Download Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im, Emory University, Atlanta, United States

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Emory University, Atlanta, United States
INDIVIDUAL RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE PROBLEM OF APOSTASY
IN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES: CLASSICAL JURIDICAL POSITIONS AND
THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
Relazione presentata al Convegno Internazionale Dignità umana e libertà di scelta
religiosa: le prospettive delle grandi tradizioni religiose, Centro di Studi Religiosi
Comparati Edoardo Agnelli, Torino, 22-23 novembre 2001
The notion of apostasy and its punishment by death is not unique to Islam, as
both existed in Judaism and Christianity, and widely practiced under the latter in the
medieval period.1 Yet these notions have been effectively eliminated from any current
Jewish or Christian discourse, and there is no possibility of imposing the death penalty
for these crimes in modern context of these societies. In contrast, these notions remain
entrenched in Islamic jurisprudence, and those found guilty of these offences can still
be sentenced to death in counties like Pakistan and Sudan today.2 The question I wish
to address here is not simply how can Islamic societies “catch up” with Jewish and
Christian societies in this regard, because the lack of penal and civil consequences for
apostasy and blasphemy were more a consequence of loss or transformation of political
power than an independent theological transformation of those two traditions. Rather,
my concern is how can Islamic jurisprudence revise its view on the matter as an
internal Islamic imperative, regardless of the nature of political authority of the state in
Muslim countries.
The underlying issue for this short essay is the important but profoundly
problematic role of classical Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) in present Islamic societies,
and their relations with other societies in an increasingly globalized and interdependent
world. As clearly illustrated below through a discussion of the relationship between the
traditional notion of apostasy (riddah) and fundamental individual rights in the modern
context, the basic assumptions, methodology and content of classical Islamic
jurisprudence are theoretically problematic and practically unrealistic for present
1
For very explicit biblical basis for the death penalty for apostasy and blasphemy can still be found in
Deuteronomy 13:6-9, and Leviticus 24:16, respectively .
2
Blasphemy cases in Palistan…. Section 126 of the Sudan Penal Code of 1992 imposes the death
penalty for apostasy.
2
Islamic societies. Yet, that jurisprudence is commonly seen as essential for the “Islamic
authenticity,” political legitimacy and practical sustainability of proposed solutions for
all sorts of problems facing Islamic societies today.
Consequently, the basic dilemma facing the proponents of various forms and
degrees of social and political reform throughout the region is whether to seek their
objectives through the difficult and protracted “negotiation” of their reform proposals
through the maze of classical jurisprudence, with little prospects of satisfactory results,
or by an authoritative, or rather authoritarian, imposition of radical “secularism”. Both
approaches have been applied in the past, and will probably continue to be used, in a
variety of forms and degrees in different parts of the Muslim world. What is lacking, it
seems to me, is a comprehensive theory of Islamic reform that can contribute to
mediating that basic dilemma by questioning the underlying assumptions of a binary
between the religious and secular, and reformulate the structure and methodology of
classical Islamic jurisprudence in order to make it more relevant and useful in the
modern context of Islamic societies.
To clarify and illustrate this thesis through a discussion of the problem of
apostasy in relation to individual religious liberty, I will begin with a review of the
definition and consequences of apostasy in classical Islamic jurisprudence, and then
demonstrate the total incompatibility of classical notions of apostasy with individual
religious liberty from an Islamic, without any reference to modern human rights
standards that may be perceived as Western forms of “cultural imperialism.”
perspective. Against this background, I will examine possibilities of reconciliation
through a reformulation of Islamic jurisprudence in ways that would completely
eliminate apostasy and related concepts and their legal consequences. Once that is
achieved, any negative social implications will diminish over time, thereby expanding
and securing the scope of religious tolerance and pluralism in Islamic societies.
1. Definition and Legal Consequences of Apostasy in Islamic Jurisprudence
In addition to its incompatibility with individual religious liberty, as discussed
later, there are two aspects to the problem of apostasy in Islamic jurisprudence itself,
namely, the vagueness and fluidity of the concept, and the ambiguity of the basis for its
legal consequences as a capital crime. As I will argue in later in this paper, these
internal jurisprudential difficulties, combined with the negative consequences for
freedom of religion and belief in general, can only be avoided through a paradigm shift
in Islamic jurisprudence that would make it possible to completely eliminate these
apostasy and associated concepts.
