demands political and enlightening fights against blasphemy of
colonialist countries that have domination and influence in the Islamic countries as well as the rulers
of Muslim Arab countries.31
Hizb-ut-Tahrir first appeared in Central Asia in the beginning of 1990s and gradually, to the
end of that decade, the number of members increased. This party follows the motto of peaceful
omission of the governments of Central Asia and the establishment of Islamic Caliphate in the
Islamic World. The party grew from radical Islamic movements of Middle East in late 1950. Unlike
IMU, Hizb-ut-Tahrir bans any hostility and armed struggle in its activities. The approach of the
theorists of the party is to achieve their goals through dialogue, activities and propagation against
29
The IMU and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghan Campaign, ICG Asia Briefing Paper, January 2000,
p.2.
30
P. Mann, ‘Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: Will it Strike Back’, Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the
IDSA, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 294,304.
31
Hizb-ut-Tahrir ,www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org (accessed 20.02.2013).
non-Islamic governments and explaining the benefits of establishing Islam in the society.32 Hizb-utTahrir is a trans-national movement that enjoys the supports of young Muslims of Western European
countries and has a vast organization in London. Although there is no detailed statistics of the
resources and members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, it is claimed that thousands people in the Central Asia are
members of this party.33
This group has a political approach towards Islam and believes that in case of establishing
Islam and proper execution of Sharia law; social problems such as corruption and poverty will be
removed. Nevertheless, the leaders of the party have not cleared a specific plan and approach
regarding the procedure of establishing their ideal society. The mottos are mostly anti-Western, antiracism and anti-Shiite. Nonetheless, due to the survival of economic problems and social
dissatisfaction, the utopian approach of Hizb-ut-Tahrir has found great importance in Central Asia.34
The most activities of Hizb-ut-Tahrir have been centralized in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and
although it calls itself a political party, it is more an ideology current that has set determining and
defining Islamic commands and improving religious beliefs of people its priorities. Most members of
this party are Uzbek; however, there are Kyrgyz and Tajik members among them as well. Although
Hizb-ut-Tahrir has been named illegal both in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, unlike IMU, the party is
not in terrorist groups list of the United States.35 It seems that relative popularity of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in
late 1990 and beginning of 2000 could be due to lack of religious pluralism, surpassing Islamism
groups in the region and in particular, in Uzbekistan, in one hand, and the disappearance of IMU
following the US War against terrorism and attack on Afghanistan.36
The relationship between Hizb-ut-Tahrir and IMU is also interesting. There are some
unverified reports of visits between leaders of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, IMU and Taliban; there is a
probability that after full defeat of armed involvement of IMU in Kyrgyzstan, Hizb-ut-Tahrir has
reached the conclusion that seeking closeness with such weak fighting forces has many
disadvantages and little advantages. In turn, the ideological basis of IMU shows significant
sympathy of it with Hizb-ut-Tahrir and admiring this party. Although, there are evidences that imply
hopelessness of IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir due to armed confrontation with the government by that
party, there is no considerable critique on Hizb-ut-Tahrir in the movement documents. In the notes
on activities of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the officials of IMU have frequently opposed the peaceful tactics of
the party and emphasized that “We should talk to the government with the only language they
Z. Eshanova, ‘Central Asia: Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Differ in Approach to Hizb-al-Tahrir’, RFE/RL, 12 July 2002,
http://www.rferl.org/features/202/01/12072002171856.asp (accessed 22.02.2013).
33
The IMU and the Hizb-ut-…, p.6
34
Ibid., p.7
35
H. Salimi and M. Haftabadi, ‘Security-Political Concerns of China in Central Asia’, Journal of Central Eurasia
Studies, Vol. 2, No.? , 2008, p. 89.
36
Javad Khansari, Islamic Fundamentalism in Uzbekistan: Possibility or Paranoia, M.A. Thesis of Central Asia and
Caucasus Studies, Allameh Tabatabaei University, Tehran, 2011, p. 109.
