* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
Download Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im, Emory University, Atlanta, United States
International reactions to Fitna wikipedia , lookup
LGBT in Islam wikipedia , lookup
Muslim world wikipedia , lookup
Islam and war wikipedia , lookup
Islamic Golden Age wikipedia , lookup
War against Islam wikipedia , lookup
Islamofascism wikipedia , lookup
Islamic democracy wikipedia , lookup
Islam and Mormonism wikipedia , lookup
Islam and Sikhism wikipedia , lookup
Sources of sharia wikipedia , lookup
Islam in Egypt wikipedia , lookup
Islamic socialism wikipedia , lookup
Islamic ethics wikipedia , lookup
Censorship in Islamic societies wikipedia , lookup
Morality in Islam wikipedia , lookup
Islam in Afghanistan wikipedia , lookup
Criticism of Islamism wikipedia , lookup
Islam and secularism wikipedia , lookup
Islam in Somalia wikipedia , lookup
Political aspects of Islam wikipedia , lookup
Islam in Bangladesh wikipedia , lookup
Hindu–Islamic relations wikipedia , lookup
Islam and violence wikipedia , lookup
Schools of Islamic theology wikipedia , lookup
Islam and modernity wikipedia , lookup
Islamic culture wikipedia , lookup
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Emory University, Atlanta, United States INDIVIDUAL RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE PROBLEM OF APOSTASY IN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES: CLASSICAL JURIDICAL POSITIONS AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE Relazione presentata al Convegno Internazionale Dignità umana e libertà di scelta religiosa: le prospettive delle grandi tradizioni religiose, Centro di Studi Religiosi Comparati Edoardo Agnelli, Torino, 22-23 novembre 2001 The notion of apostasy and its punishment by death is not unique to Islam, as both existed in Judaism and Christianity, and widely practiced under the latter in the medieval period.1 Yet these notions have been effectively eliminated from any current Jewish or Christian discourse, and there is no possibility of imposing the death penalty for these crimes in modern context of these societies. In contrast, these notions remain entrenched in Islamic jurisprudence, and those found guilty of these offences can still be sentenced to death in counties like Pakistan and Sudan today.2 The question I wish to address here is not simply how can Islamic societies “catch up” with Jewish and Christian societies in this regard, because the lack of penal and civil consequences for apostasy and blasphemy were more a consequence of loss or transformation of political power than an independent theological transformation of those two traditions. Rather, my concern is how can Islamic jurisprudence revise its view on the matter as an internal Islamic imperative, regardless of the nature of political authority of the state in Muslim countries. The underlying issue for this short essay is the important but profoundly problematic role of classical Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) in present Islamic societies, and their relations with other societies in an increasingly globalized and interdependent world. As clearly illustrated below through a discussion of the relationship between the traditional notion of apostasy (riddah) and fundamental individual rights in the modern context, the basic assumptions, methodology and content of classical Islamic jurisprudence are theoretically problematic and practically unrealistic for present 1 For very explicit biblical basis for the death penalty for apostasy and blasphemy can still be found in Deuteronomy 13:6-9, and Leviticus 24:16, respectively . 2 Blasphemy cases in Palistan…. Section 126 of the Sudan Penal Code of 1992 imposes the death penalty for apostasy. 2 Islamic societies. Yet, that jurisprudence is commonly seen as essential for the “Islamic authenticity,” political legitimacy and practical sustainability of proposed solutions for all sorts of problems facing Islamic societies today. Consequently, the basic dilemma facing the proponents of various forms and degrees of social and political reform throughout the region is whether to seek their objectives through the difficult and protracted “negotiation” of their reform proposals through the maze of classical jurisprudence, with little prospects of satisfactory results, or by an authoritative, or rather authoritarian, imposition of radical “secularism”. Both approaches have been applied in the past, and will probably continue to be used, in a variety of forms and degrees in different parts of the Muslim world. What is lacking, it seems to me, is a comprehensive theory of Islamic reform that can contribute to mediating that basic dilemma by questioning the underlying assumptions of a binary between the religious and secular, and reformulate the structure and methodology of classical Islamic jurisprudence in order to make it more relevant and useful in the modern context of Islamic societies. To clarify and illustrate this thesis through a discussion of the problem of apostasy in relation to individual religious liberty, I will begin with a review of the definition and consequences of apostasy in classical Islamic jurisprudence, and then demonstrate the total incompatibility of classical notions of apostasy with individual religious liberty from an Islamic, without any reference to modern human rights standards that may be perceived as Western forms of “cultural imperialism.” perspective. Against this background, I will examine possibilities of reconciliation through a reformulation of Islamic jurisprudence in ways that would completely eliminate apostasy and related concepts and their legal consequences. Once that is achieved, any negative social implications will diminish over time, thereby expanding and securing the scope of religious tolerance and pluralism in Islamic societies. 