3
The main sources of the vagueness and fluidity of the concept of apostasy relate
to its definition and punishment, as well as its close association with several related
concepts in Islamic jurisprudence, such as unbelief (kufr ) blasphemy (sabb al-rasul),
heresy (zandaqah), and hypocrisy (nifaq). It may therefore be necessary to examine
all these aspects to fully appreciate the difficulty of applying this concept and its legal
consequences in specific cases.
The Arabic word riddah, commonly translated as apostasy, literally means to
‘turn back’, and murtadd, the active participle from irtadda, means one who turns back.
In Islamic law, riddah is understood to be reverting from the religion of Islam to kufr
(unbelief ) whether intentionally or by necessary implication. In other words, the vast
majority of classical Muslim scholars agree that once a person becomes a Muslim by his
or her free choice, there is no way by which he or she can change religion.3 According
to those scholars, ways in which this may occur include: denial of the existence of God,
or the attributes of God; denial of a particular messenger of God or that a messenger is
truly a messenger God; denial of a principle that is established as a matter of religion,
such as the obligation to pray five times a day or fast the month of Ramadan; declaring
prohibited what is manifestly permitted (halal), or declaring permitted what is
manifestly prohibited (haram). But as illustrated by lists of what constitutes apostasy
according to various scholars, quoted in the next section below, the concept is extremely
vague and liable to grave abuse in practice.
Moreover, apostasy is said to apply whenever a person is deemed to have
reverted from Islam, by an intentional or blasphemous act or utterance, whether or not it
was said mockingly, out of stubbornness, or out of conviction. Scholars of the four main
Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence classified apostasy into three categories: beliefs,
actions, and utterances, with further sub-divisions for each of them. But each of these
categories can be controversial. For instance, the first category is supposed to include:
doubts about the existence of God, or about the message of the Prophet Muhammad or
any other prophet, doubts about the Qur’an, the Day of Judgment, the existence of
paradise and hell, doubts about the eternity of God, and doubt about any point of belief
on which there is consensus (ijma) among Muslims, such as the attributes of God. It
would therefore follow that there is no apostasy in the absence of consensus on the
issue. Yet, as a matter of fact, there is no consensus on many of the issues included in
the list of various scholars and schools. For example, there is significant disagreement
among these authorities on the God’s attributes, which mean that one can be condemned
as an apostate according to the views of one scholar for accepting or rejecting an
attribute of God that is asserted or denied by another scholar.
Another problem is the notion of apostasy is that, while the Qur’an repeatedly
condemns apostasy as a religious sin, it does not provide any punishment for it in this
3
The following review of classical Islamic jurisprudence of apostasy is based on Ibn Rushd, Bidayat alMugjtahid, vol. 2, (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabic, noted dated); and Nu`man Abd al-Razid al-Samar`i,
Ahkam al-Murtad fi al-Shari`a al-Islamyia (Beirut: al-Dar al-Arabiya, 1968).
4
life, as can be seen in verses 2:217, 4:90, 5:54, 59, 16:108, and 47:25.4 In fact, the
Qur’an clearly contemplates situations where an apostate continues to live among the
Muslim community, rather than put to death for apostasy. For example, verse 4:137 of
the Qur’an can be translated as follows: “Those who believed, then disbelieved, then
believed, and then disbelieved [once more] and became more unbelieving, God will not
forgive them or guide them to the righteous pathway.” Nevertheless, classical Islamic
jurisprudence imposes the death penalty, in addition to other sanctions, for apostasy on
the basis of some Sunna reports. According to one report, the Prophet said that the
blood of a fellow Muslim should never be shed except one of three: an adulterer,
murderer, or one who abandons Islam after having embraced it.
Another source of vagueness and fluidity in the concept is due to the fact that
early scholars did not generally differentiate between the various associated concepts
noted earlier, and tended to use the broader category of apostasy as subsuming all of
them. As can be appreciated from the brief review of these related concepts alter in this
section, subsuming several different notions under the rubric of apostasy makes this
term dangerously broad and vague, and confuses the legal Islamic basis of a purported
offence and its punishment for different types of conduct.
