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J.G. STOESSINGER: WHY NATIONS GO TO WAR WORLD WAR 1 Could it have been prevented? Most of the statesmen who made the crucial decisions behaved like fatalists. The terrible dénoucement (utgång) was foreseen, but couldn't been prevented. Historians have been afected by this fatalistic attitude (events passing beyond men's control). Stoessingers view is that this is wrong - mortals made the decisions basing their policies on fear, not facts. The alliance system: The common belief is that the system of competitive alliances dividing Europe in two camps in 1914 was a principal factor that caused the war to spread. Stoessinger critizises this view as a mechanistic one. On july 5 Germany gave her ally Austria-Hungary full support to punish Serbia. By late july however, when Austrian policy threatened a general mobilisation in Russia on Serbia's behalf, Germany attempted to restrain 1 her ally. In this attempt she failed but had Germany succeeded historians would have had to credit the alliance system with the preventation of a war. This is the reason why Stoessinger wants to examine the leading personalities of the time and the manner in which they perceived (uppfattade) one another. 1. THE GERMAN ASSURANCE TO AUSTRIA "NIBELUNGENTREUE" When the German Kaiser Wilhelm II heard about the assassination of the Austrian crown prince Franz Ferdinand he was deeply chocked. He liked the Austrian archduke and his wife and had just returned from visiting the couple at their castle. Wilhelm II had a mercurial (ombytligt) temper and he believed that the assassination represented a profound threat to the monarchial principle (he also believed that the Russian Czar (his cousin) would think the same). The crowned heads of Europe (who all were relatives in some way) would have to take a common stand against the threat of regicide (kungamördare). This is why he wanted Austra to punish Serbia. On july 2 5 he took the fateful step of assuring Austria that she could count on Germany's faithful support even if it would bring her into conflict with Russia (blank cheque to Austria). The incredible fact is that the German Kaiser hadn't the slightest idea what the Austrians would do. That this guarantee would entail military support never occured to Wilhelm II (or his advisors). He also believed that a common loyalty to monarchy would be a stronger bond than the links of ethnic kinship - That the czar would support Wilhelm II against his fellow slavs in Serbia. The Kaiser used a special term for his pledge to Austria Nibelungentreue (from the mystical German sagas - Nibelungen). The pledge of a Nibelung is a blood bond that is sacred and irrevocable - it can never be retracted. Wilhelm therefore placed the fate of his nation in hands of another power - Austria-Hungary, to take a desperate gamble. 2. THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA In 1914, the fate of Austria-Hungary was in the hands of three men; Emperor Francis Joseph, his foreign minister, Count Leopold von Berchtold, and his chief of staff, Conrad von Hötzendorff. 3 Francis Joseph was an exhausted and embittered old man; the wars he had waged in the past had ended in defeat, his wife had been murdered and his son died and now his nephew was murdered. Probably he didn't want a conflict but he was manipulated by the two others - maybe he didn't grasp (fatta) the cosequenses of the policies that count Berchtold and his chief of staff were now pursuing (eftersträvade). Conrad von Hötzendorff, A-H:s chief of staff and head of the militarist party in Vienna, believed passionately in the need to preserve his nation's status as a great power. Serbia had to be dealt a punishing blow quickly, before the situation deteriorated even further. Count Leopold von Berchtold (foreign min.) revealed a striking difference between his attitude towards Serbia before Wilhelm II blank check and after. He shared Hötzendorffs conviction that something had to be done to preserve Austria's great power status but the German support convinced him that this was the time to clear up Austria's Serbian problem once and for all. Germany could thus be made to pay the price of Austria-Hungary's last and fateful effort to remain a world power. Berchtold was the 4 mainauthor behind the Serbian ultimatum - an ultimatum he was certain Serbia would reject. The Serbian ultimatum included demands for the dissolution of Serbian nationalist groups, the dismissal of key military officers, the arrest of leading political figures, and the right for A-H to implement (genomföra) these measures to her complete satisfaction. Serbia was given 48 h to respond. The Serbian prince Peter and his ministers were deeply shaken. They suspected that it was a pretext to eliminate Serbia as a sovereign state. In deperation, the prince plead to the Russian Czar for help. Serbias reply was conciliatory and accepted most of the Austrian demands. Only those that would have abrogated (upphävt) Serbias sovereignity were treated somewhat evasively (undvikande). When Serbia didn't yield on every point Austria broke off diplomatic relations (july 25) and declared war 3 days later. 29. july Belgrade was under bombardment. During these fateful days Wilhelm II was on his yacht in the North Sea but he didn't show any interest in the matter. When Austrian bombs fell on Belgrade, Kaiser Wilhelm was compelled to face the dreadful consequences of the headless pledge to Austria he had made. 5 3. THE ANGLO-RUSSO-GERMAN CONNECTIONS The war that broke out on july 28 was a localized conflict and the Austrians gambled that it would remian so (The austrians thought yhat the russian czar would sympathize with A-H for the cause of monarchy). And even if this would be incorrect Count Berchtold was sure that Wilhelm's guarantee would prevent Russian intervention. The Russian imperial court was totally out of touch with the russian people (Rasputin) and the Czar didn't control the situation. Russia's foreign policy governed also by Foreign minister Sergei Sazonov and the minister of war, Vladimir Sukhomlinov. Sazonov was a glowing patriot embittered by Russias defeat in the Russo-Japanese war 1905. Sukhomlinov, the man responsible for Russia's preparations for war was lazy and under the influence of both Rasputin and his subordinates. The phrase "modern war" irritated him and he took pride in not having read a military manual in 25 years. When Serbia appealed for Russian help the people responded with heated sympathy (hostile demonstrations against A-H). Sazonov, when 6 informed of the Austrian ultimatum, was convinced that it was a pretext (svepskäl) for Austrian aggression against Serbia (He accused the A-H:s ambassador of setting Europe on fire). He warned Austria for war with Russia. General Sukhomlinov agreed and thought that the war would spread to a war between Russia-Germany. These are the reasons why Russia mobilized its army. With its declaration of war against Serbia, A-H had mobilized half of its army (one idea had been to frighten off Russia by this move). Sazonov viewed this as directed against Russia and decided to do the same (a quick Russian action maybe would deter(avskräcka) Austria from attacking Serbia. When Wilhelm II was informed of the war and the partial Russian mobilization he paniced. He decided to try to mediate between RussiaAustria. In this he was encouraged by Great Britain. This mediation is called the Willy-Nicky correspondence while it was directly between the cousins Wilhelm II (signed Willy) and Nicholas II (Nicky). In the past direct personal messages had been helpful but this time it didn't. It started of well but july 30 when Nicholas response to Wilhelms appeal not to take any military actions arrived to Berlin it destroyed everything. 7 In this cable Nicholas II told the German Kaiser that the decision on partly mobilization had been made 5 days earlier. Wilhelm paniced and thought that the czar had deceived Germany to gain time. Wilhelm II came to the conclusion Germany had to mobilize too. By the same afternoon the Kaiser's panic took on a quality of paranoia. When the British foreign secretary (i Storbritannien termen för utr.min.) Lord Grey warned Wilhelm of the consequences he thought it meant an Anglo-Russian pact against Germany. When Lord Grey desperately attempted to avert a general war, the Kaiser saw the British at the head of a plot to attack and destroy Germany. This was the basis on which Kaiser Wilhelm made his decision to strike first. On july 31 Wilhelm proclaimed a "state of threatening danger of war" and issued a twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia demanding demobilization. When Russia refused Germany mobilized. 4. THE ARMED "MACHINERY" TAKES CONTROL As emperors and statesmen on all sides gradually lost control, generals and military staff began to dominate the scene. During the final period before the outbreak of general war, one appaling fact becomes 8 terrifyingly clear: the unrelenting (obevekliga) rigidity of military schedules and timetables on all sides. All these had been worked out in minute detail years before (f.e. The Schlieffenplan 1905), in case war should come. Now that it was imminent, each general was terrified lest his aversary (att inte hans motståndare) move first and thus capture the initiative. Everywhere the military staffs excerted mounting pressure on their chiefs of state to move schedules ahead (probably as they done in the former Yugoslavia today) so as to strike the first blow - all plans lacked flexibility - the generals were captured by the view that once a plan was started there was no going back - a mechanical process. IN RUSSIA: When Nicholas II received Wilhelm II:s telegram in which he pleaded not to take any military actions Nicholas withdraw his order on full mobilization. The leading Russian generals thought this would give the enemy the opportunity to mobilize more quickly than Russia. Through Sazonov they succeeded in turning the Czars head. IN AUSTRIA: The chief of staff, v. Hötzendorff had worked out a plan to convert partial to full mobilization with a minimum of delay, which he did when he receive news from Russia. This he did one day earlier 9 than agreed upon with emperor Francis Joseph. IN GERMANY: Wilhelm II paniced when he heard about the Russian mobilization (aug. 1). The Kaiser was thinking on a war with Russia but his general staff, in particular its chief, Helmuth von Moltke, thought differently. The German generals were commited to the Schlieffenplan (on France through Belgium due to the Franco-Russian alliance). Wilhelm hesitated in front of a two-front war. In the meantime, however, mobilization had been ordered, and the warmachine had begun to roll. Desperately the Kaiser looked for a way out from a two-front war. The idea; of giving the French province of Alsac autonomy in exchange for French neutrality which also would mean England would stay neutral. The Kaiser seized this chance for a one-front war and immediately sent for Moltke. Moltke, a general totally lacking flexibility, couldn't even think on reversing military decisions. He refused though the German general staff had an alternative plan in their files - one-front war against Russia only. Moltke convinced the Kaiser that the German military machine couldn't be stopped, let alone reversed. IN FRANCE: p.m René Viviani feared that war would break out by 10 accident and therefore, on july 30, ordered a 10 km withdrawal along the entire French-German border. The French commander in Chief, General J. Joffre regarded this as siucidal and pleaded to mobilise August 1 he succeedded in having it his way. 5. CONCLUSION The perceptions (uppfattningar) of statesmen and generals were absolutely crucial. Following dimensions of this phenomenon: 1. A LEADERS PERCEPTION OF HIMSELF 2. HIS PERCEPTION OF HIS ADVERSARY'S CHARACTER 3. HIS PERCEPTION OF HIS ADVERSARY'S INTENTIONS 4. HIS PERCEPTIONS OF HIS ADVERSARY'S POWER AND CAPABILITIES 5. HIS CAPACITY FOR EMPATHY WITH HIS ADVERSARY All the participants suffered from greater or lesser distortions (förvanskningar) of themselves (honorable-pure) and their adversary's (diabolical). Most of the leaders also failed to pay any attention to the 11 world around them (ignoring both the reactions of their allied- and potential enemycountries). Finally, one is struck with the overwhelming mediocrity of the personalities involved. The character of each of the leaders, diplomats, or generals was badly flawed (bristfälligt) by arrogance, stupidity, carelessness or weakness. There was a pervasive (genomgripande) tendency to place the preservation of one's ego before the preservation of the peace. There was little insight and no vision whatsoever. No responsibility. As a result of their weakness, a generation of Europe's young men was destroyed and Europe totally ruined. 