1. Definition and Legal Consequences of Apostasy in Islamic Jurisprudence In addition to its incompatibility with individual religious liberty, as discussed later, there are two aspects to the problem of apostasy in Islamic jurisprudence itself, namely, the vagueness and fluidity of the concept, and the ambiguity of the basis for its legal consequences as a capital crime. As I will argue in later in this paper, these internal jurisprudential difficulties, combined with the negative consequences for freedom of religion and belief in general, can only be avoided through a paradigm shift in Islamic jurisprudence that would make it possible to completely eliminate these apostasy and associated concepts. 3 The main sources of the vagueness and fluidity of the concept of apostasy relate to its definition and punishment, as well as its close association with several related concepts in Islamic jurisprudence, such as unbelief (kufr ) blasphemy (sabb al-rasul), heresy (zandaqah), and hypocrisy (nifaq). It may therefore be necessary to examine all these aspects to fully appreciate the difficulty of applying this concept and its legal consequences in specific cases. The Arabic word riddah, commonly translated as apostasy, literally means to ‘turn back’, and murtadd, the active participle from irtadda, means one who turns back. In Islamic law, riddah is understood to be reverting from the religion of Islam to kufr (unbelief ) whether intentionally or by necessary implication. In other words, the vast majority of classical Muslim scholars agree that once a person becomes a Muslim by his or her free choice, there is no way by which he or she can change religion.3 According to those scholars, ways in which this may occur include: denial of the existence of God, or the attributes of God; denial of a particular messenger of God or that a messenger is truly a messenger God; denial of a principle that is established as a matter of religion, such as the obligation to pray five times a day or fast the month of Ramadan; declaring prohibited what is manifestly permitted (halal), or declaring permitted what is manifestly prohibited (haram). But as illustrated by lists of what constitutes apostasy according to various scholars, quoted in the next section below, the concept is extremely vague and liable to grave abuse in practice. Moreover, apostasy is said to apply whenever a person is deemed to have reverted from Islam, by an intentional or blasphemous act or utterance, whether or not it was said mockingly, out of stubbornness, or out of conviction. Scholars of the four main Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence classified apostasy into three categories: beliefs, actions, and utterances, with further sub-divisions for each of them. But each of these categories can be controversial. For instance, the first category is supposed to include: doubts about the existence of God, or about the message of the Prophet Muhammad or any other prophet, doubts about the Qur’an, the Day of Judgment, the existence of paradise and hell, doubts about the eternity of God, and doubt about any point of belief on which there is consensus (ijma) among Muslims, such as the attributes of God. It would therefore follow that there is no apostasy in the absence of consensus on the issue. Yet, as a matter of fact, there is no consensus on many of the issues included in the list of various scholars and schools. For example, there is significant disagreement among these authorities on the God’s attributes, which mean that one can be condemned as an apostate according to the views of one scholar for accepting or rejecting an attribute of God that is asserted or denied by another scholar. Another problem is the notion of apostasy is that, while the Qur’an repeatedly condemns apostasy as a religious sin, it does not provide any punishment for it in this 3 The following review of classical Islamic jurisprudence of apostasy is based on Ibn Rushd, Bidayat alMugjtahid, vol. 2, (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabic, noted dated); and Nu`man Abd al-Razid al-Samar`i, Ahkam al-Murtad fi al-Shari`a al-Islamyia (Beirut: al-Dar al-Arabiya, 1968). 