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Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour Mutual
30:4
Aid Theory and Human Development
0021–8308
391
Mutual Aid Theory and Human Development:
Sociability as Primary
MICHAEL GLASSMAN
A question raised again and again in human development is, does the individual
create the social organization, or does the social organization develop the individual. Too often this argument is relegated to the over used, too general, nature/
nurture argument. There are other, possibly more useful, approaches to this
dilemma. Among them is the theoretical differentiation between understanding
human activity as co-operative joint ventures emanating from egoistic concerns,
and seeing human activity as true cooperation. This differentiation has not, for
the most part, been carefully analyzed. Too often discussions in this area involve
superficial qualities of interaction, learning, and social relationships. The core
idea of an absolute difference between cooperation and egoistically driven cooperative activities is rarely touched. One reason for this may be the domination of
the egoistic model in the West.
The egoistic model of development in many ways reflects a vision of human
development originally set forth by Darwin (1859). T.H. Huxley (1908/1955),
possibly the most influential interpreter and disseminator of Darwin’s ideas
on evolution (Todes 1989, Bowler 1988), strongly pushed this vision of development in scientific circles. In spite of the theoretical domination of egoistic based
models of evolution, and the subsequent use of such models in the biological and
social sciences, an alternative orientation did emerge roughly in parallel to the
Darwin/Huxley paradigm. Mutual aid, a competing theory of evolution, emerged
in pre-revolutionary Russia, and reached its apotheosis at the beginning of the
20th century in the work of the sociobiologist Petr Kropotkin. This mature and
compelling theory of evolution and socially generated development could potentially force the field to re-think, or at least re-evaluate, some basic precepts
concerning development.
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Michael Glassman
THE BIRTH OF MUTUAL AID
Mutual aid theory began to emerge in Russia during approximately the same
period that population theory, and the mainstream evolutionary theories that
were its progeny, was gaining credence in industrialized England. These two
qualitatively different orientations towards evolutionary theory were, at least
partially, the result of the disparate social and ecological contexts in which they
emerged (Kropotkin 1902, Todes 1989). Industrialized England was obsessed
with issues of overpopulation, and trying to beat back questions of class differentiation brought about by the French revolution (Bowler 1988). Pre-revolutionary
Russia was largely a vast, untamed wilderness where one could travel for days
without seeing another human being. The economy was, for the most part,
agrarian, with many peasants meeting their obligations to landlords through
farming cooperatives known as mirs. The greatest general threats were the weather
and a hostile ecology.
Russian biologists such as Andrei Beketov and K.F. Kessler came to embrace
many of Darwin’s notions concering evolution, but found the Malthusian inspired idea of an egoistic struggle for survival to be counter-intuitive (Todes
1989). In their experience species did not survive because of intra-specific competition (with the most adaptable organisms emerging as a template for the
species). While scarce resources certainly did lead to intra-specific competition,
such behavior is ultimately detrimental to species survival in a hostile environment. The only way a species can survive in a hostile environment over time is
through extraordinary cooperation (Kropotkin 1902). Three general principles
emerges from this orientation,
1) The struggle for existence is a struggle with the general ecology (e.g., natural
disasters, harsh environment, predatory species);
2) Successful species are those that engage in cooperation to overcome a hostile
ecology; and
3) The fact that cooperation is so essential to species survival makes egoistic behavior detrimental, rather than beneficial, to species survival and development.
KROPOTKIN AND SOCIOBIOLOGY (PAST)
The most influential mutual aid theorist, and one of the most important evolutionary theorists and sociobiologists of his time, was Petr Kropotkin (Montague
1955). Kropotkin continues to exert influence in the areas of political philosophy, anthropology, and to a lesser extent evolutionary theory. However, even
though Kropotkin’s chief concern was with human development, broadly defined,
he is rarely referenced in the field. The fact that Kropotkin is remembered at
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all might be considered extraordinary. As one of the leaders of the anarchist/
communist movement of pre-revolutionary Russia he was exiled early in his
career, and spent a good deal of his life as an ex-patriot, moving from country to
country in an attempt to support his young family as a news writer and essayist.
He depended on his scientific writings as a means of support, with many of the
articles anonymous or written under pseudonyms. To this day it is difficult to
trace Kropotkin’s writing during the tumultuous period in which Huxley battled
for supremacy of Darwin’s theory among the scientific intelligentsia (Woodcock
1993).
After the revolution Kropotkin made a triumphant return to the new Soviet
Union. However, he quickly became a critic of the Bolsheviks, penning open letters
to Lennin chastising him and his movement for their tactics. Kropotkin died soon
after his return to the Soviet Union.
Kropotkin developed his vision of evolution as dependent on mutual aid as
a young naturalist whose early expeditions coincided with the first Russian edition of Origins of the Species. The combined influence of Origins and his first hand
expeditionary observations convinced Kropotkin that struggle for survival was
best understood as the struggle between organisms and a brutal, variable environment. Kropotkin was able to identify a number of species in the Siberian
wilderness that survived because of their ability to put community needs before
individual competition for resources.1 His two major named works, Mutual Aid
and Ethics, were written primarily while Kropotkin was in exile in England.
Mutual Aid outlines how weaker species very often survive in the face of stronger,
and at times seemingly insurmountable, opposition through sociability. For example equine species, which have few natural defenses against common predators
such as wolves or lions, survive through their ability to stay together and in cooperation in a herd. By staying together in the herd the cooperating equines can
repulse almost any predator. Kropotkin’s definition of sociability is the animal’s
need for associating with its like. The animal loves its community for community’s sake; and it is within this community of peers that the animal finds its true
“joy of life.” In lower life forms, such as bees or ants, this sociability is imposed
physiologically. In higher order animals sociability is cultivated for the benefits of
mutual aid, and for the sheer pleasure of being part of a community.
