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J.G. STOESSINGER: WHY NATIONS GO TO WAR
WORLD WAR 1
Could it have been prevented?
Most of the statesmen who made the crucial decisions behaved like
fatalists. The terrible dénoucement (utgång) was foreseen, but couldn't
been prevented.
Historians have been afected by this fatalistic attitude (events passing
beyond men's control). Stoessingers view is that this is wrong - mortals
made the decisions basing their policies on fear, not facts.
The alliance system:
The common belief is that the system of competitive alliances dividing
Europe in two camps in 1914 was a principal factor that caused the war
to spread. Stoessinger critizises this view as a mechanistic one.
On july 5 Germany gave her ally Austria-Hungary full support to punish
Serbia. By late july however, when Austrian policy threatened a general
mobilisation in Russia on Serbia's behalf, Germany attempted to restrain
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her ally. In this attempt she failed but had Germany succeeded historians
would have had to credit the alliance system with the preventation of a
war.
This is the reason why Stoessinger wants to examine the leading
personalities of the time and the manner in which they perceived
(uppfattade) one another.
1. THE GERMAN ASSURANCE TO AUSTRIA "NIBELUNGENTREUE"
When the German Kaiser Wilhelm II heard about the assassination of
the Austrian crown prince Franz Ferdinand he was deeply chocked. He
liked the Austrian archduke and his wife and had just returned from
visiting the couple at their castle.
Wilhelm II had a mercurial (ombytligt) temper and he believed that the
assassination represented a profound threat to the monarchial principle
(he also believed that the Russian Czar (his cousin) would think the
same). The crowned heads of Europe (who all were relatives in some
way) would have to take a common stand against the threat of regicide
(kungamördare). This is why he wanted Austra to punish Serbia. On july
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5 he took the fateful step of assuring Austria that she could count on
Germany's faithful support even if it would bring her into conflict with
Russia (blank cheque to Austria).
The incredible fact is that the German Kaiser hadn't the slightest idea
what the Austrians would do. That this guarantee would entail military
support never occured to Wilhelm II (or his advisors). He also believed
that a common loyalty to monarchy would be a stronger bond than the
links of ethnic kinship - That the czar would support Wilhelm II against
his fellow slavs in Serbia.
The Kaiser used a special term for his pledge to Austria Nibelungentreue (from the mystical German sagas - Nibelungen). The
pledge of a Nibelung is a blood bond that is sacred and irrevocable - it
can never be retracted. Wilhelm therefore placed the fate of his nation in
hands of another power - Austria-Hungary, to take a desperate gamble.
2. THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA
In 1914, the fate of Austria-Hungary was in the hands of three men;
Emperor Francis Joseph, his foreign minister, Count Leopold von
Berchtold, and his chief of staff, Conrad von Hötzendorff.
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Francis Joseph was an exhausted and embittered old man; the wars he
had waged in the past had ended in defeat, his wife had been murdered
and his son died and now his nephew was murdered.
Probably he didn't want a conflict but he was manipulated by the two
others - maybe he didn't grasp (fatta) the cosequenses of the policies that
count Berchtold and his chief of staff were now pursuing
(eftersträvade).
Conrad von Hötzendorff, A-H:s chief of staff and head of the militarist
party in Vienna, believed passionately in the need to preserve his
nation's status as a great power. Serbia had to be dealt a punishing blow
quickly, before the situation deteriorated even further.
Count Leopold von Berchtold (foreign min.)
revealed a striking difference between his attitude towards Serbia
before Wilhelm II blank check and after. He shared Hötzendorffs
conviction that something had to be done to preserve Austria's great
power status but the German support convinced him that this was the
time to clear up Austria's Serbian problem once and for all.
Germany could thus be made to pay the price of Austria-Hungary's last
and fateful effort to remain a world power. Berchtold was the
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mainauthor behind the Serbian ultimatum - an ultimatum he was certain
Serbia would reject.
The Serbian ultimatum included demands for the dissolution of Serbian
nationalist groups, the dismissal of key military officers, the arrest of
leading political figures, and the right for A-H to implement
(genomföra) these measures to her complete satisfaction. Serbia was
given 48 h to respond.
The Serbian prince Peter and his ministers were deeply shaken. They
suspected that it was a pretext to eliminate Serbia as a sovereign state.
In deperation, the prince plead to the Russian Czar for help. Serbias
reply was conciliatory and accepted most of the Austrian demands. Only
those that would have abrogated (upphävt) Serbias sovereignity were
treated somewhat evasively (undvikande). When Serbia didn't yield on
every point Austria broke off diplomatic relations (july 25) and declared
war 3 days later. 29. july Belgrade was under bombardment.
During these fateful days Wilhelm II was on his yacht in the North Sea
but he didn't show any interest in the matter. When Austrian bombs fell
on Belgrade, Kaiser Wilhelm was compelled to face the dreadful
consequences of the headless pledge to Austria he had made.
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3. THE ANGLO-RUSSO-GERMAN CONNECTIONS
The war that broke out on july 28 was a localized conflict and the
Austrians gambled that it would remian so (The austrians thought yhat
the russian czar would sympathize with A-H for the cause of monarchy).
And even if this would be incorrect Count Berchtold was sure that
Wilhelm's guarantee would prevent Russian intervention.
The Russian imperial court was totally out of touch with the russian
people (Rasputin) and the Czar didn't control the situation. Russia's
foreign policy governed also by Foreign minister Sergei Sazonov and
the minister of war, Vladimir Sukhomlinov.
Sazonov was a glowing patriot embittered by Russias defeat in the
Russo-Japanese war 1905.
Sukhomlinov, the man responsible for Russia's preparations for war was
lazy and under the influence of both Rasputin and his subordinates. The
phrase "modern war" irritated him and he took pride in not having read
a military manual in 25 years.
When Serbia appealed for Russian help the people responded with
heated sympathy (hostile demonstrations against A-H). Sazonov, when
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informed of the Austrian ultimatum, was convinced that it was a pretext
(svepskäl) for Austrian aggression against Serbia (He accused the A-H:s
ambassador of setting Europe on fire). He warned Austria for war with
Russia. General Sukhomlinov agreed and thought that the war would
spread to a war between Russia-Germany. These are the reasons why
Russia mobilized its army.
With its declaration of war against Serbia, A-H had mobilized half of its
army (one idea had been to frighten off Russia by this move). Sazonov
viewed this as directed against Russia and decided to do the same (a
quick Russian action maybe would deter(avskräcka) Austria from
attacking Serbia.
When Wilhelm II was informed of the war and the partial Russian
mobilization he paniced. He decided to try to mediate between RussiaAustria. In this he was encouraged by Great Britain. This mediation is
called the Willy-Nicky correspondence while it was directly between the
cousins Wilhelm II (signed Willy) and Nicholas II (Nicky). In the past
direct personal messages had been helpful but this time it didn't. It
started of well but july 30 when Nicholas response to Wilhelms appeal
not to take any military actions arrived to Berlin it destroyed everything.
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In this cable Nicholas II told the German Kaiser that the decision on
partly mobilization had been made 5 days earlier. Wilhelm paniced and
thought that the czar had deceived Germany to gain time. Wilhelm II
came to the conclusion Germany had to mobilize too.
By the same afternoon the Kaiser's panic took on a quality of paranoia.
When the British foreign secretary (i Storbritannien termen för utr.min.)
Lord Grey warned Wilhelm of the consequences he thought it meant an
Anglo-Russian pact against Germany. When Lord Grey desperately
attempted to avert a general war, the Kaiser saw the British at the head
of a plot to attack and destroy Germany. This was the basis on which
Kaiser Wilhelm made his decision to strike first.
On july 31 Wilhelm proclaimed a "state of threatening danger of war"
and issued a twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia demanding
demobilization. When Russia refused Germany mobilized.
4. THE ARMED "MACHINERY" TAKES CONTROL
As emperors and statesmen on all sides gradually lost control, generals
and military staff began to dominate the scene. During the final period
before the outbreak of general war, one appaling fact becomes
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terrifyingly clear: the unrelenting (obevekliga) rigidity of military
schedules and timetables on all sides.
All these had been worked out in minute detail years before (f.e. The
Schlieffenplan 1905), in case war should come. Now that it was
imminent, each general was terrified lest his aversary (att inte hans
motståndare) move first and thus capture the initiative. Everywhere the
military staffs excerted mounting pressure on their chiefs of state to
move schedules ahead (probably as they done in the former Yugoslavia
today) so as to strike the first blow - all plans lacked flexibility - the
generals were captured by the view that once a plan was started there
was no going back - a mechanical process.
IN RUSSIA: When Nicholas II received Wilhelm II:s telegram in which
he pleaded not to take any military actions Nicholas withdraw his order
on full mobilization. The leading Russian generals thought this would
give the enemy the opportunity to mobilize more quickly than Russia.
Through Sazonov they succeeded in turning the Czars head.
IN AUSTRIA: The chief of staff, v. Hötzendorff had worked out a plan
to convert partial to full mobilization with a minimum of delay, which
he did when he receive news from Russia. This he did one day earlier
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than agreed upon with emperor Francis Joseph.
IN GERMANY: Wilhelm II paniced when he heard about the Russian
mobilization (aug. 1). The Kaiser was thinking on a war with Russia but
his general staff, in particular its chief, Helmuth von Moltke, thought
differently. The German generals were commited to the Schlieffenplan
(on France through Belgium due to the Franco-Russian alliance).
Wilhelm hesitated in front of a two-front war. In the meantime,
however, mobilization had been ordered, and the warmachine had begun
to roll. Desperately the Kaiser looked for a way out from a two-front
war. The idea; of giving the French province of Alsac autonomy in
exchange for French neutrality which also would mean England would
stay neutral. The Kaiser seized this chance for a one-front war and
immediately sent for Moltke. Moltke, a general totally lacking
flexibility, couldn't even think on reversing military decisions. He
refused though the German general staff had an alternative plan in their
files - one-front war against Russia only. Moltke convinced the Kaiser
that the German military machine couldn't be stopped, let alone
reversed.
IN FRANCE: p.m René Viviani feared that war would break out by
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accident and therefore, on july 30, ordered a 10 km withdrawal along
the entire French-German border. The French commander in Chief,
General J. Joffre regarded this as siucidal and pleaded to mobilise August 1 he succeedded in having it his way.
5. CONCLUSION
The perceptions (uppfattningar) of statesmen and generals were
absolutely crucial. Following dimensions of this phenomenon:
1. A LEADERS PERCEPTION OF HIMSELF
2. HIS PERCEPTION OF HIS ADVERSARY'S CHARACTER
3. HIS PERCEPTION OF HIS ADVERSARY'S INTENTIONS
4. HIS PERCEPTIONS OF HIS ADVERSARY'S POWER AND
CAPABILITIES
5. HIS CAPACITY FOR EMPATHY WITH HIS ADVERSARY
All the participants suffered from greater or lesser distortions
(förvanskningar) of themselves (honorable-pure) and their adversary's
(diabolical). Most of the leaders also failed to pay any attention to the
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world around them (ignoring both the reactions of their allied- and
potential enemycountries).
Finally, one is struck with the overwhelming mediocrity of the
personalities involved. The character of each of the leaders, diplomats,
or generals was badly flawed (bristfälligt) by arrogance, stupidity,
carelessness or weakness. There was a pervasive (genomgripande)
tendency to place the preservation of one's ego before the preservation
of the peace. There was little insight and no vision whatsoever. No
responsibility.