32
understand; that is, force”. Overall, except some scattered contacts during Taliban government in
Afghanistan, there is no evidence to imply organizational and ideological contact between Hizb-utTahrir and IMU.37
Growth and expansion of Islamic Fundamentalism in Central Asia
Based on the brief description on the history of Islamic movements, particularly three
mentioned Islamic groups in Central Asia, it seems that a combination of local factors such as
economic-social problems, poverty, unemployment political pressure, authoritarian governments,
lack of political participation, absence of civil and political freedom along foreign factors such as
interference of some Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey, and
their financial supports to fundamentalist groups and 9/11 event, military presence of U.S. in
Afghanistan have been effective in the growth and expansion of Islamic fundamentalism in Central
Asia.
Iran and the Islamic Fundamentalism in Central Asia
By the fall of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 and formation of independent states in
Central Asia, four hypotheses have been introduced on the future role of Islam in the region:
1. Islam as an effective factor in social system and the factor that forms political-social identity
of the countries in the region,
2. Islam as a factor in establishing Islamic political systems in the newly independent states,
3. Changing into a radical ideology and a competitor of modernism,
4. The non-religious approach of regional countries and not using the abilities of Islam in the
formation of a religious state.38
The first two hypotheses were de on the writings and implications of Western theoreticians on
probability of intervention of Iran in Central Asia and directing the countries of the region towards a
political system similar to the Islamic Republic. In this context the possibility of this scenario
seemed more probable with respect to the historical-cultural ties and the geographic neighborhood of
Iran and the regional countries. For example, in 1993, the analysts of the U.S. national security drew
up a perspective of the Central Asia in 2000 that showed vast areas in green color against a red
point; that is Iran, as a source of threat for the region.39 Despite the emphasis of some analysis about
goals and plans of I. R. Iran in Central Asia, the real conditions of the Central Asian states, absence
of Shiite Muslims and the pragmatic foreign policy of Iran in the region caused the ideological
penetration of Iran to remain in the limit of a model and a governmental idea. The different
conditions can be seen in the following:
37
Khorshidi, ‘Grounds and Outcomes …’, p. 98.
E. Yazdani, ‘ Role of Islam in Central Asia after Soviet Collapse’, Journal of Central Asia and the Caucasus
Studies, Vol. 48, Winter 2005, pp. 195,221.
39
Anoushirvan Ehteshami, From to Central Asia, Exeter: Short Run Press, 1994, p.115.
38
1) Regional conditions
The regional conditions that generally lowered the penetration of Islamic movements and in
particular, reduced the ideological influence of Iran in the region including different factors:
a. The legacy of more than 7 decades domination of communist regimes in these countries. The
efforts of the Soviet state in propagation of the Communism ideology and decrease in presence of
Islam in all social arenas of these countries sent Islam and its codes to private sphere. Nevertheless,
the anti-religious policies of the Soviet era caused the role of Islam in post-Soviet era to show itself
as a factor for retrieving ethnicity and cultural identity.
b. The existence of authoritarian states in the region: Following independence of Central Asian
countries, three main groups step into campaign for political dominance:
- Representatives of party-dominance that were later
many areas,
- New groups who were mostly under leadership of
during the Soviet era,
-Islamic renaissance groups and principle clergymen
outside the official religious education system of the
with political party systems as well.40
disintegrated into different groups in
the intellects who had marginal role
who had been developed and grown
Soviet Union and were in opposition
Therefore, after independence, the ex-elites of the communist party were the first group in a
suitable situation in the Central Asia and could put the political and economic entities of the region
under control as far as all presidents of the Central Asian states, except Kyrgyzstan. They still
believe in authoritarian methods. These leaders employed two methods to stabilize their
authoritarian systems: First: surpassing local opposition parties through establishing legal obstacles
for their activities and making accusations, such as passing the law for restricting the activities of
religious organizations and entities in Uzbekistan in May 1991 or arresting the members of ARK
with the charge of coup-d’état and legal activities, as well as sentencing Tahir Uldashov and Joma
Namangani in 2000 with the charge of Tashkent bomb attacks.41Second: reforms in the
constitutional laws of the countries: The leaders of Central Asian States held referendums to
centralize power in president and founded political systems based on personal power. For example,
the leaders of these republics extended their presidency term to the end of 2000 through referendums
in 1995s.42 By prolonging the presidency term in Turkmenistan to 2002, necessary ground was
prepared for political and economic stability of this country in launching a 10-year reform plan by
the president.