Mutual Aid as a Response of Huxley
Mutual Aid (1902) was originally a series of essays written in response to
T.H. Huxley’s movement to use evolutionary theory in general, and Darwinism
in particular as a sociological and political tool. Huxley’s major original statement
on Darwinism, “Struggle for Existence”, was actually an economic/sociological
treatise. His thinking in this work followed a logic extracted from Darwin (1859)
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and Malthus (1817). This is not to say that Huxley engaged in any type of radical
reinterpretation of Darwin. Malthus’ strong influence on Darwin is apparent
in many of his writings, and especially in his seminal work Origin of the Species
(Kropotkin would later argue that other works such as The Descent of Man were
more important precisely because of Malthus’ influence on Origin of the Species).
The argument over how important Malthus was to Darwin’s thinking is belied
by the fact that Darwin remained very close the Huxley throughout his later
life. It is questionable whether Huxley would have argued so vehemently for a
Malthusian interpretation of Darwin in scientific circles without Darwin’s open
and/or tacit acceptance of that position. A complicating issue is that Kropotkin
argued against the Malthusian position while at the same time recognizing
Darwin as the most important thinker in evolutionary theory (Montague 1955).
Kropotkin was always careful to couch his critiques to the Malthusian position as
responses to Huxley.
Huxley suggested in his writings that the general task of humans is multiplication of the species, as it is with all species. This is a task with two faces. The
darker face of the task involves the necessities for survival when multiplication of
species leads to limited resources and one member of the species is pitted against
the other. The natural, and logical, denouement of this task is that members
of the same species will battle each other without consideration, where “the strongest, the swiftest, the cunningest live to fight another day.” The nature of existence
promotes brutality. Huxley believed that humans were the only species to escape
this brutality through the creation of society. Society is unique to the human
condition, and allows humans to transcend the base conditions of nature and
escape this cycle of brutality.
The earliest humans, who developed only primitive societies, were still slaves
to a base nature that promotes brutality. Only societies that reach a certain level
of complexity are able to develop moral ideals and the accompanying social
and ecological milieus that allow humans to come together in peace. Ideas
such as morality and charity are the residue of a well developed human society.
We learn to help others because it helps us to avoid our baser natures, and to
learn to survive in cooperation. There is however a caveat to the development
of society. Any time that the multiplicative task pushes even the most highly
developed social communities beyond their limits in terms of resources, ethical
considerations and cooperation crumbles and humans return to their baser
natures. There are three basic points in Huxley’s thesis that deserve special
consideration in relation to Kropotkin,
1) That humanity, at its most basic level, is a collection of individuals who are
concerned with their own survival.
2) That society is created by humans as a complex method of meeting individual
needs. Many of the general qualities of society, such as cooperation and
charity, exist primarily to maintain peace and security for the individual.
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Therefore individuals should engage in pro-social activities because it is in
their best interests.
3) Society is basically an artificial creation of humans. The individual struggle
for survival is still the natural state for humans, as it is for all animals.
Society will eventually break down, and when it does it will take attributes
such as cooperation and charity with it.
Huxley’s focus, and his use of Darwin’s theory in that focus was especially
important because of his role as “Darwin’s bulldog” in the long fight to replace
theological theories with Darwin’s theory of evolution in England’s scientific
circles (Bowler 1988). Darwin considered Huxley his most important proponent
and greatest ally in a brutal intellectual fight for which he himself was ill-suited.
I bring up this point because I believe it gave Huxley’s treatise extraordinary
moment in scientific circles, and it helped to mold the way we think about the
convergence between evolution and human development.
The essays comprising Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid are a response to Huxley’s thesis;
a response that Huxley did not answer. Kropotkin took evolutionary theory and
applied it to the human condition in much the same way that Huxley did. However, Kropotkin disdained both Huxley’s individualism and his view of base nature
as featuring intraspecific brutality. Kropotkin countered Huxley with the concept
of sociability and a vision of base nature as species based communities working
together to meet common ends. Kropotkin saw the development of complex
human society as being at odds with ethical and cooperative behavior. Complex
states set up barriers between everyday human activity and how that activity
promotes the commonweal. The more complex the society, the more complex
the barriers, the more opaque the connections between activity and community.
Kropotkin used the same starting point for his argument as Huxley: the general task of the species is multiplication. But Kropotkin did not see multiplication
as a “two-faced” task. Multipication is the result of a single, common quality
shared, to one degree or another, by all surviving species. This means that the
struggle of individual against individual should not, and could not, be considered
a base law of nature. According to Kropotkin the antagonist of multiplication of
species is not limited resources, but an unforgiving ecology. The basic aspect of
nature leading to multiplication of species is social groups of organisms working
together to battle this unmerciful ecology.
Society then is the natural state of surviving species. Central to Kropotkin’s
thesis is the idea that animals in general, and humans in particular, do not create
social systems to meet their needs. Social systems, or more particularly sociability, serves as a maintenance system for humanity ( just as sociability, to one
degree or another, serves as a maintenance systems for every species). This is in
direct contradiction to Huxley’s argument, which claimed that evolutionary forces
developed organisms (humans) capable to creating (social) structures that circumvent the natural forces of evolution.
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The development of sociability through a process of natural selection
Both Huxley and Kropotkin use Darwin’s theory of natural selection as a central
theme in their arguments. It would be a mistake to assume that simply because
Kropotkin does not reflect the more popular Malthusian based view of natural
selection that the concept is not integral to his theory of mutual aid (Montague
1955). It might even be argued that Kropotkin’s view is the more parsimonious
and more elegant model of natural selection.
The Malthusian inspired natural selection that Huxley adopted from Darwin
promotes intraspecific competition as the chief engine of evolutionary change.
This view stresses the desires of the individual, and the preservation of individual
gene pools, over the needs of the species based group. Huxley is very open about
his belief in the individual, and individualism, as the driving force in development. This perspective has been manifested in sociobiology as the organism desires
to preserve its own gene line, whether through competition (e.g., Wilson 1975)
or altruistic behavior (e.g., Trivers 1971). The natural assumption is that those
organisms best able to survive in a competitive atmosphere are those that are
best able to preserve their gene lines. The surviving gene lines are thought to be
the strongest/most adaptable.