4 life, as can be seen in verses 2:217, 4:90, 5:54, 59, 16:108, and 47:25.4 In fact, the Qur’an clearly contemplates situations where an apostate continues to live among the Muslim community, rather than put to death for apostasy. For example, verse 4:137 of the Qur’an can be translated as follows: “Those who believed, then disbelieved, then believed, and then disbelieved [once more] and became more unbelieving, God will not forgive them or guide them to the righteous pathway.” Nevertheless, classical Islamic jurisprudence imposes the death penalty, in addition to other sanctions, for apostasy on the basis of some Sunna reports. According to one report, the Prophet said that the blood of a fellow Muslim should never be shed except one of three: an adulterer, murderer, or one who abandons Islam after having embraced it. Another source of vagueness and fluidity in the concept is due to the fact that early scholars did not generally differentiate between the various associated concepts noted earlier, and tended to use the broader category of apostasy as subsuming all of them. As can be appreciated from the brief review of these related concepts alter in this section, subsuming several different notions under the rubric of apostasy makes this term dangerously broad and vague, and confuses the legal Islamic basis of a purported offence and its punishment for different types of conduct. Since apostasy is supposed to be openly reverting to disbelief in Islam after having freely embraced it, an obvious association is with disbelief (kufur) -- open and complete rejection of the message of Islam itself. While repeatedly speaking of disbelief and belief, and related terms, the Qur’an does not provide clear guidance on what these terms mean beyond the basic sense of either accepting or rejecting the confession of the faith -- that “there is no God but God, and Muhammad is his messenger”. For example, the Qur’an frequently links belief to performing worship rituals like prayer and fasting the months of Ramadan and doing good deeds, but does not say what should happen to those who fail to live up to these obligations other than punishment in the afterlife. Moreover, the Qur’an does not expressly state the consequences of questioning the precise meaning of the confession of the faith itself. What does it mean to say that “there is no God but God”? What do believers know, or should know, about God? How does belief in the unity of God determine the believers’ way of life, whether at the private personal level or in relation to public socio-economic and political institutions and processes? Who has the authority to adjudicates the inevitable disagreements about these and other matters after the death of Prophet, and how? The Qur’an leaves Muslims to struggle with all these issues for themselves. It is true that they have the additional practical guidance of the Sunna, or life-model of the Prophet, but that also has its uncertainties and ambiguities. It is therefore not surprising to find major differences among Muslims on the role of action or deeds (amal) within 4 The Qur’an is cited here by giving the number of the Chapter (Surah), followed by the number of the verse (Ayah). 5 the definition of belief (iman). Whereas some Muslim scholars were willing to accept an apparent confession of the faith for a person to be considered a Muslim, others insisted that professed belief must be expressed in specific action or deeds. For those who hold the latter view, the question becomes what to do about people who claim to be Muslims but fail to act accordingly. But then, who decides whether or not a person has acted according to the requirements of the faith, and what consequences should follow from such a determination? These debates and their violent manifestations raged from the views and actions of the Kharijites during the civil wars of the seventh century to the status of the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan since 1950s, to Usama bin Ladin’s call to vindicate belief in Islam by any means possible, including international terrorism. As already noted, the field is further complicated by ambiguities and disagreements about other concepts. Blasphemy is the use of foul language primarily about the Prophet Muhammad, known as insulting the Prophet (sabb al-rasul), God or any of the angels or prophets, and is punishable by death. At a later stage, this offence was extended to cover using foul language against the Companions of the Prophet as well to silence some dissenting voices among Muslims, like the Kharijites and Shi`ites who were reviling leading figures of the early Muslim community in the context of the civil wars of the seventh and early eighth centuries. But while for some scholars this category of blasphemy is a special category in which the person remains a Muslim but can be killed as punishment for this offence, others maintain that committing such a sin automatically removes the person from the fold of Islam. If the act is committed by a non-Muslim, then the question of apostasy does not arise, but the person is still to be punished by death. To complicate the matter further, a distinction is made by some scholars between reviling God and reviling the Prophet, whereby a more severe view is taken of the latter. Since the Prophet is not in a position to avenge this abuse, the argument goes, it is the responsibility of the Muslim community at large (ummah) to protect the Prophet’s honour by imposing the punishment of death. The same logic was applied to reviling the Companions of the Prophet through the extension of those whose honour is supposed to be protected in this way. The punishment for blasphemy appears to be based on certain incidents in the lifetime of the Prophet as there is no clear Qur’anic instruction on the matter. Even when the Qur’an uses the term sabb, as in 6:108, it only commands