2) Regional competitive ideas
H. Abolhassan Shirazi, ‘Continuity of Authoritarian System in Central Asia’, Journal of Faculty of Law and
Political Sciences, Vol. 67, No. ? , 2005, pp. 1, 26.
41
Ibidem.
42
Ibidem.
40
In the last years of the Soviet Union, in addition to Islamic revolution idea which was
supported by I.R of Iran, two other strong ideas were expanding in the region and as competitor
ideas of Islamic Revolution and extensively limited the influence of Iranian ideology in Central
Asia: a) Fundamentalist Islam: In early years of Central Asian republics independence, the radical
Islamic groups who mainly received mental and financial aids by countries such as Saudi Arabia,
U.A.E. and Pakistan started extended activities in the region. The foundation of those movements
was to propagate radical Vahabi beliefs in the region. With respect to the existence of some common
thought and ideological grounds between this group and Sunni population of the region, Vahabies
took advantage of those common grounds. They introduced themselves as Sunni Muslims by
apparent and propagation measures. Those activities made a closer feeling towards this group and
Central Asian Muslims.43b) The West-supported Islam: After the independence of these republics
and flow of Islamic trends and inclination to expand relationship with the Islamic World, particularly
I. R. of Iran West was seriously concerned with growth of Islamism in Central Asia. The reflection
of this concern could be seen in Berginsky’s words that pictured the expansion of Islamism in the
region as a dangerous pit that might be appeared as a result of geopolitical vacuum for USA and
Russia. For that reason, America tried to support Turkey as a model of separation of religion from
politics and help this country to penetrate in the region, to control the influence of Iran, and took
steps to prevent the expansion of political Islam as well as penetration of Islamic revolution thought
in the region.
3) The role of regional and trans-regional powers
Each regional power such as Russia, Turkey and China, and the trans-regional powers such as
US and EU have common interests in controlling Islamism and preventing revival of political Islam
among Central Asian people. The US government supported Taliban group that appeared in political
area of Afghanistan in 1995, as a force to create security in the region and to oppose the I.R. of Iran
and Russian as well as Central Asian republics’ policies. It also made strong emphasis on the
necessity of controlling fundamentalism raised by Islamic Revolution of Iran.44 The Russian
government, too, has shown fear from expansion of Islamic fundamentalism. In some instances,
Russia has sent its military troops to surpass local forces; as an example, intervention of Russian
army in Tajikistan Civil War from Fall 1992 to 1993 to back the communist groups of Tajikistan and
confronting the Islamic forces. China; too, is highly concerned with expansion of Islamic idea and
radical thoughts to Xin Kiang, its Muslim province in neighborhood of Central Asia. In this respect,
one of the important reasons in the establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) by
A. Farajirad and J.Khansari, ‘Terrorism in Afghanistan and Instability in Central Asia’, Central Asia and the
Caucasus, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2011, pp. 31,36.
44
R. Dobson B, ‘Islam in Central Asia’, Central Asian Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 170,186.
43
China, Russia and membership of Central Asian states in it, is to struggle against Islamic
fundamentalism and radical Muslim groups.45
Followed by 11/9 terrorist attacks and global war declared against terrorism by the US
president that led to the overthrow of Taliban regime in Afghanistan and overall presence of the US
Army in the region, the importance of war against terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism became
more important for Central Asian governments. The ruling elites in the region benefitted from this
opportunity to intensify surpassing of Islamic groups in the region. 46 This influence and presence of
trans-regional powers reduced the political influence of I.R. of Iran in general and penetration of
Islamic revolution thoughts, in the region in particular.