Within this Malthusian framework, the human ability to develop social structures that enhance human development is an evolutionary anomaly. That is Huxley
(and many of the individualist evolutionary theorists who followed) believed that
humans reached the point in their evolutionary history (whether by accident
or design) where they developed intellectual and communicative capabilities
that enabled creation of rudimentary social structures. These rudimentary social
structures served as a buffer against the brutal competition that is the chief
engine of evolutionary development. Human society took on a separate trajectory, developing more complex structures of ethics, morality, and industry that
would better allow human relationships to (temporarily) transcend the brutality
of nature. Eventually however, the forces of nature will pull humans back into
the cycle of brutality. Theoretically, this cycle should lead to the development of
stronger human gene lines, or a stronger species.
Kropotkin does not try to argue that brutality does not exist in nature. But he
does make the argument that it has little to do with natural selection in the evolutionary process. He claims that society based life is the most essential ingredient
for species survival. It is society that “enable the feeblest insects, the feeblest birds,
and the feeblest mammals to resist or to protect themselves from the most terrible
birds and beasts of prey; it permits longevity, it enables the species to rear its progeny
with the least waste of energy and to maintain its numbers albeit a very slow birth
rate” (p. 57, 1902). Kropotkin uses this observation to claim that while different
types of qualities allow for greater maintenance of the species in certain circumstances, sociability allows for greater maintenance of the species “under any circumstances.” “Sociability is the greatest advantage in the struggle for life” (p. 57).
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Kropotkin’s argument for natural selection is based on the fact that ecologies
change continuously, often in dramatic and erratic fashions. Change in food
sources is only one of a number of possible changes. It is folly to assume that
under these circumstances, species are primarily dependent on slow moving
genetic variation for survival. It is those organisms that tend towards the formation and maintenance of social organizations that have the greater chance
for survival. Those species that find it more difficult to form and maintain social
organizations are doomed to decay and eventual extinction.
The discovery and adoption of new territories through migration is one of
Kropotkin’s strongest arguments of adaptation through sociability. He offers
the example of squirrels, which roam over vast areas and change eating habits
to adapt to changing conditions. A group of squirrels may find one region so
abundant that they become relatively sedentary. As circumstances become more
harsh (as they invariably will), a better organized sub-group of squirrels may
travel to find a more hospitable environment. While the main group remains in
their primary region, the subgroup that migrates may develop into an “incipient”
new species. This new species comes into existence without competition or extermination of the original squirrels. It is possible, within Kropotkin’s framework, for
different species, one descended from the other, to exist simultaneously for long
periods of time. Eventually, the migrating squirrels will survive their sedentary forebears, both because their range of movement creates food sources more
easily, and the lifestyle will engender the formation of new habits. This is not to
say that genetic variation cannot have an impact, or that genetic variation does
not occur through the migration process. Darwin’s (1859) example of wolves
becoming slimmer and faster to deal with a changing food population still holds.
However, the ability to migrate provides a much more powerful tool for species
survival because it can overcome the pure chance qualities of genetic variation.
Kropotkin makes the case that the type of mass migration described above
demands a higher level of sociability. Migration demands enormous trust and
caring between members of the group. Thus a pattern for natural selection of
squirrels (and species in general) begins to emerge. The migrating species, based
on a population with greater sociability, outlives the older species. There is a
natural selection; those that are more capable of migration patterns through
mutual aid survive those that are less capable.
Kropotkin follows this with the argument that natural selection based on mutual
aid makes a good deal more sense than natural selection based on competition.
The simplest case for natural selection through competition is the “arithmetical
Malthusian argument.” It is an argument that Darwin incorporated into his
evolutionary theory and that Huxley extended into a general discussion of the
human condition. That is, without competition there would be terrible overpopulation. Kropotkin uses Huxley’s own thesis against him here: natural disasters, diseases, and a continuously changing environment easily keeps populations
down. But there is a very important difference between the two theories in the
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way these natural population checks are understood and treated. Huxley’s brand
of Darwinism, while recognizing these natural checks as immediately repugnant,
sees them as being “species friendly.” They ultimately work to the advantage of
the species by both thinning the population and forcing the types of individual
competitions that will strengthen the species through natural selection. It is for
this reason that Malthus and Huxley made the political argument that human
society should not interfere in any way with these natural checks. One of the
advantages of human relations is that they can actually supplement this process
through “developed checks” such as poverty, class distinctions, and war.
Kropotkin’s mutual aid theory sees these natural checks as “species hostile.”
Natural disasters and changes in ecology certainly serve the function of thinning
out the population, but ultimately they work against the interests of the species.
These natural checks have two main evolutionary effects. First, without some
type of cooperative responsive actions these natural checks are strong enough to
eventually destroy any species. The purpose of sociability is to protect the reproductive integrity of the species in the face of hostile forces. This means sociability
is the most important attribute for the survival of any species. Second, because
these checks are such powerful forces, and (because of variability) species are
reactive rather than proactive to them, there is little reason to worry about overpopulation. This does not mean that the natural checks are ultimately positive
(it is impossible to know what a world would be like without them), they are
simply a fact of nature.
A more complex argument for competition as the engine of natural selection
is that those organisms that do survive natural calamities survive through competition. The natural extension of this line of thinking is that those who do survive,
do so because they are stronger (more adaptable) and therefore make the species
stronger. Kropotkin responds that those species members that survive calamities
such as famine and illness are usually weaker rather than stronger. The only
ability survivors have is greater endurance of particular privations; but such
endurance does not necessarily engender abilities to escape further privations
through adaptation.