12 13 THE END OF THE ARMED PEACE 1890 - 1914. I. The breakdown of the Bismarckian system 1890-1907. In the beginning of 1890 Bismarck resigned from his office as German Chancellor. This had far reaching consequences; -Bismarcks resignation happened immediately before the EXPIRY OF THE REINSURANCE TREATY signed between Russia and Germany in 1887. This treaty had served the purpose to preserve friendship with Russia alongside the alliance with Austria. There existed a considerable amount of opposition against the Russo-German treaty inside the German government and when Bismarck wasn't in office anymore these forces succeeded in changing the course of German foreign policy: Austrian hopes rose when Bismarck resigned. In Vienna he had always been regarded as incorrigibly (oförbätterligt) russian in his sympathies. With the appointment of General Caprivi to the chancellorship, the NEUE KURS policy went into operation. The fragile friendship with Russia was abandoned (eventhough Russia had proposed a renewal of the Treaty for 6 years). Instead the German government was hoping on a closer relation with Great Britain. Caprivi's 14 determination to establish closer relations with Britain by the speedy conclusion, after years of haggling by Bismarck, of the Heligoland-Zanzibar agreement of july 1890. This agreement was a deliberate attempt by Caprivi to bring Germany's colonial and European policies into line, by making concessions to Britain in Africa in order to win her support in Europe (the exchange for Heligoland for Zanzibar). The Russian reaction came immediately: The country began looking in the very direction which Bismarck had always attempted to bloc - FRANCE. There was already a considerable French investment in Russia (development of the industry, communication, machinery. By 1897 48% of her national debt were in the hand of foreigners, predominantly French). FRANCE WAS ONLY TO ANXIOUS TO ESCAPE HER OWN ISOLATION. The formation of a Franco-Russian alliance wasn't the only alternative. 1) France would have welcomed a closer relationship with Germany but this was ruined by tactless behaviour of Wilhelm II's mother on a visit to Paris (turned the public opinion against Germany). 2) Some French groups would have preferred a British alliance, but rivalry over Africa put this out of reach. 3) Russia was still thinking of the Reinsurance treaty, 15 but when in june 1891 the triple alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy was renewed and Italy's P.M. Rudini in a statement stressed Italys good relations with Britain, the Russians and the French FINALLY BECAME CONVINCED THAT BRITAIN WAS ABOUT TO JOIN THE CENTRAL POWERS. EVENTUALLY, in August 1892, A MILITARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS SIGNED. 1) IF FRANCE WERE ATTACKED BY GERMANY, OR BY ITALY SUPPORTED BY GERMANY, RUSSIA WOULD ATTACK GERMANY. 2) IF RUSSIA WERE ATTACKED BY GERMANY OR BY AUSTRIA SUPPORTED BY GERMANY, FRANCE WOULD ATTACK GERMANY. 3) IF ANY MEMBER OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE MOBILIZED THEN FRANCE AND RUSSIA WOULD BOTH AUTOMATICALLY MOBILIZE WITHOUT FURTHER CONSULTATION. The agreement became official in 1894 when it had been officially accepted by Alexander III and the French government. Since it was technically a military agreement the actual terms of the treaty remained secret. The treaty wasn't offensive in a way that something would have been mentioned about aims like the return of Alsac-Lorraine. As a military agreement however, and the obligations involved in it, it consisted the mechanism of the chain reaction that led to the outbreak of war in 1914. 16 "Mobilization is declaration of war" - General de Boisdeffre. GERMANY: The immediate consequence of the Franco-Russian aliance was to confirm the recent calculations of the military in Germany and of the Naval experts in Great Britain. The German General Staff had long thought of the possibility of war on two fronts. But before the FrancoRussian alliance the plan had ben to hold a defensive position in the west, while making for limited objectives in the east. This changed in 1891 when von Schlieffen became the new Chief of the General Staff. Schlieffen abandoned the old strategic and prefered an immediate attack on France. Much later he devised a new scheme for a great outflanking movement through Belgium. Schlieffen calculated that all would be over and France defeated in six weeks. Then the German armies could be rushed across Germany by railway to deal with the russians whose mobilization would have been considerably slower. The Schlieffen plan - an academic theory with some quite big faults. Schlieffen didn't take in account; -the possibility of French resistance after the French army would have been knocked-out (although this had happened in 1871). 17 -He didn't realize the possible diplomatic consequences of the violation of the Belgian neutrality (British intervention). -He ignored the possibility that Russia wouldn't wait but attack Germany immediately while the German armies would be occupied on the western front. Schlieffen remained in his office until 1906 and his plan continued to dominate all German military thought and preparation until 1914 under his successor von Moltke. GREAT BRITAIN: The main interest for Britain was to maintain a NAVAL SUPREMACY. (Britain felt that a Naval supremacy was a necessity while the country was isolated and with no large conscript army). When other European nations began expanding their naval power the British admirals got alarmed. In the early 1890's the biggest concern came from the Russo-French alliance together with investments on their fleets. In 1893 Britain proclaimed THE TWO-POWER PRINCIPAL: Britains fleet should be equal to the combination of the two next strongest navies together. The feeling of insecurity resulted in some means to escape isolation. -Alliance with France was ruled out due to colonial 18 rivalry. -An alliance with Germany seemed quite possible. But when Germany miscalculated Britains dependance and demanded that Britain should join the Triple Alliance the agreement failed. The isolation increased when; -(1895)Britain was excluded from a Continental Group (Germany, France, Russia), formed to put pressure on Japan. France, Germany and Russia had interests in the Far East which were threatened by excessive Japanese influence (Sino-Japanese War, 1894). Japan was forced to leave her mainland gains but Britain was not consulted, despite her strong interests in the region. -(1896)Britains problems with the Boers. Wilhelm II showed his sympathy with the Boers (The Kruger Telegramme, Wilhelm II tried to force Britain closer to the Triple Entente by congratulating the Boer president Kruger on having overcome the British threat 'without appealing for the help of friendly Powers). The intention was to convince the British government of their isolation and force the country into the Triple Alliance. But, all Wilhelm did achive was to anger the British public opinion. Wilhelm didn't learn from this mistake but tried to continued with his policy aiming to show 19 the British how crucial the German friendship was to Britain. -In 1897 he tried to talk Nicholas II into a joint action to prevent further British expansion. -The next year he proposed the same to France. Both attempts proved to be failures but all this raised a anti-German feeling among the British. -Meanwhile the Ottoman Empire dealt with the Armenian minority in a very brutal way (1893-98). Britain, Russia and France all sent official protests but Germany didn't. This episode raised strong anti-Turkish feelings in Britain and at the same time opened the way to closer diplomatic relations between Berlin and Constantinople. The rift between Britain-Germany widened. Britains need to break out of isolation increased even more in the very last years of the century. Russia settled her conflicts with Austria in 1898 and turned her concentration on the policy in teh Far East. At the same time both France and Germany also increased their influence in the same area (the Chinese coast). Britain needed an ally who would safeguard her own interests in the Far East. Two attempts to establish a closer relationship with Germany were made: 1) 1898 - failed while Wilhelm II couldn't see any German interests to defend in Africa or the Far East. 20 Germany were afraid Britain tried to use her in the rivalry against Russia (and it was Germany, not Britain who had a common border with Russia). 2) 1901 - the second British aproach but the germans rejected this as well believing that Britain would be bound to turn to them anyway. BUT MUCH HAD HAPPENED BETWEEN 1898-1901 which actually had receded the likelihood of an Anglo-German alliance: -Germany cultivated her friendship with Turkey (the building of a Berlin-Bagdad railway). -The BOER WAR - made Britain very unpopular on the continent (especially in Germany). -The most important aspect: THE GERMAN DECISION TO BUILD A NAVY. Wilhelm II calculated that Germany needed a large navy as a tool to threaten Britain into a more amenable (foglig) attitude. With admiral VON TIRPITZ as minister of marine, a series of Navy laws were passed. DIRECT THREAT TO BRITISH SECURITY. The public opinion in both countries reacted very strongly, nationalistic in this competitive matter. THE LOSS OF THE CHANCE OF AN ALLIANCE WITH BRITAIN WAS TO DEPRIVE GERMANY OF ROOM FOR DIPLOMATIC MANOEVRE MADE HER DEPENDENT UPON AUSTRIA AGAIN. Eventually, in 1902, Great Britain found in JAPAN the 21 partner that her particular interests required: 1. BOTH HAD REASON TO MISTRUST THE GROWTH OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN MANCHURIA 2. BOTH HAD RECENTLY FAILED TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA 3. EACH RECOGNIZED THE OTHERS INTEREST IN CHINA (strict neutrality if either were involved in a war with one country, assistance if a war against two countries) 4. PREVENTED ANY RUSSO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE AIMED AT A PARTITION OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN CHINA (Resulted in a much more strict Japanese policy towards Russia causing eventually the Russo-Japanese war in 1904). 5. Eventhough it was a last-minute emergency-measure it had the great advantage (for Britain) over a German alliance of checking Russia in the Far East while allowing Britain to remain free from commitment to a continental bloc. THE TERMS OF THE TREATY WERE PUBLISHED - TO PREVENT FRENCH SUPPORT TO RUSSIA IN CASE OF A CONFLICT. The French, anxious to avoid beeing dragged into a Russo-Japanese War, began to look for an alignment that would help to keep them out - Britain.(some agreement with) There existed a further motive for the French: French control over Morocco. 22 France had gained Italian acceptance (1902) (by promising French acquiescence (samtycke) over the further annexation of Tripoli by Italy) but needed Britains approval to reach an agreement with Spain. Britain-France established closer relations in 1903 (king Edward VII in Paris) and in 1904 The ENTENTE CORDIALE was signed - settlement over the colonial frontiers. BUT before The Entente Cordiale was signed (1904) what seemed to have been the worst possible French nightmare became true - JAPAN ATTACKED RUSSIA ON 8 feb. 1904 without any official decleration of war. Russia failed to gain control over the sea and was swiftly defeated by Japan. France escaped a very difficult situation when, through American mediation, the war came to an end in september 1905. The Russo-Japanese war had also made the British sensitive to the risk of an open conflict with Russia. Eventhough France could take a breath of relief most European Powers were shocked by Japans victory (and especially the usage of new weapons like the torpedo and the mine). During the Russo-Japanese war (Russia faced her first revolution, the final rehearsal according to Lenins 23 statement) Germany regarded the situation with some satisfaction hoping that a war between Great BritainRussia would break out (there existed a moment of great tension in the relations). In Germany the political leadership wished that in case of growing hostility between Britain-Russia the latter would turn to Germany. These hopes for an alliance were shattered by the French who were determined to prevent a war where they would have to choose between their alliance with Russia and their new friendship with Great Britain. FIRST MOROCCO CRISES When Germany realised they lost this chance the next steps taken aimed at wrecking the Anglo-French entente and work towards some agreement with Russia. The place where Germany could hit a splinter between BritainFrance was MOROCCO. 1) The last of March 1905 The German Kaiser made a public statement that Germany would regard Morocco as an independent country (with this Wilhelm hoped that a crises would reveal the weakness of the Anglo-French entente). 2) The same summer Wilhelm arranged a meeting with Tsar Nicholas II in Finland. They agreed on a treaty of defensive alliance against attack by any European Power in Europe. 