As a result of their weakness, a generation of Europe's young men was
destroyed and Europe totally ruined.
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THE END OF THE ARMED PEACE 1890 - 1914.
I. The breakdown of the Bismarckian system 1890-1907.
In the beginning of 1890 Bismarck resigned from his
office as German Chancellor. This had far reaching
consequences;
-Bismarcks resignation happened immediately before the
EXPIRY OF THE REINSURANCE TREATY signed between Russia
and Germany in 1887. This treaty had served the purpose
to preserve friendship with Russia alongside the
alliance with Austria.
There existed a considerable amount of opposition
against the Russo-German treaty inside the German
government and when Bismarck wasn't in office anymore
these forces succeeded in changing the course of German
foreign policy: Austrian hopes rose when Bismarck
resigned. In Vienna he had always been regarded as
incorrigibly (oförbätterligt) russian in his sympathies.
With the appointment of General Caprivi to the
chancellorship, the NEUE KURS policy went into
operation.
The fragile friendship with Russia was abandoned
(eventhough Russia had proposed a renewal of the Treaty
for 6 years). Instead the German government was hoping
on a closer relation with Great Britain. Caprivi's
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determination to establish closer relations with Britain
by the speedy conclusion, after years of haggling by
Bismarck, of the Heligoland-Zanzibar agreement of july
1890. This agreement was a deliberate attempt by Caprivi
to bring Germany's colonial and European policies into
line, by making concessions to Britain in Africa in
order to win her support in Europe (the exchange for
Heligoland for Zanzibar).
The Russian reaction came immediately: The country began
looking in the very direction which Bismarck had always
attempted to bloc - FRANCE.
There was already a considerable French investment in
Russia (development of the industry, communication,
machinery. By 1897 48% of her national debt were in the
hand of foreigners, predominantly French).
FRANCE WAS ONLY TO ANXIOUS TO ESCAPE HER OWN ISOLATION.
The formation of a Franco-Russian alliance wasn't the
only alternative.
1) France would have welcomed a closer relationship with
Germany but this was ruined by tactless behaviour of
Wilhelm II's mother on a visit to Paris (turned the
public opinion against Germany).
2) Some French groups would have preferred a British
alliance, but rivalry over Africa put this out of reach.
3) Russia was still thinking of the Reinsurance treaty,
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but when in june 1891 the triple alliance of Germany,
Austria and Italy was renewed and Italy's P.M. Rudini in
a statement stressed Italys good relations with Britain,
the Russians and the French FINALLY BECAME CONVINCED
THAT BRITAIN WAS ABOUT TO JOIN THE CENTRAL POWERS.
EVENTUALLY, in August 1892, A MILITARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS SIGNED.
1) IF FRANCE WERE ATTACKED BY GERMANY, OR BY ITALY
SUPPORTED BY GERMANY, RUSSIA WOULD ATTACK GERMANY.
2) IF RUSSIA WERE ATTACKED BY GERMANY OR BY AUSTRIA
SUPPORTED BY GERMANY, FRANCE WOULD ATTACK GERMANY.
3) IF ANY MEMBER OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE MOBILIZED THEN
FRANCE AND RUSSIA WOULD BOTH AUTOMATICALLY MOBILIZE
WITHOUT FURTHER CONSULTATION.
The agreement became official in 1894 when it had been
officially accepted by Alexander III and the French
government. Since it was technically a military
agreement the actual terms of the treaty remained
secret.
The treaty wasn't offensive in a way that something
would have been mentioned about aims like the return of
Alsac-Lorraine.
As a military agreement however, and the obligations
involved in it, it consisted the mechanism of the chain
reaction that led to the outbreak of war in 1914.
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"Mobilization is declaration of war" - General de
Boisdeffre.
GERMANY:
The immediate consequence of the Franco-Russian aliance
was to confirm the recent calculations of the military
in Germany and of the Naval experts in Great Britain.
The German General Staff had long thought of the
possibility of war on two fronts. But before the FrancoRussian alliance the plan had ben to hold a defensive
position in the west, while making for limited
objectives in the east.
This changed in 1891 when von Schlieffen became the new
Chief of the General Staff. Schlieffen abandoned the old
strategic and prefered an immediate attack on France.
Much later he devised a new scheme for a great outflanking movement through Belgium. Schlieffen calculated
that all would be over and France defeated in six weeks.
Then the German armies could be rushed across Germany by
railway to deal with the russians whose mobilization
would have been considerably slower.
The Schlieffen plan - an academic theory with some quite
big faults. Schlieffen didn't take in account;
-the possibility of French resistance after the French
army would have been knocked-out (although this had
happened in
1871).
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-He didn't realize the possible diplomatic consequences
of the violation of the Belgian neutrality (British
intervention).
-He ignored the possibility that Russia wouldn't wait
but attack Germany immediately while the German armies
would be occupied on the western front.
Schlieffen remained in his office until 1906 and his
plan continued to dominate all German military thought
and preparation until 1914 under his successor von
Moltke.
GREAT BRITAIN:
The main interest for Britain was to maintain a NAVAL
SUPREMACY. (Britain felt that a Naval supremacy was a
necessity while the country was isolated and with no
large conscript army). When other European nations began
expanding their naval power the British admirals got
alarmed. In the early 1890's the biggest concern came
from
the Russo-French alliance together with
investments on their fleets. In 1893 Britain proclaimed
THE TWO-POWER PRINCIPAL: Britains fleet should be equal
to the combination of the two next strongest navies
together.
The feeling of insecurity resulted in some means to
escape isolation.
-Alliance with France was ruled out due to colonial
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rivalry.
-An alliance with Germany seemed quite possible. But
when Germany miscalculated Britains dependance and
demanded that Britain should join the Triple Alliance
the agreement failed.
The isolation increased when;
-(1895)Britain was excluded from a Continental Group
(Germany, France, Russia), formed to put pressure on
Japan. France, Germany and Russia had interests in the
Far East which were threatened by excessive Japanese
influence (Sino-Japanese War, 1894). Japan was forced to
leave her mainland gains but Britain was not consulted,
despite her strong interests in the region.
-(1896)Britains problems with the Boers. Wilhelm II
showed his sympathy with the Boers (The Kruger
Telegramme, Wilhelm II tried to force Britain closer to
the Triple Entente by congratulating the Boer president
Kruger on having overcome the British threat 'without
appealing for the help of friendly Powers).
The
intention was to convince the British government of
their isolation and force the country into the Triple
Alliance.
But, all Wilhelm did achive was to anger the British
public opinion. Wilhelm didn't learn from this mistake
but tried to continued with his policy aiming to show
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the British how crucial the German friendship was to
Britain.
-In 1897 he tried to talk Nicholas II into a joint
action to prevent further British expansion.
-The next year he proposed the same to France.
Both attempts proved to be failures but all this raised
a anti-German feeling among the British.
-Meanwhile the Ottoman
Empire dealt with the Armenian
minority in a very brutal way (1893-98). Britain, Russia
and France all sent official protests but Germany
didn't. This episode raised strong anti-Turkish feelings
in Britain and at the same time opened the way to closer
diplomatic relations between Berlin and Constantinople.
The rift between Britain-Germany widened.
Britains need to break out of isolation increased even
more in the very last years of the century. Russia
settled her conflicts with Austria in 1898 and turned
her concentration on the policy in teh Far East. At the
same time both France and Germany also increased their
influence in the same area (the Chinese coast). Britain
needed an ally who would safeguard her own interests in
the Far East. Two attempts to establish a closer
relationship with Germany were made:
1) 1898 - failed while Wilhelm II couldn't see any
German interests to defend in Africa or the Far East.
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Germany were afraid Britain tried to use her in the
rivalry against Russia (and it was Germany, not Britain
who had a common border with Russia).
2) 1901 - the second British aproach but the germans
rejected this as well believing that Britain would be
bound to turn to them anyway. BUT MUCH HAD HAPPENED
BETWEEN 1898-1901 which actually had receded the
likelihood of an Anglo-German alliance:
-Germany cultivated her friendship with Turkey (the
building of a Berlin-Bagdad railway).
-The BOER WAR - made Britain very unpopular on the
continent (especially in Germany).
-The most important aspect: THE GERMAN DECISION TO BUILD
A NAVY. Wilhelm II calculated that Germany needed a
large navy as a tool to threaten Britain into a more
amenable (foglig) attitude. With admiral VON TIRPITZ as
minister of marine, a series of Navy laws were passed.
DIRECT THREAT TO BRITISH SECURITY. The public opinion
in both countries reacted very strongly, nationalistic
in this competitive matter.
THE LOSS OF THE CHANCE OF AN ALLIANCE WITH BRITAIN WAS
TO DEPRIVE GERMANY OF ROOM FOR DIPLOMATIC MANOEVRE MADE HER DEPENDENT UPON AUSTRIA AGAIN.
Eventually, in 1902, Great Britain found in JAPAN the
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partner that her particular interests required:
1. BOTH HAD REASON TO MISTRUST THE GROWTH OF RUSSIAN
INFLUENCE IN MANCHURIA
2. BOTH HAD RECENTLY FAILED TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH
RUSSIA
3. EACH RECOGNIZED THE OTHERS INTEREST IN CHINA (strict
neutrality if either were involved in a war with one
country, assistance if a war against two countries)
4. PREVENTED ANY RUSSO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE AIMED AT A
PARTITION OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN CHINA (Resulted in a
much more strict Japanese policy towards Russia causing eventually the Russo-Japanese war in 1904).
5. Eventhough it was a last-minute emergency-measure it
had the great advantage (for Britain) over a German
alliance of checking Russia in the Far East while
allowing Britain to remain free from commitment to a
continental bloc.
THE TERMS OF THE TREATY WERE PUBLISHED - TO PREVENT
FRENCH SUPPORT TO RUSSIA IN CASE OF A CONFLICT.
The French, anxious to avoid beeing dragged into a
Russo-Japanese War, began to look for an alignment that
would help to keep them out - Britain.(some agreement
with)
There existed a further motive for the French:
French control over Morocco.
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France had gained Italian acceptance (1902) (by
promising French acquiescence (samtycke) over the
further annexation of Tripoli by Italy) but needed
Britains approval to reach an agreement with Spain.
Britain-France established closer relations in 1903
(king Edward VII in Paris) and in 1904 The ENTENTE
CORDIALE was signed - settlement over the colonial
frontiers.
BUT before The Entente Cordiale was signed (1904) what
seemed to have been the worst possible French nightmare
became true - JAPAN ATTACKED RUSSIA ON 8 feb. 1904
without any official decleration of war.
Russia failed to gain control over the sea and was
swiftly defeated by Japan. France escaped a very
difficult situation when, through American mediation,
the war came to an end in september 1905.
The Russo-Japanese war had also made the British
sensitive to the risk
of an open conflict with Russia.
Eventhough France could take a breath of relief most
European Powers were shocked by Japans victory (and
especially the usage of new weapons like the torpedo and
the mine).
During the Russo-Japanese war (Russia faced her first
revolution, the final rehearsal according to Lenins
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statement) Germany regarded the situation with some
satisfaction hoping that a war between Great BritainRussia would break out (there existed a moment of great
tension in the relations). In Germany the political
leadership wished that in case of growing hostility
between Britain-Russia the latter would turn to Germany.