Since apostasy is supposed to be openly reverting to disbelief in Islam after
having freely embraced it, an obvious association is with disbelief (kufur) -- open and
complete rejection of the message of Islam itself. While repeatedly speaking of
disbelief and belief, and related terms, the Qur’an does not provide clear guidance on
what these terms mean beyond the basic sense of either accepting or rejecting the
confession of the faith -- that “there is no God but God, and Muhammad is his
messenger”. For example, the Qur’an frequently links belief to performing worship
rituals like prayer and fasting the months of Ramadan and doing good deeds, but does
not say what should happen to those who fail to live up to these obligations other than
punishment in the afterlife. Moreover, the Qur’an does not expressly state the
consequences of questioning the precise meaning of the confession of the faith itself.
What does it mean to say that “there is no God but God”? What do believers know, or
should know, about God? How does belief in the unity of God determine the believers’
way of life, whether at the private personal level or in relation to public socio-economic
and political institutions and processes? Who has the authority to adjudicates the
inevitable disagreements about these and other matters after the death of Prophet, and
how?
The Qur’an leaves Muslims to struggle with all these issues for themselves. It is
true that they have the additional practical guidance of the Sunna, or life-model of the
Prophet, but that also has its uncertainties and ambiguities. It is therefore not surprising
to find major differences among Muslims on the role of action or deeds (amal) within
4
The Qur’an is cited here by giving the number of the Chapter (Surah), followed by the number of the
verse (Ayah).
5
the definition of belief (iman). Whereas some Muslim scholars were willing to accept
an apparent confession of the faith for a person to be considered a Muslim, others
insisted that professed belief must be expressed in specific action or deeds. For those
who hold the latter view, the question becomes what to do about people who claim to be
Muslims but fail to act accordingly. But then, who decides whether or not a person has
acted according to the requirements of the faith, and what consequences should follow
from such a determination? These debates and their violent manifestations raged from
the views and actions of the Kharijites during the civil wars of the seventh century to
the status of the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan since 1950s, to Usama bin Ladin’s call to
vindicate belief in Islam by any means possible, including international terrorism. As
already noted, the field is further complicated by ambiguities and disagreements about
other concepts.
Blasphemy is the use of foul language primarily about the Prophet Muhammad,
known as insulting the Prophet (sabb al-rasul), God or any of the angels or prophets,
and is punishable by death. At a later stage, this offence was extended to cover using
foul language against the Companions of the Prophet as well to silence some dissenting
voices among Muslims, like the Kharijites and Shi`ites who were reviling leading
figures of the early Muslim community in the context of the civil wars of the seventh
and early eighth centuries. But while for some scholars this category of blasphemy is a
special category in which the person remains a Muslim but can be killed as punishment
for this offence, others maintain that committing such a sin automatically removes the
person from the fold of Islam. If the act is committed by a non-Muslim, then the
question of apostasy does not arise, but the person is still to be punished by death. To
complicate the matter further, a distinction is made by some scholars between reviling
God and reviling the Prophet, whereby a more severe view is taken of the latter. Since
the Prophet is not in a position to avenge this abuse, the argument goes, it is the
responsibility of the Muslim community at large (ummah) to protect the Prophet’s
honour by imposing the punishment of death. The same logic was applied to reviling the
Companions of the Prophet through the extension of those whose honour is supposed to
be protected in this way.
The punishment for blasphemy appears to be based on certain incidents in the
lifetime of the Prophet as there is no clear Qur’anic instruction on the matter. Even
when the Qur’an uses the term sabb, as in 6:108, it only commands Muslims not to
revile the deities of non-Muslims lest they revile God, but without any reference to
punishment in this life. However, during the time of the Prophet, some Muslims killed
a number of non-Muslims who reviled the Prophet and therefore apparently committed
the offence of blasphemy (sabb). Since all those killed in these incidents were among
the most staunch opponents of Islam, some of them fabricated certain stories about the
Prophet, and also the Muslim community in general, it is difficult to identify the precise
reason believed to justify killing them. But it is clear that neither the Qur’an nor the
Prophet declare the existence of an offence called ‘blasphemy’ or a specific punishment
for it.