24 Each of these schemes failed: 1) Over Morocco Germany did get their conference but it didn't strengthen Germany's hand. The entente Powers remained undivided and Italy supported them - The Triple Alliance revealed to be the weaker of the two existing alliances. Italy felt isolated, threatened by Austrian interests in the Adriatic area and abandond by Germany. This had resulted in attempts to improve the French- Italian relations. Italy got France's recognition for their ambitions in Tripoli while Italy promised to back up France in their attempts to get the control over Morocco. (at the same time a wearisome tariffwar between the countries was buried). In 1902 Italian PM PRINETTI went as far as he promised Italian neutrality in any Franco-German war, provoked by Germany, in exchange for a completely free hand in Tripoli and the promise of financial assistance. THIS WAS NEVER UNDONE AND IT CERTAINLY UNDERMINED THE EFFECTIVNESS OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. The German provokation resulted in a closer relationship between Britain-France. 2) The "Björkö" agreement was ratified by neither the German or the Russian government (which had more power than before due to the upheavals in 1905). The Russian ministers were afraid of offending France. 25 Germany was becoming more and more isolated. In October 1904 (during the Russo-Japanese war) Austria reached an netrality agreement with Russia. It stated benevolent (välvillig) neutrality in the event of war with a third power. At the time one assumed that this third power could have been Italy (in case of a war vith Austria). This revealed that the Triple alliance wasn't a solid one. Actually it also threatened the Dual alliance. Britain's new foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey (who from the beginning had been suspicious of German methods), made his conclusions from the Moroccocrises; He became convinced Britain had to stop the German expansionist policy and at the same time re-establish Russia as a factor in European politics. "An entente between Russia, France and ourselves would be absolutely secure. If it is necessary to check Germany, it could then be done." Germany became even more "encircled" in 1907 (31.8) with the formation of THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE (not a military treaty). The treaty was signed though the public opinion in Britain disliked it very much. Russia's weakness (Japanese war) made her anxious to find another friend. Germanys friendship with Turkey 26 (Berlin-Baghdad railway) resulted in that Russia came to the conclusion Britain represented a more loyal ally. As Russia wasn't a threat to Britain's interests anymore (in China) Britain's foreign policy aimed at preventing Russia from drifting closer to Germany again (Reinsurance Treaty). In form the agreement was similar to the Anglo-French agreements but during the negotiations Grey had hinted that Britain in the future might agree to an alteration of the rule of the strait's in Russia's favour (Black sea fleet access to the Mediterranean). The Russian view of the agreement was different; The main task was to restore Russia's position as a great power. One was not interested in new alignments that would inevitably carry with them the risk of new conflicts. As many limited agreements as possible without commiting Russia against anybody. The agreement was balanced by an agreement with Japan, by a Russo-German agreement to maintain the status quo in the Baltic and by proposals to the Austrians to extend the agreements reached in 1897. Izvolsky (foreign minister in Russia) critizesed Britain for beeing to occupied with " weaving webs and forming rings around Germany". In Germany the reactions were obviously very strong 27 fear of encirclement eventhough the Anglo-Russian entente didn't aim at this. THE APPROACH OF WAR 1907-14 From now until the outbreak of the first World War European relations were dominated by two general factors; A. THE RENEWAL OF RIVALRY BETWEEN RUSSIA-AUSTRIA OVER THE BALKANS. B. THE GROWING NAVAL COMPETITION BEETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN - GERMANY. A. There existed two main reasons for the end of the diplomatic truce between Russia-Austria. 1) After the Russo-Japanese War and the Anglo-Russian entente Russia TURNED HER ATTENTION BACK ONCE AGAIN TO THE BALKANS. 2) After a coup d'etat (1903) in Serbia the country embarked upon a PRO-RUSSIAN POLICY. Austria adopted a very anti-Serbian policy from 1906 (with the appointment of a new foreign minister and Chief of the General Staff). In the beginning the relations between Austria-Russia were not upset but in 1908-1909 the first crises emerged. In sept. 1908 the foreign ministers of Russia-Austria 28 agreed that Austria could annex Bosnia (which had been occupied since 1878), which would have been a major setback for Serbia who had long hoped to gain these provinces. In return Austria promised their support for a Russian diplomatic action aiming at opening the Straits. The mistake made by Austria was that they didn't take their commitments to seriously and almost immediately proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia-Hertzegovina. This offended Russia who swung around and supported the serbs. The crises lasted several months and it was the Central Powers who were victorious. -Germany backed up Austria while neither Britain or France were to interested in supporting Russia's case. Germany promised their full military support to Austria and threatened Russia with mobilization. Russia was forced to withdraw their support to Serbia. THIS WAS TO HAVE AN SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON RUSSIA'S ATTITUDE IN 1914. THE BOSNIAN CRISES; -also brought The Entente powers closer together -Germany became bound to Austrias activities in the Balkans - an interpretation of the Dual Alliance which Bismarck never would have approved with. 29 -Anti-Austrian feelings rose in Serbia - THE BLACK HAND, a secret organisation. One of the leaders, Colonel Dragutin Dimitrievi´c (APIS), was chief of the Intelligence Department of The Serbian General Staff. B. At the same time the British and the Germans were continuing to compete over the size of their respective navies. THE DREADNOUGHTS, a new design of a all-big-gun ship. The competition turned into rearmament race on large scale from 1908-09. THE SECOND MOROCCOCRISES (1911) A local rebellion in Morocco resulted in French intervention. Germany declared that France's action nullified the Algeciras agreement (1906) and sent a gunboat, the Panther, to Agadir. The British government was alarmed lest (av fruktan att) France and Germany might strike a private bargain which might include the cession of Agadir to Germany as a naval base on the Atlantic coast. Britain addressed an warning to France and Germany that the Kingdom couldn't be indifferent (likgiltigt) to these possible changes. The war scare mounted throughout August, but in September there was a financial panic (high finance was troubled by the withdrawal of short-term French loans 30 which depressed the stock market) in Germany and the crises slowly defused over the following two months. In november 1911 a new agreement had been negotiated. Germany secured part of the French Congo (with access to the sea) in return of a French protectorate in Morocco. In Britain there was relief that war had been averted but at the same time many argued that it was necessary to put an end to Germany bullying and for this a clear British naval lead was vital. There were mixed reactions inside Germany. Widespread indignation over British and French policy coexisted with relief that war had been averted. The nationalists were furious. The Social Democrats opposed war. Among German big business many were fearful of war, especially with Britain. The German navy was unprepared for war. Germany's ally Austria was unsympathetic, though Aerenthal (foreign min.) expected an Anglo-German war in two-three years. The naval enthusiasts in Germany were furious and demanded rearmament. Admiral Tripitz demanded a supplementary naval bill in order to attain naval parity with Britain by 1920, and he did succeed in gaining increases in plans for construction. All this, however was in conflict with the advice of the German ambassador in London who warned that this will 31 only result in an even closer attachment between Britain and France. Eventhough many politicians of both Germany and Britain worked to establish a closer relationship between the countries the naval competition remained to a big obstacle. War had for the moment been averted but the threat to the peace in Europe remained. -In september 1911 (when the other Great Powers were preoccupied with the second Moroccocrises) Italy embarked (invecklade) upon a war with Turkey. Italy wanted to extend their colonial power in North Africa (Tripoli, Libya). Italy attacked Libya but when it turned out that the war would not easily be won in Tripolitania itself Italy extended the war to Turkey itself (especially the Turkish Islands in the Meditarenean. After peace talks (which resulted in the treaty of Lausanne, October 1912) Tripoli was given to Italy and Italy had to leave the occupied Islands (for exampel Rhodes). 32 The politicians of Germany and Great Britain were by no means happy about the growing naval competition after the second Moroccocrises. It was this attitude that led to the so called HALDANE MISSION, Lord Haldane was sent over to Germany for negotiations. Britain offered Germany support for an extension of her African Empire in return for a halt to naval building. The visit came to nothing, as Germany wouldn't stop her naval expansion without concrete compensation. The news of the Haldane visit did, however, have a marked effect upon French diplomatic activity: Military conversations led to a coordination of naval strategy. A revolutionary change in British dispositions in that the French in the future were to be responsible for the Mediterranean, thus leaving the British free to concentrate on their home waters and the Channel. At the same time France was anxious to strengthen her ties with Russia, which had not shown themselves to be particulary effective during the crises of 1908 and 1911. Russia wanted to reinforce her position too. In August 1912 the French P.M. Poincaré, visited Russia 33 and during his conversations a far wider interpretaion of their existing agreements was attached: According to the military treaty of 1892 French aid to Russia would only follow an attack on Russia by Germany or Austria assisted by Germany. The Bosnian crises of 1908, however, had made it clear that the problem was complicated. If Serbia were threatened by Austria, Russia might well find herself attacking Austria in Serbia's defence, and if a German attack on Russia then followed it might have been possible for France to argue that Russia had brought this upon herself by her own action (while everyone knew about Germany's obligations towards Austria while Bismarck had made the terms in the Dual alliance public in 1888) and that the FrancoRussian alliance therefore didn't become militarily operative. The Poincaré visit now established the fact that if such circumstances should arise, France would regard herself as bound to support Russia. THUS THE AGREEMENT SUPPLIED A FATAL LINK IN THE CHAIN OF DIPLOMATIC COMMITMENTS; FOR WHEN IT IS TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE GERMAN PROMISE TO MOBILIZE THE MOMENT RUSSIA MOBILIZES (Moltke-Conrad correspondence 1909), IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SITUATION HAD BEEN FINALLY CREATED WHEREBY A BALKAN CRISES COULD LEAD AUTOMATICALLY TO A GENERAL WAR! 34 This was certainly not intentional. It sprang simply from a desire to bolster up the Franco-Russian alliance. THE SECOND BALKANCRISES October 1912: Montenegro, swiftly followed by Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia declared war on Turkey. This was a crises entirely of the Balkan states' own making but it changed the STATUS QUO in the area as the aggressors were very victorious. RUSSIA had no intention of letting Constantinople fall to Bulgaria, while Austria was determined to prevent Serbia from gaining a part of the Adriatic coast. The Powers cooperated to impose an armistice and a peace trety was signed on 30.5.1913 - The independent Albania was created to prevent Serbia from extending her frontiers to the Adriatic. Serbia demanded areas of Macedonia as compensation for the loss of the territories involved in the creation of Albania. Bulgaria, confident of her own military powers, opposed and declared war on Greece and Serbia. The war was a disaster for Bulgaria who also had to confront Turkey and Rumania. In the treaty of Bucharest (Aug. 1913) Bulgaria lost some of her recent gains as well as the region of Dobruja (Rumania). Serbia was greatly enlarged due to this treaty which 35 alarmed Austria (though the country accepted the treaty). FROM NOW ON, CONRAD (Chief of Staff) AND COUNT LEOPOLD VON BERCHTOLD (P.M. since February 1912), thought to seek a solution in a short war, followed by the partition of Serbia. Wilhelm II made it clear that AUSTRIA COULD COUNT ON GERMAN SUPPORT! At the same time Europe experienced a mounting ARMAMENTS RACE BETWEEN THE POWERS. Even so, it was not impossible for the Powers to reach agreement over some of their difficulties. In 1914 relations between Germany and Britain seemed to be improving