These hopes for an alliance were shattered by the French
who were determined to prevent a war where they would
have to choose between their alliance with Russia and
their new friendship with Great Britain.
FIRST MOROCCO CRISES
When Germany realised they lost this chance the next
steps taken aimed at wrecking the Anglo-French entente
and work towards some agreement with Russia. The place
where Germany could hit a splinter between BritainFrance was MOROCCO.
1) The last of March 1905 The German Kaiser made a
public statement that Germany would regard Morocco as an
independent country (with this Wilhelm hoped that a
crises would reveal the weakness of the Anglo-French
entente).
2) The same summer Wilhelm arranged a meeting with Tsar
Nicholas II in Finland. They agreed on a treaty of
defensive alliance against attack by any European Power
in Europe.
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Each of these schemes failed:
1) Over Morocco Germany did get their conference but it
didn't strengthen Germany's hand. The entente Powers
remained undivided and Italy supported them - The Triple
Alliance revealed to be the weaker of the two existing
alliances. Italy felt isolated, threatened by Austrian
interests in the Adriatic area and abandond by Germany.
This had resulted in
attempts to improve the French-
Italian relations. Italy got France's recognition for
their ambitions in Tripoli while Italy promised to back
up France in their attempts to get the control over
Morocco. (at the same time a wearisome tariffwar between
the countries was buried).
In 1902 Italian PM PRINETTI went as far as he promised
Italian neutrality in any Franco-German war, provoked by
Germany, in exchange for a completely free hand in
Tripoli and the promise of financial assistance.
THIS WAS NEVER UNDONE AND IT CERTAINLY UNDERMINED THE
EFFECTIVNESS OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.
The German provokation resulted in a closer relationship
between Britain-France.
2) The "Björkö" agreement was ratified by neither the
German or the Russian government (which had more power
than before due to the upheavals in 1905). The Russian
ministers were afraid of offending France.
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Germany was becoming more and more isolated. In October
1904 (during the Russo-Japanese war) Austria reached an
netrality agreement with Russia. It stated benevolent
(välvillig) neutrality in the event of war with a third
power. At the time one assumed that this third power
could have been Italy (in case of a war vith Austria).
This revealed that the Triple alliance wasn't a solid
one. Actually it also threatened the Dual alliance.
Britain's new foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey (who
from the beginning had been suspicious of German
methods), made his conclusions from the Moroccocrises;
He became convinced Britain had to stop the German
expansionist policy and at the same time re-establish
Russia as a factor in European politics. "An entente
between Russia, France and ourselves would be absolutely
secure. If it is necessary to check Germany, it could
then be done."
Germany became even more "encircled" in 1907 (31.8) with
the formation of THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE (not a
military treaty). The treaty was signed though the
public opinion
in Britain disliked it very much.
Russia's weakness (Japanese war) made her anxious to
find another friend. Germanys friendship with Turkey
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(Berlin-Baghdad railway) resulted in that Russia came to
the conclusion Britain represented a more loyal ally.
As Russia wasn't a threat to Britain's interests anymore
(in China) Britain's foreign policy aimed at preventing
Russia from drifting closer to Germany again
(Reinsurance Treaty).
In form the agreement was similar to the Anglo-French
agreements but during the negotiations Grey had hinted
that Britain in the future might agree to an alteration
of the rule of the strait's in Russia's favour (Black
sea fleet access to the Mediterranean).
The Russian view of the agreement was different; The
main task was to restore Russia's position as a great
power. One was not interested in new alignments that
would inevitably carry with them the risk of new
conflicts. As many limited agreements as possible
without commiting Russia against anybody.
The agreement was balanced by an agreement with Japan,
by a Russo-German agreement to maintain the status quo
in the Baltic and by proposals to the Austrians to
extend the agreements reached in 1897.
Izvolsky (foreign minister in Russia) critizesed Britain
for beeing to occupied with " weaving webs and forming
rings around Germany".
In Germany the reactions were obviously very strong 27
fear of encirclement eventhough the Anglo-Russian
entente didn't aim at this.
THE APPROACH OF WAR 1907-14
From now until the outbreak of the first World War
European relations were dominated by two general
factors;
A. THE RENEWAL OF RIVALRY BETWEEN RUSSIA-AUSTRIA OVER
THE BALKANS.
B. THE GROWING NAVAL COMPETITION BEETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN
- GERMANY.
A. There existed two main reasons for the end of the
diplomatic truce between Russia-Austria.
1) After the Russo-Japanese War and the Anglo-Russian
entente Russia TURNED HER ATTENTION BACK ONCE AGAIN TO
THE BALKANS.
2) After a coup d'etat (1903) in Serbia the country
embarked upon a PRO-RUSSIAN POLICY.
Austria adopted a very anti-Serbian policy from 1906
(with the appointment of a new foreign minister and
Chief of the General Staff).
In the beginning the relations between Austria-Russia
were not upset but in 1908-1909 the first crises
emerged.
In sept. 1908 the foreign ministers of Russia-Austria
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agreed that Austria could annex Bosnia (which had been
occupied since 1878), which would have been a major
setback for Serbia who had long hoped to gain these
provinces. In return Austria promised their support for
a Russian diplomatic action aiming at opening the
Straits.
The mistake made by Austria was that they didn't take
their commitments to seriously and almost immediately
proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia-Hertzegovina.
This offended Russia who swung around and supported the
serbs.
The crises lasted several months and it was the Central
Powers who were victorious.
-Germany backed up Austria while neither Britain or
France were to interested in supporting Russia's case.
Germany promised their full military support to Austria
and threatened Russia with mobilization. Russia was
forced to withdraw their support to Serbia.
THIS WAS TO HAVE AN SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON RUSSIA'S
ATTITUDE IN 1914.
THE BOSNIAN CRISES;
-also brought The Entente powers closer together
-Germany became bound to Austrias activities in the
Balkans - an interpretation of the Dual Alliance which
Bismarck never would have approved with.
29
-Anti-Austrian feelings rose in Serbia - THE BLACK HAND,
a secret organisation. One of the leaders, Colonel
Dragutin Dimitrievi´c (APIS), was chief of the
Intelligence Department of The Serbian General Staff.
B. At the same time the British and the Germans were
continuing to compete over the size of their respective
navies. THE DREADNOUGHTS, a new design of a all-big-gun
ship. The competition turned into rearmament race on
large scale from 1908-09.
THE SECOND MOROCCOCRISES (1911)
A local rebellion in Morocco resulted in French
intervention. Germany declared that France's action
nullified the Algeciras agreement (1906) and sent a
gunboat, the Panther, to Agadir.
The British government was alarmed lest (av fruktan att)
France and Germany might strike a private bargain which
might include the cession of Agadir to Germany as a
naval base on the Atlantic coast. Britain addressed an
warning to France and Germany that the Kingdom couldn't
be indifferent (likgiltigt) to these possible changes.
The war scare mounted throughout August, but in
September there was a financial panic (high finance was
troubled by the withdrawal of short-term French loans
30
which depressed the stock market) in Germany and the
crises slowly defused over the following two months. In
november 1911 a new agreement had been negotiated.
Germany secured part of the French Congo (with access to
the sea) in return of a French protectorate in Morocco.
In Britain there was relief that war had been averted
but at the same time many argued that it was necessary
to put an end to Germany bullying and for this a clear
British naval lead was vital.
There were mixed reactions inside Germany. Widespread
indignation over British and French policy coexisted
with relief that war had been averted. The nationalists
were furious. The Social Democrats opposed war. Among
German big business many were fearful of war, especially
with Britain. The German navy was unprepared for war.
Germany's ally Austria was unsympathetic, though
Aerenthal (foreign min.) expected an Anglo-German war in
two-three years.
The naval enthusiasts in Germany were furious and
demanded rearmament. Admiral Tripitz demanded a
supplementary naval bill in order to attain naval parity
with Britain by 1920, and he did succeed in gaining
increases in plans for construction.
All this, however was in conflict with the advice of the
German ambassador in London who warned that this will
31
only result in an even closer attachment between Britain
and France.
Eventhough many politicians of both Germany and Britain
worked to establish a closer relationship between the
countries the naval competition remained to a big
obstacle.
War had for the moment been averted but the threat to
the peace in Europe remained.
-In september 1911 (when the other Great Powers were
preoccupied with the second Moroccocrises) Italy
embarked (invecklade) upon a war with Turkey. Italy
wanted to extend their colonial power in North Africa
(Tripoli, Libya). Italy attacked Libya but when it
turned out that the war would not easily be won in
Tripolitania itself Italy extended the war to Turkey
itself (especially the Turkish Islands in the
Meditarenean. After peace talks (which resulted in the
treaty of Lausanne, October 1912) Tripoli was given to
Italy and Italy had to leave the occupied Islands (for
exampel Rhodes).
32
The politicians of Germany and Great Britain were by no
means happy about the growing naval competition after
the second Moroccocrises. It was this attitude that led
to the so called HALDANE MISSION, Lord Haldane was sent
over to Germany for negotiations. Britain offered
Germany support for an extension of her African Empire
in return for a halt to naval building. The visit came
to nothing, as Germany wouldn't stop her naval expansion
without concrete compensation.
The news of the Haldane visit did, however, have a
marked effect upon French diplomatic activity: Military
conversations led to a coordination of naval strategy. A
revolutionary change in British dispositions in that the
French in the future were to be responsible for the
Mediterranean, thus leaving the British free to
concentrate on their home waters and the Channel.
At the same time France was anxious to strengthen her
ties with Russia, which had not shown themselves to be
particulary effective during the crises of 1908 and
1911. Russia wanted to reinforce her position too.
In August 1912 the French P.M. Poincaré, visited Russia
33
and during his conversations a far wider interpretaion
of their existing agreements was attached:
According to the military treaty of 1892 French aid to
Russia would only follow an attack on Russia by Germany
or Austria assisted by Germany. The Bosnian crises of
1908, however, had made it clear that the problem was
complicated. If Serbia were threatened by Austria,
Russia might well find herself attacking Austria in
Serbia's defence, and if a German attack on Russia then
followed it might have been possible for France to argue
that Russia had brought this upon herself by her own
action (while everyone knew about Germany's obligations
towards Austria while Bismarck had made the terms in the
Dual alliance public in 1888) and that the FrancoRussian alliance therefore didn't become militarily
operative. The Poincaré visit now established the fact
that if such circumstances should arise, France would
regard herself as bound to support Russia.
THUS THE AGREEMENT SUPPLIED A FATAL LINK IN THE CHAIN OF
DIPLOMATIC COMMITMENTS; FOR WHEN IT IS TAKEN IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE GERMAN PROMISE TO MOBILIZE THE
MOMENT RUSSIA MOBILIZES (Moltke-Conrad correspondence
1909), IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SITUATION HAD BEEN FINALLY
CREATED WHEREBY A BALKAN CRISES COULD LEAD AUTOMATICALLY
TO A GENERAL WAR!
34
This was certainly not intentional. It sprang simply
from a desire to bolster up the Franco-Russian alliance.
THE SECOND BALKANCRISES
October 1912: Montenegro, swiftly followed by Bulgaria,
Greece and Serbia declared war on Turkey.