6
The term heresy (zandaqah) is applied in classical Islamic jurisprudence to a
heretic whose teaching becomes a danger to the state, thereby rendering him liable to
the death penalty, though the term and its derivatives do not appear in the Qur’an at all,
and seem to have come into Arabic from Persian.5 This term was apparently used for
the first time in connection with the execution of Ja`d bin Dirham in 742 – more than a
century after the Prophet’s death. “In practice, the polemics of the conservatives
describe as a zindik (one who is guilty of zandaqah) anyone whose external profession
of Islam seems to them to be not sufficiently sincere.”6 But there is no agreement
among Muslims scholars on a general definition of these terms. Instead, one finds a
variety of views about “the type of conduct” that constitutes zandaqah, or make a person
a zindiq, such as those who outwardly show they are Muslims while retaining their
former religion.
But how is that to be known, or proved, in specific cases? Some scholars were
prepared to infer that from the fact that the person advocated indulgence in various acts
that are prohibited in Islam such as zina or drinking wine. The ambiguity of the concept
appears to have been both caused by, and grossly abused in the context of, the largescale conversion of people to Islam following the Muslim conquests of the first two
centuries of Islamic history. In other words, the emergence and expansion of this
concept may have been prompted by fears of infiltration of the Muslim community and
state by non-Muslims who may have been using Islam for personal gain or to escape
discrimination. But the vagueness of the concept and difficulty of proving its
application in specific cases also permitted its abuse for political ends by rulers, and
even by some scholars against their theological or intellectual rivals. Yet, a clear
definition is critical for distinguishing it from apostasy since some scholars, of the
Hanafi and Maliki schools in particular, would not grant a zindiq a chance to repent, as
they would an apostate.
The third term associated with apostasy is hypocrisy (nifaq), referring to those
who openly profess belief in Islam, while harboring disbelief. Again, while the Qur’an
repeatedly condemns such hypocrisy (2:8-10), promises hypocrites punishment in hell
in the afterlife (9:68), and warns the Muslim community against the dangers of having
hypocrites in their mist (2:8-10, 9:68) it does not prescribe any punishment in this life.
In verse 9:73, the Prophet is commanded to engage in jihad against the hypocrites and
unbelievers, but that cannot mean imposing criminal punishment as such, which can
only happen within the jurisdiction of a stable and effective state, away from the context
of jihad. Nevertheless, Muslim scholars, especially of the Hanafi and Maliki schools,
decided to impose the death penalty on a zindiq as a hypocrite who professes Islam and
hide a contrary belief.
5
6
Article ‘Zindik’, Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden: EJ Brill, 1991, p.659.
Ibid.
7
As this brief review clearly shows, there was a substantial degree of confusion
and fluidity in these concepts and how they were to be defined, as well as uncertainty
about the basis of their criminal punishment. Since the Qur’an neither defined these
concepts in legal terms, nor imposed a punishment for any of them in this life, the
Muslim communities could have chosen to simply view them as matters of freedom of
conscience, instead of punishing them as capital crimes. Indeed, the Prophet himself set
that example by refusing to question the beliefs of anyone who claimed to profess Islam
as a religion. Yet, those purported offences and their punishment became entrenched in
classical Islamic jurisprudence, probably for political reasons disguised with an alleged
religious rationale. In this light, I am now urging present day Islamic societies to reaffirm religious liberty as an Islamic imperative by categorically abolishing these
purported crimes and related legal consequences. In other words, I maintain that this
view of religious liberty should be seen as essential for the validity of belief in Islam as
a matter of choice, rather than coercion through criminal sanction or other negative legal
consequences.
2. Apostasy, Religious Liberty and Ideology
This proposition is clearly substantiated by the following review of two “lists”
of actions or speech that are deemed by some cotemporary scholars even today to
constitute apostasy. By drastically diminishing the scope of religious liberty in any
meaningful sense, these lists of apostasy acts not only stifle and limit possibilities of
religious discourse among Muslims themselves, but also encourage serious abuse and
manipulation of the capital crime of apostasy for ideological and political ends. In fact,
the formulation of the various “causes” of apostasy is clearly intended to apply to
specific religious or theological views of some segments of the Muslim community at
large, thereby seeking to justify their persecution and suppression of their beliefs.