with conversations over Africa and an agreement over the south of Persia. Everything restaed on the situation in the Balkans and it was here that the BLACK HAND organisation in Serbia brought about the last fatal crises. For some time APIS had been determined on a assasination attempt. When the Austrian governor of Bosnia (General Potiorek) in 1913 invited Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Habsburg throne, to attend army manoevres in Bosnia in june 1914, Apis decided that this would be a perfect victim. In May 1914, when the three selected assasinators 36 already where in Bosnia, the P.M. of Serbia, Pa´si´c seems to have heard something of the plot and was concequently faced with a highly unpleasant dilemma. To deounce it might lead to his own assassination by the Black Hand and would in any case place Serbia in a difficult diplomatic position; on the other hand, to let it go forward might have some appalling concequences. His reaction to the problem was to send a guarded (diskret) warning to Vienna. Francis Ferdinand duly attended the manoevres in june 1914 and on the last day of his visit proceeded with his wife to pay a formal visit to Sarajevo. On the way to the City Hall the bomb that was thrown at their car did not harm them, but on the return journey, owing to a remarkable series of mischances, their car came to a halt within a few yards of the spot where GAVRILO PRINCIP was standing. Princip shot them both and the shots where mortal. Nearly all those involved in the plot were captured by the police. Their Serbian origin was undeniable and BERCHTOLD AND CONRAD AT ONCE BELIEVED THAT THE FATE HAD PRESENTED THEM WITH A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE WAR WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO CRUSH SERBIA. Austria, however, dared not act without a blank cheque from Germany. The Austrian appeal for support was 37 considered in Berlin 5 July. The German government supported Austria, simply envisaging a local war between the two countries. On 23 July Austria presented Serbia with an overwhelming ultimatum. It included terms no self-respecting state could accept. A few minutes before its expiry Serbia accepeted almost all its conditions (The Serb reply impressed on Wilhelm II). Austria was determined not to hold back. The Austrians were still unable to prove a positive link between the Sarajevo conspirators and the Serbian government, and diplomatic intervention by the other Powers might rob them of what seemed a golden opportunity. ON 28 JULY AUSTRIA, INSISTING THAT SHE WAS ONLY ENGAGING IN LOCAL HOSTILITIES IN SELF-DEFENCE, DECLARED WAR ON SERBIA. PEACE TREATIES - SETTLEMENTS AFTER THE GREAT WAR ESSAYQUESTIONS ON THE FIRST (GREAT) WORLD WAR 1. Why did the First World War last so long? 2. Why were the Central Powers defeated in the First World War? 3. How far would you support the view that "amongst the causes of the First World War, which was essentially a 38 European War, colonial issues were of little importance"? 4. How valid is it to claim that Europe "stumbled into" a world war in 1914? 5. "The new Europe" What would you regard as the essential differences between the Europe after 1918 from that of the years before 1914? 6. Describe the economic consequences of the First World War on European countries and the United States. 7. Choose TWO battles or campaigns from the First World War, and show how they affected the subsequent course and eventual outcome of the war. 8. "Wars settle nothing." Examine the validity of this claim with reference to the First World War. 9. How far do you agree that the reasons used to justfy going to war are often modified during the course of war The First World War)? 10. "Europe was not ready for war in 1914 and was 39 shocked when it broke out." Discuss. 11. To what extend did the First World War modify the financial relations between the U.S.A and Europe? 12. "Every country lost the 1914-1918 war". Discuss. 13. The war at sea in 1914-1918. 14. Give an account of the main features of one important battle which took place during the First World War, and discuss its strategic consequenses. 15. What is meant by "total war" and how did it make World War I different from previous wars? 16. Wars are basically exercises in military power for the achievement of nationalistic goals. How reasonable is this statement as a summary of the causes of the First World War? THE GREAT WAR Nowadays we talk about the FIRST WORLD WAR, as a forerunner of the second; but for the generation that grew up after 1918 it was the GREAT WAR, an event of 40 unparallelled horror. For four years millions of men faced each other in trenches across a shattered "No-mans land". The prevailing belief was in the swift 'knock-out blow'. All the schemes, however, were upset by one miscalculation: The period of 'armed peace' since 1871 had deprived any single country of that overwhelming superiority which the 'knock-out blow' demended. The Dual Alliance and the Entente Powers had created something of a balance and, even after this failed to preserve the peace, the crude military balance remained. The outcome was to be a long, desperate war of attrition (utnötningskrig). The Entente Powers had a combined population of 238 millions against Germany-Austrias' 120 millions but the Centralpowers were centrally placed and their forces could thus enjoy closer coordination and greater flexibility of movement between the eastern and western fronts. On 2 August 1914 Turkey had signed an alliance with Germany but it was not until the end of October that she took definite action against Russia with the bombardment of Odessa. 41 If one compares the different armies: The Central Powers: The German army was big and probably the best in Europe. On the other hand Austria-Hungary had quite a sizeable army but orders had to be given in nine different languages and the political reliability of some troops was uncertain. Turkey had a smaller army but with German officers and arms it could harass Russia in the south and keep the Straits closed. The Entente Powers: Russia had the largest army while France probably the most effective. The British Expeditionary Force was a purely professional army but a very small one (the same size as Belgiums' and only half the size of Serbias') In naval strength, however, Britain had a fair lead over Germany in modern battleships and a far greater one in the older types of ship, although German submarine strength was later to be a considerable treath. THE UNSUCCESFUL SHLIEFFENPLAN In the west all depended upon the great German sweep through Belgium and France - the Schlieffenplan. The idea was to knock out France in 6 weeks and then turn to the east and Russia. But Germany was at war on two 42 fronts from 3 August 1914. The first clash between the Russians and the Germans took place in the middle of August, when Russia responded a plea from France and attacked before their mobilization was completed. The German commander PRITTWITZ panicked and was replaced by PAUL von HINDENBURG and his chief of staff LUDENDORFF. Afterwards Hindenburg always enjoyed the credit for the victory over the Russian forces but actually the German (very succesful) counterattack was drawn up (Max Hoffman) and set in motion before Hindenburg and Ludendorff arrived. The Austrians had been less succesful. Eventhough it was Austria who had lanched an attack on Serbia it was the Serbian army who was victorious. By 10 September Russia was ready for a great movement which would probably have destroyed the Austrian forces, had not Conrad heard of the plan in advance owing to the remarkable RUSSIAN HABIT OF SENDING IMPORTANT MESSAGES BY WIRELESS UNCODED - Austria withdrew their forces. But German troops were needed to help Austria to stem the Russian offensive, and the German warmachine was forced to divide its energies between the various theatres of war. 43 Meanwhile, in the west, a million and a half German troops were commited to the Schlieffenplan - through Belgium and France. British troops landed on the continent on 8 August. Brussels was occupied on 20 August by German troops. France counterattacked the 14 August but Germany succeded in repulsing it after a week's hard fighting. In the end of the month the fighting reached a crucial stage. French and British forces had to fall back towards Paris. The plan that von Schlieffen had devised had always assumed that the extreme right wing of the German sweep would swing south only when it was well to the west of Paris, whose defending forces would then be swiftly enveloped (omringade). The Germans assumed optimistically that the encirclement of both Paris and the French front-line would cause the French to surrender. After this the British would be persuaded to negotiate a peace. In the last days of August, however, some decisions changed the whole character of the attack on France; 1) Four German divisions were sent from the western to the eastern front. 2) von Moltke decided to strengthen the centre and left 44 flank as the German army began an attack on Verdun. This reinforcement would definetily have been needed on the right. 3) The German commander of the divisions who were responsible of the swing west and south of Paris, von Kluck, decided to wheel south while he was still east of Paris (due to a gap between his army and the next German army). 4) The German army ran short of shells after only six weeks although they had provided five times more than in 1870. Underestimation of of the intesity of modern warfare. But one should remember that even with total concentration of all forces on the right wing it had always been very doubtful whether the German Army could be strong enough to sustain a sweep of so wide a radius as to pass to the west of Paris. When von Kluck was forced to turn southwards his flank became exposed and French forces counterattacked. (The French had learned their lessons from Bismarck wars, and they used their railway system to great advantage in rapidly deploying their forces). The widening gap between the German first and second armies resulted in succesful movements by the British and Frensh forces. 45 Moltke became desperate by the thought that there might be an allied breakthrough and therefore ordered the German armies to pull back (to the river Aisne). On the 14 September Erich von Falkenhayn, the Prussian minister of War, replaced Moltke (who was dismissed) as supreme commander. Germany tried desparetely to reach the Channel ports (to cut off reinforcements from Britain) but failed to do so despite the appalling losses inflicted on the British and French, at the first battle of Ypres. Gradually the opposing lines of armies settled down to digging themselves in, and the separate lengths of trench began to link up in an elaborate (utförligt) system of dugouts, reserve lines and communication TRENCHES RUNNING intermittently (ojämnt) from the CHANNEL TO THE SWISS FRONTIER. 46 THE EASTERN FRONT Within a month of the start of the war in 1914, BRITAIN, FRANCE AND RUSSIA SIGNED THE PACT OF LONDON, AGREEING NOT TO MAKE PEACE SEPARATELY. Geography nevertheless determined that they would fight separate wars. For the next three years trench warfare predominated on the eastern and the western fronts. In the west, however, the frontlines hardly moved at all. An 100 meter advance could cost tens of thousands of lives only to be forced to pull back the same distance the following day. A senseless massacre in which men continued to be sent forward to their deaths in thousands long after it was clear that the offensive had failed In the east, however there was room for manoeuvre and the lines oscillated over considerable distances, stretching from Espoo, Finland down to the Black Sea. The OTTOMAN EMPIRE became involved in the war on the side of the Central Powers in October 1914 and, in 1915, the British attempted to open a supply route to Russia through the Dardanelles, seeking now to open the Straits and to knock-out Turkey of the war. But the attempt didn't succeed - British and Australasian troops landed 47 on the GALLIPOLI peninsula in APRIL 1915, they persevered in the enterprise throughout the year, but the troops had to be evacuated in january 1916 (250 000 casualties, to no purpose) - Russia remained to a large extent isolated from its Allies, almost always desperately short of supplies, though not of manpower. After the first Russian attacks on Germany the German army succeeded in turning the tide. In August 1915 the retreating Russians had to abandon Warsaw (5.8) and, shortly afterwards, they were driven from Poland, WHICH THE GERMANS DECLARED INDEPENDENT. Much of Lithuania was taken. Since the beginning of the war both sides had been hoping to win over Bulgaria; The Entente Powers had offered her Macedonia, but the Central Powers were prepared to raise the bid with Greek and Rumanian territory as well. In September Bulgaria joined the war together with the Central Powers - this resulted in a successful invasion of Serbia by the Central Powers in mid-October. The Entente Powers thus had no military success in 1915 but in the diplomatic field they did at least gain ITALY. In a TREATY, SIGNED IN APRIL 1915, the Entente 48 Powers promised Italy TRIESTE, THE ISTRIAN PENINSULA AND NORTHERN DALMATIA, as well as more hypothetical regions in Asia Minor and among the German colonies in Africa. ON 23 MAY ITALY DECLARED WAR ON AUSTRIA AND THE ITALIAN ARMY EMBARKED UPON A LONG AND UNSUCCESSFUL ASSAULT on the Austrian positions. In 1916 Russia mounted an offensive, responding to an appeal by their allies that they should distract the Germans from the Western front (the French troops were under hard pressure at Verdun and the Italian troops were pushed back by the Austrian army). The Russian General BRUSILOV launched a great offensive before which the Austrian armies began to break up. Due to early Russian successes Rumania became encouraged to declare war on the Central Powers (August 1916) The Germans had to rush forces from the western front and the Austrians halted their offensive against the Italians. Hindenburg succeeded once again in turning the tide. Russia lost half a million men, the Russian army was forced to retreat and the GERMANS SWEPT INTO RUMANIA. The succession of defeats, the heavy casualties, and the apparent hopelessness of the war against far better 49 equipped German forces, increased the discontent within Russia. IN FEBRUARY 1917 NIKOLAJ II WAS OVERTHROWN. 