Natural selection leading to sociability
Humans survive and prosper as a species because of their evolutionarily developed abilities of sociability. The most extraordinary quality of this developed
sociability in humans is their ability to cultivate, and maintain, unique, complex
social organizations. Kropotkin sees sociability as a species wide characteristic,
and therefore suggests it is impossible to discern qualitative differences between
species wide social organizations. There are differences in complexity, but this is
basically a quantitative, and not necessarily productive difference. Increased
complexity of social relationships can often lead to deterioration of mutual aid.
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Human social communities are created naturally, out of the inherent desire
for what Kropotkin defines as sociability; and humans then survive and prosper
because of these cultivated social organizations. Individuals will knowingly engage
in almost any type of activity, including those leading to their own mutilation
and/or death, in order to preserve the larger social organization (Kropotkin 1924).
This is a function of not only humans and their social communities, but of all
animal communities (though it is more of a conscious choice among humans).
Kropotkin offers examples of animals that will run recklessly, at great individual
risk, simply to maintain the social herd. The same is true of humans who will
tolerate the seemingly intolerable (e.g., infanticide, female genital mutilation)
in order to maintain the social organization as a whole. Kropotkin believes that
many of these intolerable practices must have emerged through sheer necessity,
but over history slowly became intertwined within the larger society. Individuals
fear the pulling of the single thread might cause the entire social fabric to unravel.
The social affiliation offered by the community supercedes individual fear, or
pain, or despair. The destruction of the community means the destruction of any
joy of life. There is an important distinction to be made here between sacrifice
for the community and self sacrifice as it is usually perceived. The sacrifice here
is made out of the natural understanding that preservation of community supercedes preservation of self.
KROPOTKIN AND SOCIOBIOLOGY (PRESENT)
Kropotkin’s thesis seemed to be lost for a number of historical and political
reasons. Some of the reasons include the fact that Huxley died without responding to Kropotkin. Kropotkin continued to support his family through a hand to
mouth existence. Kropotkin continued to be a political pariah in Western Europe,
being jailed a number of times. After the Russian revolution he quickly returned
to the Soviet Union, leaving behind any support he had built up in Western
Europe. He died before he was able to complete and publish his follow up writings
to Mutual Aid.
This is not to say that Kropotkin was alone in his view of evolution and the
human conditions. By chance or design ideas that resonate with mutual aid
theory have emerged, prospered, and in some cases gained great credence, over
the last century. Similar ideas have been especially powerful in cellular level discussions of evolution (most social science discussions of evolution have taken place
at the species/post-Cambian level). Lynn Margulis (1970) offers a compelling
argument for cellular evolution through symbiosis rather than natural selection
through mutation (in the process raising the question as to why there are so few
interconnections between cellular based and species based discussions of evolution).
Margulis’s theory is rich, complex, and highly technical and it is impossible to
do it justice in this venue. Her general argument is that by steadfastly claiming
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that cellular evolution is driven by natural selection through mutation scientists
have left themselves defending a difficult, if not impossible, evolutionary progression from prokaryotes cell based organisms (e.g., blue green algae) to eukaryotes
cell based organisms (e.g., higher green plants and eventually animals). So determined are scientists to adhere to this “classical” view (which I would argue is
symptomatic of the Darwin/Huxley paradigm) that they are willing to depend
on an organism that has never been found, and very probably never existed
(“uralgae”) as the lynchpin of their theory for the evolution of plants.
Margulis counters this inexplicable attachment to natural selection through
mutation with the theory of symbiosis. Emphasis is not placed on mutations that
better situate an organism to survive in a particular environment, but on cooperation between different types of cellular organisms. In symbiotic theory cells with
different attributes merge together (through a form of ingestion), and in the process
merge qualities of the two organisms so that they are better able to handle the
changes in the ecology. This cellular theory echoes two of Kropotkin’s most
important points. 1) That the major threat to organisms are not other organisms
but a highly variable ecology, and 2) that it is difficult to make the argument that
species survive primarily through genetic mutations (because of the small chances
that these mutations will meet the demands of the changing ecology).
Margulis (1970) points out that there are three major phenomena that serve as
“prerequisites for the organic evolution process: faithful reproduction, mutations,
and environmental selective pressures (p. 51).” Malthusian Darwinism tends to
focus on the interrelationship between mutations and environmental selective
pressures. Both Kropotkin and Margulis emphasize the importance of faithful
reproduction, what Margulis refers to as the “sine qua non” of evolution. This is
not to say that mutations are unimportant. But mutations have little meaning
without reproductive validity and precision. Kropotkin’s thesis that community
attributes of cooperation protect faithful reproduction better than any possible
individual qualities is a powerful argument. An individual organism attempting
to protect its own DNA poses two problems. First, it splits the community, and
therefore the greatest asset to faithful reproduction. Second, it actually limits the
amount and type of possible mutations. Margulis’ theory makes the important
point that, at least on the cellular level, important mutations/changes that meet
ecological needs occur when organisms (that under the classical perspective should
be in competition) come together and merge attributes.
Kropotkin’s ideas continue to have resonance not only in cellular evolution.
Some of the core issues raised in the theoretical war Kropotkin waged with Huxley
in the early part of the century re-emerged five decades later in arguments over
the uses and abuses of sociobiology. The new sociobiology, as represented by
theorists such as E.O. Wilson (1975) and Robin Trivers (1971), was, in one
essential way, a throw back to the Malthus/Darwin/Huxley paradigm. It promotes the idea that individual organisms act out of individual needs and through
these activities create social systems that engender species maintenance. For
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example Trivers (1971), in his theory of reciprocal altruism, suggests that like
members of species develop reciprocal helping systems (rudimentary social organization), because the helping animal supports its own survival, or the survival of
its progeny, by engaging in such activities. It is tempting to equate reciprocal
altruism with mutual aid theory because of their superficial similarities; but at a
basic theoretical level they are diametrically opposed. Trivers sees social organization as emerging out of the needs of individual organisms. Kropotkin sees
incipient species as emerging out of the societies animals develop through sociability. The social organizations themselves are primary; the fact that they also
act as species maintenance organizations is providential, but secondary. Trivers,
in his theory of reciprocal altruism, is promoting a basically egoistic orientation.