Muslims not to revile the deities of non-Muslims lest they revile God, but without any reference to punishment in this life. However, during the time of the Prophet, some Muslims killed a number of non-Muslims who reviled the Prophet and therefore apparently committed the offence of blasphemy (sabb). Since all those killed in these incidents were among the most staunch opponents of Islam, some of them fabricated certain stories about the Prophet, and also the Muslim community in general, it is difficult to identify the precise reason believed to justify killing them. But it is clear that neither the Qur’an nor the Prophet declare the existence of an offence called ‘blasphemy’ or a specific punishment for it. 6 The term heresy (zandaqah) is applied in classical Islamic jurisprudence to a heretic whose teaching becomes a danger to the state, thereby rendering him liable to the death penalty, though the term and its derivatives do not appear in the Qur’an at all, and seem to have come into Arabic from Persian.5 This term was apparently used for the first time in connection with the execution of Ja`d bin Dirham in 742 – more than a century after the Prophet’s death. “In practice, the polemics of the conservatives describe as a zindik (one who is guilty of zandaqah) anyone whose external profession of Islam seems to them to be not sufficiently sincere.”6 But there is no agreement among Muslims scholars on a general definition of these terms. Instead, one finds a variety of views about “the type of conduct” that constitutes zandaqah, or make a person a zindiq, such as those who outwardly show they are Muslims while retaining their former religion. But how is that to be known, or proved, in specific cases? Some scholars were prepared to infer that from the fact that the person advocated indulgence in various acts that are prohibited in Islam such as zina or drinking wine. The ambiguity of the concept appears to have been both caused by, and grossly abused in the context of, the largescale conversion of people to Islam following the Muslim conquests of the first two centuries of Islamic history. In other words, the emergence and expansion of this concept may have been prompted by fears of infiltration of the Muslim community and state by non-Muslims who may have been using Islam for personal gain or to escape discrimination. But the vagueness of the concept and difficulty of proving its application in specific cases also permitted its abuse for political ends by rulers, and even by some scholars against their theological or intellectual rivals. Yet, a clear definition is critical for distinguishing it from apostasy since some scholars, of the Hanafi and Maliki schools in particular, would not grant a zindiq a chance to repent, as they would an apostate. The third term associated with apostasy is hypocrisy (nifaq), referring to those who openly profess belief in Islam, while harboring disbelief. Again, while the Qur’an repeatedly condemns such hypocrisy (2:8-10), promises hypocrites punishment in hell in the afterlife (9:68), and warns the Muslim community against the dangers of having hypocrites in their mist (2:8-10, 9:68) it does not prescribe any punishment in this life. In verse 9:73, the Prophet is commanded to engage in jihad against the hypocrites and unbelievers, but that cannot mean imposing criminal punishment as such, which can only happen within the jurisdiction of a stable and effective state, away from the context of jihad. Nevertheless, Muslim scholars, especially of the Hanafi and Maliki schools, decided to impose the death penalty on a zindiq as a hypocrite who professes Islam and hide a contrary belief. 5 6 Article ‘Zindik’, Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden: EJ Brill, 1991, p.659. Ibid. 7 As this brief review clearly shows, there was a substantial degree of confusion and fluidity in these concepts and how they were to be defined, as well as uncertainty about the basis of their criminal punishment. Since the Qur’an neither defined these concepts in legal terms, nor imposed a punishment for any of them in this life, the Muslim communities could have chosen to simply view them as matters of freedom of conscience, instead of punishing them as capital crimes. Indeed, the Prophet himself set that example by refusing to question the beliefs of anyone who claimed to profess Islam as a religion. Yet, those purported offences and their punishment became entrenched in classical Islamic jurisprudence, probably for political reasons disguised with an alleged religious rationale. In this light, I am now urging present day Islamic societies to reaffirm religious liberty as an Islamic imperative by categorically abolishing these purported crimes and related legal consequences. In other words, I maintain that this view of religious liberty should be seen as essential for the validity of belief in Islam as a matter of choice, rather than coercion through criminal sanction or other negative legal consequences. 