This was a crises entirely of the Balkan states' own
making but it changed the STATUS QUO in the area as the
aggressors were very victorious. RUSSIA had no intention
of letting Constantinople fall to Bulgaria, while
Austria was determined to prevent Serbia from gaining a
part of the Adriatic coast.
The Powers cooperated to impose an armistice and a peace
trety was signed on 30.5.1913 - The independent Albania
was created to prevent Serbia from extending her
frontiers to the Adriatic.
Serbia demanded areas of Macedonia as compensation for
the loss of the territories involved in the creation of
Albania. Bulgaria, confident of her own military powers,
opposed and declared war on Greece and Serbia. The war
was a disaster for Bulgaria who also had to confront
Turkey and Rumania. In the treaty of Bucharest (Aug.
1913) Bulgaria lost some of her recent gains as well as
the region of Dobruja (Rumania).
Serbia was greatly enlarged due to this treaty which
35
alarmed Austria (though the country accepted the
treaty).
FROM NOW ON, CONRAD (Chief of Staff) AND COUNT LEOPOLD
VON BERCHTOLD (P.M. since February 1912), thought to
seek a solution in a short war, followed by the
partition of Serbia. Wilhelm II made it clear that
AUSTRIA COULD COUNT ON GERMAN SUPPORT!
At the same time Europe experienced a mounting ARMAMENTS
RACE BETWEEN THE POWERS.
Even so, it was not impossible for the Powers to reach
agreement over some of their difficulties. In 1914
relations between Germany and Britain seemed to be
improving with conversations over Africa and an
agreement over the south of Persia.
Everything restaed on the situation in the Balkans and
it was here that the BLACK HAND organisation in Serbia
brought about the last fatal crises.
For some time APIS had been determined on a assasination
attempt. When the Austrian governor of Bosnia (General
Potiorek) in 1913 invited Francis Ferdinand, the heir to
the Habsburg throne, to attend army manoevres in Bosnia
in june 1914, Apis decided that this would be a perfect
victim.
In May 1914, when the three selected assasinators
36
already where in Bosnia, the P.M. of Serbia, Pa´si´c
seems to have heard something of the plot and was
concequently faced with a highly unpleasant dilemma. To
deounce it might lead to his own assassination by the
Black Hand and would in any case place Serbia in a
difficult diplomatic position; on the other hand, to let
it go forward might have some appalling concequences.
His reaction to the problem was to send a guarded
(diskret) warning to Vienna.
Francis Ferdinand duly attended the manoevres in june
1914 and on the last day of his visit proceeded with his
wife to pay a formal visit to Sarajevo. On the way to
the City Hall the bomb that was thrown at their car did
not harm them, but on the return journey, owing to a
remarkable series of mischances, their car came to a
halt within a few yards of the spot where GAVRILO
PRINCIP was standing. Princip shot them both and the
shots where mortal.
Nearly all those involved in the plot were captured by
the police. Their Serbian origin was undeniable and
BERCHTOLD AND CONRAD AT ONCE BELIEVED THAT THE FATE HAD
PRESENTED THEM WITH A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE WAR WHICH
WOULD ENABLE THEM TO CRUSH SERBIA.
Austria, however, dared not act without a blank cheque
from Germany. The Austrian appeal for support was
37
considered in Berlin 5 July.
The German government supported Austria, simply
envisaging a local war between the two countries.
On 23 July Austria presented Serbia with an overwhelming
ultimatum. It included terms no self-respecting state
could accept.
A few minutes before its expiry Serbia accepeted almost
all its conditions (The Serb reply impressed on Wilhelm
II). Austria was determined not to hold back. The
Austrians were still unable to prove a positive link
between the Sarajevo conspirators and the Serbian
government, and diplomatic intervention by the other
Powers might rob them of what seemed a golden
opportunity.
ON 28 JULY AUSTRIA, INSISTING THAT SHE WAS ONLY ENGAGING
IN LOCAL HOSTILITIES IN SELF-DEFENCE, DECLARED WAR ON
SERBIA.
PEACE TREATIES - SETTLEMENTS AFTER THE GREAT WAR
ESSAYQUESTIONS ON THE FIRST (GREAT) WORLD WAR
1. Why did the First World War last so long?
2. Why were the Central Powers defeated in the First
World War?
3. How far would you support the view that "amongst the
causes of the First World War, which was essentially a
38
European War, colonial issues were of little
importance"?
4. How valid is it to claim that Europe "stumbled into"
a world war in 1914?
5. "The new Europe" What would you regard as the
essential differences between the Europe after 1918 from
that of the years before 1914?
6. Describe the economic consequences of the First World
War on European countries and the United States.
7. Choose TWO battles or campaigns from the First World
War, and show how they affected the subsequent course
and eventual outcome of the war.
8. "Wars settle nothing." Examine the validity of this
claim with reference to the First World War.
9. How far do you agree that the reasons used to justfy
going to war are often modified during the course of war
The First World War)?
10. "Europe was not ready for war in 1914 and was
39
shocked when it broke out." Discuss.
11. To what extend did the First World War modify the
financial relations between the U.S.A and Europe?
12. "Every country lost the 1914-1918 war". Discuss.
13. The war at sea in 1914-1918.
14. Give an account of the main features of one
important battle which took place during the First World
War, and discuss its strategic consequenses.
15. What is meant by "total war" and how did it make
World War I different from previous wars?
16. Wars are basically exercises in military power for
the achievement of nationalistic goals. How reasonable
is this statement as a summary of the causes of the
First World War?
THE GREAT WAR
Nowadays we talk about the FIRST WORLD WAR, as a
forerunner of the second; but for the generation that
grew up after 1918 it was the GREAT WAR, an event of
40
unparallelled horror. For four years millions of men
faced each other in trenches across a shattered "No-mans
land".
The prevailing belief was in the swift 'knock-out blow'.
All the schemes, however, were upset by one
miscalculation:
The period of 'armed peace' since 1871 had deprived any
single country of that overwhelming superiority which
the 'knock-out blow' demended.
The Dual Alliance and the Entente Powers had created
something of a balance and, even after this failed to
preserve the peace, the crude military balance remained.
The outcome was to be a long, desperate war of attrition
(utnötningskrig).
The Entente Powers had a combined population of 238
millions against Germany-Austrias' 120 millions but the
Centralpowers were centrally placed and their forces
could thus enjoy closer coordination and greater
flexibility of movement between the eastern and western
fronts.
On 2 August 1914 Turkey had signed an alliance with
Germany but it was not until the end of October that she
took definite action against Russia with the bombardment
of Odessa.
41
If one compares the different armies:
The Central Powers:
The German army was big and probably the best in Europe.
On the other hand Austria-Hungary had quite a sizeable
army but orders had to be given in nine different
languages and the political reliability of some troops
was uncertain. Turkey had a smaller army but with German
officers and arms it could harass Russia in the south
and keep the Straits closed.
The Entente Powers:
Russia had the largest army while France probably the
most effective. The British Expeditionary Force was a
purely professional army but a very small one (the same
size as Belgiums' and only half the size of Serbias')
In naval strength, however, Britain had a fair lead over
Germany in modern battleships and a far greater one in
the older types of ship, although German submarine
strength was later to be a considerable treath.
THE UNSUCCESFUL SHLIEFFENPLAN
In the west all depended upon the great German sweep
through Belgium and France - the Schlieffenplan. The
idea was to knock out France in 6 weeks and then turn to
the east and Russia. But Germany was at war on two
42
fronts from 3 August 1914.
The first clash between the Russians and the Germans
took place in the middle of August, when Russia
responded a plea from France and attacked before their
mobilization was completed.
The German commander PRITTWITZ panicked and was replaced
by PAUL von HINDENBURG and his chief of staff
LUDENDORFF.
Afterwards Hindenburg always enjoyed the credit for the
victory over the Russian forces but actually the German
(very succesful) counterattack was drawn up (Max
Hoffman) and set in motion before Hindenburg and
Ludendorff arrived.
The Austrians had been less succesful. Eventhough it was
Austria who had lanched an attack on Serbia it was the
Serbian army who was victorious.
By 10 September Russia was ready for a great movement
which would probably have destroyed the Austrian forces,
had not Conrad heard of the plan in advance owing to the
remarkable RUSSIAN HABIT OF SENDING IMPORTANT MESSAGES
BY WIRELESS UNCODED - Austria withdrew their forces.
But German troops were needed to help Austria to stem
the Russian offensive, and the German warmachine was
forced to divide its energies between the various
theatres of war.
43
Meanwhile, in the west, a million and a half German
troops were commited to the Schlieffenplan - through
Belgium and France. British troops landed on the
continent on 8 August. Brussels was occupied on 20
August by German troops.
France counterattacked the 14 August but Germany
succeded in repulsing it after a week's hard fighting.
In the end of the month the fighting reached a crucial
stage.
French and British forces had to fall back towards
Paris. The plan that von Schlieffen had devised had
always assumed that the extreme right wing of the German
sweep would swing south only when it was well to the
west of Paris, whose defending forces would then be
swiftly enveloped (omringade). The Germans assumed
optimistically that the encirclement of both Paris and
the French front-line would cause the French to
surrender. After this the British would be persuaded to
negotiate a peace.
In the last days of August, however, some decisions
changed the whole character of the attack on France;
1) Four German divisions were sent from the western to
the eastern front.
2) von Moltke decided to strengthen the centre and left
44
flank as the German army began an attack on Verdun. This
reinforcement would definetily have been needed on the
right.
3) The German commander of the divisions who were
responsible of the swing west and south of Paris, von
Kluck, decided to wheel south while he was still east of
Paris (due to a gap between his army and the next German
army).
4) The German army ran short of shells after only six
weeks although they had provided five times more than in
1870. Underestimation of of the intesity of modern
warfare.
But one should remember that even with total
concentration of all forces on the right wing it had
always been very doubtful whether the German Army could
be strong enough to sustain a sweep of so wide a radius
as to pass to the west of Paris.
When von Kluck was forced to turn southwards his flank
became exposed and French forces counterattacked. (The
French had learned their lessons from Bismarck wars, and
they used their railway system to great advantage in
rapidly deploying their forces). The widening gap
between the German first and second armies resulted in
succesful movements by the British and Frensh forces.
45
Moltke became desperate by the thought that there might
be an allied breakthrough and therefore ordered the
German armies to pull back (to the river Aisne).
On the 14 September Erich von Falkenhayn, the Prussian
minister of War, replaced Moltke (who was dismissed) as
supreme commander. Germany tried desparetely to reach
the Channel ports (to cut off reinforcements from
Britain) but failed to do so despite the appalling
losses inflicted on the British and French, at the first
battle of Ypres.
Gradually the opposing lines of armies settled down to
digging themselves in, and the separate lengths of
trench began to link up in an elaborate (utförligt)
system of dugouts, reserve lines and communication
TRENCHES RUNNING intermittently (ojämnt) from the
CHANNEL TO THE SWISS FRONTIER.
46
THE EASTERN FRONT
Within a month of the start of the war in 1914, BRITAIN,
FRANCE AND RUSSIA SIGNED THE PACT OF LONDON, AGREEING
NOT TO MAKE PEACE SEPARATELY.
Geography nevertheless determined that they would fight
separate wars.