50 OVERSEAS Outside Europe the results were more decisive; In South Africa the German forces were crushed in German South-West Africa. Togoland was overrun by British, French and Belgian troops and only in Tanganyika did the Germans manage to put up a resistance. In the Pacific, Japan, Australia and New Zeeland helped themselves to the German Island colonies. Almost the entire German Naval Force outside South America was destroyed and Britain could safely claim she ruled the waters. In the near and Middle East the allied forces met with gradual success against the Turks. After some failures the Entente Powers achieved successes from the summer 1916 when the Arabs revolted against the Turks (T.E. Lawrence). But eventhough the Entente Powers did achieve some victories they were by no mean superior by the end of 1917. 51 THE LAST TWO YEARS, 1917-1918 Four dramatic events changed the course of the war in 1918. 1. THE ENTRY OF THE USA IN APRIL 1917 (2.4) - fresh troops and equipement on the western front. 2. TREATY OF BREST LITOVSK IN MARCH 1918 - The Bolshevistic Russia pulled out of the War and the Central Powers had a complete victory on the eastern front. 3. FROM MARCH 1918 GERMANY COULD SWING ALL HER FORCES INTO A GREAT WESTERN OFFENSIVE. 4. WHEN THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE HAD SPENT ITSELF BY THE MIDDLE OF THE SUMMER THE REINFORCED ALLIED ARMIES BEGAN DRIVE THE GERMANS BACK IN A RETREAT WHICH ENDED IN AN ARMISTICE IN NOV. 1918. 1. WHY DID USA JOIN THE ENTENTE POWERS IN THE WAR? In 1916 US President W. Wilson had been reelected while he had promise to keep his country out of the war. The 52 public opinion was against an intervention. The attitude switched due to some events; -While Germany was afraid that USA would join the war due to the German Submarine campaigns(on civil targets) the country started preparing itself on a war against USA. In Jan. 1917 the German foreign minister, Zimmerman, dispatched a telegram in code to the German minister in Mexico City in which he described his plans for stimulating a Mexican invasion across the Rio Grande in the event of the US entering the war. This message was intercepted by the British, decoded, and after being passed on to Washington, actually appeared in the American press.(Which proves that the US government also wanted to swing the attitudes of the antiinterventionists). -From february 1917 Germany embarked upon a unrestricetd submarine campaign. Any ship going in to a enemy port was regarded as enemytargets. This German campaign swung the American opinion around. (-One has to remember the fact that Germany had no direct contact with USA from the very start of the war due to the fact that Britain did cut off the German caples over the Atlantic. USA got their picture of the 53 European war mainly by Britain.) 54 2. Britain and France gained an ally in USA but lost their principal ally in the east; -After the Russian revolution in February the new temporary government promised to pull Russia out of the war (this was one of the main reasons to the spontanious revolution). BUT KERNSKIJS GOVERNMENT DIDN'T KEEP THIS PROMISE TO THEIR PEOPLE AND MADE A SECRET AGREEMENT WITH BRITAIN AND FRANCE TO CONTINUE THE WAR (Russia was promised vast landareas). This decision and the continuing misery resulted in the OCTOBERREVOLUTION during which Lenin and the Bolshevikr managed to seize the power. The communists rising popularity could be explained by their promises to the people - PEACE, BREAD AND LAND. After difficult negotiations with the Germans (and a division between different bolshevikleaders) the peace between the Central Powers and Russia was signed 55 on 3 MARCH 1918. A very favourable peace for Germany which the Russians didn't forget. The Allied representatives, inquired what possibilities there were of keeping Russia in the war. But as they wanted to get rid of the Bolsheviks this came to nothing. Besides, the British and the French had no troops to send. All they could offer was Japanese assictance in the Far East which only alarmed the Bolsheviks, while they knew that the Japanese were only interested to grab Russian territory for themselves. With the peacetreaty Russia lost all the conquests that the Tsars had made during the last two hundred years. THE BALTIC STATES, POLAND, EVEN THE UKRAINE, BECAME THEORETICALLY INDEPENDENT. In practice, they were added to the German Empire. 3. When the war on the eastern front ceased Germany could switch a vast number of troops to the western front for an ALL-OUT OFFENSIVE BEFORE THE ALLIES HAD BEEN TO STRONGLY REINFORCED BY THE NEW AMERICAN CONTINGENTS. But one has to remember that the Germans distrusted the Russians and German divisions remained on the eastern front - some to extract grain from the peasants, the rest as a precaution against the imaginary Red Army. 56 Actually although America's entry brought limitless recources to the Allied side this didn't take place at once but only in a comparetively distant future. The US had a great navy but virtually no army. Millions of men had to be conscripted and trained. There were few munition factories. Tanks, Guns and even rifles had to be supplied by the British and the French, not the other way around. The americans needed all their recources for themselves. Thus, America's entry into the war brought at first handicaps, not immediate aid. And this was something the Germans knew as well. Time was working against the Germans. The Allied blockade was causing grave shortages, more of industrial raw materials than of food. American troops were arriving in France in growing number. Austria-Hungary was creaking in at the joints. The Germans had no new weapons with which to mount an offensive. Nor had Ludendorff much superiority in men, even after the Germans brought over 52 divisions from the east front. The reinforced German army was quite succesful but although the allies suffered very numerous casualties so did the Germans. The allied lines were pushed back but they held. The last German offensive came on 15 July. (During the spring the first shells fell in Paris from 57 an enormous German gun, Big Bertha, 71 miles away. The Royal Air Force came into existence on 1 April 1918.) 4. Germany couldn't take this, at the end not very successful, offensive. The fighting spirit vanished while that decisive victory, so often promised, didn't arrive. (The Allied armies, on the other hand gained new confidence from each blow that was beaten off) There existed a growing discontent in Germany; widespread strikes and a mutiny among bored sailors at Kiel. The 8 August the Allies launched their very successful counterattack and from this time on the Germans were constantly on retreat (by now the Americans had joined as well). This shattered the faith in victory among the Germans. Now they only wanted to end the war. The 11 August Wilhelm II concluded that Germany was going towards defeat and the war had to be ended. By the end of September Bulgaria had surrendered, Turkey was under very heavy pressure and the Italian army had broken through the Austrian frontlines. On 29 September Ludendorff insisted that there must be an immediate armistice. He feared that the Allies would break through. This was due to the fact that Bulgaria had pulled out of the war the same day. Ludendorff imagined that an armistice would permit the 58 German armies to withdraw and then to stand on a more formidable defensive position in their own country. When the civilian ministers in the German government objected that the Allies would impose harsh terms on a 'militaristic' Germany, Ludendorff at once produced an solution; there must be an revolution from above. The German people learnt, much to their surprise that Germany had become a democratic country by order of the High Command (This way responsibility was passed on to the civilians as well, but fewe thought about this). Prince MAX VON BADEN, a prince with a liberal reputation, was appointed chancellor. Social Demokrats joined the government. Lundendorff and the other generals regarded this as window-dressing to deceive the Allies. But it didn't stop there. The Press was freed and the left-wing opponents of the war couldn't be silenced no longer. Meanwhile negotiations with Germany had begun. THE ARMISTICE WAS SIGNED 11.11.1918 AT 11 O'CLOCK. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY The situation in Austria had been very bad since 1917 when the country tried to start peacenegotiations, which failed. To break the Austrian resictance in 1918 the Allies 59 appealed to the different nationals, axcept the Germans and the Hungarians. THE CZECHS ASKED TO BE RECOGNIZED AS AN ALLIED NATION. Czech prisoners of war in Russia had been assembled in order to return home across Siberia and the Pacific. In the general confusion they organized their own legion, their own movement along the Trans-Siberian railway. At first the Bolsheviks regarded them with an friendly eye, then came to believe that they were secret agents for counter-revolution or Allied intervention. On May 14 Czechs and Hungarians quarrelled at the Siberian station of Chelyabinsk. The Czech legion won control. The Bolshevik Government, in alarm, ardered that the legion should be disarmed. Instead the Czech legion seized the entire railway from Samara to Irkutsk. With this the Czechs became heroes in the Allied eyes; representatives of a great democratic principle, yet also the spearhead of intervention against the Bolsheviks. Allied intervention in Russia could be presented as a move to rescue the Czechs and the Allies agreed on a Japanese intervention in Siberia. In this way the Allies got an other war on their hands before they had finished the first. The Czechs received their rewards. They were rcognized as a people 60 struggling to be free and a people who had established their right to their own state. This spelled doom to the Empire of the Habsburgs. It could survive loss of territory in the outposts, to Serbians or Rumanians but an independent Czechoslovakia cut out its heart. 61 EUROPE AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR The Peace Settlement The Peace conference assembled in Paris in January 1919, only two months after the fighting had stopped. The leaders of 32 countries, representing between them some 3/4 of the world's population. Nowhere more than in Paris, however, was the atmosphere charged with hatred of the Germans. Most of the advice which flooded over the peacemakers at the conference was 'to make Germany pay'. The French at least believed that one of the principal purposes of the conference was to humble Germany still further, and to complete its humiliation. The peacemakers had to re-draw the map of Europe, and to deal with other Central Powers as well as Germany; THEY AIMED TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS OF EVERLASTING PEACE. Nevertheless the statesmen felt the necessity to work quickly, partly because they needed to turn their attention to urgent problems at home. The peacesettlers had to deal with vast problems and they had to overcome divisions among themselves. Decisionmaking was confined to the victorious Allies (US, Britain, France, Italy and Japan) and the 62 conference was dominated by the COUNCIL OF TEN (2 members /each country). But the keyfigures, and the men who took many of the decisions in private discussions, were Pres. Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau, the French p.m. who presided over the conference. Lloyd George had been re-elected as p.m. at the end of 1918. Wartime propaganda and a heated election campaign, in which there was a talk of hanging the Kaiser. He had to support the peaceterms which would humble Germany. Both Wilson and Lloyd George had frequently to give way to Clemenceau who pointed out that the recent war had not been fought on American or British soil. Twice in his lifetime C. had seen German armies in France and he wanted to ensure that this wouldn't happen again. Clemenceau was backed up by Marshal Foch, allied commander in chief during the final stages of the war, who was present at the peacenegotiations and could be relied on to ensure that Clemenceau didn't moderate his stance. Similar sentiments inspired the Italians. Orlando, the p.m., was well aware that if he failed to deliver great territorial and economical gains he would be charged with betrayal by more extreme nationalist elements seeking to expand their political influence. PUBLIC OPINION IN THE ALLIED COUNTRIES One of the most important factors influencing the shape 63 of the peace settlement was the strength of popular feeling in Britain, Italy and, more particulary, the countries invaded by German troops during the war; France and Belgium. The popular press had developed during the war into a major influence on the formation of public opinion. With leading articles often presented in grossly oversimplified terms , it played its part in raising the temperature of attitude and debate. It also ensured that the peacemakers in Paris had to negotiate in the full glare of publicity, knowing that details of their discussions would be carried the next day in newspaper columns throughout the world. WARTIME TREATIES AND COMMITMENTS A lot of secret diplomatic agreements were made during the course of the war. When the full extent of the secret wartime diplomacy was revealed, and the beneficiaries called in their debts at the peace negotiations, much argument and bitterness ensued. italy was one such beneficiary. The price of the Italian warentry had been set up in the secret treaty of London, signed by all four nations on 26 April 1915. In addition to somewhat vague assurances that she would receive a 'just share' in any partition of the Ottoman Empire and further territory if Britain and France annexed any German colonies, Italy was promised sovereignity over 64 the Dodecanese islands and major territorial gains at the expence of the Habsburg Empire; to her north, the German speaking Alpine regions of Trentino and South Tyrol, and , across the Adriatic Sea, Istria and part of Dalmatia, both Slav-populated. If these specific promises materialized, almost a quarter of a million German speaking Austrians and well over a half a million Slavs and Turks would find themselves incorporated into the Italian kingdom. This would have threatened the establishment of a strong Serbia and a stable Albania. It would also run completely cuonter to any attempt to reorganize Europe after the war on lines of selfdetermination. Italian demands posed major problems for the peacemakers. The collapse of the Tsarist Russia saved Britain and France from even worse problems concerning wartimeagreements with Russia. IN 1915-1916 Britain had promised that Britain would recognize and support the independence of the Arabs on vast areas south of Turkey. Greece had entered the war in 1917. It was clearly going to be very difficult to reconcile Italian ambitions with those of France and Greece in the Far east, or to adjudicate (tilldöma) on the claims of Arabs and Jews in Palestine (in 1917 Balfour declaration promising a national home in 65 Palestine for the Jewish people). Japan, which entered the war in 1914, had last no time in seizing the German Pacific possessions north of the equator. However, the ruling warlord coalition in Peking, which itself declared war on Germany in August 1917, didn't accept Japanese claims on Chinese territory. THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES To WIlson, the outbeak of the war was tangible proof of the failure of traditional European diplomacy,based on balances of power, armed alliances and secret negotiations. What Wilson sought to construct was a more just and equitable system of international relations, based on PEACE TREATIES - SETTLEMENTS AFTER THE GREAT WAR EUROPE AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR The Peace Settlement 66 The Peace conference assembled in Paris in January 1919, only two months after the fighting had stopped. The leaders of 32 countries, representing between them some 3/4 of the world's population. Nowhere more than in Paris, however, was the atmosphere charged with hatred of the Germans. Most of the advice which flooded over the peacemakers at the conference was 'to make Germany pay'. The French at least believed that one of the principal purposes of the conference was to humble Germany still further, and to complete its humiliation. The peacemakers had to re-draw the map of Europe, and to deal with other Central Powers as well as Germany; THEY AIMED TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS OF EVERLASTING PEACE. Nevertheless the statesmen felt the necessity to work quickly, partly because they needed to turn their attention to urgent problems at home. The peacesettlers had to deal with vast problems and they had to overcome divisions among themselves. Decisionmaking was confined to the victorious Allies (US, Britain, France, Italy and Japan) and the conference was dominated by the COUNCIL OF TEN (2 members /each country). But the keyfigures, and the men who took many of the decisions in private discussions, were Pres. Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau, the French p.m. who presided over the conference. Lloyd George had been re-elected as p.m. at the end of 2 1918. Wartime propaganda and a heated election campaign, in which there was a talk of hanging the Kaiser. He had to support the peaceterms which would humble Germany. Both Wilson and Lloyd George had frequently to give way to Clemenceau who pointed out that the recent war had not been fought on American or British soil. Twice in his lifetime C. had seen German armies in France and he wanted to ensure that this wouldn't happen again. Clemenceau was backed up by Marshal Foch, allied commander in chief during the final stages of the war, who was present at the peacenegotiations and could be relied on to ensure that Clemenceau didn't moderate his stance. Similar sentiments inspired the Italians. Orlando, the p.m., was well aware that if he failed to deliver great territorial and economical gains he would be charged with betrayal by more extreme nationalist elements seeking to expand their political influence. PUBLIC OPINION IN THE ALLIED COUNTRIES One of the most important factors influencing the shape of the peace settlement was the strength of popular feeling in Britain, Italy and, more particulary, the countries invaded by German troops during the war; France and Belgium. The popular press had developed during the war into a major influence on the formation of public opinion. With leading articles often presented in grossly oversimplified terms , it played its part in raising the temperature of attitude and debate. It also ensured that the peacemakers in Paris had to negotiate in the full glare of publicity, knowing 3 that details of their discussions would be carried the next day in newspaper columns throughout the world. WARTIME TREATIES AND COMMITMENTS A lot of secret diplomatic agreements were made during the course of the war. When the full extent of the secret wartime diplomacy was revealed, and the beneficiaries called in their debts at the peace negotiations, much argument and bitterness ensued. italy was one such beneficiary. The price of the Italian warentry had been set up in the secret treaty of London, signed by all four nations on 26 April 1915. In addition to somewhat vague assurances that she would receive a 'just share' in any partition of the Ottoman Empire and further territory if Britain and France annexed any German colonies, Italy was promised sovereignity over the Dodecanese islands and major territorial gains at the expence of the Habsburg Empire; to her north, the German speaking Alpine regions of Trentino and South Tyrol, and , across the Adriatic Sea, Istria and part of Dalmatia, both Slav-populated. If these specific promises materialized, almost a quarter of a million German speaking Austrians and well over a half a million Slavs and Turks would find themselves incorporated into the Italian kingdom. This would have threatened the establishment of a strong Serbia and a stable Albania. It would also run completely cuonter to any attempt to reorganize Europe after the war on lines of selfdetermination. Italian demands posed major problems for the peacemakers. The collapse of the Tsarist Russia saved Britain and France 4 from even worse problems concerning wartime-agreements with Russia. IN 1915-1916 Britain had promised that Britain would recognize and support the independence of the Arabs on vast areas south of Turkey. Greece had entered the war in 1917. It was clearly going to be very difficult to reconcile Italian ambitions with those of France and Greece in the Far east, or to adjudicate (tilldöma) on the claims of Arabs and Jews in Palestine (in 1917 Balfour declaration promising a national home in Palestine for the Jewish people). Japan, which entered the war in 1914, had last no time in seizing the German Pacific possessions north of the equator. However, the ruling warlord coalition in Peking, which itself declared war on Germany in August 1917, didn't accept Japanese claims on Chinese territory. THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES 5 To WIlson, the outbeak of the war was tangible proof of the failure of traditional European diplomacy,based on balances of power, armed alliances and secret negotiations. What Wilson sought to construct was a more just and equitable system of international relations, based on clear principles of international law and centred on a universal association of nations working through agreed prodcedures to maintain world order. Wilson believed that the United states should take the lead in the creation of such a system - the extension of democracy throughout the World. When the 14 points were first outlined, German newspapers were scatching, denouncing them as hypocritical but as defeat loomed nearer the German tune changed. Wilson's peaceprogramme and general attitude appeared to promise some protection for Germany against punitive French and British demands. The Allies, on the other hand were far from happy with the 14-point programme. Lloyd George objecting in particular to point 2, which would rule out future naval blokades by Britain, and Clemenceau insisting that Germany's agreement to pay compensation ' for all the damages done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property' be written in. The USA med it clear however that unless the allies toed the line, she would conclude a separate peace with Germany. Wilson informed the Germans of the allied acceptance of his peaceprogramme with the addition of the two reservations. The armistice terms were severe onn Germany but not very harsh. Fear that Germany might be provoked to fight on, or 6 that she might be left to weak to cope with Bolshevikinspired uprisings saw to that. The blokade of Germany was to continue until peace terms had been settled and accepted. Even before the armistice had been signed, however, Wilson's position at the forthcoming peacecongress as the spokesman for American aims had been dealt a savage blow. The Republicans were victorious in the mid-term elections (nov. 1918) and won majority in both Houses of Congress. Since any peace treaty to which the United states was a party would require approval by 2/3 majority in the Senate (now Republican-controlled), the President's chances of gaining acceptance at home of any settlement he might negotiate on the basis of his 'Fourteen points' were seriously imperilled. Wilson no longer spoke authoritavely for his country. MAKING THE PEACE The French government urged that major issues should be trashed out privately between the 5 leading powers at sessions of the Supreme War Council. Wilson managed to ensure that, in the early stages of the conference, the smaller powers participated in a wide range of general discussions. However, as soon as the discussions switched to more contenious issues like the disposition of ex-German colonies and the territorial claims in Europe of allies such as Serbia, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and Denmark, the leading powers increasingly settled them by mutual negotiations and agreement, without reference to 7 plenary sessions of the conference. Disputed points were referred back to the Council of Ten or its successor, The Council of Four 'THE (Britain, USA, France and Italy). THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS At the insistence of President Wilson, this was the first issue dealt with at the peace conference. A commission was set up to draft a constitution for the new international organization. French attempts to fashion the League as a military alliance which could automatically be directed against potential aggressors failed completely. To work towards the establishment of a more peaceful international order, member states agreed to respect and preserve the 'territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League'. Wilson succesfully pressed for inclusion in the League covenant of extra clauses, 1) reaffirming the validity of international engagements or 'regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine., 2) member states could leave the League if they so wished after giving two years' notice, 3) stipulating that if disputes arose from domestic sources they could not be considered by the League. MILITARY AND NAVAL TERMS Disputes also arose over the naval and military terms of the peace settlement. Conserning the German Fleet the 8 germans solved the problem themselves by sinking their Fleet on 21.6.1919, whwn it had become clear that, whatever was decided, the ships would not be allowed to return to Germany. Germany was forbidden to possess submarines or naval aircraft in the future. The Navy was cut down to a minimum (max. 1500 officers). As the navy the army was also to be strictly limited and to be forbidden the use of tanks, military aircraft or heavy artillery. 