Marshall Sahlins (1976) played Kropotkin’s role in the second debate, but
without the evolutionary/biological overtones. Sahlins made the argument that
biology cannot be used to explain culture. Human social systems, as represented
by culture, are basically arbitrary. For instance, it is very difficult to make the
argument that kinship systems are organized for maintenance of the “gene pool.”
Kinship systems are some times the result of acts of birth (reflecting the new
sociobiological orientation), but could also just as easily be the result of acts of
exchange, or residence. Sahlins buttresses his argument in much the same way
that Kropotkin did; by describing the structures of actual diverse societies. Sahlins
makes the compelling argument that, in general, culture reflects the pragmatic
cooperation that is essential for human species survival much more than it does
egoistically conceived natural selection.
Sahlins makes four judgments concerning the development of human society
that are very sympathetic to Kropotkin’s general outline for mutual aid theory. The
first judgment is that human kinship relations are not the result of any genetic
coefficients (i.e., egoistic models where organisms attempt to promote their own
DNA), but are arbitrary. There are always rules of marriage, residence, and descent,
but the rules are created through the history of the social organizations themselves.
This reflects Kropotkin’s basic premise that it is the social organization itself
which is the constant, and that individuals then develop out of this organization.
Sahlin’s second judgment, closely related to the first, is that “as the culturally
constituted kinship relations govern the real processes of cooperation in production, property, mutual aid, and marital exchange, the human systems ordering
reproductive success have an entirely different calculus than that predicted by
kind selection and, sequitir est, an eogoistically conceived natural selection” (Sahlins
1977, p. 57). In this quote Sahlins makes almost exactly the same point to the
modern sociobiolgists that Kropotkin made to Huxley and his followers 70 years
earlier. The social structures of human societies around the world simply do not
support the thesis of egoistically driven models of natural selection. The most
“primitive” societies very often find a manner of social existence based almost
solely on cooperation for the sake of cooperation. These societies are at least as
ethical as the more complex societies that judge them.
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Sahlins third judgment is that “kinship is a unique characteristic of human
societies, distinguishable precisely by its freedom from natural relationships”
(p. 58). While Kropotkin would have agreed with the sentiment behind this
statement, including the idea that kinship is a unique characteristic of human
societies, he almost certainly would have disagreed with the idea that all other
animal societies are based solely on natural relationships (i.e., blood connections).
All species are dependent on sociability in the struggle for survival. Organisms
must care about members of their societal group rather than members of their
direct genetic group (granting that they are often one in the same) in order to
face the dangers of a brutal ecology. The migrating squirrels come together to
form a subgroup not because they share specific DNA, but because they share
the ability and the desire to form a social organization capable of engaging in
more advanced migratory activities. However, it is obvious to Kropotkin that
humans have reached an extraordinary level of sociability; one that allows them
to come together and protect each other based on socially determined abstract
rule systems. As rule systems become more abstract, connections between members
of social organizations become more abstract.
Sahlins’ fourth judgment is that what human societies reproduce “is not human
beings qua human beings, but the system of social groups, categories, and relations in which they live” (p. 60). Here Sahlins comes close to restating Kropotkin’s
major thesis (although he limits it to humans). Organisms, including humans,
come into the world as part of a social organization. When they reproduce, they
do not reproduce themselves as much as the social organization they are part of.
The higher the level of species sociability, the more apparent this becomes.
Sahlins argument for pragmatic cooperation as the primary force in human
relations is, in many ways, a close replication of Kropotkin’s thesis of mutual aid.
The main difference between the two is that while Sahlins simply minimizes the
Malthus/Darwin/Huxley orientation of biology and evolution, Kropotkin actually
offers a legitimate and compelling alternative. Sahlins’ arguments have not,
to this point, had the same resonance in the field of human development as
those of Wilson and Trivers. Kropotkin however, offers an important biological
counterpart to Sahlins’ theory of culture, and together they force a number of
developmental issues to the forefront. The idea of sociability as primary suggests
some perplexing problems for theorists at a very basic level, and an avenue for
re-evaluation of a number of developmental issues.2
Kropotkin’s theory as group selection
In modern parlance Kropotkin’s theory is one of group selection. It is, as a
matter of fact, about as strong a group selection theory as one can imagine. This
creates difficulties because of the emphasis that has been put on individual selection models in evolutionary biology. Since the 1960s group selection models
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have not only been castigated as having little merit, but as not even being worthy
of discussion (Sober & Wilson 1998). This despite the fact that individual selection theorists may not have as quite as strong an argument as they believe. It
would be impossible to present the entire history of the individual selection/
group selection debate here (see Sober & Wilson 1998 for an extensive review),
even as it relates only to Kropotkin. Instead I will concentrate on two ideas,
1) Why Kropotkin sees group selection as far more important than individual
selection in evolution of species; and
2) Why Kropotkin’s theory of sociability does not fall into the natural selection trap that theories promoting the development of altruism often do.
The idea of individual selection is often promoted as the driving force in
evolutionary development. This argument generally comes from Darwin’s Origin
of the Species (1865) and it based on the idea that certain individual organisms
within groups develop qualities that better allow them to succeed and prosper in
the current environment. There is the already mentioned famous example of the
development of sleek wolves that are better at catching deer. There is Williams’
(1966) point that a fleet herd of deer is fleet because being fleet benefits each
individual deer. The faster deer survive while the slower deer fall prey (presumably to the sleek wolves). In a nutshell this is the argument for individual
selection as the primary force in evolutionary change (I will not go into the relationship between individual selection and Malthusian population dynamics).