For the next three years trench warfare predominated on
the eastern and the western fronts. In the west,
however, the frontlines hardly moved at all. An 100
meter advance could cost tens of thousands of lives only
to be forced to pull back the same distance the
following day. A senseless massacre in which men
continued to be sent forward to their deaths in
thousands long after it was clear that the offensive had
failed
In the east, however there was room for manoeuvre and
the lines oscillated over considerable distances,
stretching from Espoo, Finland down to the Black Sea.
The OTTOMAN EMPIRE became involved in the war on the
side of the Central Powers in October 1914 and, in 1915,
the British attempted to open a supply route to Russia
through the Dardanelles, seeking now to open the Straits
and to knock-out Turkey of the war. But the attempt
didn't succeed - British and Australasian troops landed
47
on the GALLIPOLI peninsula in APRIL 1915, they
persevered in the enterprise throughout the year, but
the troops had to be evacuated in january 1916 (250 000
casualties, to no purpose) - Russia remained to a large
extent isolated from its Allies, almost always
desperately short of supplies, though not of manpower.
After the first Russian attacks on Germany the German
army succeeded in turning the tide.
In August 1915 the retreating Russians had to abandon
Warsaw (5.8) and, shortly afterwards, they were driven
from Poland, WHICH THE GERMANS DECLARED INDEPENDENT.
Much of Lithuania was taken.
Since the beginning of the war both sides had been
hoping to win over Bulgaria;
The Entente Powers had offered her Macedonia, but the
Central Powers were prepared to raise the bid with Greek
and Rumanian territory as well. In September Bulgaria
joined the war together with the Central Powers - this
resulted in a successful invasion of Serbia by the
Central Powers in mid-October.
The Entente Powers thus had no military success in 1915
but in the diplomatic field they did at least gain
ITALY. In a TREATY, SIGNED IN APRIL 1915, the Entente
48
Powers promised Italy TRIESTE, THE ISTRIAN PENINSULA AND
NORTHERN DALMATIA, as well as more hypothetical regions
in Asia Minor and among the German colonies in Africa.
ON 23 MAY ITALY DECLARED WAR ON AUSTRIA AND THE ITALIAN
ARMY EMBARKED UPON A LONG AND UNSUCCESSFUL ASSAULT on
the Austrian positions.
In 1916 Russia mounted an offensive, responding to an
appeal by their allies that they should distract the
Germans from the Western front (the French troops were
under hard pressure at Verdun and the Italian troops
were pushed back by the Austrian army).
The Russian General BRUSILOV launched a great offensive
before which the Austrian armies began to break up.
Due to early Russian successes Rumania became encouraged
to declare war on the Central Powers (August 1916)
The Germans had to rush forces from the western front
and the Austrians halted their offensive against the
Italians.
Hindenburg succeeded once again in turning the tide.
Russia lost half a million men, the Russian army was
forced to retreat and the GERMANS SWEPT INTO RUMANIA.
The succession of defeats, the heavy casualties, and the
apparent hopelessness of the war against far better
49
equipped German forces, increased the discontent within
Russia.
IN FEBRUARY 1917 NIKOLAJ II WAS OVERTHROWN.
50
OVERSEAS
Outside Europe the results were more decisive;
In South Africa the German forces were crushed in German
South-West Africa. Togoland was overrun by British,
French and Belgian troops and only in Tanganyika did the
Germans manage to put up a resistance.
In the Pacific, Japan, Australia and New Zeeland helped
themselves to the German Island colonies.
Almost the entire German Naval Force outside South
America was destroyed and Britain could safely claim she
ruled the waters.
In the near and Middle East the allied forces met with
gradual success against the Turks. After some failures
the Entente Powers achieved successes from the summer
1916 when the Arabs revolted against the Turks (T.E.
Lawrence). But eventhough the Entente Powers did achieve
some victories they were by no mean superior by the end
of 1917.
51
THE LAST TWO YEARS, 1917-1918
Four dramatic events changed the course of the war in
1918.
1. THE ENTRY OF THE USA IN APRIL 1917 (2.4) - fresh
troops and equipement on the western front.
2. TREATY OF BREST LITOVSK IN MARCH 1918 - The
Bolshevistic Russia pulled out of the War and the
Central Powers had a complete victory on the eastern
front.
3. FROM MARCH 1918 GERMANY COULD SWING ALL HER FORCES
INTO A GREAT WESTERN OFFENSIVE.
4. WHEN THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE HAD SPENT ITSELF BY THE
MIDDLE OF THE SUMMER THE REINFORCED ALLIED ARMIES BEGAN
DRIVE THE GERMANS BACK IN A RETREAT WHICH ENDED IN AN
ARMISTICE IN NOV. 1918.
1. WHY DID USA JOIN THE ENTENTE POWERS IN THE WAR?
In 1916 US President W. Wilson had been reelected while
he had promise to keep his country out of the war. The
52
public opinion was against an intervention. The attitude
switched due to some events;
-While Germany was afraid that USA would join the war
due to the German Submarine campaigns(on civil targets)
the country started preparing itself on a war against
USA. In Jan. 1917 the German foreign minister,
Zimmerman, dispatched a telegram in code to the German
minister in Mexico City in which he described his plans
for stimulating a Mexican invasion across the Rio Grande
in the event of the US entering the war. This message
was intercepted by the British, decoded, and after being
passed on to Washington, actually appeared in the
American press.(Which proves that the US government also
wanted to swing the attitudes of the antiinterventionists).
-From february 1917 Germany embarked upon a unrestricetd
submarine campaign. Any ship going in to a enemy port
was regarded as enemytargets. This German campaign swung
the American opinion around.
(-One has to remember the fact that Germany had no
direct contact with USA from the very start of the war
due to the fact that Britain did cut off the German
caples over the Atlantic. USA got their picture of the
53
European war mainly by Britain.)
54
2. Britain and France gained an ally in USA but lost
their principal ally in the east;
-After the Russian revolution in February the new
temporary government promised to pull Russia out of the
war (this was one of the main reasons to the spontanious
revolution). BUT KERNSKIJS GOVERNMENT DIDN'T KEEP THIS
PROMISE TO THEIR PEOPLE AND MADE A SECRET AGREEMENT WITH
BRITAIN AND FRANCE TO CONTINUE THE WAR (Russia was
promised vast landareas). This decision and the
continuing misery resulted in the OCTOBERREVOLUTION
during which Lenin and the Bolshevikr managed to seize
the power. The communists rising popularity could be
explained by their promises to the people - PEACE, BREAD
AND LAND. After difficult negotiations with the Germans
(and a division between different bolshevikleaders) the
peace between the Central Powers and Russia was signed
55
on 3 MARCH 1918. A very favourable peace for Germany
which the Russians didn't forget.
The Allied representatives, inquired what possibilities
there were of keeping Russia in the war. But as they
wanted to get rid of the Bolsheviks this came to
nothing. Besides, the British and the French had no
troops to send. All they could offer was Japanese
assictance in the Far East which only alarmed the
Bolsheviks, while they knew that the Japanese were only
interested to grab Russian territory for themselves.
With the peacetreaty Russia lost all the conquests that
the Tsars had made during the last two hundred years.
THE BALTIC STATES, POLAND, EVEN THE UKRAINE, BECAME
THEORETICALLY INDEPENDENT. In practice, they were added
to the German Empire.
3. When the war on the eastern front ceased Germany
could switch a vast number of troops to the western
front for an ALL-OUT OFFENSIVE BEFORE THE ALLIES HAD
BEEN TO STRONGLY REINFORCED BY THE NEW AMERICAN
CONTINGENTS. But one has to remember that the Germans
distrusted the Russians and German divisions remained on
the eastern front - some to extract grain from the
peasants, the rest as a precaution against the imaginary
Red Army.
56
Actually although America's entry brought limitless
recources to the Allied side this didn't take place at
once but only in a comparetively distant future. The US
had a great navy but virtually no army. Millions of men
had to be conscripted and trained. There were few
munition factories. Tanks, Guns and even rifles had to
be supplied by the British and the French, not the other
way around. The americans needed all their recources for
themselves. Thus, America's entry into the war brought
at first handicaps, not immediate aid. And this was
something the Germans knew as well.
Time was working against the Germans. The Allied
blockade was causing grave shortages, more of industrial
raw materials than of food. American troops were
arriving in France in growing number. Austria-Hungary
was creaking in at the joints.
The Germans had no new weapons with which to mount an
offensive. Nor had Ludendorff much superiority in men,
even after the Germans brought over 52 divisions from
the east front.
The reinforced German army was quite succesful but
although the allies suffered very numerous casualties so
did the Germans. The allied lines were pushed back but
they held. The last German offensive came on 15 July.
(During the spring the first shells fell in Paris from
57
an enormous German gun, Big Bertha, 71 miles away. The
Royal Air Force came into existence on 1 April 1918.)
4. Germany couldn't take this, at the end not very
successful, offensive. The fighting spirit vanished
while that decisive victory, so often promised, didn't
arrive. (The Allied armies, on the other hand gained new
confidence from each blow that was beaten off) There
existed a growing discontent in Germany; widespread
strikes and a mutiny among bored sailors at Kiel. The 8
August the Allies launched their very successful
counterattack and from this time on the Germans were
constantly on retreat (by now the Americans had joined
as well). This shattered the faith in victory among the
Germans. Now they only wanted to end the war.
The 11 August Wilhelm II concluded that Germany was
going towards defeat and the war had to be ended.
By the end of September Bulgaria had surrendered, Turkey
was under very heavy pressure and the Italian army had
broken through the Austrian frontlines. On 29 September
Ludendorff insisted that there must be an immediate
armistice. He feared that the Allies would break
through. This was due to the fact that Bulgaria had
pulled out of the war the same day.
Ludendorff imagined that an armistice would permit the
58
German armies to withdraw and then to stand on a more
formidable defensive position in their own country.
When the civilian ministers in the German government
objected that the Allies would impose harsh terms on a
'militaristic' Germany, Ludendorff at once produced an
solution; there must be an revolution from above. The
German people learnt, much to their surprise that
Germany had become a democratic country by order of the
High Command (This way responsibility was passed on to
the civilians as well, but fewe thought about this).
Prince MAX VON BADEN, a prince with a liberal
reputation, was appointed chancellor. Social Demokrats
joined the government. Lundendorff and the other
generals regarded this as window-dressing to deceive the
Allies. But it didn't stop there. The Press was freed
and the left-wing opponents of the war couldn't be
silenced no longer.
Meanwhile negotiations with Germany had begun.
THE ARMISTICE WAS SIGNED 11.11.1918 AT 11 O'CLOCK.
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
The situation in Austria had been very bad since 1917
when the country tried to start peacenegotiations, which
failed.
To break the Austrian resictance in 1918 the Allies
59
appealed to the different nationals, axcept the Germans
and the Hungarians.
THE CZECHS ASKED TO BE RECOGNIZED AS AN ALLIED NATION.
Czech prisoners of war in Russia had been assembled in
order to return home across Siberia and the Pacific. In
the general confusion they organized their own legion,
their own movement along the Trans-Siberian railway. At
first the Bolsheviks regarded them with an friendly eye,
then came to believe that they were secret agents for
counter-revolution or Allied intervention. On May 14
Czechs and Hungarians quarrelled at the Siberian station
of Chelyabinsk. The Czech legion won control. The
Bolshevik Government, in alarm, ardered that the legion
should be disarmed. Instead the Czech legion seized the
entire railway from Samara to Irkutsk.