4) Difference in socio-economic conditions
The differences in the economic, social and political conditions and experiences of Central
Asian societies with Iran caused that none of the regional countries to show tendency towards
revolutionary Islamic thoughts as they were in Iran. According to Shireen Hunter, trend to
revolutionary Islam in countries like Iran was one of the outcomes of unsuccessful Westernization
policies of the government and political-economic difficulties caused by it as well as the ideological
vacuum of it compared to the expanded Western and Eastern ideologies.47 Even if we assume that
Central Asia is inclined to move in this path, the anti-Western trends have not developed in these
republics so far. At the same time, none of the central Asian republics has experienced the
consequences of Western model of economic-social developments fairly well; therefore, they cannot
have the perception of the countries that support revolutionary Islam. On the other hand, they have
not experienced the Western colonialism and are not familiar with the negative results that are
common in the countries with revolutionary Islam origin. In this respect, the necessary grounds for
developing the Iranian revolutionary Islamic model is not prepared in the region and even if Islam
becomes the basis of forming a political system, it would not be associated with anti-Western
trends.48
In addition, in spite of common historical- cultural experiences of Iran and Central Asian
societies, the religious differences between Iran and the regional countries and the Shiite and Iranian
characteristics of the Islamic revolution have limited its effects in these societies. According to John
Spozito, although Iranian revolution has affected the region and world in many aspects, its Iranian
characteristics, if we do not say have important effects in limiting Islamic Revolution, they had at
least given it a particular template and perspective. Many political thinkers, even the serous fans of
Yazdani, ‘ Role of Islam in …’, p. 205.
A.Faraji Rad and J.Khansari, ‘From Appearance of Islam in Large Khorasan to Fundamentalism in Central Asia’,
Research Journal of Great Khorasan, No. 2, Summer 2011, p. 62.
47
S. Hunter , ‘The Muslim Republic of the Former Soviet Union: Policy Challenges for United States’, The
Washington Quarterly, Summer 1992, pp. 57,51.
48
Ibidem.
45
46
the revolution are largely complaining that Islamic revolution has a Shiite and Iranian characteristics
in large extent.49 However, to understand the issue foreign policy of Iran will be reviewed in the new
Central Asia.
Iran’s foreign policy in the New Central Asia
After collapse of the Soviet Union, the foreign policy of the I.R. of Iran and its approach to
Central Asia caused that despite initial expectations, Iran could not expand its influence in the
region. In general, the characteristics of Iran’s foreign policy in the region could be distinguished in
three groups:
1) Lack of symbolic importance of the region for I.R. of Iran: Freedom of Quds, issue of Palestine
and destruction of Israel have been the most important focus of Islamic Revolution in Islamic World,
there will be the possibility of vanishing Israel.50 However, the symbolic importance and special
approach never existed on Central Asia. The I.R. of Iran approach towards that region was
significantly away from ideological effects and the ideological focus of Iran was searched in other
regions particularly in the Middle East in serious form.51
2) Expansion of relationship between Iran and Russia: The foreign policy of I.R.of Iran in general
and in Central Asia in particular is essentially affected by the inclination of Iran to maintain close
ties with Russia. Russian has been effective on foreign policy of Iran in the region.
3) Supply of defensive and armament demands of Iran: As a result of weakness of military power of
Iran in the 8-year imposed war with the Ba`ath regime of Iraq and Iranian failed efforts to have the
Chinese and EU supports for supplying Iranian industrial and spare parts equipment for opposition
of America pushed Iran towards Russia in providing its defense needs. On the other hand, Russians
too, following changes in their foreign policy approaches in post-Soviet collapse, due to significant
economic profits of armaments transactions with Iran and gaining strategic influence in this country,
showed intention to expand such relations.52
Based on some reports, during 1989 to 1995, Iran purchased around 5 billion dollars military
equipment from Russia. In 1998, Iranians declared their interests in buying 8 S-300 PMUI land to air
missiles, thousand Igla measles, 25 Mi-17-B helicopters and 8 Socho 25 airplanes from Russia. In
addition, in the visit of Ali Shamkhani, the then defense minister of Iran to Moscow in 2001, a 33
million dollar contract was signed between the two countries with 5 years duration.53 However, the
most influential area on Iran’s foreign policy is the Russian’s help in construction, completion and
49
John L. Spozito, Islamic Revolution of Iran and its Global Reflection, translated by Mohsen Modir Shanehchi,
Tehran: Astan Ghods Publication, 2003, P. 86.