The group selection model also stems from Darwin, but primarily his writings
in The Descent of Man (1871). Some theorists suggest that Darwin simply mentioned ideas underpinning group selection in this book, but never really fleshed
them out (Sober & Wilson 1998). Kropotkin however quotes heavily from this
book (1924) and makes the claim that it contains the stronger of Darwin’s theses.
In any case group selection is based on the idea that it is the development of
group qualities, rather than the development of individual qualities, which allow
for long term survival of the species. Kropotkin interprets these group qualities
as being far more adaptive than the development of individual qualities. They
are based on intraspecies relationships and the way these relationships work
towards survival under any number of circumstances (both Kropotkin and Darwin
saw in this the roots of morality/ethics).
Herein lies Kropotkin’s argument against individual selection as a long term
force in evolution. The development of individual qualities usually only meet
needs within a limited ecological framework. The deer who become faster have
a better opportunity of escaping (one type of ) predator. But this is all the development of this quality offers the deer population. Kropotkin’s perspective is that
dependence on this type of natural selection in brutal, wildly varying ecologies
makes little evolutionary sense. Within a relatively short time circumstances were
going to arise where speed was not a particularly helpful quality, and might even
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Michael Glassman
be a hindrance (e.g., certain types of storms). What would happen to the species
at this point? Individual selection only leads to short term solutions, not long
term survival in a variable ecology.
There is a second point to be made from a Kropotkin perspective along these
same lines. Individual selection suggests an extraordinary level of coincidence
between changes in the ecology and genetic mutation. Once again, Kropotkin
tries to make the argument that changes in ecological milieu are very often random
and sudden. Many times species cannot depend on development of individual
qualities to meet needs when there is a change in the food supply. What if there
weren’t any genetic structures leading to a sleeker, faster wolf ? Do the wolves
automatically become extinct? Group based activities such as migration seem
to be of far more worth to the survival efforts of a species than any types of
individual variations. It is in fact far more likely that individual variations would
occur in response to changing habits as a result of migration. This is not to say
that individual selection does not occur, or that it does not offer short term
solutions (in terms of evolutionary time) for certain species. But individual selection has little to offer long term survival of the species as opposed to group
selection.
The altruism trap
Group selection’s greatest difficulty in acceptance involves what I will term the
altruism trap. The great majority of group selection theories are based in the
development of altruism within the group (Sober & Wilson 1998). Altruism is
actually a very broad term as used by evolutionary theorists (that can conceivably include Kropotkin’s notion of sociability), but it is generally defined as the
willingness to sacrifice benefits towards the self in order to benefit the group. The
general argument against altruism is that organisms willing to sacrifice their own
benefits have a far lesser chance of survival than organisms that are continuously
looking after their own benefits.
The self-sacrifice model of altruism has historically been a difficult one to
make (Sober & Wilson 1998). The self-sacrifice model generally suggests that
more altruistic members of the community will be lost through the course of
natural survival activities. The non-altruistic “free-rider” organisms both benefit
from the sacrifices of the altruistic organisms while at the same time avoiding
risk. The argument whether such a model is mathematically viable has been
going on for a number of years (logically the “free riders” genes should eventually overwhelm the altruistic organism gene pool). Sober and Wilson (1998)
make a valiant attempt at showing it is mathematically possible for these types of
altruistic/self-sacrifice communities to evolve if the sacrifice benefits the community to the extent that a credible population of altruistic organisms is maintained
within the larger population.
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It is important to realize that while Sober and Wilson have made a cogent
argument for group selection through self-sacrifice/altruism, this is not Kropotkin’s
theory of group selection. Kropotkin would, I believe, offer a very different
explanation, one that points to important distinctions between sociability and
altruism as it is usually conceived. In the type of altruism described above the
self-sacrificing organisms can be viewed as individuals attempting to save a conglomeration of individuals that might or might not be a community. For Kropotkin
it is the community that is primary and all things emanate from the community.
This is a subtle but very important difference. If sociability is the key factor
organisms would not automatically sacrifice themselves for the free rider dominated species group. This is because it splits the community and works against
sociability rather than towards it. A division of self-sacrificing and free rider
organisms is a community division that cannot easily be rectified. In a mutual
aid theory of evolution the more sociable organisms will attempt to engage the
less sociable free riders in a more collectively oriented solution to their dilemma
(e.g., a change of venue). If the sociable organisms are unable to convince the
“free riders” they will eventually break off through the process of migration,
and form their own community. The new community may eventually become
an “incipient species”. Sociability is far more neutral than altruism in individual
selection.
I believe that Kropotkin’s thesis may be a stronger argument for group
selection than the self-sacrifice/altruism position. The neutrality of sociability
in individual survival offers a compelling reason as to why the mutual aid instinct
is the primary factor in the survival and the development of species.
KROPOTKIN AND THE ISSUE OF CULTURE
Kropotkin offers some important additions to perspectives on culture and the
role that culture plays in human development. Through his writings he allows a
vision of human culture as the far end of a continuum, directly related to, but
qualitatively different from the social organization of other animals. This model
suggests that the core constituent of culture is mutual aid, and that the way
animal societies in general, and human culture in particular, are best understood
as the way mutual aid manifests itself within the biological and ecological parameters of the species. I would argue that this represents a different perspective
on culture than is usually found in discussion of human development. In general
culture is seen as something that is separate from the relationship humans have
with the rest of nature; as something created by humans, in an attempt to
advance or create a more hospitable environment for humans. It accomplishes
this by either by harnessing the power of the human genetic structure (Scarr
1993), or creating collective utilitarian organizations that more efficiently meet
the needs of their members (Vygotsky 1987). There is a third view of culture, as
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Michael Glassman
a disembodied non-rational rule system that drives human activity (Shweder
1984). It is this third view that probably has the most to gain from Kropotkin’s
perspective.