With this the Czechs became heroes in the Allied eyes;
representatives of a great democratic principle, yet
also the spearhead of intervention against the
Bolsheviks.
Allied intervention in Russia could be presented as a
move to rescue the Czechs and the Allies agreed on a
Japanese intervention in Siberia.
In this way the Allies got an other war on their hands
before they had finished the first. The Czechs received
their rewards. They were rcognized as a people
60
struggling to be free and a people who had established
their right to their own state. This spelled doom to the
Empire of the Habsburgs. It could survive loss of
territory in the outposts, to Serbians or Rumanians but
an independent Czechoslovakia cut out its heart.
61
EUROPE AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR
The Peace Settlement
The Peace conference assembled in Paris in January 1919,
only two months after the fighting had stopped. The
leaders of 32 countries, representing between them some
3/4 of the world's population.
Nowhere more than in Paris, however, was the atmosphere
charged with hatred of the Germans. Most of the advice
which flooded over the peacemakers at the conference was
'to make Germany pay'.
The French at least believed that one of the principal
purposes of the conference was to humble Germany still
further, and to complete its humiliation.
The peacemakers had to re-draw the map of Europe, and to
deal with other Central Powers as well as Germany;
THEY AIMED TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS OF EVERLASTING PEACE.
Nevertheless the statesmen felt the necessity to work
quickly, partly because they needed to turn their
attention to urgent problems at home.
The peacesettlers had to deal with vast problems and
they had to overcome divisions among themselves.
Decisionmaking was confined to the victorious Allies
(US, Britain, France, Italy and Japan) and the
62
conference was dominated by the COUNCIL OF TEN (2
members /each country). But the keyfigures, and the men
who took many of the decisions in private discussions,
were Pres. Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau, the
French p.m. who presided over the conference.
Lloyd George had been re-elected as p.m. at the end of
1918. Wartime propaganda and a heated election campaign,
in which there was a talk of hanging the Kaiser. He had
to support the peaceterms which would humble Germany.
Both Wilson and Lloyd George had frequently to give way
to Clemenceau who pointed out that the recent war had
not been fought on American or British soil. Twice in
his lifetime C. had seen German armies in France and he
wanted to ensure that this wouldn't happen again.
Clemenceau was backed up by Marshal Foch, allied
commander in chief during the final stages of the war,
who was present at the peacenegotiations and could be
relied on to ensure that Clemenceau didn't moderate his
stance. Similar sentiments inspired the Italians.
Orlando, the p.m., was well aware that if he failed to
deliver great territorial and economical gains he would
be charged with betrayal by more extreme nationalist
elements seeking to expand their political influence.
PUBLIC OPINION IN THE ALLIED COUNTRIES
One of the most important factors influencing the shape
63
of the peace settlement was the strength of popular
feeling in Britain, Italy and, more particulary, the
countries invaded by German troops during the war;
France and Belgium. The popular press had developed
during the war into a major influence on the formation
of public opinion. With leading articles often presented
in grossly oversimplified terms , it played its part in
raising the temperature of attitude and debate. It also
ensured that the peacemakers in Paris had to negotiate
in the full glare of publicity, knowing that details of
their discussions would be carried the next day in
newspaper columns throughout the world.
WARTIME TREATIES AND COMMITMENTS
A lot of secret diplomatic agreements were made during
the course of the war. When the full extent of the
secret wartime diplomacy was revealed, and the
beneficiaries called in their debts at the peace
negotiations, much argument and bitterness ensued. italy
was one such beneficiary. The price of the Italian
warentry had been set up in the secret treaty of London,
signed by all four nations on 26 April 1915. In addition
to somewhat vague assurances that she would receive a
'just share' in any partition of the Ottoman Empire and
further territory if Britain and France annexed any
German colonies, Italy was promised sovereignity over
64
the Dodecanese islands and major territorial gains at
the expence of the Habsburg Empire; to her north, the
German speaking Alpine regions of Trentino and South
Tyrol, and , across the Adriatic Sea, Istria and part of
Dalmatia, both Slav-populated. If these specific
promises materialized, almost a quarter of a million
German speaking Austrians and well over a half a million
Slavs and Turks would find themselves incorporated into
the Italian kingdom. This would have threatened the
establishment of a strong Serbia and a stable Albania.
It would also run completely cuonter to any attempt to
reorganize Europe after the war on lines of
selfdetermination. Italian demands posed major problems
for the peacemakers.
The collapse of the Tsarist Russia saved Britain and
France from even worse problems concerning wartimeagreements with Russia.
IN 1915-1916 Britain had promised that Britain would
recognize and support the independence of the Arabs on
vast areas south of Turkey. Greece had entered the war
in 1917. It was clearly going to be very difficult to
reconcile Italian ambitions with those of France and
Greece in the Far east, or to adjudicate (tilldöma) on
the claims of Arabs and Jews in Palestine (in 1917
Balfour declaration promising a national home in
65
Palestine for the Jewish people).
Japan, which entered the war in 1914, had last no time
in seizing the German Pacific possessions north of the
equator. However, the ruling warlord coalition in
Peking, which itself declared war on Germany in August
1917, didn't accept Japanese claims on Chinese
territory.
THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES
To WIlson, the outbeak of the war was tangible proof of
the failure of traditional European diplomacy,based on
balances of power, armed alliances and secret
negotiations. What Wilson sought to construct was a more
just and equitable system of international relations,
based on
PEACE TREATIES - SETTLEMENTS AFTER THE GREAT WAR
EUROPE AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR
The Peace Settlement
66
The Peace conference assembled in Paris in January 1919,
only two months after the fighting had stopped. The leaders
of 32 countries, representing between them some 3/4 of the
world's population.
Nowhere more than in Paris, however, was the atmosphere
charged with hatred of the Germans. Most of the advice
which flooded over the peacemakers at the conference was
'to make Germany pay'.
The French at least believed that one of the principal
purposes of the conference was to humble Germany still
further, and to complete its humiliation.
The peacemakers had to re-draw the map of Europe, and to
deal with other Central Powers as well as Germany;
THEY AIMED TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS OF EVERLASTING PEACE.
Nevertheless the statesmen felt the necessity to work
quickly, partly because they needed to turn their attention
to urgent problems at home.
The peacesettlers had to deal with vast problems and they
had to overcome divisions among themselves. Decisionmaking
was confined to the victorious Allies (US, Britain, France,
Italy and Japan) and the conference was dominated by the
COUNCIL OF TEN (2 members /each country). But the
keyfigures, and the men who took many of the decisions in
private discussions, were Pres. Wilson, Lloyd George and
Clemenceau, the French p.m. who presided over the
conference.
Lloyd George had been re-elected as p.m. at the end of
2
1918. Wartime propaganda and a heated election campaign, in
which there was a talk of hanging the Kaiser. He had to
support the peaceterms which would humble Germany. Both
Wilson and Lloyd George had frequently to give way to
Clemenceau who pointed out that the recent war had not been
fought on American or British soil. Twice in his lifetime
C. had seen German armies in France and he wanted to ensure
that this wouldn't happen again.
Clemenceau was backed up by Marshal Foch, allied commander
in chief during the final stages of the war, who was
present at the peacenegotiations and could be relied on to
ensure that Clemenceau didn't moderate his stance. Similar
sentiments inspired the Italians. Orlando, the p.m., was
well aware that if he failed to deliver great territorial
and economical gains he would be charged with betrayal by
more extreme nationalist elements seeking to expand their
political influence.
PUBLIC OPINION IN THE ALLIED COUNTRIES
One of the most important factors influencing the shape of
the peace settlement was the strength of popular feeling in
Britain, Italy and, more particulary, the countries invaded
by German troops during the war; France and Belgium. The
popular press had developed during the war into a major
influence on the formation of public opinion. With leading
articles often presented in grossly oversimplified terms ,
it played its part in raising the temperature of attitude
and debate. It also ensured that the peacemakers in Paris
had to negotiate in the full glare of publicity, knowing
3
that details of their discussions would be carried the next
day in newspaper columns throughout the world.
WARTIME TREATIES AND COMMITMENTS
A lot of secret diplomatic agreements were made during the
course of the war. When the full extent of the secret
wartime diplomacy was revealed, and the beneficiaries
called in their debts at the peace negotiations, much
argument and bitterness ensued. italy was one such
beneficiary. The price of the Italian warentry had been set
up in the secret treaty of London, signed by all four
nations on 26 April 1915. In addition to somewhat vague
assurances that she would receive a 'just share' in any
partition of the Ottoman Empire and further territory if
Britain and France annexed any German colonies, Italy was
promised sovereignity over the Dodecanese islands and major
territorial gains at the expence of the Habsburg Empire; to
her north, the German speaking Alpine regions of Trentino
and South Tyrol, and , across the Adriatic Sea, Istria and
part of Dalmatia, both Slav-populated. If these specific
promises materialized, almost a quarter of a million German
speaking Austrians and well over a half a million Slavs and
Turks would find themselves incorporated into the Italian
kingdom. This would have threatened the establishment of a
strong Serbia and a stable Albania. It would also run
completely cuonter to any attempt to reorganize Europe
after the war on lines of selfdetermination. Italian
demands posed major problems for the peacemakers.
The collapse of the Tsarist Russia saved Britain and France
4
from even worse problems concerning wartime-agreements with
Russia.
IN 1915-1916 Britain had promised that Britain would
recognize and support the independence of the Arabs on vast
areas south of Turkey. Greece had entered the war in 1917.
It was clearly going to be very difficult to reconcile
Italian ambitions with those of France and Greece in the
Far east, or to adjudicate (tilldöma) on the claims of
Arabs and Jews in Palestine (in 1917 Balfour declaration
promising a national home in Palestine for the Jewish
people).
Japan, which entered the war in 1914, had last no time in
seizing the German Pacific possessions north of the
equator. However, the ruling warlord coalition in Peking,
which itself declared war on Germany in August 1917, didn't
accept Japanese claims on Chinese territory.
THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES
5
To WIlson, the outbeak of the war was tangible proof of the
failure of traditional European diplomacy,based on balances
of power, armed alliances and secret negotiations. What
Wilson sought to construct was a more just and equitable
system of international relations, based on clear
principles of international law and centred on a universal
association of nations working through agreed prodcedures
to maintain world order. Wilson believed that the United
states should take the lead in the creation of such a
system - the extension of democracy throughout the World.
When the 14 points were first outlined, German newspapers
were scatching, denouncing them as hypocritical but as
defeat loomed nearer the German tune changed. Wilson's
peaceprogramme and general attitude appeared to promise
some protection for Germany against punitive French and
British demands. The Allies, on the other hand were far
from happy with the 14-point programme. Lloyd George
objecting in particular to point 2, which would rule out
future naval blokades by Britain, and Clemenceau insisting
that Germany's agreement to pay compensation ' for all the
damages done to the civilian population of the Allies and
their property' be written in.
The USA med it clear however that unless the allies toed
the line, she would conclude a separate peace with Germany.
Wilson informed the Germans of the allied acceptance of his
peaceprogramme with the addition of the two reservations.
The armistice terms were severe onn Germany but not very
harsh. Fear that Germany might be provoked to fight on, or
6
that she might be left to weak to cope with Bolshevikinspired uprisings saw to that. The blokade of Germany was
to continue until peace terms had been settled and
accepted.