50
Seyed Rouholla Khomeini, Sahifeh Noor, Tehran: Institute of Drawing up and Publication of Works of Imam
Khomeini, Vol. 2, 2006, p. 139.
51
Hunter , ‘The Muslim Republic …’, pp. 133,148.
52
R. Freedman, ‘Iran- Russia Relations in 1990s’, Foreign Policy, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2002, pp. 381,406.
53
A. Zargar, ‘Straits of Strategic Unity of Iran and Russia’, Rahbord, Vol. 36, 2005, pp. 275,294.
utilization of Bushehr Nuclear power plant which was envisaged by signing an 800 million dollar
contract in 1995 and Moscow undertook to implement the plant to the end of 2003.54
The security concerns of Iran in the new Central Asia
The governing situation on the international system from the beginning of 1990 when America
gradually worked towards expanding its hegemonic influence in strategic points of world such as the
Middle East and Persian Gulf has been a serious threat to the regional actors, particularly Iran and
this concern has reinforced the necessity of unity with some of the large powers such as Russia and
China. In addition, the Iranian security concerns in Central Asia and challenges caused by the
collapse of the Soviet ad trans-regional players such as America, Israel and EU for expanding
influence in the region, as well as the eastward expansion policy adopted by NATO have been
influential in expansion of Iranian relations with Russia.55
The pragmatic approach of Iran in the new Central Asia
The collapse of the Soviet Union and deep changes in the international system, almost
coincided with the end of Iraq-Iran War and changes of dialogues of I.R. of Iran’s foreign policy
from “idealistic” to “economic pragmatism”. The new dialogue was developed by Hashemi
Rafsanjani who gave priority to reconstruction of the country and ruins of 8 years of Imposed War
through making two major changes in the foreign policy of Iran: Emphasis on reducing external
concerns in favor of domestic concerns, lowering the effectiveness of ideological statics and thought
of revolution exportation in the statements of foreign policy, putting priority over national interests,
realism and pragmatism in foreign policy.56
Pragmatism and attention to national interests in new dialogue, was intensified following the
geopolitical consequences of the Soviet Union disintegration and made Iran to draw up its relations
with regional countries based on economic, political and cultural considerations. According to Abbas
Maleki, Vice-Minister of Velayati who directed foreign policy of I.R. of Iran for sixteen years, the
I.R. Iranian policy on Central Asian states, unlike the common views of Western countries never
aimed to export principal Islamism to the region, expanding its ideological influence or establishing
a government similar to the Islamic Republic, but it rather always emphasized on expanding
economic, political and cultural relations.57 The dead-end regional policy of Iran in Persian Gulf
coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and independence of Central Asian states. Based on
the realistic approach that conducted foreign policy of Iran in that period, the independence of the
A. Jalali, ‘Overall Iran and Russia Cooperation’, Journal of Central Asia and Caucasia Studies, Vol.11, No. 41,
2003, pp. 157,178.
55
Jalali, ‘Overall Iran and Russia …’, pp. 157-178 also Freedman, ‘Iran- Russia Relations …’, pp. 381,401.
56
Seyed Jalal Dehghani Firouzabadi, Foreign Policy of Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran: SAMT, 2010, pp. 387388.
57
A. Maleki, ‘Iran and Turan: A Propose of Iran’s Relation with Central Asia and Caucasian Republics’, Central
Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 11, No. 5, 2001.
54
republics of Central Asia were accounted as a basic geopolitical change and transformation in the
Iranian geographic and security environment.