For example, Ali al-Tamimi, provides the following list of actions and/or
speech, with elaborations (quoted in full here) that constitutes, in his view, the capital
crime of apostasy today:7
Knowing the meaning of our testimony [confession] of [the] faith is
necessary but not sufficient. One should also know the causes that may
lead a person to revoke this testimony. In other words, one should know
7
Ali Al-Timimi, ‘The Muslim’s Belief—Some Causes that Lead to Apostasy from the Religion of
Islam’, The Friday Report, Dar Makkah, August–September 1994. This text is quoted here as it appears
in http://www.islaam.com/sunnah/apostacy.htm, viewed Oct. 31, 2001.
8
the causes that lead to apostasy from the religion of Islam. Among the
more prevalent causes of apostasy in our times:
1. To Associate Others with Allah or "Shirk"
The first cause of apostasy is to commit shirk. Allah said (4:48):8 "Allah
forgives not that partners should be set up with Him in worship, but He
forgives anything else to whomsoever He pleases, and whoever sets up
partner with Allah in worship, he has indeed forged a mighty sin."
And He said (5:72): "Verily, whosoever associates with Allah anything,
for him Allah has forbidden Paradise, and the Fire will be his abode; and
the wrongdoers shall have no helpers."
There are four types of Shirk:
•
Shirk through one's prayers (See 29:65)
•
Shirk through one's intent in his acts of worship (See 11:15-16)
•
Shirk through one's obedience (See 9:31)
•
Shirk through one's love (See 2:165)
The fourth type of shirk is explained by Allah's statement (See 9:24):
"Say (to them O Muhammad, sallallaahu `alayhi wa sallam): 'If your
fathers, your sons, your brothers, your wives, your kindred, your
possessions that you have gained, commerce you fear may slacken, and
dwellings you love, if these are dearer to you than Allah and His
Messenger (Muhammad), and to struggle in His Way, then wait until
Allah brings about His Command (Punishment). And Allah guides not
the wrong-doing people.'"
2. To Deny the Finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad, sallallaahu
`alayhi wa sallam
The second cause of apostasy is denial of finality of Prophethood with
the Prophet Muhammad sallallaahu `alayhi wa sallam. Whoever claims
Prophethood or believes the claim of a false prophet has left the fold of
Islam. For example, in our times, those who believe the claims of
prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad, Elijah Poole, or Rashad Khalifa have
left the fold of Islam
3. To Deny the Binding Nature of the Sunnah
The third cause of apostasy is denial of the Sunnah. For example, those
who claim that Islam is only the Qur'an have left the fold of Islam.
8
This and subsequent similar numbers (all in the original) are references to the Qur’an, by number of
chapter followed by number of verse.
9
4. To Judge by Other than Sharia
The fourth cause of apostasy is to judge by other than the sharia that
Allah sent down to the Prophet Muhammad, sallallaahu `alaihi wa
sallam. For example those who believe that the systems and laws devised
by men are better than the sharia, or that it is permissible to judge by
other than the sharia even if one does not believe that judgment to be
better than that of the sharia, or that Islam should be restricted to the
private relationship between an individual and His Lord without entering
into the other aspects of life.
5. To Ridicule Any Aspect of Islam
The fifth cause of apostasy is to ridicule or make fun of any aspect of
Islam, its rewards or punishments.
Allah said (9:65-66): "And if you (O Muhammad) question them, they
(the hypocrites) will say: "We were only talking idly and jesting." Say
(to them o Muhammad), "What, then were you mocking Allah and His
Signs and His Messenger. Make no excuse you have disbelieved after
you have believed."
6. To Hate Any Aspect of Islam
The sixth cause of apostasy is to hate any aspect of Islam.
Allah said: (47:A9): "That is because they have been averse to what
Allah has sent down, so He has made their deeds to fail."
7. To Perform or to be Pleased with Sorcery
The seventh cause of apostasy is to perform sorcery or to be pleased with
the performance of sorcery like bringing a man and a woman to love or
hate one another.
Allah said (2:102): "The devils disbelieved, they teach people sorcery."
8. To Believe that One May Obtain Salvation by Following Other than
the Sharia of the Prophet
The eighth cause of apostasy is to believe that one may obtain salvation
by following other than the religion of Islam or by refusing to cal the
infidels, like the Jews and Christians, infidels, or to doubt their unbelief,
or to say their religion is still correct.