2. Apostasy, Religious Liberty and Ideology This proposition is clearly substantiated by the following review of two “lists” of actions or speech that are deemed by some cotemporary scholars even today to constitute apostasy. By drastically diminishing the scope of religious liberty in any meaningful sense, these lists of apostasy acts not only stifle and limit possibilities of religious discourse among Muslims themselves, but also encourage serious abuse and manipulation of the capital crime of apostasy for ideological and political ends. In fact, the formulation of the various “causes” of apostasy is clearly intended to apply to specific religious or theological views of some segments of the Muslim community at large, thereby seeking to justify their persecution and suppression of their beliefs. For example, Ali al-Tamimi, provides the following list of actions and/or speech, with elaborations (quoted in full here) that constitutes, in his view, the capital crime of apostasy today:7 Knowing the meaning of our testimony [confession] of [the] faith is necessary but not sufficient. One should also know the causes that may lead a person to revoke this testimony. In other words, one should know 7 Ali Al-Timimi, ‘The Muslim’s Belief—Some Causes that Lead to Apostasy from the Religion of Islam’, The Friday Report, Dar Makkah, August–September 1994. This text is quoted here as it appears in http://www.islaam.com/sunnah/apostacy.htm, viewed Oct. 31, 2001. 8 the causes that lead to apostasy from the religion of Islam. Among the more prevalent causes of apostasy in our times: 1. To Associate Others with Allah or "Shirk" The first cause of apostasy is to commit shirk. Allah said (4:48):8 "Allah forgives not that partners should be set up with Him in worship, but He forgives anything else to whomsoever He pleases, and whoever sets up partner with Allah in worship, he has indeed forged a mighty sin." And He said (5:72): "Verily, whosoever associates with Allah anything, for him Allah has forbidden Paradise, and the Fire will be his abode; and the wrongdoers shall have no helpers." There are four types of Shirk: • Shirk through one's prayers (See 29:65) • Shirk through one's intent in his acts of worship (See 11:15-16) • Shirk through one's obedience (See 9:31) • Shirk through one's love (See 2:165) The fourth type of shirk is explained by Allah's statement (See 9:24): "Say (to them O Muhammad, sallallaahu `alayhi wa sallam): 'If your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your wives, your kindred, your possessions that you have gained, commerce you fear may slacken, and dwellings you love, if these are dearer to you than Allah and His Messenger (Muhammad), and to struggle in His Way, then wait until Allah brings about His Command (Punishment). And Allah guides not the wrong-doing people.'" 2. To Deny the Finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad, sallallaahu `alayhi wa sallam The second cause of apostasy is denial of finality of Prophethood with the Prophet Muhammad sallallaahu `alayhi wa sallam. Whoever claims Prophethood or believes the claim of a false prophet has left the fold of Islam. For example, in our times, those who believe the claims of prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad, Elijah Poole, or Rashad Khalifa have left the fold of Islam 3. To Deny the Binding Nature of the Sunnah The third cause of apostasy is denial of the Sunnah. For example, those who claim that Islam is only the Qur'an have left the fold of Islam. 8 This and subsequent similar numbers (all in the original) are references to the Qur’an, by number of chapter followed by number of verse. 9 4. To Judge by Other than Sharia The fourth cause of apostasy is to judge by other than the sharia that Allah sent down to the Prophet Muhammad, sallallaahu `alaihi wa sallam. For example those who believe that the systems and laws devised by men are better than the sharia, or that it is permissible to judge by other than the sharia even if one does not believe that judgment to be better than that of the sharia, or that Islam should be restricted to the private relationship between an individual and His Lord without entering into the other aspects of life. 5. To Ridicule Any Aspect of Islam The fifth cause of apostasy is to ridicule or make fun of any aspect of Islam, its rewards or punishments. Allah said (9:65-66): "And if you (O Muhammad) question them, they (the hypocrites) will say: "We were only talking idly and jesting." Say (to them o Muhammad), "What, then were you mocking Allah and His Signs and His Messenger. Make no excuse you have disbelieved after you have believed." 6. To Hate Any Aspect of Islam The sixth cause of apostasy is to hate any aspect of Islam. Allah said: (47:A9): "That is because they have been averse to what Allah has sent down, so He has made their deeds to fail." 7. To Perform or to be Pleased with Sorcery The seventh cause of apostasy is to perform sorcery or to be pleased with the performance of sorcery like bringing a man and a woman to love or hate one another. Allah said (2:102): "The devils disbelieved, they teach people sorcery." 