These changes had dual strategic implications for Iran. On one hand, it meant formation of a
new geopolitics of Northwest Asia.58 This geo-strategic and geo-economic area has characteristics
and dimensions that have highly important reflections and strategic effects for Iran. The strategic
importance of central Asia, the oil and gas resources in the region, lack of access of these states to
open seas, creation of a fresh and untouched economic-industrial market, growth of ethnic-racist
conflicts, civil war in Tajikistan and efforts of trans-regional countries such as US, EU, and Turkey
to penetrate in this region caused I.R. of Iran to take an overall foreign policy based on its regional
and trans-regional goals and interests, to work towards benefitting from the opportunities and
reducing its security threats. Formation of a geo-strategic Northwest Asian zone, on the other hand,
changed the geographic situation and promoted the geopolitical position of Iran: First, Iran is in the
cross section on North-West axis in producing energy, and the East-West axis of energy
consumption. Second, Iran became a connection bridge to join the two strategic regions of North West Asia and Persian Gulf. Third, due to the landlocked position and the lack of access of Central
Asian states to the international waters and need suitable and secure routs for energy exportation,
Iran has become the shortest and most economical path. Forth, those changes placed Iran as a
geopolitical core and center of security-economic order of the region. The breakeven of the four
elements considerably increased the acting level and role creating power of Iran both in the region
and in the international systems.59
Therefore, I.R. of Iran adopted a pragmatic model of behavior in its foreign policy. Effective
role taking of Iran as a mediator and peace guard for settling regional wars was one of the
dimensions of this behavioral model. Playing its role for creating peace in Tajikistan was performed
in that framework. I.R. of Iran has perused few strategic goals in adopting this policy. First, remove
threats and security challenges caused by war through preventing any development and creation of
de-centralization trends and separatism among ethic-racial and lingual minority of the country.
Second, present a new and conventional picture of Islamic Republic as a peace-loving and
pragmatist country that does not move towards exporting revolution and supporting fundamentalist
movements in the region. Third, attracting the trust of newly established states and Russia, through
removing their concerns and misunderstanding towards it.60
Conclusion
58
By North West Asia, it means the newly established republics of South Caucasus and Central Asia that are in East
and West of Caspian Sea.
59
Dehghani Firouzabadi, Foreign Policy of Islamic …, p. 436
60
Seyed Hossein Seyfzadeh, Foreign Policy of Iran, Tehran: Mizan, 2005, pp. 188,193.
Collapse of the Soviet Union for Islamic Republic of Iran was not only interpreted as the end
of bipolar system, but also it followed with independence of new neighboring countries. Those
newly independent republics created many challenges and opportunities for I. R. of Iran. On one
hand, the strategic environment of Iran after tens of years faced changes. The heavy burden of a
communist super-power was lifted from Iran; a power that threated and restricted its independence
and security for more than two centuries. On the other hand, those countries inherited the instability
and riskiness in the northern borders of Iran. Those successors faced consequent crisis after a short
time and affected I.R. of Iran as well. However, an important and great opportunity was put in Iran’s
hands. The Central Asia region could be considerable economic market and influence area for Iran.
In this way, the independence of Central Asian countries made new issues for the foreign policy of
Iran including, growth and expansion of Islamic fundamentalism in the region. Many theories and
analysis in this area have been presented with emphasize on the external factors effective in this
process in which, sometimes, the role of I. R. of Iran and its foreign policy has been emphasized as
one of the effective and basic factors in growth and expansion of Islamic fundamentalism in Central
Asia.
Nevertheless after more than two decades, it seems that unlike some claims and focus on the
role of I. R. of Iran in growth and expansion of Islamic fundamentalism and supporting radical
movements in Central Asia, on one hand, due to the specific domestic conditions of the region, such
as sustainability of authoritarian politician systems, challenge and competitions of regional and
trans-regional powers for expanding their influence, gaining and increasing political and economic
interests and existence of ideological competitors for Iran in the region, and on the other hand, the
pragmatic foreign policy based on developing economic-trade and cultural relations of Iran and the
view to the zone from the window of relationship with Russia for some security concerns, Iran did
not have much opportunity to play a role in the process of growth and expansion of fundamentalism
and supporting radical movements in the region.