100.000 in size and on a volunteer basis (no conscriptions). During the 1920s, allied commissioners repeatedly complained that Germany was not complying with the peaceterms relating to German disarmament. Germany replied that neither did the allies undergoing any disarmament, and therefore Germany should be allowed to re-arm. REPARATIONS No single issue caused more acrimony (bitterhet, hätskhet) at the peace talks than the question of reparation payments. Germany agreed to pay compensation for damage caused by German aggression 'by land, by sea and from the air'. But how was the damage to be assessed, and was Germany to pay for all of it. The French, who had taken huge loans themselves to cover the costs of fighting, expected that German finance would cover the costs of restoration of invaded territories and repayment of wardebts (one aim was also to keep Germany financially and economically weak). 9 This was not in Britain's long-term interests. Especially the economist J.M. Keynes pointed out that Britain's postwar economic recovery was crucially dependent on a general revival of trade. Before 1914 Germany had been one of Britains best customers and was needed as such again. A Germany heavily in debt to the allied powers would not be able to buy British goods in sufficient quantities. Lloyd George was in a dilemma; If Germany was only to pay for direct war damage caused, Britain would receive a very small part of the total payment. He succeeded in persuading his colleagues to include war pensions, and separation allowances (underhåll, traktamenten) and Britain was to receive a larger sum from Germany whos liability (ansvarsskyldighet) would be vastly increased. US tried to limit Germany's liability by basing it on her ability to pay. In pursuit of this aim John Foster Dulles (later to be heard of) proposed that a formula be adopted requiring Germany to admit a moral and theoretical responsibility for the entire cost of the war, while accepting an actual liability for only civilian damage. His formula was in corporated into the Treaty of Versailles as art. 231, which became known as the 'war guilt' clause. The cluse, more than any other in the entire Treaty, was to cause lasting resentment in Germany, but ironically it was inserted in order to provide a clear basis on which reparations could be exacted, and to limit the overall sum. Germany was in fact to be liable only for 'civilian damage', except in the case of Belgium which was to receive 10 from Germany her full war costs, because her invasion had been a violation of the treaties which in 1839 had guaranteed Belgian neutrality. The consequence of all conflicting pressures was that the exact total of reparations to be paid by Germany was not stated in the Treaty of Versailles. Instead a reperations Commission, comprisisng representatives of the leading allied powers+Belgium was established, to settle the figure after detailed consideration. The Germans angrily complained that they were beeing asked to sign a 'blanque cheque'. In fact the delay in naming the sum worked in Germany's advantage. in 1921, Germany's liability to pay was established at 6000million (30.000million-demand in 1919) Pounds, and even this sum was progressively reduced and payments recyckled to ease her burden. German nationalists made tremendous political capital out of the sums demanded, though the German nation succeeded in evading payment on anything but the most nominal level. At the same time, reparations wrangles and demands from the USA for repayment of wardebts set the allied powers at each other's throats, and was one of the most important faactors which drove them apart after 1919. VERDICT ON THE PEACE TREATIES The Treaty of Versailles was completed in great haste at the end of April, and handed to German representatives on 7 may. Few of its 440 clauses had not been subject of intense 11 bargaining and serious disagreement, and while it had been the original intention to invite the enemy delegates to join the confence when a preliminary peace settlement had been drawn up, the difficulties of reaching a settlement at all made this impossible. The Germans were given 15 days, later extended by a week, to comment on the Treaty, and this they did on great length. German objections reinforced growing feelings, particulary amongst the British, that the treaty was to harsh. Some critisized it for departing so radically from Wilson's 14 points (Keynes) while other thought that the over all effect were too much (Lloyd George). There was therefore an eleventhhour attempt by the British delegation to pess for modifications in response to the German objections. The demand for a plebiscite in Upper-Silesia was accepted but Wilson in particular took a strong stand against making changes at this late stage. The Treaty was signed 28.6.1919.clear principles of international law and centred on a universal association of nations working through agreed prodcedures to maintain world order. Wilson believed that the United states should take the lead in the creation of such a system - the extension of democracy throughout the World. When the 14 points were first outlined, German newspapers were scatching, denouncing them as hypocritical but as defeat loomed nearer the German tune changed. Wilson's peaceprogramme and general attitude appeared to promise some protection for Germany against punitive French and British demands. The Allies, on the other hand were far 12 from happy with the 14-point programme. Lloyd George objecting in particular to point 2, which would rule out future naval blokades by Britain, and Clemenceau insisting that Germany's agreement to pay compensation ' for all the damages done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property' be written in. The USA med it clear however that unless the allies toed the line, she would conclude a separate peace with Germany. Wilson informed the Germans of the allied acceptance of his peaceprogramme with the addition of the two reservations. The armistice terms were severe onn Germany but not very harsh. Fear that Germany might be provoked to fight on, or that she might be left to weak to cope with Bolshevikinspired uprisings saw to that. The blokade of Germany was to continue until peace terms had been settled and accepted. Even before the armistice had been signed, however, Wilson's position at the forthcoming peacecongress as the spokesman for American aims had been dealt a savage blow. The Republicans were victorious in the mid-term elections (nov. 1918) and won majority in both Houses of Congress. Since any peace treaty to which the United states was a party would require approval by 2/3 majority in the Senate (now Republican-controlled), the President's chances of gaining acceptance at home of any settlement he might negotiate on the basis of his 'Fourteen points' were seriously imperilled. Wilson no longer spoke authoritavely for his country. 13 MAKING THE PEACE The French government urged that major issues should be trashed out privately between the 5 leading powers at sessions of the Supreme War Council. Wilson managed to ensure that, in the early stages of the conference, the smaller powers participated in a wide range of general discussions. However, as soon as the discussions switched to more contenious issues like the disposition of ex-German colonies and the territorial claims in Europe of allies such as Serbia, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and Denmark, the leading powers increasingly settled them by mutual negotiations and agreement, without reference to plenary sessions of the conference. Disputed points were referred back to the Council of Ten or its successor, The Council of Four 'THE (Britain, USA, France and Italy). THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS At the insistence of President Wilson, this was the first issue dealt with at the peace conference. A commission was set up to draft a constitution for the new international organization. French attempts to fashion the League as a military alliance which could automatically be directed against potential aggressors failed completely. To work towards the establishment of a more peaceful international order, member states agreed to respect and preserve the 'territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League'. Wilson succesfully pressed for inclusion in the League covenant of 14 extra clauses, 1) reaffirming the validity of international engagements or 'regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine., 2) member states could leave the League if they so wished after giving two years' notice, 3) stipulating that if disputes arose from domestic sources they could not be considered by the League. MILITARY AND NAVAL TERMS Disputes also arose over the naval and military terms of the peace settlement. Conserning the German Fleet the germans solved the problem themselves by sinking their Fleet on 21.6.1919, whwn it had become clear that, whatever was decided, the ships would not be allowed to return to Germany. Germany was forbidden to possess submarines or naval aircraft in the future. The Navy was cut down to a minimum (max. 1500 officers). As the navy the army was also to be strictly limited and to be forbidden the use of tanks, military aircraft or heavy artillery. 100.000 in size and on a volunteer basis (no conscriptions). During the 1920s, allied commissioners repeatedly complained that Germany was not complying with the peaceterms relating to German disarmament. Germany replied that neither did the allies undergoing any disarmament, and therefore Germany should be allowed to re-arm. 15 REPARATIONS No single issue caused more acrimony (bitterhet, hätskhet) at the peace talks than the question of reparation payments. Germany agreed to pay compensation for damage caused by German aggression 'by land, by sea and from the air'. But how was the damage to be assessed, and was Germany to pay for all of it. The French, who had taken huge loans themselves to cover the costs of fighting, expected that German finance would cover the costs of restoration of invaded territories and repayment of wardebts (one aim was also to keep Germany financially and economically weak). This was not in Britain's long-term interests. Especially the economist J.M. Keynes pointed out that Britain's postwar economic recovery was crucially dependent on a general revival of trade. Before 1914 Germany had been one of Britains best customers and was needed as such again. A Germany heavily in debt to the allied powers would not be able to buy British goods in sufficient quantities. Lloyd George was in a dilemma; If Germany was only to pay for direct war damage caused, Britain would receive a very small part of the total payment. He succeeded in persuading his colleagues to include war pensions, and separation allowances (underhåll, traktamenten) and Britain was to receive a larger sum from Germany whos liability (ansvarsskyldighet) would be vastly increased. US tried to limit Germany's liability by basing it on her ability to pay. In pursuit of this aim John Foster Dulles 16 (later to be heard of) proposed that a formula be adopted requiring Germany to admit a moral and theoretical responsibility for the entire cost of the war, while accepting an actual liability for only civilian damage. His formula was in corporated into the Treaty of Versailles as art. 231, which became known as the 'war guilt' clause. The cluse, more than any other in the entire Treaty, was to cause lasting resentment in Germany, but ironically it was inserted in order to provide a clear basis on which reparations could be exacted, and to limit the overall sum. Germany was in fact to be liable only for 'civilian damage', except in the case of Belgium which was to receive from Germany her full war costs, because her invasion had been a violation of the treaties which in 1839 had guaranteed Belgian neutrality. The consequence of all conflicting pressures was that the exact total of reparations to be paid by Germany was not stated in the Treaty of Versailles. Instead a reperations Commission, comprisisng representatives of the leading allied powers+Belgium was established, to settle the figure after detailed consideration. The Germans angrily complained that they were beeing asked to sign a 'blanque cheque'. In fact the delay in naming the sum worked in Germany's advantage. in 1921, Germany's liability to pay was established at 6000million (30.000million-demand in 1919) Pounds, and even this sum was progressively reduced and payments recyckled to ease her burden. 