Allah said: "The true religion with Allah is Islam." (3:19)
"Whoever desires a religion other than Islam, it shall not be accepted of
him and in the Hereafter he shall be among the losers." (33:85)
10
"And they say, "Be Jews or Christians then you shall be guided." Say:
"Nay, rather the religion of Abraham, a man of pure faith, and he was not
of idolaters."" (2:135)
The Prophet has said: "By Him in Whose Hand Muhammad's soul is,
anyone of this community, Jew or Christian, who hears of me and then
dies without believing in me, will be among the inhabitants of the
Hellfire." [Muslim]
9. To Turn Away from Islam by Neither Learning nor Acting Upon its
Teachings
The ninth cause of apostasy is to turn away from the religion of Islam by
neither learning it or acting upon it.
Allah said (32:22): "And who does greater evil than he who is reminded
of the signs of His Lord, then turns away from them? We shall take
vengeance upon the criminals. (end of quote)
I have quoted this text in full as it appears in its original published form (except
for style of citation of the Qur’an for consistency in this paper) to avoid any risk of
distortion or misrepresentation, to allow each item to speak for itself on the extreme
dangers of the vagueness and ambiguity. Quoting these formulations in full also brings
out the clear ideological objectives that are to be served by these views. For instance,
this list condemn as apostasy activities which can easily be, and are in fact usually, the
subject of legitimate disagreement among all Muslims, especially those engaged in
scholarly or theological debates and reflection. Thus, according to this list, those
Muslims who raise any doubts about the authenticity of a significant part of the reports
Sunna could be considered apostates, although this technique was always used by
Muslims themselves in debating different views of Shari`a. Item 3 is obviously
intended to exclude the Ahmadiyah of Pakistan from the fold of Islam in order to justify
their oppression, while item 4 is clearly an ideological position on the application of
Shari`a by the state that would render the vast majority of present day Muslims who do
not support this view apostates. Item 8 constitutes a serious and permanent barrier to
any possibility of religious tolerance and pluralism by requiring Muslims to condemn
the Scriptures of Jews and Christians as necessarily invalid, even for those
communities. Item 9 can apply to the vast majority of Muslims today as apostates
simply because they are illiterate and have a minimal knowledge and understanding of
the precepts of Islam, as elaborated in complex and often controversial treaties of
classical jurisprudence and theology.
The same or similar objections can be raised against the list of apostasy acts and
speech of the late Shaikh Abdul Aziz b Abdullah b. Baz, the former mufti (leading
11
scholar charged with issuing officially authoritative opinions) of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia until his death a few years ago.9
Brother and Sister Muslim, you must be aware that there are matters
which nullify your Islam. Please be mindful of them.
1. Associating partners with Allah (shirk). Allah Most High says (in the
meaning):
"Truly, whosoever sets up partners with Allah, then Allah has forbidden
the Garden for him, and the Fire will be his abode. And for the
wrongdoers there are no helpers." (5:72)
Calling upon the dead, asking their help, or offering them gifts or
sacrifices are all forms of shirk.
2. Setting up intermediaries between oneself and Allah, making
supplication to them, asking their intercession with Allah, and placing
ones trust in them is unbelief (kufr).
3. Anyone who does not consider the polytheists (mushrikeen) to be
unbelievers, or who has doubts concerning their unbelief, or considers
their way to be correct, is himself/herself an unbeliever (kafir).
4. Anyone who believes any guidance to be more perfect, or a decision
other than the Prophets decision to be better, is an unbeliever. This
applies to those who prefer the rule of Evil (Taghout) to the Prophets
rule. Some examples of this are:
(a) To believe that systems and laws made by human beings are better
than the Shariah of Islam; for example,
•
That the Islamic system is not suitable for the twentieth century.
•
That Islam is the cause of the backwardness of the Muslims.
•
Or that al-Islam is a relationship between Allah and the Muslim. It
should not interfere in other aspects of life.
(b) To say that enforcing the punishments prescibed by Allah, such as
cutting of the hand of the thief or the stoning of an adulterer, is not
suitable for this day and age.
(c) To believe that it is permissible to give a rule from that which Allah
did not reveal in Islamic transactions or matters of law, punishments or
other affairs. Although one may not believe such things to be superior to
9
This text is quoted here in full as it appears in http://thetruereligion.org/nullify.htm, viewed October 31,
2001.