8. To Believe that One May Obtain Salvation by Following Other than the Sharia of the Prophet The eighth cause of apostasy is to believe that one may obtain salvation by following other than the religion of Islam or by refusing to cal the infidels, like the Jews and Christians, infidels, or to doubt their unbelief, or to say their religion is still correct. Allah said: "The true religion with Allah is Islam." (3:19) "Whoever desires a religion other than Islam, it shall not be accepted of him and in the Hereafter he shall be among the losers." (33:85) 10 "And they say, "Be Jews or Christians then you shall be guided." Say: "Nay, rather the religion of Abraham, a man of pure faith, and he was not of idolaters."" (2:135) The Prophet has said: "By Him in Whose Hand Muhammad's soul is, anyone of this community, Jew or Christian, who hears of me and then dies without believing in me, will be among the inhabitants of the Hellfire." [Muslim] 9. To Turn Away from Islam by Neither Learning nor Acting Upon its Teachings The ninth cause of apostasy is to turn away from the religion of Islam by neither learning it or acting upon it. Allah said (32:22): "And who does greater evil than he who is reminded of the signs of His Lord, then turns away from them? We shall take vengeance upon the criminals. (end of quote) I have quoted this text in full as it appears in its original published form (except for style of citation of the Qur’an for consistency in this paper) to avoid any risk of distortion or misrepresentation, to allow each item to speak for itself on the extreme dangers of the vagueness and ambiguity. Quoting these formulations in full also brings out the clear ideological objectives that are to be served by these views. For instance, this list condemn as apostasy activities which can easily be, and are in fact usually, the subject of legitimate disagreement among all Muslims, especially those engaged in scholarly or theological debates and reflection. Thus, according to this list, those Muslims who raise any doubts about the authenticity of a significant part of the reports Sunna could be considered apostates, although this technique was always used by Muslims themselves in debating different views of Shari`a. Item 3 is obviously intended to exclude the Ahmadiyah of Pakistan from the fold of Islam in order to justify their oppression, while item 4 is clearly an ideological position on the application of Shari`a by the state that would render the vast majority of present day Muslims who do not support this view apostates. Item 8 constitutes a serious and permanent barrier to any possibility of religious tolerance and pluralism by requiring Muslims to condemn the Scriptures of Jews and Christians as necessarily invalid, even for those communities. Item 9 can apply to the vast majority of Muslims today as apostates simply because they are illiterate and have a minimal knowledge and understanding of the precepts of Islam, as elaborated in complex and often controversial treaties of classical jurisprudence and theology. The same or similar objections can be raised against the list of apostasy acts and speech of the late Shaikh Abdul Aziz b Abdullah b. Baz, the former mufti (leading 11 scholar charged with issuing officially authoritative opinions) of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia until his death a few years ago.9 Brother and Sister Muslim, you must be aware that there are matters which nullify your Islam. Please be mindful of them. 1. Associating partners with Allah (shirk). Allah Most High says (in the meaning): "Truly, whosoever sets up partners with Allah, then Allah has forbidden the Garden for him, and the Fire will be his abode. And for the wrongdoers there are no helpers." (5:72) Calling upon the dead, asking their help, or offering them gifts or sacrifices are all forms of shirk. 2. Setting up intermediaries between oneself and Allah, making supplication to them, asking their intercession with Allah, and placing ones trust in them is unbelief (kufr). 3. Anyone who does not consider the polytheists (mushrikeen) to be unbelievers, or who has doubts concerning their unbelief, or considers their way to be correct, is himself/herself an unbeliever (kafir). 4. Anyone who believes any guidance to be more perfect, or a decision other than the Prophets decision to be better, is an unbeliever. This applies to those who prefer the rule of Evil (Taghout) to the Prophets rule. Some examples of this are: (a) To believe that systems and laws made by human beings are better than the Shariah of Islam; for example, • That the Islamic system is not suitable for the twentieth century. • That Islam is the cause of the backwardness of the Muslims. • Or that al-Islam is a relationship between Allah and the Muslim. It should not interfere in other aspects of life. (b) To say that enforcing the punishments prescibed by Allah, such as cutting of the hand of the thief or the stoning of an adulterer, is not suitable for this day and age. (c) To believe that it is permissible to give a rule from that which Allah did not reveal in Islamic transactions or matters of law, punishments or other affairs. Although one may not believe such things to be superior to 9 This text is quoted here in full as it appears in http://thetruereligion.org/nullify.htm, viewed October 31, 2001. 