Even before the armistice had been signed, however,
Wilson's position at the forthcoming peacecongress as the
spokesman for American aims had been dealt a savage blow.
The Republicans were victorious in the mid-term elections
(nov. 1918) and won majority in both Houses of Congress.
Since any peace treaty to which the United states was a
party would require approval by 2/3 majority in the Senate
(now Republican-controlled), the President's chances of
gaining acceptance at home of any settlement he might
negotiate on the basis of his 'Fourteen points' were
seriously imperilled. Wilson no longer spoke authoritavely
for his country.
MAKING THE PEACE
The French government urged that major issues should be
trashed out privately between the 5 leading powers at
sessions of the Supreme War Council. Wilson managed to
ensure that, in the early stages of the conference, the
smaller powers participated in a wide range of general
discussions. However, as soon as the discussions switched
to more contenious issues like the disposition of ex-German
colonies and the territorial claims in Europe of allies
such as Serbia, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and
Denmark, the leading powers increasingly settled them by
mutual negotiations and agreement, without reference to
7
plenary sessions of the conference. Disputed points were
referred back to the Council of Ten or its successor, The
Council of Four 'THE (Britain, USA, France and Italy).
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
At the insistence of President Wilson, this was the first
issue dealt with at the peace conference. A commission was
set up to draft a constitution for the new international
organization. French attempts to fashion the League as a
military alliance which could automatically be directed
against potential aggressors failed completely.
To work towards the establishment of a more peaceful
international order, member states agreed to respect and
preserve the 'territorial integrity and existing political
independence of all Members of the League'. Wilson
succesfully pressed for inclusion in the League covenant of
extra clauses, 1) reaffirming the validity of international
engagements or 'regional understandings like the Monroe
Doctrine., 2) member states could leave the League if they
so wished after giving two years' notice, 3) stipulating
that if disputes arose from domestic sources they could not
be considered by the League.
MILITARY AND NAVAL TERMS
Disputes also arose over the naval and military terms of
the peace settlement. Conserning the German Fleet the
8
germans solved the problem themselves by sinking their
Fleet on 21.6.1919, whwn it had become clear that, whatever
was decided, the ships would not be allowed to return to
Germany. Germany was forbidden to possess submarines or
naval aircraft in the future. The Navy was cut down to a
minimum (max. 1500 officers).
As the navy the army was also to be strictly limited and to
be forbidden the use of tanks, military aircraft or heavy
artillery. 100.000 in size and on a volunteer basis (no
conscriptions).
During the 1920s, allied commissioners repeatedly
complained that Germany was not complying with the
peaceterms relating to German disarmament. Germany replied
that neither did the allies undergoing any disarmament, and
therefore Germany should be allowed to re-arm.
REPARATIONS
No single issue caused more acrimony (bitterhet, hätskhet)
at the peace talks than the question of reparation
payments. Germany agreed to pay compensation for damage
caused by German aggression 'by land, by sea and from the
air'. But how was the damage to be assessed, and was
Germany to pay for all of it.
The French, who had taken huge loans themselves to cover
the costs of fighting, expected that German finance would
cover the costs of restoration of invaded territories and
repayment of wardebts (one aim was also to keep Germany
financially and economically weak).
9
This was not in Britain's long-term interests. Especially
the economist J.M. Keynes pointed out that Britain's postwar economic recovery was crucially dependent on a general
revival of trade. Before 1914 Germany had been one of
Britains best customers and was needed as such again. A
Germany heavily in debt to the allied powers would not be
able to buy British goods in sufficient quantities. Lloyd
George was in a dilemma; If Germany was only to pay for
direct war damage caused, Britain would receive a very
small part of the total payment. He succeeded in persuading
his colleagues to include war pensions, and separation
allowances (underhåll, traktamenten) and Britain was to
receive a larger sum from Germany whos liability
(ansvarsskyldighet) would be vastly increased.
US tried to limit Germany's liability by basing it on her
ability to pay. In pursuit of this aim John Foster Dulles
(later to be heard of) proposed that a formula be adopted
requiring Germany to admit a moral and theoretical
responsibility for the entire cost of the war, while
accepting an actual liability for only civilian damage. His
formula was in corporated into the Treaty of Versailles as
art. 231, which became known as the 'war guilt' clause.
The cluse, more than any other in the entire Treaty, was to
cause lasting resentment in Germany, but ironically it was
inserted in order to provide a clear basis on which
reparations could be exacted, and to limit the overall sum.
Germany was in fact to be liable only for 'civilian
damage', except in the case of Belgium which was to receive
10
from Germany her full war costs, because her invasion had
been a violation of the treaties which in 1839 had
guaranteed Belgian neutrality.
The consequence of all conflicting pressures was that the
exact total of reparations to be paid by Germany was not
stated in the Treaty of Versailles. Instead a reperations
Commission, comprisisng representatives of
the leading
allied powers+Belgium was established, to settle the figure
after detailed consideration. The Germans angrily
complained that they were beeing asked to sign a 'blanque
cheque'.
In fact the delay in naming the sum worked in Germany's
advantage. in 1921, Germany's liability to pay was
established at 6000million (30.000million-demand in 1919)
Pounds, and even this sum was progressively reduced and
payments recyckled to ease her burden.
German nationalists made tremendous political capital out
of the sums demanded, though the German nation succeeded in
evading payment on anything but the most nominal level. At
the same time, reparations wrangles and demands from the
USA for repayment of wardebts set the allied powers at each
other's throats, and was one of the most important faactors
which drove them apart after 1919.
VERDICT ON THE PEACE TREATIES
The Treaty of Versailles was completed in great haste at
the end of April, and handed to German representatives on 7
may. Few of its 440 clauses had not been subject of intense
11
bargaining and serious disagreement, and while it had been
the original intention to invite the enemy delegates to
join the confence when a preliminary peace settlement had
been drawn up, the difficulties of reaching a settlement at
all made this impossible. The Germans were given 15 days,
later extended by a week, to comment on the Treaty, and
this they did on great length. German objections reinforced
growing feelings, particulary amongst the British, that the
treaty was to harsh. Some critisized it for departing so
radically from Wilson's 14 points (Keynes) while other
thought that the over all effect were too much (Lloyd
George). There was therefore an eleventhhour attempt by the
British delegation to pess for modifications in response to
the German objections. The demand for a plebiscite in
Upper-Silesia was accepted but Wilson in particular took a
strong stand against making changes at this late stage. The
Treaty was signed 28.6.1919.clear principles of
international law and centred on a universal association of
nations working through agreed prodcedures to maintain
world order. Wilson believed that the United states should
take the lead in the creation of such a system - the
extension of democracy throughout the World.
When the 14 points were first outlined, German newspapers
were scatching, denouncing them as hypocritical but as
defeat loomed nearer the German tune changed. Wilson's
peaceprogramme and general attitude appeared to promise
some protection for Germany against punitive French and
British demands. The Allies, on the other hand were far
12
from happy with the 14-point programme. Lloyd George
objecting in particular to point 2, which would rule out
future naval blokades by Britain, and Clemenceau insisting
that Germany's agreement to pay compensation ' for all the
damages done to the civilian population of the Allies and
their property' be written in.
The USA med it clear however that unless the allies toed
the line, she would conclude a separate peace with Germany.
Wilson informed the Germans of the allied acceptance of his
peaceprogramme with the addition of the two reservations.
The armistice terms were severe onn Germany but not very
harsh. Fear that Germany might be provoked to fight on, or
that she might be left to weak to cope with Bolshevikinspired uprisings saw to that. The blokade of Germany was
to continue until peace terms had been settled and
accepted.
Even before the armistice had been signed, however,
Wilson's position at the forthcoming peacecongress as the
spokesman for American aims had been dealt a savage blow.
The Republicans were victorious in the mid-term elections
(nov. 1918) and won majority in both Houses of Congress.
Since any peace treaty to which the United states was a
party would require approval by 2/3 majority in the Senate
(now Republican-controlled), the President's chances of
gaining acceptance at home of any settlement he might
negotiate on the basis of his 'Fourteen points' were
seriously imperilled. Wilson no longer spoke authoritavely
for his country.
13
MAKING THE PEACE
The French government urged that major issues should be
trashed out privately between the 5 leading powers at
sessions of the Supreme War Council. Wilson managed to
ensure that, in the early stages of the conference, the
smaller powers participated in a wide range of general
discussions. However, as soon as the discussions switched
to more contenious issues like the disposition of ex-German
colonies and the territorial claims in Europe of allies
such as Serbia, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and
Denmark, the leading powers increasingly settled them by
mutual negotiations and agreement, without reference to
plenary sessions of the conference. Disputed points were
referred back to the Council of Ten or its successor, The
Council of Four 'THE (Britain, USA, France and Italy).
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
At the insistence of President Wilson, this was the first
issue dealt with at the peace conference. A commission was
set up to draft a constitution for the new international
organization. French attempts to fashion the League as a
military alliance which could automatically be directed
against potential aggressors failed completely.
To work towards the establishment of a more peaceful
international order, member states agreed to respect and
preserve the 'territorial integrity and existing political
independence of all Members of the League'. Wilson
succesfully pressed for inclusion in the League covenant of
14
extra clauses, 1) reaffirming the validity of international
engagements or 'regional understandings like the Monroe
Doctrine., 2) member states could leave the League if they
so wished after giving two years' notice, 3) stipulating
that if disputes arose from domestic sources they could not
be considered by the League.
MILITARY AND NAVAL TERMS
Disputes also arose over the naval and military terms of
the peace settlement. Conserning the German Fleet the
germans solved the problem themselves by sinking their
Fleet on 21.6.1919, whwn it had become clear that, whatever
was decided, the ships would not be allowed to return to
Germany. Germany was forbidden to possess submarines or
naval aircraft in the future. The Navy was cut down to a
minimum (max. 1500 officers).
As the navy the army was also to be strictly limited and to
be forbidden the use of tanks, military aircraft or heavy
artillery. 100.000 in size and on a volunteer basis (no
conscriptions).
During the 1920s, allied commissioners repeatedly
complained that Germany was not complying with the
peaceterms relating to German disarmament. Germany replied
that neither did the allies undergoing any disarmament, and
therefore Germany should be allowed to re-arm.
15
REPARATIONS
No single issue caused more acrimony (bitterhet, hätskhet)
at the peace talks than the question of reparation
payments. Germany agreed to pay compensation for damage
caused by German aggression 'by land, by sea and from the
air'. But how was the damage to be assessed, and was
Germany to pay for all of it.
The French, who had taken huge loans themselves to cover
the costs of fighting, expected that German finance would
cover the costs of restoration of invaded territories and
repayment of wardebts (one aim was also to keep Germany
financially and economically weak).
This was not in Britain's long-term interests. Especially
the economist J.M. Keynes pointed out that Britain's postwar economic recovery was crucially dependent on a general
revival of trade. Before 1914 Germany had been one of
Britains best customers and was needed as such again. A
Germany heavily in debt to the allied powers would not be
able to buy British goods in sufficient quantities. Lloyd
George was in a dilemma; If Germany was only to pay for
direct war damage caused, Britain would receive a very
small part of the total payment. He succeeded in persuading
his colleagues to include war pensions, and separation
allowances (underhåll, traktamenten) and Britain was to
receive a larger sum from Germany whos liability
(ansvarsskyldighet) would be vastly increased.