12
the Shari'ah he in effect affirms such a stand by declaring a thing which
Allah has totally prohibited, such as adultery, drinking alcohol or usury,
to be permissible. According to the consensus of the Muslims, one who
declares such things to be permissible is an unbeliever (Kafir)
5. Anyone who hates any part of what the Messenger of Allah [saw] has
declared to be lawful has nullified his Islam, even though he may act in
accordance with it. Allah Most High says(in the meaning):
"This is because they hate what Allah has sent down, so he has made
their deeds fruitless" (47:9)
6. Anyone who ridicules any aspect of the religion of the Messenger of
Allah [saw], or any of its rewards or punishments, becomes an
unbeliever. Allah Most High says (in the meaning):
"Say: Was it Allah, and His signs and His Messenger that you were
mocking? Make no excuse; you have disbelieved after you had
believed." (9:65-66)
7. The practice of magic. Included in this, for example, is causing a rift
between a husband and wife by turning his love for her into hatred, or
tempting a person to do things he dislikes using black arts. One who
engages in such a thing or is pleased with it is outside the fold of Islam.
Allah Most High says (in the meaning):
"But neither of these two (angels, Harut and Marut) taught anyone
(magic) till they had said, Indeed, we are a trial; then do not disbelieve."
(2:102)
8. Supporting and aiding polytheists against the Muslims. Allah Most
High says (in the meaning):
"Whoever among you who takes them as allies is surely one of them.
Truly, Allah does not guide the wrongdoers." (5:51)
9. Anyone who beleives that some people are permitted to deviate from
the Shariah of Muhammad [saw] is an un believer by the word of Allah
Most High (in the meaning):
"And whoever seeks a religion other than Islam, it will not be accepted
of him, and in the hereafter he will be from among the losers." (3:85)
10. To turn completely away from the religion of Allah neither learning
its precepts nor acting upon it. Allah most high says (what means):
"And who does greater wrong than he who is reminded of the revelations
of his Lord and turns aside therefrom. Truly, We shall exact retribution
from the guilty." (32:22)
13
and He [swt] also says (what means):
"But those who disbelieve turn away from that about which they are
warned."
It makes no difference whether such violations are committed as a joke,
in seriousness or out of fear, except when done under compulsion (i.e.
from threat of loss of life). We seek refuge in Allah from such deeds as
entail His wrath and severe punishment.
Again, I have quoted this list in full, as it appears in its published source, except
for correcting obvious spelling and style of citation of the Qur’an for consistency,
because the extreme dangers of the vagueness and ambiguity of every item are too
obvious to require further elaboration. In addition to all the problems noted with the
first list above, this one clearly reflects the theological and ideological bias of the
Wahabi school of thought, which is the official creed of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
while being strongly rejected by the vast majority of Muslims around the world. Thus,
items 1 and 2 are intended to render Sufi practices that are followed by millions of
Muslims in all parts of the world sufficient cause for condemnation as an apostate. The
ideological and political point of item 4 has already been noted, but it is particularly
serious here because of its association with the ideology and political agenda of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
The basic point I wish to make in light of these lists is that the notion of
apostasy, and related terms and concepts, are extremely problematic in theory, and
difficult to apply in practice. The inherent vagueness and ambiguity of these notions
encourages their manipulation and abuse for political ends. These risks also tend to
diminish possibilities of legitimate theological and jurisprudential reflection and
development within any Islamic community, whether at the local, regional or global
level. My main conclusion, therefore, is that there are compelling reasons for
abolishing apostasy and all related notions in the best interest of Islam as a religion, and
Islamic societies themselves. In my view, these are sufficient reasons to this end,
without any reference to international standards of human rights that may be rejected as
a tool of Western cultural imperialism.
This emphasis on an internal Islamic rationale for the abolition of apostasy and
related concepts is not intended to imply a rejection of the universality of all human
rights, including religious liberty. On the contrary, demonstrating an internal Islamic
argument and approach to protecting religious liberty in this way is the best way of
making the case for the universality of the same principle that is affirmed by
international standards of human rights. From this point of view, I will now discuss and
attempt to reconcile different approaches to protecting individual religious liberty from
an internal Islamic perspective.