Those who seem to argue for culture as a harnessing force take the position
that individual DNA is primary in development, but that trajectory of the individual is at least partially determined by the environment (e.g. Scarr & McCartney
1983, Geary 1995, 1996). Environment can take any number of forms, but one
of the major forms is certainly the type(s) collective organization that can be considered culture. Geary for example makes the argument that certain individual
cognitive abilities (mathematical) are primarily driven by biological predispostions.
The sensory and perceptual systems that form the basis for the abilities are the
result of evolutionary pressures (individual selection). Social and environmental
information plays the role of “activating” force. In this view humans have specific
individualized abilities developed over the course of evolution that can be used
in exerting control over their environment. Culture acts as an activating force
and in some cases a canalizing device for such abilities. It is not clear exactly
how these collective organization come about, but because individual abilities
are primary, genesis of culture most probably has some type of Huxleyan basis
(i.e., a unique human conception, created by individual humans, for the benefit
of humans).
A second view of culture sees the social/cultural construct as primary in
immediate development, but still as a unique creation of humanity (Vygotsky
& Luria 1993). This view of “cultural psychology” sees culture as utilitarian,
based on meeting the needs of a social organization’s members most efficiently.
This view of culture is heavily invested in the power of praxis, human activity
developed through social relationships that directly meets needs. “Life involves
before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many
other things. The first historical act is thus the production of means to satisfy
these needs . . .” (Marx and Engels 1965, p. 39). Pivotal to this view of culture is
tool use and education/teaching. This reflects the more general notion that the
discriminating factor of human culture is the ability to teach tool use to neophytes
so efficient methodologies can be passed down from generation to generation.
The idea of culture as a mediating force for the teaching of socially efficient
behavior is central to Vygotsky (1987) and many of the Activity Theorists who
followed him (Leontiev 1981, Glassman 1996). Recently theorists such as Rogoff
and Lave have the pursued the idea that cultures serve important educational
functions that meet the needs of the social organization. Rogoff and Chauajay
(1995) describes two types of learning in cultural contexts. Individuals learn
through participation in shared activities that are derived from community traditions and constitute community traditions. The emphasis seems to be on individual development through a teaching learning process that promotes the general
culture. Lave and Wenger (1991) introduce the notion of legitimate peripheral
participation, which focuses on the role of apprenticeships involving activity with
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some discernable community purpose. General culture fosters individual cognition to meet its purposes.
The view of human culture as a utilitarian endeavor developed through
particularly human capabilities in order to tame, and possibly dominate, their
environment is a seductive one. Such a notion,
1) Places humans on a qualitatively different evolutionary plane than all other
animals (if we must admit some great apes as junior partners we will do
so . . . grudgingly).
2) Offers a simple and easy explanation as to why culture exists, while at the
same time making the argument that all benefits of human culture are well
deserved . . . because humans created it.
Culture as non-rational
The idea that culture is utilitarian is based in the notion that rationalism is the
primary force in cultural (and ontogenetic) human development. At its core this
is a specific teleological argument in which rationalism is the ultimate adaptive
function, and therefore the natural goal of all humans and human societies. A
culture starts out with limited rational capabilities. A series of interactions in the
world forces the development of greater rationality (or eventual extinction of the
species group). This is a deficit model of development with roots in Huxley’s thesis.
The greatest difficulty with rationality as the ultimate adaptive function is that
it is belied by evidence concerning actual cultures in the world. Theorists as
diverse as Kropotkin (1902), Levy-Bruhl (1926), Sahlins (1976) and Shweder
(1984) have pointed out numerous successful cultures in which social institutions
and rule systems are not rational. A great many cultures are non-rational (very
different from irrational or arational) in that social institutions and rule systems
have little (if any) direct relationship to utility. Rather than seeing functionality
as driving culture, it is culture that drives the functionality and/or maintenance
of the activity (i.e., members of a cultural group engage in activity because it
promotes the culture) (Miller 1999).
This realization however still leaves a question. If culture does not come into
existence for transparently utilitarian purposes, why then does it come into existence, and why does it continue? In other words, if rationality is not the adaptive
function that accounts for culture, then what is? It is a rational question in search
of a non-rational answer. Sahlins (1976) for instance provides strong evidence for
successful cultures as non-rational, what he terms “cultures of meanings”. The
raison de etre for a culture of meanings is mostly implicit in Sahlin’s writings: the
human desire to live in a community. There is a willingness to participate in and
maintain social superstructures for the sake of community, rather than for any
utilitarian or rational purpose.
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Michael Glassman
Social constructionists such as Shotter (1992) take a similar position from a
distinctly more philosophical perspective. Shotter for instance emphasizes that
you must understand the development and maintenance of intricate social systems through social activity itself, rather than assuming some rational meaning/
progression driving the development. He makes the case (1984) that the unit of
analysis in understanding (deconstructing) social systems is joint activity. At the
core of this thinking is the same point made by Sahlin’s (and from an evolutionary perspective Kropotkin) that it is the desire for social relationships, or more
specifically sociability, that is at the core of human activity. The ways in which
these social relationships develop is relatively tangential to what is driving human
society.
Kropotkin’s theory offers a well argued, developmental explanation for why
this human desire for community is so strong it overpowers all other considerations. For Korpotkin, culture is not unique to the human condition (this is
actually an area where he may be at odds with Sahlins), but it is an expansion of
the mutual aid instinct that exists to one degree or another in all species. The
addition of human language and abstract thinking gives mutual aid a different
quality in human activity, but only by means of extending it in a new direction.
Humans live in cultures not because they meet their needs or act as collective
maintenance systems, but because humans are naturally drawn together and
find greater “joy of life” in community rather than out. The fact that human
communities do act as maintenance systems is of course not just a happy coincidence. It is the result of long term evolutionary pressures. Sociability in and of
itself serves the adaptive function; mediating forces such as rational and nonrational cultural institutions are only that, mediating forces.