US tried to limit Germany's liability by basing it on her
ability to pay. In pursuit of this aim John Foster Dulles
16
(later to be heard of) proposed that a formula be adopted
requiring Germany to admit a moral and theoretical
responsibility for the entire cost of the war, while
accepting an actual liability for only civilian damage. His
formula was in corporated into the Treaty of Versailles as
art. 231, which became known as the 'war guilt' clause.
The cluse, more than any other in the entire Treaty, was to
cause lasting resentment in Germany, but ironically it was
inserted in order to provide a clear basis on which
reparations could be exacted, and to limit the overall sum.
Germany was in fact to be liable only for 'civilian
damage', except in the case of Belgium which was to receive
from Germany her full war costs, because her invasion had
been a violation of the treaties which in 1839 had
guaranteed Belgian neutrality.
The consequence of all conflicting pressures was that the
exact total of reparations to be paid by Germany was not
stated in the Treaty of Versailles. Instead a reperations
Commission, comprisisng representatives of
the leading
allied powers+Belgium was established, to settle the figure
after detailed consideration. The Germans angrily
complained that they were beeing asked to sign a 'blanque
cheque'.
In fact the delay in naming the sum worked in Germany's
advantage. in 1921, Germany's liability to pay was
established at 6000million (30.000million-demand in 1919)
Pounds, and even this sum was progressively reduced and
payments recyckled to ease her burden.
17
German nationalists made tremendous political capital out
of the sums demanded, though the German nation succeeded in
evading payment on anything but the most nominal level. At
the same time, reparations wrangles and demands from the
USA for repayment of wardebts set the allied powers at each
other's throats, and was one of the most important faactors
which drove them apart after 1919.
VERDICT ON THE PEACE TREATIES
The Treaty of Versailles was completed in great haste at
the end of April, and handed to German representatives on 7
may. Few of its 440 clauses had not been subject of intense
bargaining and serious disagreement, and while it had been
the original intention to invite the enemy delegates to
join the confence when a preliminary peace settlement had
been drawn up, the difficulties of reaching a settlement at
all made this impossible. The Germans were given 15 days,
later extended by a week, to comment on the Treaty, and
this they did on great length. German objections reinforced
growing feelings, particulary amongst the British, that the
treaty was to harsh. Some critisized it for departing so
radically from Wilson's 14 points (Keynes) while other
thought that the over all effect were too much (Lloyd
George). There was therefore an eleventhhour attempt by the
British delegation to pess for modifications in response to
the German objections. The demand for a plebiscite in
Upper-Silesia was accepted but Wilson in particular took a
strong stand against making changes at this late stage. The
18
Treaty was signed 28.6.1919.
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, BULGARIA
The signing of the Treaty og St Germaine-en-Laye with
Austria followed on 10 September, and that of the Treaty of
Neuilly with Bulgaria on 27 November. The Treaty of Trianon
with Hungary was not signed until 4 June 1920.
While Bulgarian territorial losses were not great, the new
state of Austria contained only a quarter of the area of
the old, with only a fifth of the population - mainly
concentrated in the capital, Vienna. She was to be limited
to a volunteer army of 30.000 men and to 3 policeboats on
the Danube. Hungary lost Transsylvania (3 million Magyars)
to Romania.
Yet, the main criticism against the unjustness of the
treaties came from Germany. But the Treaty of Versailles
was not excessively harsh on Germany, either territorially
or economically. It deprived her of about 13½ % of her
territory, about 13% of her economic productivity adn about
7 million of her inhabitants (just over 10%) as well as her
colonies and large merchant vessels.
However, the German people were expecting victory and not
defeat - this made the treaty so hard to accept.
Even before the Treaty was ratified in January 1920, Keynes
had written a devasteting critique of the way the treaty
had been negotiated, drawing attention in particular to the
unworkability and
undesirability of the reparationclauses.
The publication of Keynes ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE
PEACE in December 1919 fed growing hostility towards the
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treaty in the United States, and both in November 1919 and
in March 1920 United States senate failed to ratify the
Treaty of Versailles by the necessary 2/3 majority.
Thus within a year of the peace conference, the victorious
alliance which had defeated Germany and negotiated a set of
peace terms had crumbled away. This critical collapse
ensured that the Treaty of Versailles was never fully
accepted or enforced. Negotiations at the peace conference
exposed the divisions between the victorious powers and
opened the rifts which widened and divided the powers
seeking to uphold the peace settlement.
KEEPING THE PEACE
United States change of policy was confirmed in March 1920
when the US signed a separate peace treaty with Germany,
and did not become a member of the League of Nations.
The worst fears of French leaders were now relized.
France's pre-war ally Russia no longer had a common border
with Germany and was in the throes of civil war. The
Bolsheviks were not likely to want to work with France to
contain possible German expansion.
France's wastime ally, Britain, was unwilling to gurantee
military assistance in the event of unprovoked attack.
United States was in the process detaching herself
completely from the political life of Europe.
France with her population (40 million) was to be left
alone to face her German neighbour who had a population
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approaching 70 million, and who still retained considerable
economic and industrial strength which could provide the
basis for future militayr aggression.
In this situation France concluded military agremeents with
Poland and Czechoslovakia aimed at the encirclement of
Germany. France also refused to contemplate any measures of
disarmament until the British government was prepared to
offer some guarantees of military assistance.
Without US support, however, the British government was
reluctant to underwrite French security.
At the same time both France and Britain faced serious
challenges to hold on to their overseas possessions. France
faced national challenges in North Africa, in Indo-China
and Syria. Britain's trading interests were challenged by
USA and also had to cope with rebellions in Ireland, Egypt
and India (The dominions made demands for more
independence, South Africa, Canada, Australia, Newe
Zealand).
A strict enforcement of the territorial settlement in
Europe would reduce Britain's capacity to maintain a strong
presence outside Europe. What was needed in Europe was as
rapid a return as possible to pre-war political and
economic stability, boosting Britain's trade prospects and
freeing her from expensive political and military
involvment. The means to this end was seen to lie not
through strict enforcement of the treaty but through German
acceptance of the main bulk of its terms. British political
leaders argued that this could be secured only after
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detailed discussions and revision of the more contentious
(omtvistade) terms, in direct negotiations with the
Germans. They tried to persuade the French to co-operate in
this process, and to adopt policies which would appease
Germany and ensure her co-operation in the achievement of
stability in Europe.
But post-war French leaders did not see the APPEASEMENT of
Germany as a step on the road to the restoration of peace
and stability in Europe. They feared that treaty revision
would inevitably strengthen Germany and lead to her
economic adn military domination of Europe, resulting in a
German war of revenge, with the invasion and defeat of
France as its prime objective.
Britain and France were thus in total disagreement on the
means through which lasting peace in Europe could be
achieved, and on their policies towards Germany. THE RESULT
WAS A SERIES OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS IN THEIR
POLICIES TOWARDS EASTERN AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE, over the
key issues of reparations, disarmament and security, and
over the role and activities of the League of Nations.
EASTERN AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
Unites States withdrawal from political involvement in
post-war Europe made it extremely difficult for the allied
powers to stabilize the situation in this part of Europe.
It had already been apparent during the peace negotiations
that the leading powers were unable to excert a decisive
influence over the ambitions of the new east European
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states, and beyond them raged a civil war in Russia.
Allied intervention failed to overthrow the Bolshevik
government, and allied military occupation of
Constantinople provoked a national uprising in Turkey which
challenged the newly established territorial settlement in
the whole of the Near East.
Polish nationalist ambitions spilled over into military
confrontation with Galicians, Lithuanians and Bolshviks. In
1920, Polish forces advanced on Kiev in the Ukraine before
being pushed back by Bolshevik troops almost to the gates
of Warsaw. The frontier between Russia and Poland was not
clearly demarcated until 1921 when, by the Treaty of Riga,
some 3 million Russians were assigned to Polish rule. The
line of demarcation could hardly be regarded as stable or
secure - The Poles could feel the threat from both Russia
and Germany.
The new east European states were racially mixed amalgams
of territories at very different stages of economic
development, and the process of national unification was
bound to be long and painful.
United States finance and credit could have made major
contribution to the stabilization of eastern and southeastern Europe. In its absence, the social and economic
tensions within the new states kept them weak and sapped
the foundations of the territorial settlement, leaving it
open to challenge in the 1930s.
The economies of the East European states were further
strained by the considerable armies which were built up,
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especially by the 'Little Entente' powers of Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia and Romania and by Poland.
Both Poland and her neighbour Czechoslovakia owed their
existence to the military defeat of Germany and AustriaHungary and the collapse of Tsarist Russia. They both
contained large concentrations of German-speaking
inhabitants. Any increase in German economic or military
strength could pose a serious threat to their very
existence. Not surprisingly, therefore, these two east
European states worked closely with France to ensure that,
while the peace treaties were stricktly observed,
particularly in relation to the disarmament of Germany,
they could together mobilize armies totalling well over a
million men.
Many inter-war politicians, like Lloyd George, shared a
belief that the new states of eastern Europe were
unreliable and unstable. They might fall under Bolshevik
influence.
It seemed obvious that future German govenments would press
for territorial modifications in the east, starting with
the desire to ling East Prussia more closely with the rest
of Germany, and no British government was prepared after
1919 to close the door to that possibility (Munich -38).
Britain hoped to persuade France and her eastern allies to
agree to peaceful territorial revision of the frontiers in
eastern Europe in negotiations between Germany adn her
neighbours. But such agreement was
not forthcoming in the
1920s, and many British politicians therefore had some
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sympathy with Nazi German leaders who argued, in the 1930s,
that they were forced to seek territorial revision in the
east by force, because peaceful revision through negotiated
agreements had been blocked by the refusal of France and
her eastern allies to enter into any discussions on the
subject.
British and French differences of attitude and policy in
eastern Europe were repeated in the Near East. Britain
backed the Greeks against the challenge from Mustapha
Kemal's Turkish troops, while France came to a secret
accomodation with the new nationalist regime at Ankara.
(close to a military confrontation between Britain-France).
The Anglo-French disunity could not have been more clearly
revealed. It was the same story in the Middle and Far East.
When Mussolini seized power in Italy it widened the gap
Between Britain-France even more.
CONCLUSION
It wasn't the Depression alone that brought the European
peace settlement crashing down in ruins. Nor can the
peacetreaties themselves be blamed for the failure to
secure a lasting peace in Europe. Those who negotiated the
terms of the peace traties in 1919 did their best to
construct a durable settlement, but they disagreed strongly
on the means of achieving this outcome. They were grapping
with the forces of nationalism and militarism unleashed by
the First World War, and with severe economic dislocation.
Any peace settlement framed in such circumstances was bound
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to suffer from serious shortcomings.
But the significant defect of the 1919 settlement didn't
lie in its terms so much as in the total lack of agreement
on how they should be applied, between those who pressed
for gradual revision in order to secure the co-operation of
the defeated powers and those who believed that peace could
only be guaranteed by strict enforcement.
Both Britain and France became increasingly frustrated at
their inability to modify each other's attitudes and
policies, and thus Germany was able to play off one former
enemy against the other.
By 1933 she had secured substantial revision of the Treaty
of Versailles.
The failure of the architects of the 1919 peace settlement
to complete their work on an agreed basis in the decade
after 1919 was one of the major factors contributing to the
outbreak of war just 20 years later.
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