14
3. Competing Models of Reform and Reconciliation
As stated in the introduction to this paper, the basic dilemma facing the
proponents of reform in Islamic societies today is whether to seek their objectives
through the existing corpus and methodology of classical Islamic jurisprudence or
attempt to avoid the limitations of that approach by attempting to impose European and
North American notions of secularism as separation of religion and the state. While the
vast majority of Islamic societies today are struggling with the first approach, several
have attempted varying forms or degrees of the second, with Turkey being the most
extreme example of authoritarian imposition of European secularism by the state under
the ideology of Mustafa Kamal At-Turk and his successors. In this last section, I will
briefly explain the limitations of both approaches, and argue for a comprehensive theory
of Islamic reform that can contribute to mediating that basic dilemma by questioning the
underlying assumptions of a binary between the religious and secular. Such a theory is
necessary, I believe, for reformulating the structure and methodology of classical
Islamic jurisprudence in order to make it more relevant and useful in the modern context
of Islamic societies.
As I have argued in detail elsewhere,10 the basic limitation of reform efforts
within the framework of what we call here classical Islamic jurisprudence cannot
achieve the complete abolition of the notion of apostasy and related concepts, while the
imposition of European and North American models of secularism by the state will be
resisted as anti-Islamic. On the one hand, classical Islamic jurisprudence cannot achieve
the desired degree of reform because of the limitations of its own methodology,
commonly known as usul al-fiqh, which does not permit changing any rule of Shari`a
that is based on an explicit and categorical text of Qur’an or Sunna. While the Qur’an
strongly condemns apostasy, without providing a specific punishment for it in this life,
Sunna has been cited as the basis of that, as noted earlier. On the other hand, apostasy
cannot simply be abolished through purely secular law and policy, without some form
of Islamic justification. Regardless of one’s view of the validity or viability of the
ideological and political objectives of Islamic political activists in different parts of the
Muslim, it has to be conceded that they have succeeded in creating a popular conception
of the unity of Islam and the state. Since that view is premised on an alleged imperative
of implementation of Shari`a by the state, a proposed reform methodology must
challenge that premise, or at least contest the normative content of Shari`a that is
supposed to be implement as the official law of the state. The first approach seeks to
make the normative content of Shari`a irrelevant for law and public policy in general,
while the second concedes a central role for Shari`a to these fields, but attempts to
change the implications or outcome of its application.
However, an assertion of separation of Islam and the state is unlikely to be
accepted by Muslims unless it is presented with an Islamic rationale or justification.
10
See, generally, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human
Rights and International Law (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), especially chapter 4.
15
Otherwise, such a separation will have to be imposed on the community, which means
the negation of its own alleged objectives of democratisation and protection of
fundamental individual rights, as can be seen in the case of Turkey where the
secularisation of the state continues to be enforced by the army since it was imposed by
At-Turk in the 1920s. Moreover, even if Shari`a is not enforced by the state as such, it
will still be influential in shaping law and policy through the political processes of the
country. For instance, as long as Muslims believe apostasy to be a capital crime
punishable by death, in addition to other legal consequences noted earlier, they will
probably continue to vindicate that belief by supporting political leaders who will enact
laws to that effect. In other words, secularisation in the formal sense of separation of
Islam and the state will not be enough without a transformation of the content of
Shari`a, as it is known and accepted by Muslims.
I am therefore calling for a combination of the two approaches to clarify the
relation between Islam and the state, while at the same time drastically reforming
certain aspects of Shari`a before of its powerful social and political role, even when it is
not enforced by the state as such. My argument for the first part of this combination is
on the view that, once applied by the state, Shari`a ceases to be the religious law of
Islam and becomes the political will of that state. Moreover, given the wide diversity of
opinion among classical scholars and schools of thought, any effort to enact Shari`a as
state law will necessarily exclude some of those contradictory views, thereby denying
Muslims their religious freedom of choice among equally valid and legitimate
interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunna.11 The possibility of drastic reform of the
content of Shari`a, even as a private religious normative system requires the
fundamental reformation of usul al-fiqh because every interpretation of the Qur’an and
Sunna, in the past, present or future, is necessarily a product of the historical context of
the Muslim society of that time and place.12
11
For an elaboration of this argument see my article, “Sharica and Positive Legislation: is an Islamic State
Possible or Viable?” In Eugene Cotran and Chibli Mallat, General Editors, Yearbook of Islamic and
Middle Eastern Law, vol. 5 (1998-1999). The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000, pp. 29-42.
12
On this approach and its possible outcome see An-Na`im, Toward an Islamic Reformation.