The desire to live within a culture is primary. The culture itself is a very
general vehicle for adaptation to circumstances similar to the way other animal
societies are general vehicles for adaptation to circumstances. Teaching and
passing down of culture emerges in humans much the same way that migration
emerges in squirrels; level of sociability combines with other species wide qualities to create a natural momentum for this type of activity.
Mutual aid and theories of social behavior
One area where Kropotkin’s ideas could have an important influence is very
obviously the social realm. A good deal of the research in the areas of social
behavior and social development has approached relevant questions from the
perspective of individual responsibility, individual choices, and or individual
activity. In many ways it is the same argument that individuals create social
community through their actions that is at the base of the ideas proposed by
Trivers (1971). Mutual aid was originally envisioned as much an ethical theory
as an evolutionary theory. Mutual aid theory sees social/ethical behavior as
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occurring and developing naturally through transparent social interactions.
Society does not develop ethical behavior to enhance the human condition, but
it can subvert ethical behavior to enhance itself. The concept of morality takes
on a very different tenor in this light. Moral rules are created by society to
protect the integrity of the society, but may actually work against the natural
social/ethical behavior of human community.
Mutual aid theory could offer a fresh perspective on some of the landmark
research done by social theorists such as Milgram (1974), Sherif (Sherif, Harvey,
Hoyt, Hood & Sherif 1961) and Asch (1956). For instance, it is possible to reconceptualize the obedience to authority in the Milgram experiments in terms
of Milgram’s ability to define the social community, and present his proposed
activity in the context of rule systems integral to the survival of the that community. The more opaque and abstract the rule system (divorced from actual
community) the easier it became for the subjects of the study to follow moral
imperatives at the expense of human community.
Mutual aid may have even more important implications for research and
theory involving social development (particularly moral development). Much of
socio-moral theory is dominated by the idea that humans create moral systems
out of egoistic concerns (e.g., Turiel 1983, Kohlberg 1981, Eisenberg 1996).
Turiel suggests that individuals recognize the absolute difference in the moral
quality of various activities. For instance, an individual understands the difference
between an activity that is conventional and one that is moral. The assumption
then is that humans build their social organizational systems based on this differentiation. Mutual aid theory suggests that any such differentiation, and indeed
the way any member of any community understands the ethical dimensions of
an activity, is the residue of that activity as it affects that community. The ethical
nature of an activity is primarily dependent on the transparent impact that
activity has on the community. Thus when children, or adults, are confronted with
activities with obvious community repercussions they will take these activities as
far more serious than activities with opaque, or no apparent, repercussions. Of
primary importance is not the individual’s thinking about such activity, but the
ways in which the community is defined, or understood by the target member of
the community.
The research on pro-social development, and its reliance on concepts of individual altruism might also find some relevance in Kropotkin’s ideas. Eisenberg
(1996) suggests that individuals engage in altruistic, helping behaviors because
they view themselves as altruistic. The reasoning and behavior of the individual
reflects “the individuals hierarchy of goals in a given context” (p. 61). Other prosocial researchers such as Staub (1984) seem to reflect the same individualist,
personal orientation to perceived pro-social behavior. Kropotkin might dismiss
this notion of altruism (which Eisenberg says is only a sub-category of pro-social)
and claim that activity should be understood as pro-social, but from a social
rather than an individual perspective. Any activity that works towards the benefit
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Michael Glassman
of the community is pro-social. But it is also true that for the type of abstract
ethical systems that humans create the definitions of pro-social activity come
from the social community itself. Individuals then engage in pro-social activity if
they feel a member of that community, and through membership an obligation
to maintain that community. This leads to a very interesting idea; that pro-social
activity is completely dependent on the individual’s sense of community. Overlapping communities, where individuals move back and forth between social
organizations that engage them as cooperative members, and social organizations that do not engage certain individuals to the point that they have feelings
of sociability, make the examination of pro-social and/or anti-social activity
extraordinarily complex.
CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to define mutual aid theory as an alternative theoretical base for the study of human development and activity. The idea that humans
are social creatures first, and that individuality emerges from sociability, may
open new, important avenues of research, and certainly allows for interesting
re-interpretation of existing theory and research. In addition to the examples
mentioned in this paper, mutual aid theory could have an impact on the way the
field approaches emotional development, language development, and cognitive
development. Mutual aid and pragmatic cooperation are still relative mysteries
precisely because they have been ignored for so long. There is, however, little
doubt that such orientations offer a fresh perspective for much of the research
that has been, and continues to be done.
Michael Glassman
Department of Human Development & Family Sciences
The Ohio State University
135 Campbell Hall
1787 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1295
Phone: 614-292-5622
e-mail: [email protected]
NOTES
1
Kropotkin’s theory has scientific merit within the particular world hypothesis it
occupies (i.e., organicist). Kropotkin’s theory is based on a large body of research (based
not only on his own empirical research, but the research of a large body of Russian
biologists—see Todes 1989 for an expanded discussion). It is not based on a religious or
even overtly philosophical system. It has, I believe, force, weight and cogency. Mutual aid
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theory is a logical argument extremely well constructed where, if the premises are correct,
Kropotkin’s major thesis cannot be denied.
2
A third member of a triumvirate offering a cohesive argument for cooperation as the
driving force in human relations on a species, cultural, and social level is Emile Durkheim.
Durkheim’s concept of a “conscience collective” (1960) captures the idea that humans are
in essence social animals who desire and pursue collective activity for the sake of participating in collective activity. The most primary human societies are those in which the
attitudes of the individual are a microcosm of the attitudes of the community. Perhaps
even more interesting in Durkeim’s work is his view of later societies as advanced organisms which are made of different parts functioning interdependently, maintaining a certain level of cohesiveness in the face of a more dispersed social community, and the way
this mirrors Kropotkin’s view of later complex societies. Durkheim is certainly not the
anarchist that Kropotkin is, and does not take as dim a view of these later, complex
societies. But they both have similar visions of what drives the development of social
collectives.
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