12 the Shari'ah he in effect affirms such a stand by declaring a thing which Allah has totally prohibited, such as adultery, drinking alcohol or usury, to be permissible. According to the consensus of the Muslims, one who declares such things to be permissible is an unbeliever (Kafir) 5. Anyone who hates any part of what the Messenger of Allah [saw] has declared to be lawful has nullified his Islam, even though he may act in accordance with it. Allah Most High says(in the meaning): "This is because they hate what Allah has sent down, so he has made their deeds fruitless" (47:9) 6. Anyone who ridicules any aspect of the religion of the Messenger of Allah [saw], or any of its rewards or punishments, becomes an unbeliever. Allah Most High says (in the meaning): "Say: Was it Allah, and His signs and His Messenger that you were mocking? Make no excuse; you have disbelieved after you had believed." (9:65-66) 7. The practice of magic. Included in this, for example, is causing a rift between a husband and wife by turning his love for her into hatred, or tempting a person to do things he dislikes using black arts. One who engages in such a thing or is pleased with it is outside the fold of Islam. Allah Most High says (in the meaning): "But neither of these two (angels, Harut and Marut) taught anyone (magic) till they had said, Indeed, we are a trial; then do not disbelieve." (2:102) 8. Supporting and aiding polytheists against the Muslims. Allah Most High says (in the meaning): "Whoever among you who takes them as allies is surely one of them. Truly, Allah does not guide the wrongdoers." (5:51) 9. Anyone who beleives that some people are permitted to deviate from the Shariah of Muhammad [saw] is an un believer by the word of Allah Most High (in the meaning): "And whoever seeks a religion other than Islam, it will not be accepted of him, and in the hereafter he will be from among the losers." (3:85) 10. To turn completely away from the religion of Allah neither learning its precepts nor acting upon it. Allah most high says (what means): "And who does greater wrong than he who is reminded of the revelations of his Lord and turns aside therefrom. Truly, We shall exact retribution from the guilty." (32:22) 13 and He [swt] also says (what means): "But those who disbelieve turn away from that about which they are warned." It makes no difference whether such violations are committed as a joke, in seriousness or out of fear, except when done under compulsion (i.e. from threat of loss of life). We seek refuge in Allah from such deeds as entail His wrath and severe punishment. Again, I have quoted this list in full, as it appears in its published source, except for correcting obvious spelling and style of citation of the Qur’an for consistency, because the extreme dangers of the vagueness and ambiguity of every item are too obvious to require further elaboration. In addition to all the problems noted with the first list above, this one clearly reflects the theological and ideological bias of the Wahabi school of thought, which is the official creed of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, while being strongly rejected by the vast majority of Muslims around the world. Thus, items 1 and 2 are intended to render Sufi practices that are followed by millions of Muslims in all parts of the world sufficient cause for condemnation as an apostate. The ideological and political point of item 4 has already been noted, but it is particularly serious here because of its association with the ideology and political agenda of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The basic point I wish to make in light of these lists is that the notion of apostasy, and related terms and concepts, are extremely problematic in theory, and difficult to apply in practice. The inherent vagueness and ambiguity of these notions encourages their manipulation and abuse for political ends. These risks also tend to diminish possibilities of legitimate theological and jurisprudential reflection and development within any Islamic community, whether at the local, regional or global level. My main conclusion, therefore, is that there are compelling reasons for abolishing apostasy and all related notions in the best interest of Islam as a religion, and Islamic societies themselves. In my view, these are sufficient reasons to this end, without any reference to international standards of human rights that may be rejected as a tool of Western cultural imperialism. This emphasis on an internal Islamic rationale for the abolition of apostasy and related concepts is not intended to imply a rejection of the universality of all human rights, including religious liberty. On the contrary, demonstrating an internal Islamic argument and approach to protecting religious liberty in this way is the best way of making the case for the universality of the same principle that is affirmed by international standards of human rights. From this point of view, I will now discuss and attempt to reconcile different approaches to protecting individual religious liberty from an internal Islamic perspective. 