17 German nationalists made tremendous political capital out of the sums demanded, though the German nation succeeded in evading payment on anything but the most nominal level. At the same time, reparations wrangles and demands from the USA for repayment of wardebts set the allied powers at each other's throats, and was one of the most important faactors which drove them apart after 1919. VERDICT ON THE PEACE TREATIES The Treaty of Versailles was completed in great haste at the end of April, and handed to German representatives on 7 may. Few of its 440 clauses had not been subject of intense bargaining and serious disagreement, and while it had been the original intention to invite the enemy delegates to join the confence when a preliminary peace settlement had been drawn up, the difficulties of reaching a settlement at all made this impossible. The Germans were given 15 days, later extended by a week, to comment on the Treaty, and this they did on great length. German objections reinforced growing feelings, particulary amongst the British, that the treaty was to harsh. Some critisized it for departing so radically from Wilson's 14 points (Keynes) while other thought that the over all effect were too much (Lloyd George). There was therefore an eleventhhour attempt by the British delegation to pess for modifications in response to the German objections. The demand for a plebiscite in Upper-Silesia was accepted but Wilson in particular took a strong stand against making changes at this late stage. The 18 Treaty was signed 28.6.1919. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, BULGARIA The signing of the Treaty og St Germaine-en-Laye with Austria followed on 10 September, and that of the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria on 27 November. The Treaty of Trianon with Hungary was not signed until 4 June 1920. While Bulgarian territorial losses were not great, the new state of Austria contained only a quarter of the area of the old, with only a fifth of the population - mainly concentrated in the capital, Vienna. She was to be limited to a volunteer army of 30.000 men and to 3 policeboats on the Danube. Hungary lost Transsylvania (3 million Magyars) to Romania. Yet, the main criticism against the unjustness of the treaties came from Germany. But the Treaty of Versailles was not excessively harsh on Germany, either territorially or economically. It deprived her of about 13½ % of her territory, about 13% of her economic productivity adn about 7 million of her inhabitants (just over 10%) as well as her colonies and large merchant vessels. However, the German people were expecting victory and not defeat - this made the treaty so hard to accept. Even before the Treaty was ratified in January 1920, Keynes had written a devasteting critique of the way the treaty had been negotiated, drawing attention in particular to the unworkability and undesirability of the reparationclauses. The publication of Keynes ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE in December 1919 fed growing hostility towards the 19 treaty in the United States, and both in November 1919 and in March 1920 United States senate failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles by the necessary 2/3 majority. Thus within a year of the peace conference, the victorious alliance which had defeated Germany and negotiated a set of peace terms had crumbled away. This critical collapse ensured that the Treaty of Versailles was never fully accepted or enforced. Negotiations at the peace conference exposed the divisions between the victorious powers and opened the rifts which widened and divided the powers seeking to uphold the peace settlement. KEEPING THE PEACE United States change of policy was confirmed in March 1920 when the US signed a separate peace treaty with Germany, and did not become a member of the League of Nations. The worst fears of French leaders were now relized. France's pre-war ally Russia no longer had a common border with Germany and was in the throes of civil war. The Bolsheviks were not likely to want to work with France to contain possible German expansion. France's wastime ally, Britain, was unwilling to gurantee military assistance in the event of unprovoked attack. United States was in the process detaching herself completely from the political life of Europe. France with her population (40 million) was to be left alone to face her German neighbour who had a population 20 approaching 70 million, and who still retained considerable economic and industrial strength which could provide the basis for future militayr aggression. In this situation France concluded military agremeents with Poland and Czechoslovakia aimed at the encirclement of Germany. France also refused to contemplate any measures of disarmament until the British government was prepared to offer some guarantees of military assistance. Without US support, however, the British government was reluctant to underwrite French security. At the same time both France and Britain faced serious challenges to hold on to their overseas possessions. France faced national challenges in North Africa, in Indo-China and Syria. Britain's trading interests were challenged by USA and also had to cope with rebellions in Ireland, Egypt and India (The dominions made demands for more independence, South Africa, Canada, Australia, Newe Zealand). A strict enforcement of the territorial settlement in Europe would reduce Britain's capacity to maintain a strong presence outside Europe. What was needed in Europe was as rapid a return as possible to pre-war political and economic stability, boosting Britain's trade prospects and freeing her from expensive political and military involvment. The means to this end was seen to lie not through strict enforcement of the treaty but through German acceptance of the main bulk of its terms. British political leaders argued that this could be secured only after 21 detailed discussions and revision of the more contentious (omtvistade) terms, in direct negotiations with the Germans. They tried to persuade the French to co-operate in this process, and to adopt policies which would appease Germany and ensure her co-operation in the achievement of stability in Europe. But post-war French leaders did not see the APPEASEMENT of Germany as a step on the road to the restoration of peace and stability in Europe. They feared that treaty revision would inevitably strengthen Germany and lead to her economic adn military domination of Europe, resulting in a German war of revenge, with the invasion and defeat of France as its prime objective. Britain and France were thus in total disagreement on the means through which lasting peace in Europe could be achieved, and on their policies towards Germany. THE RESULT WAS A SERIES OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS IN THEIR POLICIES TOWARDS EASTERN AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE, over the key issues of reparations, disarmament and security, and over the role and activities of the League of Nations. EASTERN AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE Unites States withdrawal from political involvement in post-war Europe made it extremely difficult for the allied powers to stabilize the situation in this part of Europe. It had already been apparent during the peace negotiations that the leading powers were unable to excert a decisive influence over the ambitions of the new east European 22 states, and beyond them raged a civil war in Russia. Allied intervention failed to overthrow the Bolshevik government, and allied military occupation of Constantinople provoked a national uprising in Turkey which challenged the newly established territorial settlement in the whole of the Near East. Polish nationalist ambitions spilled over into military confrontation with Galicians, Lithuanians and Bolshviks. In 1920, Polish forces advanced on Kiev in the Ukraine before being pushed back by Bolshevik troops almost to the gates of Warsaw. The frontier between Russia and Poland was not clearly demarcated until 1921 when, by the Treaty of Riga, some 3 million Russians were assigned to Polish rule. The line of demarcation could hardly be regarded as stable or secure - The Poles could feel the threat from both Russia and Germany. The new east European states were racially mixed amalgams of territories at very different stages of economic development, and the process of national unification was bound to be long and painful. United States finance and credit could have made major contribution to the stabilization of eastern and southeastern Europe. In its absence, the social and economic tensions within the new states kept them weak and sapped the foundations of the territorial settlement, leaving it open to challenge in the 1930s. The economies of the East European states were further strained by the considerable armies which were built up, 23 especially by the 'Little Entente' powers of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania and by Poland. Both Poland and her neighbour Czechoslovakia owed their existence to the military defeat of Germany and AustriaHungary and the collapse of Tsarist Russia. They both contained large concentrations of German-speaking inhabitants. Any increase in German economic or military strength could pose a serious threat to their very existence. Not surprisingly, therefore, these two east European states worked closely with France to ensure that, while the peace treaties were stricktly observed, particularly in relation to the disarmament of Germany, they could together mobilize armies totalling well over a million men. Many inter-war politicians, like Lloyd George, shared a belief that the new states of eastern Europe were unreliable and unstable. They might fall under Bolshevik influence. It seemed obvious that future German govenments would press for territorial modifications in the east, starting with the desire to ling East Prussia more closely with the rest of Germany, and no British government was prepared after 1919 to close the door to that possibility (Munich -38). Britain hoped to persuade France and her eastern allies to agree to peaceful territorial revision of the frontiers in eastern Europe in negotiations between Germany adn her neighbours. But such agreement was not forthcoming in the 1920s, and many British politicians therefore had some 24 sympathy with Nazi German leaders who argued, in the 1930s, that they were forced to seek territorial revision in the east by force, because peaceful revision through negotiated agreements had been blocked by the refusal of France and her eastern allies to enter into any discussions on the subject. British and French differences of attitude and policy in eastern Europe were repeated in the Near East. Britain backed the Greeks against the challenge from Mustapha Kemal's Turkish troops, while France came to a secret accomodation with the new nationalist regime at Ankara. (close to a military confrontation between Britain-France). The Anglo-French disunity could not have been more clearly revealed. It was the same story in the Middle and Far East. When Mussolini seized power in Italy it widened the gap Between Britain-France even more. CONCLUSION It wasn't the Depression alone that brought the European peace settlement crashing down in ruins. Nor can the peacetreaties themselves be blamed for the failure to secure a lasting peace in Europe. Those who negotiated the terms of the peace traties in 1919 did their best to construct a durable settlement, but they disagreed strongly on the means of achieving this outcome. They were grapping with the forces of nationalism and militarism unleashed by the First World War, and with severe economic dislocation. Any peace settlement framed in such circumstances was bound 25 to suffer from serious shortcomings. But the significant defect of the 1919 settlement didn't lie in its terms so much as in the total lack of agreement on how they should be applied, between those who pressed for gradual revision in order to secure the co-operation of the defeated powers and those who believed that peace could only be guaranteed by strict enforcement. Both Britain and France became increasingly frustrated at their inability to modify each other's attitudes and policies, and thus Germany was able to play off one former enemy against the other. By 1933 she had secured substantial revision of the Treaty of Versailles. The failure of the architects of the 1919 peace settlement to complete their work on an agreed basis in the decade after 1919 was one of the major factors contributing to the outbreak of war just 20 years later. 26