14 3. Competing Models of Reform and Reconciliation As stated in the introduction to this paper, the basic dilemma facing the proponents of reform in Islamic societies today is whether to seek their objectives through the existing corpus and methodology of classical Islamic jurisprudence or attempt to avoid the limitations of that approach by attempting to impose European and North American notions of secularism as separation of religion and the state. While the vast majority of Islamic societies today are struggling with the first approach, several have attempted varying forms or degrees of the second, with Turkey being the most extreme example of authoritarian imposition of European secularism by the state under the ideology of Mustafa Kamal At-Turk and his successors. In this last section, I will briefly explain the limitations of both approaches, and argue for a comprehensive theory of Islamic reform that can contribute to mediating that basic dilemma by questioning the underlying assumptions of a binary between the religious and secular. Such a theory is necessary, I believe, for reformulating the structure and methodology of classical Islamic jurisprudence in order to make it more relevant and useful in the modern context of Islamic societies. As I have argued in detail elsewhere,10 the basic limitation of reform efforts within the framework of what we call here classical Islamic jurisprudence cannot achieve the complete abolition of the notion of apostasy and related concepts, while the imposition of European and North American models of secularism by the state will be resisted as anti-Islamic. On the one hand, classical Islamic jurisprudence cannot achieve the desired degree of reform because of the limitations of its own methodology, commonly known as usul al-fiqh, which does not permit changing any rule of Shari`a that is based on an explicit and categorical text of Qur’an or Sunna. While the Qur’an strongly condemns apostasy, without providing a specific punishment for it in this life, Sunna has been cited as the basis of that, as noted earlier. On the other hand, apostasy cannot simply be abolished through purely secular law and policy, without some form of Islamic justification. Regardless of one’s view of the validity or viability of the ideological and political objectives of Islamic political activists in different parts of the Muslim, it has to be conceded that they have succeeded in creating a popular conception of the unity of Islam and the state. Since that view is premised on an alleged imperative of implementation of Shari`a by the state, a proposed reform methodology must challenge that premise, or at least contest the normative content of Shari`a that is supposed to be implement as the official law of the state. The first approach seeks to make the normative content of Shari`a irrelevant for law and public policy in general, while the second concedes a central role for Shari`a to these fields, but attempts to change the implications or outcome of its application. However, an assertion of separation of Islam and the state is unlikely to be accepted by Muslims unless it is presented with an Islamic rationale or justification. 10 See, generally, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights and International Law (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), especially chapter 4. 15 Otherwise, such a separation will have to be imposed on the community, which means the negation of its own alleged objectives of democratisation and protection of fundamental individual rights, as can be seen in the case of Turkey where the secularisation of the state continues to be enforced by the army since it was imposed by At-Turk in the 1920s. Moreover, even if Shari`a is not enforced by the state as such, it will still be influential in shaping law and policy through the political processes of the country. For instance, as long as Muslims believe apostasy to be a capital crime punishable by death, in addition to other legal consequences noted earlier, they will probably continue to vindicate that belief by supporting political leaders who will enact laws to that effect. In other words, secularisation in the formal sense of separation of Islam and the state will not be enough without a transformation of the content of Shari`a, as it is known and accepted by Muslims. I am therefore calling for a combination of the two approaches to clarify the relation between Islam and the state, while at the same time drastically reforming certain aspects of Shari`a before of its powerful social and political role, even when it is not enforced by the state as such. My argument for the first part of this combination is on the view that, once applied by the state, Shari`a ceases to be the religious law of Islam and becomes the political will of that state. Moreover, given the wide diversity of opinion among classical scholars and schools of thought, any effort to enact Shari`a as state law will necessarily exclude some of those contradictory views, thereby denying Muslims their religious freedom of choice among equally valid and legitimate interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunna.11 The possibility of drastic reform of the content of Shari`a, even as a private religious normative system requires the fundamental reformation of usul al-fiqh because every interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna, in the past, present or future, is necessarily a product of the historical context of the Muslim society of that time and place.12 11 For an elaboration of this argument see my article, “Sharica and Positive Legislation: is an Islamic State Possible or Viable?” In Eugene Cotran and Chibli Mallat, General Editors, Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, vol. 5 (1998-1999). The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000, pp. 29-42. 12 On this approach and its possible outcome see An-Na`im, Toward an Islamic Reformation.